Tentative Ruling: Pasi A Puentes vs Ford Motor Company et al
Case Number
25CV01045
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Mon, 07/27/2026 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings
1. Motions to Compel (2); 2. Motion for Judgment on Pleadings
Tentative Ruling
Pasi A. Puentes v. Ford Motor Company, et al.
Case No. 25CV01045
Hearing Date: July 27, 2026
HEARING: (1) Motion of Defendant Ford Motor Company for Judgment on the Pleadings
(2) Motion of Defendant Ford Motor Company to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production and for Monetary Sanctions
(3) Motion of Defendant Ford Motor Company to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production and for Monetary Sanctions
ATTORNEYS: For Plaintiff Pasi A. Puentes: Larry Chae, Mani Arabi, Gregory Yu, Strategic Legal Practices
For Defendant Ford Motor Company: Elizabeth V. McNulty, Christopher Waldon, Evans Fears Schuttert McNulty Mickus
TENTATIVE RULING:
- The motion of defendant Ford Motor Company for judgment on the pleadings is denied.
- The motion of defendant Ford Motor Company to compel responses to requests for production and for monetary sanctions is denied.
- The motion of defendant Ford Motor Company to compel responses to special interrogatories and for monetary sanctions is denied.
Background:
On February 18, 2025, plaintiff Pasi A. Puentes initiated this action by filing a complaint against defendants Ford Motor Company (Ford) and Perry Ford of Santa Barbara (Perry) setting forth six causes of action for: (1) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (d); (2) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (b); (3) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (a)(3); (4) violation of Civil Code sections 1791.1, 1794, and 1795.5; (5) negligent repair; and (6) fraudulent inducement by concealment.
As alleged in the complaint: On December 31, 2017, plaintiff entered into a warranty contract with Ford regarding a 2018 Ford F150 (Vehicle), which was manufactured or distributed by Ford. (Compl., ¶ 7.) Defects and nonconformities to warranty manifested themselves within the applicable warranty period, including transmission defects, engine defects, and other defects and non-conformities. (Compl., ¶ 12.) Defendant Ford knew that vehicles equipped with the same 10-speed transmission as the Vehicle suffered from one or more transmission defects (Transmission Defects). (Compl., ¶ 67.) Ford knew that the transmission installed in the Vehicle was defective but failed to disclose this fact to plaintiff at the time of the sale and thereafter. (Compl., ¶ 66.) Had plaintiff known about the Transmission Defects or other defects, plaintiff would not have purchased the Vehicle. (Compl., ¶ 77.) Because of these defects, the Vehicle has no value. (Compl., ¶ 14.) Defendant Ford and its representatives have been unable to service or repair the Vehicle to conform to the applicable express warranties after a reasonable number of opportunities. (Compl., ¶ 40.) Plaintiff seeks to recover damages, penalties, attorney fees, and other relief. (Compl., p. 15.)
On May 9, 2025, Ford filed an answer to the complaint generally denying the allegations therein and setting forth 39 affirmative defenses. The court’s file does not reflect a responsive pleading by Perry, although service of summons was effectuated on Perry on April 11, 2025.
On April 1, 2026, Ford filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the first four causes of action in the complaint, arguing that the statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 871.21, subdivision (b), has run based on the allegations in the complaint. Plaintiff opposes this motion on the grounds that this statutory provision does not apply to plaintiff’s complaint.
On June 18, 2026, Ford filed a motion to compel responses to requests for production (RFPs) and a motion to compel responses to special interrogatories (SIs). Ford argues that plaintiff did not serve any responses or meet and confer. Although styled in the captions as motions to compel further responses, Ford’s motions seek to compel responses under the premise that no responses were served. Thus, Ford’s motions are motions to compel responses, rather than further responses. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.290, subd. (b), 2031.300, subd. (b).)
As to the RFP motion, Ford moves “for an Order compelling verified responses to Ford’s Request for Production of Documents … and for an award of sanctions in favor of Ford in the amount of $1,200.00.” (RFP Motion, p. 2, ll. 5-7.) The RFP motion “is made and based upon the fact that Plaintiff has failed to provide discovery responses to Defendant’s Request for Production propounded on him on March 18, 2026 and Plaintiff has not engaged in any meaningful attempts to resolve this matter without necessitating court intervention.” (RFP Motion, p. 2, ll. 8-12.)
Similarly, as to the SI motion, Ford moves “for an Order compelling verified responses to Ford’s Special Interrogatories … and for an award of sanctions in the amount of $1,200.00.” (SI Motion, p. 1, ll. 25-27.) The SI motion “is made and based upon the fact that Plaintiff has failed to provide discovery responses to Special Interrogatories propounded on him on March 18, 2026 and Plaintiff has not engaged in any meaningful attempts to resolve this matter without necessitating court intervention.” (SI Motion, p. 1., l. 28 – p. 2, l. 3.) Plaintiff opposes these two motions on the grounds that timely responses were served on April 21, albeit with objections only.
Analysis:
(1) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
“ ‘A judgment on the pleadings in favor of the defendant is appropriate when the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action. [Citation.] A motion for judgment on the pleadings is equivalent to a demurrer and is governed by the same … standard of review.’ [Citation.]” (Sepanossian v. National Ready Mixed Concrete Co. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 192, 199.) “Because the function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of a pleading as a matter of law, we … assume the truth of the allegations in the complaint, but do not assume the truth of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law. [Citation.] It is error for the trial court to sustain a demurrer if the plaintiff has stated a cause of action under any possible legal theory, and it is an abuse of discretion for the court to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if the plaintiff has shown there is a reasonable possibility a defect can be cured by amendment.” (California Logistics, Inc. v. State of California (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 242, 247). “The reviewing court gives the complaint a reasonable interpretation, and treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded.” (Payne v. National Collection Systems, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1037, 1043.) “[I]n ruling on a demurrer the trial court may take into account in addition to the complaint itself any matter that may be properly considered under the doctrine of judicial notice.” (Cruz v. County of Los Angeles (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 1131, 1133-1134.)
“[I]t is difficult for demurrers based on the statute of limitations to succeed because (1) trial and appellate courts treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded and (2) resolution of the statute of limitations issue can involve questions of fact. Furthermore, when the relevant facts are not clear such that the cause of action might be, but is not necessarily, time-barred, the demurrer will be overruled. [Citation.] Thus, for a demurrer based on the statute of limitations to be sustained, the untimeliness of the lawsuit must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint and matters judicially noticed.” (Schmier v. City of Berkeley (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 549, 554 (Schmier).)
Here, Ford seeks judgment on the pleadings as to the first, second, third, and fourth causes of action based on the statute of limitations set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 871.21, subdivision (b).
“(a) An action covered by Section 871.20 shall be commenced within one year after the expiration of the applicable express warranty.
“(b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), an action covered by Section 871.20 shall not be brought later than six years after the date of original delivery of the motor vehicle.
“(c) The time periods prescribed in subdivisions (a) and (b) shall be tolled as follows:
“(1) As provided by tolling requirements prescribed in subdivision (c) of Section 1793.22 of the Civil Code, as applicable.
“(2) For the time the motor vehicle is out of service by reason of repair for any nonconformity.
“(3) For the time period after a pre-suit notice is provided to the manufacturer in accordance with Section 871.24, which time period shall not exceed 60 days.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 871.21.)
Ford has the burden to demonstrate it is entitled to judgment on the pleadings. (Evid. Code, § 500.) Code of Civil Procedure section 871.21, subdivision (b), only “applies to an action, brought against a manufacturer who has elected under Section 871.29 to proceed under this chapter ….” (Code Civ. Proc., § 871.20, subd. (a).) Ford has not filed a request for judicial notice in support of this motion demonstrating when or if Ford made such an election pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 871.20, 871.29, or 871.30. Ford has made no citation demonstrating such election can be ascertained from the face of the complaint or any matter subject to judicial notice.
Ford submits a declaration by attorney Crhistopher Waldon stating that Ford made an election under Code of Civil Procedure sections 871.20 through 871.30 (New Lemon Law Procedures) on April 12, 2025. (Waldon Decl. ISO MJP, ¶ 6, Ex. 3.) However, this declaration is not part of the pleadings at issue. As noted, no request for judicial notice has been made by Ford in support of this motion. Ford has not established on the pleadings or by judicial notice that section 871.21, subdivision (b), applies to any claims in this action. Since Ford has not offered any other bases in support of its motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court will deny Ford’s motion.
Additionally, plaintiff argues that the statute of limitations in the New Lemon Law Procedures cannot be applied retroactively and the complaint was pending prior to Ford making any election under these statutory provisions. The court agrees. “[A] statute may be applied retroactively only if it contains express language of retroactivity or if other sources provide a clear and unavoidable implication that the Legislature intended retroactive application.” (McClung v. Employment Development Dept. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 467, 475.) This basic tenant of statutory law is applicable here. Section 871.21 and the related code sections in the New Lemon Law Procedures do not expressly indicate this new limitations period should be retroactively applied to actions pending at the time a manufacturer makes an election under this statute. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 871.20-871.30.) Ford has not cited the court to any source indicating a clear and unavoidable legislative intent for retroactive application of this statute to actions already pending when an election is made under this statute. The court has not independently located any such source. Assuming arguendo that Ford did opt in to the New Lemon Law Procedures on April 25, 2025, as declared by attorney Waldon, this action was filed by plaintiff on February 18, 2025. There is no basis for the court to retroactively apply the statute of limitations in the New Lemon Law Procedures to matters already pending at the time of an election, such as this action. The court will deny the motion on this additional basis.
Additionally, Ford’s motion is based on the delivery date of the Vehicle but cites no allegation in the complaint that establishes the date the Vehicle was delivered to plaintiff. (Motion, p. 3, ll. 6-13, p. 5, ll. 3-12.) The date of the warranty contract as alleged in the complaint is not necessarily the same date as the delivery date. (See Compl., ¶ 7.) For all these reasons, the first four causes of action are not clearly and affirmatively barred by the statute of limitations on the face of the complaint, attachments, and matters subject to judicial notice. (See Schmier, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 554.) For all these reasons, the court will deny the motion.
(2) Motions to Compel
Ford’s two motions to compel are based on the argument that plaintiff did not serve any responses to Ford’s first set of written discovery (RFPs and SIs) served on March 18, 2026. Ford argues the responses were due on April 21, 2026. Ford argues that it met and conferred by email on May 2, 2026, but plaintiff failed to respond. Ford’s motions seek an order compelling responses and for monetary sanctions.
Plaintiff submits evidence that plaintiff did serve timely responses to these RFPs and SIs on April 21, albeit with objections only, and that plaintiff previously produced responsive documents. (Declaration of Tyson Smith ISO Opp. to Ford SI Mtn., ¶¶ 3-6, Exs. A-D; Declaration of Tyson Smith ISO Opp. to Ford RFP Mtn., ¶¶ 3-6, Exs. A-D.) Plaintiff argues that Ford failed to meet and confer as required by statute. Plaintiff argues that Ford’s arguments are based on stated conclusions in Ford’s motions that are inaccurate.
Ford argues in reply that plaintiff served the discovery responses, consisting of objections only, on an attorney no longer with defense counsel’s firm and a nonexistent email address. “The party propounding interrogatories shall serve a copy of them on the party to whom the interrogatories are directed.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.080, subd. (a).) “A person represented by counsel, who has appeared in an action or proceeding, shall accept electronic service of a notice or document that may be served by mail, express mail, overnight delivery, or facsimile transmission.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1010.6, subd. (b)(2).) “Before first serving a represented person electronically, the person effecting service shall confirm the appropriate electronic service address for the counsel being served.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1010.6, subd. (b)(3).)
Here, the proofs of service indicate service of the April 21 responses on Ford attorneys, Elizabeth V. McNulty (SBN 192455), Joshua D. Cools (SBN 319531), and Colin P. Cronin (SBN 325644). (Declaration of Tyson Smith ISO Opp. to Ford SI Mtn., Ex. B at p. 66; Declaration of Tyson Smith ISO Opp. to Ford RFP Mtn., Ex. B at p. 43.) The court notes that attorney McNulty is listed as the first attorney on Ford’s answer, the motions to compel at issue in this hearing, and most if not all of the filings by Ford in this action. (See Ford SI Mtn., p. 1; Ford RFP Mtn., p. 1; Ford Answer, p. 1.) The email address for attorney McNulty on the proofs of service appears to be the same email address on these pleadings: emcnulty@efsmmlaw.com. Ford’s replies do not deny that these responses were served on attorney McNulty and received by attorney McNulty on April 21. (See Declaration of Brian J. Kim ISO Reply Re Ford SI Mtn., ¶¶ 2-3; Declaration of Brian J. Kim ISO Reply Re Ford RFP Mtn., ¶¶ 2-5.) Ford does not argue that this is not an appropriate email address for attorney McNulty.
Ford also argues in reply that plaintiff’s memorandum in opposition to the RFP motion was not properly served on Ford in compliance with the proof of service. However, Ford promptly downloaded these opposition papers from the court website when it recognized the issue. (Declaration of Brian J. Kim ISO Reply Re Ford RFP Mtn., ¶¶ 2-4.) Ford filed a timely reply and made extensive arguments as to the issues raised in plaintiff’s opposition papers. Under these circumstances, the court, in its discretion, will consider the opposition papers by plaintiff and Ford’s extensive reply.
After considering the arguments and evidence, as well as the stated grounds of the motions by Ford, the court agrees with plaintiff. The two bases for Ford’s discovery motions are (1) plaintiff did not serve any responses to the RFPs and SIs and (2) plaintiff did not properly meet and confer. (Ford RFP Motion, p. 2, ll. 5-12.; Ford SI Motion, p. 1, ll. 25 – p. 2, l. 3.) As discussed herein, Ford did not carry its burden of proof on these asserted grounds.
While it would have been preferable if plaintiff had served the April 21 responses on all of the Ford attorneys recently appearing in this action, plaintiff presented a declaration attaching responses and proofs of service on attorney McNulty by email on April 21. (Declaration of Tyson Smith ISO Opp. to Ford SI Mtn., ¶¶ 3-6, Exs. A-D; Declaration of Tyson Smith ISO Opp. to Ford RFP Mtn., ¶¶ 3-6, Exs. A-D.) “Except as otherwise provided by law, a party has the burden of proof as to each fact the existence or nonexistence of which is essential to the claim for relief or defense that he is asserting.” (Evid. Code, § 500.) Ford has not carried its burden to demonstrate that Plaintiff did not serve any timely responses. The evidence before the court shows that on April 21 plaintiff served timely responses to the RFPs and SIs, albeit objections only, on attorney McNulty, lead counsel for Ford in this action. The evidence shows that Ford received actual notice of these responses. It appears Ford’s two motions are based on an inaccurate premise.
Ford argues that it met and conferred with plaintiff by email on May 2, but this email does not comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 2016.040. “A meet and confer declaration in support of a motion shall state facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt, either in person, by telephone, or by videoconference, to informally resolve each issue presented by the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.040, subd. (a), italics added.) The May 2 email states: “Your client’s responses to Ford’s discovery requests (attached) are overdue. Please provide your client’s verified discovery responses immediately, failing which we will move to compel and seek sanctions.” (Declaration of Christopher J. Waldon, ¶ 5, Ex. 2.) The May 2 email sent by Ford was not in person, by telephone, or by videoconference, and did not propose any of these methods for a good faith conference.
Additionally, because responses were served, even if objections only, Ford was required to submit separate statements in support of its motions. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(a).) Ford did not do so. The court also declines to consider new arguments in reply about the sufficiency of these objection-only responses when the motions were not supported by separate statements or a proper meet and confer declaration despite Ford receiving notice of the April 21 responses. “A basic tenet of motion practice is that the notice of motion must state the grounds for the order being sought [citations], and courts generally may consider only the grounds stated in the notice of motion.” (Kinda v. Carpenter (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1277.) “The purpose of the notice requirements is to cause the moving party to sufficiently define the issues for the information and attention of the adverse party and the court.” (Ibid.)
In summary, Ford has not carried its burden to demonstrate that plaintiff did not serve any responses to the RFPs or SIs on or before April 21 or that plaintiff failed to meet plaintiff’s meet and confer obligations in response to Ford’s good faith meet and confer efforts. It appears neither party fulfilled their meet and confer obligations, but Ford has the burden of proof on these motions. For all the reasons stated herein, the court will deny Ford’s two motions to compel responses and for monetary sanctions.
The court requires the parties to comply with the Code of Civil Procedure as to discovery and any disputes pertaining to discovery. Plaintiff is ordered moving forward to confer with Ford’s counsel pertaining to electronic service and undertake best efforts to ensure outdated or invalid email addresses are not used in whole or in part for service. Plaintiff’s counsel should also take care not to utilize any outdated proofs of service that may contain opposing attorneys in prior actions associated with defense counsel’s firm that have not appeared in this action.