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Tentative Ruling: Pasi A. Puentes v. Ford Motor Company, et al

Case Number

25CV01045

Case Type

Civil Law & Motion

Hearing Date / Time

Mon, 06/15/2026 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion of Defendant Ford Motor Company for Summary Adjudication

Tentative Ruling

Pasi A. Puentes v. Ford Motor Company, et al.      

Case No. 25CV01045

           

Hearing Date:      June 15, 2026                                 

HEARING:              Motion of Defendant Ford Motor Company for Summary Adjudication

ATTORNEYS:        For Plaintiff Pasi A. Puentes: Larry Chae, Mani Arabi, Gregory Yu, Strategic Legal Practices

                                    For Defendant Ford Motor Company: Elizabeth V. McNulty, Christopher Waldon, Evans Fears Schuttert McNulty, Mickus

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion for summary adjudication by defendant Ford Motor Company is denied.

Background:

On February 18, 2025, plaintiff Pasi A. Puentes initiated this action by filing a complaint against defendants Ford Motor Company (Ford) and Perry Ford of Santa Barbara (Perry) setting forth six causes of action for: (1) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (d); (2) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (b); (3) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (a)(3); (4) violation of Civil Code sections 1791.1, 1794, and 1795.5; (5) negligent repair; and (6) fraudulent inducement by concealment.

As alleged in the complaint: On December 31, 2017, plaintiff entered into a warranty contract with Ford regarding a 2018 Ford F150 (Vehicle) which was manufactured or distributed by Ford. (Compl., ¶ 7.) Defects and nonconformities to warranty manifested themselves within the applicable warranty period, including transmission defects, engine defects, engine defects, among other defects and non-conformities. (Compl., ¶ 12.) Defendant Ford knew that vehicles equipped with the same 10-speed transmission as the Vehicle suffered from one or more transmission defects (Transmission Defects). (Compl., ¶ 67.) Ford knew that the transmission installed in the Vehicle was defective but failed to disclose this fact to plaintiff at the time of the sale and thereafter. (Compl., ¶ 66.) Had plaintiff known about the Transmission Defects or other defects, plaintiff would not have purchased the Vehicle. (Compl., ¶ 77.) Because of these defects, the Vehicle has no value. (Compl., ¶ 14.) Defendant Ford and its representatives have been unable to service or repair the Vehicle to conform to the applicable express warranties after a reasonable number of opportunities. (Compl., ¶ 40.) Plaintiff seeks to recover damages, penalties, attorney fees, and other relief. (Compl., p. 15.)

On May 9, 2025, Ford filed an answer to the complaint generally denying the allegations therein and setting forth 39 affirmative defenses. The court’s file does not reflect a responsive pleading by Perry although service of summons was effectuated on Perry on April 11, 2025.

On January 5, 2026, Ford filed a motion for summary adjudication as to plaintiff’s fifth cause of action for fraudulent inducement by concealment on the grounds there are no triable issues of fact and this cause of action is barred under Rattagan v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2024) 17Cal.5th 1. On March 17, 2026, the court continued this motion at the ex parte request of plaintiff to this hearing. Plaintiff opposes this motion.

Analysis:

(1)       Standard on Summary Adjudication

A defendant may move for summary judgment if the defendant contends the action against it has no merit. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a).) To obtain summary judgment, a defendant must show “there is no triable issue as to any material fact and [the defendant] is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Id., subd. (c).)

A defendant has “met that party’s burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) Once the defendant has met that burden, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff or cross-complainant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.) However, “[f]rom commencement to conclusion, the moving party bears the burden of persuasion that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 845 (Aguilar).)

“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).)

“The supporting papers shall include a separate statement setting forth plainly and concisely all material facts that the moving party contends are undisputed. Each of the material facts stated shall be followed by a reference to the supporting evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(1).) “ ‘Material facts’ are facts that relate to the cause of action, claim for damages, issue of duty, or affirmative defense that is the subject of the motion and that could make a difference in the disposition of the motion.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(a)(2).) “The separate statement should include only material facts and not any facts that are not pertinent to the disposition of the motion.” (Id., rule 3.1350(d)(2).) Litigants are to “[i]nclude only those facts which are truly material to the claims or defenses involved because the separate statement effectively concedes the materiality of whatever facts are included. Thus, if a triable issue is raised as to any of the facts in your separate statement, the motion must be denied! [Citation.]” (Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 252 (Nazir).)

(2)       Triable Issues as to Fact No. 5

Fact No. 5 submitted by Ford states, “[p]rior to purchasing the Subject Vehicle, Plaintiff … only read information about trucks in general online, but did not read anything specific about F-150 vehicles.” (Plaintiff’s Response to Ford’s Separate Statement, filed May 22, 2026 [Sep. Stat.], disputed Fact No. 5.) In support of this fact, Ford cites the transcript of plaintiff’s deposition at pages 29 and 30. (Ibid.)

The court has reviewed the deposition testimony cited by Ford. Ford’s counsel asked plaintiff several questions about what steps he took to gather information when plaintiff was shopping for a car in 2017. (Ford Compendium, Ex. 2 at p. 29, l. 21 – p. 30, l. 22.) Plaintiff described his efforts, including that he reviewed information from “multiple sources. Online, in print I guess technically would be also online with the publications, and then also seeing the vehicles in person. So talking with the dealers and seeing the vehicles and test driving.” (Ibid.) The testimony cited by Ford does not establish that plaintiff “only read information about trucks in general online” or “did not read anything specific about F-150 vehicles.” (Ibid.) The testimony expressly states that plaintiff’s efforts included “talking with dealers and seeing the vehicles and test driving.” (Ibid.)

Ford did not carry its burden to establish Fact No. 5 with admissible evidence. Moreover, plaintiff disputes Fact No. 5 and cites his declaration, which states that plaintiff did review information specific to Ford F-150 vehicles as well as discuss this model with dealership sales staff. (Sep. Stat., disputed Fact No. 5; Puentes Decl., ¶¶ 6-9.) There are triable issues of fact as to Fact No. 5.

 (3)      Triable Issues as to Fact No. 11

Fact No. 11 states, “[p]laintiff has no admissible evidence that any alleged ‘Transmission Defect’ creates unreasonably dangerous situations for consumers.” (Sep. Stat., disputed Fact No. 11.) Ford does not cite any evidence in support of this fact, and only refers to paragraph 67 of plaintiff’s complaint. (Ibid.) Plaintiff submits a declaration indicating that his Vehicle had recurring transition defects that caused loss of power and erratic shifting, and that Ford’s service agents could not repair them. (Puentes Decl., ¶¶ 10-11, 15-17, 20.) Plaintiff testifies that, “the transmission was slipping from 1st to 2nd gear when going downhill and I received a low voltage alert.” (Puentes Decl., ¶ 10.) “The loss of power and erratic shifting while driving create[d] a dangerous condition, particularly in traffic.” (Puentes Decl., ¶ 20.) Plaintiff testified to his own experiences with his Vehicle pertaining to the transmission issues, and this is sufficient to create a triable issue of fact. There are triable issues as to Fact No. 11.

(4)       Triable Issues as to Fraudulent Concealment – Economic Loss Rule and Rattagan

“[T]he elements of an action for fraud and deceit based on concealment are: (1) the defendant must have concealed or suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant must have been under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) the defendant must have intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) the plaintiff must have been unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff must have sustained damage.” (SCC Acquisitions Inc. v. Central Pacific Bank (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 859, 864.)

In the context of consumer allegations that a car manufacturer concealed known defects, a cause of action for fraudulent concealment/inducement is sufficiently alleged against the manufacturer where: “vehicles (including the one plaintiffs purchased) were defective; [manufacturer] knew of the defects and the hazards they posed; [manufacturer] had exclusive knowledge of the defects but intentionally concealed and failed to disclose that information; [manufacturer] intended to deceive plaintiffs by concealing known [defects]; plaintiffs would not have purchased the car if they had known of the defects; and plaintiffs suffered damages in the form of money paid to purchase the car.” (Dhital v. Nissan North America, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828, 844 (Dhital).)

Rattagan v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2024) 17 Cal.5th 1 (Rattagan), involved a case brought by a corporate attorney hired to assist in a ride-share platform in Argentina against the company that contracted with him to perform this work. (Rattagan, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 13-18.) Rattagan held in response to a certified question from United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that, “[a] plaintiff may assert a fraudulent concealment cause of action based on conduct occurring in the course of a contractual relationship if the elements of the claim can be established independently of the parties’ contractual rights and obligations, and the tortious conduct exposes the plaintiff to a risk of harm beyond the reasonable contemplation of the parties when they entered into the contract.” (Id. at p. 38.)

“The guiding and distinguishing principle is this. If the alleged breach is based on a failure to perform as the contract provides, and the parties reasonably anticipated and allocated the risks associated with the breach, the cause of action will generally sound only in contract because a breach deprives an injured party of a benefit it bargained for. However, if the contract reveals the consequences were not reasonably contemplated when the contract was entered and the duty to avoid causing such a harm has an independent statutory or public policy basis, exclusive of the contract, tort liability may lie.” (Rattagan, supra, 17 Cal.5th 1 at p. 27.)

Ford argues that the alleged concealment issues are within the scope of the contractual warranty dispute between the parties and there is no basis for an independent tort under Rattagan. The court has reviewed Fact Nos. 24 through 30, which Ford argues should result in adjudication in its favor under the economic loss rule and Rattagan. However, these facts, assuming arguendo they are supported by evidence as contended by Ford, do not establish that Ford is entitled to adjudication as a matter of law on the sixth cause of action for fraudulent concealment.

The concealment/inducement cause of action is based on conduct that occurred before the contract was completed that induced plaintiff to enter into this contract. (Puentes Decl., ¶¶ 6-9.) Plaintiff submits evidence that he did not reasonably contemplate that Ford and its agents were selling him a car with known transmission defects, rendering the Vehicle dangerous to operate. (Puentes Decl., ¶¶  9, 20.) The injury resulting from the alleged fraud is not the failure to repair the Vehicle under the warranty. Rather, the alleged injury is that plaintiff would not have purchased the Vehicle or entered into the warranty contract had plaintiff known he was being defrauded. (See ibid.) This alleged harm is independent of Ford’s contractual warranty obligations under these circumstances. (See Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 838-844; Rattagan, supra, 17 Cal.5th 1 at p. 27.) Ford has not demonstrated that the sixth cause of action is barred as a matter of law by the economic loss rule or the holding in Rattagan. The court finds there are triable issues of fact.

(5)       Request for Judicial Notice         

Plaintiff requests judicial notice of a number of documents pertaining to the alleged transmission defects at issue in this action. The court declines to take judicial notice of these materials because they are not pertinent to the disposition of this motion. “It is not sufficient that the evidence [subject to judicial notice] be relevant to an argument made by its proponent. The evidence must be relevant to the disposition of the matter.” (OneTaste Inc. v. Netflix, Inc. (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 174, 194.)

(6)       Evidentiary Objections

“[T]he court need rule only on those objections to evidence that it deems material to its disposition of the motion.” (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (q).) The court overrules the evidentiary objections asserted by Ford as to the portions of plaintiff’s declaration cited by the court in this ruling, including paragraphs 6 through 11, 15 through 17, and 20. (See Puentes Decl., ¶¶ 6-11, 15, 17.) The court has reviewed the other evidentiary objections submitted by Ford and does not find they are material to the disposition of this motion.

For all these reasons, the court will deny Ford’s motion for summary adjudication as to the sixth cause of action.

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