Sable Offshore Corp. and Pacific Pipeline Company v. California Coastal Commission

Case Number

25CV00974

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 02/18/2026 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

1) Motion for Reconsideration re Writ of Mandate; 2) Motion for Reconsideration re Preliminary Injunction and Stay of Cease and Desist Order; 3) Motion to Compel; 4) CMC

Tentative Ruling

For Plaintiffs and Petitioners Sable Offshore Corp. and Pacific Pipeline Company:

Jeffrey D. Dintzer, Garrett B. Stanton, Alston & Bird LLP; Trevor D. Large, Fauver, Large, Archbald & Spray LLP

                                   

For Defendant and Respondent California Coastal Commission: Rob Bonta, Norman N. Franklin, Wyatt E. Sloan-Tribe, Office of the California Attorney General

                    

RULING

1. For the reasons set forth herein, the motion of Petitioners for reconsideration of the Court’s ruling of October 15, 2025, as supplemented on December 3, 2025, on Petitioners’ first cause of action for issuance of a writ of mandate is denied in its entirety, including as to other prior rulings encompassed within that motion.

2. For the reasons set forth herein, the motion of Petitioners for reconsideration of the Court’s grant of a preliminary injunction by orders on May 28 and June 10, 2025, or for modification or dissolution of the preliminary injunction, and for reconsideration of the Court’s order of July 9, 2025, denying Petitioners’ motion to stay the cease and desist order of the California Coastal Commission, are denied on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction pending disposition of Petitioners’ appeal of preliminary injunction.

3. As for the Commission’s to-be-filed motion for judgment on the pleadings:

        A. The Motion to be filed by 3/18/26; set for hearing on 5/20/26 at 10 am.

       

        B. Response filed 4/22/26; and

       

         C. Reply filed 5/6/25.

4. The motion of Petitioners to compel the deposition of Cassidy Teufel will be continued to 5/20/26.

Background

This matter arises out of work done by Petitioners Sable Offshore Corp. (Sable OC) and Pacific Pipeline Company (PPC) (collectively, Sable or Petitioners) subject to the California Coastal Act of 1976 (Coastal Act, Pub. Resources Code, § 30000 et seq.).

The factual background is set forth in the Court’s ruling of October 15, 2025, which is incorporated herein by reference. Citations to the Administrative Record (AR) are in the form of “AR [page number(s)]” with leading zeros omitted.

On February 18, 2025, Sable filed its initial petition in this matter asserting four causes of action: (1) damages for inverse condemnation; (2) declaratory relief for impairment of vested rights; (3) declaratory relief for inverse condemnation; and (4) declaratory relief re Public Resources Code section 30803.

On March 10, 2025, Sable submitted a Statement of Defense to the Commission. (AR 1740-10165.)

The Commission set the matter for a formal administrative adjudication and, on March 28, 2025 issued its staff report and recommendation. (AR 117-205.)

On April 10, 2025, the Commission held a public hearing on its proposed enforcement orders against Sable. (AR 12973-13227.) At this hearing, Sable presented its defense. (Ibid.) At the conclusion of the hearing, following deliberation among the Commissioners, the Commission voted to issue three orders (collectively, the April 10 Orders): Cease and Desist Order No. CCC-25-CD-01 (CDO); Restoration Order No. CCC-25-RO-01 (RO); and Administrative Penalty No. CCC-25-AP3-01 (AP). (AR 12497-12522.) The AP provided an administrative penalty of $18,022,500. (AR 12501.)

Also on April 10, 2025, the Commission filed a demurer to Sable’s original complaint in this Court.

On April 16, 2025, Sable filed its FAP. The FAP asserts six causes of action: (1) for writ of traditional mandamus, or alternatively for administrative mandamus; (2) for declaratory relief; (3) for inverse condemnation; (4) for declaratory relief for impairment of vested rights; (5) for declaratory relief for inverse condemnation; and (6) for declaratory relief under Public Resources Code section 30803. The first cause of action seeks issuance of a writ of mandate to set aside the NOVs, EDCDOs, and April 10 orders.

Also on April 16, 2025, the Commission filed a cross-complaint against Sable asserting two causes of action: (1) equitable relief to restrain violation of a cease and desist order; and (2) for declaratory relief.

On May 15, 2025, the Commission filed its first amended cross-complaint (FACC) asserting five causes of action: (1) equitable relief to restrain violation of a cease and desist order; (2) equitable relief to restrain violation of a restoration order; (3) equitable relief to restrain violation of an administrative civil penalty order; (4) for declaratory relief for Sable’s violation of CDO CCC-25-CD-01; and (5) for declaratory relief for Sable’s violation of RO CCC-25-RO-01.

On May 16, 2025, the Commission made a motion to bifurcate and separately try the writ of mandate claims before the non-writ claims. Also on May 16, the Commission filed its demurrer to the FAP.

On May 28, 2025, the Court granted the Commission’s motion for issuance of a preliminary injunction. The Court entered its written order on June 10, 2025.

On June 16, 2025, Sable filed its demurrer to the FACC.

On June 18, 2025, the Court sustained, without leave to amend, the Commission’s demurrer to the sixth cause of action of the FAP and otherwise overruled the demurrer.

On July 9, 2025, the Court denied Sable’s motion to stay the Commission’s cease and desist order. Also on July 9, 2025, Sable filed its notice of appeal of the June 10, 2025, written order granting preliminary injunction.

On July 23, 2025, the Court overruled Sable’s demurrer to the FACC. The Court also granted the Commission’s motion to bifurcate. The Court set a briefing schedule for resolution of the writ claims on the administrative record.

On August 18, 2025, Sable filed its motion to compel the deposition of Commission Deputy Director Cassidy Teufel. The motion was originally noticed for hearing on October 22. The motion is opposed by the Commission.

On August 22, 2025, the parties stipulated to augment the AR by the addition of two exhibits.

On August 29, 2025, Sable filed its motion for writ of mandate on Sable’s first cause of action. The parties subsequently filed their respective briefs on the merits of Sable’s motion for writ of mandate.

On October 6, 2025, Sable filed its motion for leave to file a second amended complaint (SAC). The motion was opposed by the Commission.

On October 15, 2025, the Court addressed the merits of Sable’s motion for issuance of writ of mandate. The Court adopted its tentative ruling finding in favor of the Commission and against Sable on Sable’s first cause of action for issuance of a writ of mandate. The Court also rejected Sable’s request for a ruling at that hearing, taking up the matter at the hearing on December 3. The Court also continued Sable’s motion to compel to December 3 and noted that Sable’s motion for leave to file a SAC was also set for hearing on December 3.

On November 6, 2025, the Commission filed its motion for judgment on the pleadings seeking a judgment in its favor on its FACC. This motion was opposed by Sable.

On December 2, 2025, Sable filed a request to reopen the hearing on the writ of mandate to submit extra-record evidence. The Court formally denied this request on December 8, 2025.

On December 3, 2025, the Court made a number of rulings. The Court denied the Commission’s motion for judgment on the pleadings noting that the matters could not be resolved on the pleadings. The Court granted Sable’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint and to deem the Commission’s answer to the FAC to apply to the SAC, when filed, to deny all material allegations set forth in the amendments. The Court also continued the hearing on Sable’s motion to compel a deposition. The Court also supplemented and adopted its ruling of October 15 denying Sable’s petition for issuance of a writ of mandate. The Court requested that the parties provide further briefing on the manner in which to proceed to resolve the remaining claims.

On December 11, 2025, Sable filed its SAC.

On December 12, 2025, Sable filed motions: (1) for reconsideration of the Court’s ruling on the motion for writ of mandate, as well as orders of May 12 (motion to quash deposition), July 23 (bifurcation order), and August 27 (order on motion to compel); and (2) for reconsideration of the preliminary injunction and stay of cease and desist order. These motions are opposed by the Commission.

Hearing on all pending motions were continued by stipulation and order to this hearing of February 18. The parties have also filed briefs in response to the Court’s request concerning the manner of moving forward.

Analysis

(1)       Reconsideration of Motion for Writ of Mandate

Sable moves for reconsideration of the Court’s ruling on their motion for writ of mandate, and certain prior orders, on the grounds that Sable seeks to present extra-record evidence in support of its motion, which evidence was not presented in connection with the Court’s ruling on October 15 and December 3, 2025. The Commission argues that the motion is procedurally and substantively improper.

Sable’s basis for this motion is: “Although the Court denied the Commission’s Motion for Protective Order seeking to prevent discovery, the Court has not yet allowed for Plaintiffs to take discovery, as it previously bifurcated Plaintiffs’ writ claims from its declaratory relief and inverse condemnation claims and did not allow any extra-record evidence to be presented with Plaintiffs’ Motion for Writ of Mandate.” (Dintzer decl., ¶ 6.) “Prior to the administrative hearing on the Commissions’ April 10 Orders, Plaintiffs were unable, despite reasonable diligence, to obtain certain, additional evidence that will be helpful to demonstrate the Commission’s April 10 Orders were unlawfully issued. Plaintiffs can only obtain such evidence through discovery by requiring the Commission provide verified discovery responses and statements under oath at deposition or at trial.” (Dintzer decl., ¶ 7.)

The Court stated in making its December 3, 2025, addition to its October 15 order:

“In response to the Court’s tentative ruling for the October 15, 2025, hearing, Sable argued that the Court applied the wrong standard. In particular, Sable argued that the proper standard is independent judgment. (Sable Response, filed Oct. 15, 2025, pp. 2-3.) Sable did not make this argument in either its opening trial brief or in its reply. (Sable Opening Trial Brief, p. 8 [setting forth standard of review]; Sable Reply Trial Brief, p. 6 & fn. 1 [arguing that issues are jurisdiction and authorization].) This issue was therefore not expressly addressed in the Court’s October 15 written ruling.

“To address Sable’s response, the Court supplements its October 15, 2025, ruling on the first cause of action of Sable’s FAC as follows:

“Alternatively, upon a review of the administrative record and the arguments of the parties and upon the exercise of the Court’s independent judgment, the Court agrees with and adopts as its own the factual findings of the Commission in issuing the April 10 Orders. Based on those factual findings and the analysis set forth in the October 15, 2025, ruling, on this alternative basis, the Court concludes that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in issuing the April 10 Orders and that in all other respects Sable has failed to meet its burden as to the first cause of action for issuance of a writ of mandate. On this alternative basis, the petition for administrative mandate as set forth in the first cause of action is denied.” (Minute Order, filed Dec. 3, 2025, at p. 9.)

As indicated in the October 15 ruling and emphasized again in the December 3 ruling, the Court has reviewed the entire, extensive administrative record and the respective arguments of the parties. Based upon this review, the Court has reached the same factual conclusions on the administrative record whether applying the standard of substantial evidence or the standard of independent judgment. The December 3 supplemental text was intended to confirm this point given Sable’s late assertion that the Court applied the wrong standard in reaching its conclusions. By including this alternative determination, the Court does not imply that the Court has determined that independent judgment review is proper; the Court provided this alternative determination to avoid any suggestion that the underlying factual determinations depend upon the standard of review because the Court reaches the same factual determinations under independent review.

In making this motion, Sable argues that the independent judgment standard requires not only that the Court reweigh the evidence but that the Court consider extra-record evidence beyond the administrative record. In support of this proposition, Sable cites, among other cases, Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130 (Bixby) and Benetatos v. City of Los Angeles (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1270 (Benetatos).

In Bixby, the Plaintiffs sought an administrative writ of mandate to compel the Commissioner of Corporations to set aside a decision approving a recapitalization plan submitted by the corporate real party in interest. (Bixby, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 134.) The trial Court denied the petition applying a substantial evidence standard and finding no abuse of discretion. (Id. at pp. 136-137.) On review in the California Supreme Court, the Bixby Court stated:

“By carefully scrutinizing administrative decisions which substantially affect vested, fundamental rights, the Courts of California have undertaken to protect such rights, and particularly the right to practice one’s trade or profession, from untoward intrusions by the massive apparatus of government. If the decision of an administrative agency will substantially affect such a right, the trial Court not only examines the administrative record for errors of law but also exercises its independent judgment upon the evidence disclosed in a limited trial de novo. [¶] If the administrative decision does not involve, or substantially affect, any fundamental vested right, the trial Court must still review the entire administrative record to determine whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the agency committed any errors of law, but the trial Court need not look beyond that whole record of the administrative proceedings.” (Bixby, supra, 4 Cal.3d at pp. 143–144, fns. omitted.)

In Benetatos, the Plaintiff owners of a fast food restaurant sought an administrative writ of mandate to overturn the decision of the City of Los Angeles that the operation of the restaurant constituted a nuisance and imposing conditions on the continued operation of the restaurant. (Benetatos, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 1272.) The trial Court denied the petition. (Id. at pp. 1279-1280.) On appeal, the Plaintiffs argued that the Court should have reviewed the matter under the independent judgment standard. (Id. at p. 1280.) Affirming the trial Court’s judgment, the Court stated:

“Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, there are two alternative standards of review that a trial Court uses to review a petition for writ of administrative mandamus. [Citation.] ‘If the administrative decision involved or substantially affected a “fundamental vested right,” the superior Court exercises its independent judgment upon the evidence disclosed in a limited trial de novo in which the Court must examine the administrative record for errors of law and exercise its independent judgment upon the evidence. [Citations.]’ [Citations.] ‘Where no fundamental vested right is involved, the superior Court’s review is limited to examining the administrative record to determine whether the adjudicatory decision and its findings are supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Benetatos, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 1280.)

“ ‘The substantial evidence test has been applied to review administrative decisions that restrict a property owner’s return on his property, or which increase the cost of doing business, or reduce profits, because such decisions impact mere economic interests rather than fundamental vested rights. [Citations.] [¶] In contrast, the independent judgment test is applied to review administrative decisions that will drive an owner out of business or significantly injure the business’s ability to function. [Citations.]’ [Citations.] As one authority has said, ‘When a case involves purely economic interests (e.g., administrative decisions that result in restrictions on a property owner’s return on property, increases in the cost of doing business, or reductions in profits), Courts are far less likely to find a fundamental vested right.’ [Citations.]” (Benetatos, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 1281.)

While both Bixby and Benetatos address when the two different standards are applied, neither directly addresses the issue of the scope of the record to be addressed under the respective standard of review.

This petition is brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, which provides in part:

“Where the Court finds that there is relevant evidence that, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, could not have been produced or that was improperly excluded at the hearing before Respondent, it may enter judgment as provided in subdivision (f) remanding the case to be reconsidered in the light of that evidence; or, in cases in which the Court is authorized by law to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence, the Court may admit the evidence at the hearing on the writ without remanding the case.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (e).)

The California Supreme Court addressed section 1094.5, subdivision (e) in Voices of the Wetlands v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 499 (Voices):

“[W]e are persuaded that section 1094.5, subdivision (e) is not intended to prevent the Court, upon finding that the administrative record itself lacks evidence sufficient to support the agency’s decision, from remanding for consideration of additional evidence. A more reasonable interpretation, which fully honors the statutory language, is that subdivision (e) simply prevents a mandamus Petitioner from challenging an agency decision that is supported by the administrative record on the basis of evidence, presented to the Court, which could have been, but was not, presented to the administrative body.

“This interpretation adheres most closely to the literal words of section 1094.5, subdivision (e). As noted, the subdivision provides that when the Court determines there ‘is relevant evidence’ meeting the statutory criteria, it may remand to the agency for consideration of ‘that evidence,’ or, in cases where the Court is authorized to weigh the evidence independently, the Court may ‘admit the evidence’ [(italics in original)] in the judicial proceeding itself. Read most naturally, this language contemplates a situation in which a party to the mandamus action has actually proffered to the Court specific evidence not included in the administrative record. Subdivision (e) provides that the Court may remand for agency consideration of such evidence, or may consider the evidence itself, only if that evidence could not reasonably have been presented, or was improperly excluded, at the administrative proceeding.

“Thus, subdivision (e) of section 1094.5 merely confirms that while, in most cases, the Court is limited to the face of the administrative record in deciding whether the agency’s decision is valid as it stands, in fairness, the Court may consider, or may permit the agency to consider, extra-record evidence for a contrary outcome, if persuaded that such evidence was not available, or was improperly excluded, at the original agency proceeding.” (Voices, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 532, italics added.)

Thus, under Voices, the Court is generally limited to the administrative record whether the standard is substantial evidence or independent judgment, and extra-record evidence is considered by augmentation of the record. “Augmentation of the administrative record is permitted only within the strict limits set forth in section 1094.5, subdivision (e) …. In the absence of a proper preliminary foundation showing that one of the exceptions noted in section 1094.5, subdivision (e) applies, it is error for the Court to permit the record to be augmented.” (Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center v. Superior Court (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 93, 101.)

Here, the administrative record includes a substantial presentation by Sable at the administrative hearing before the Commission on the relevant issues. (AR 12973-13227.) As explained at length in the October 15 order, the writ petition is fundamentally based upon a disagreement as to whether the pipeline work conducted by Sable prior to the administrative hearing was authorized by the prior coastal development permits, and correspondingly, whether the Commission had the authority to assert that the work was beyond the scope of such permits.

In making this motion for reconsideration, Sable asserts that “certain evidence” could not have been presented without describing the nature of such evidence, only stating that such evidence can only be obtained through discovery. (Dintzer decl., ¶ 7.) Sable does not connect this “certain evidence” to the issues underlying the administrative hearing and does not show how this certain evidence bears upon the relevant issues.

“When an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a Court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or Court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. The party making the application shall state by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (a).)

Sable does not provide any new or different facts, circumstances, or law to support this motion for reconsideration. Sable only provides speculation that it may discover such new or different facts. Sable has not met its burden for the Court to reconsider its ruling on the merits of its cause of action for issuance of a writ of mandate. The Court has also considered the evidence and arguments presented and declines to reconsider its ruling on its own motion. (See Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1096–1097.)

Sable’s motion for reconsideration of the Court’s rulings of May 12, July 23, and August 27, 2025, are untimely and derivative of Sable’s motion for reconsideration of the October 15, 2025, ruling. The motion is denied as to such additional motions as well.

(2)       Motion for Reconsideration of Grant of Preliminary Injunction and Stay of Cease and Desist Order

The Court granted the Commission’s motion for preliminary injunction by written order filed on June 10, 2025. On July 9, 2025, Sable filed its notice of appeal of this order. This appeal remains pending.

The Court has been required on prior occasions to address the effect of this appeal on the Court’s jurisdiction to proceed.

“As a general rule, ‘the perfecting of an appeal stays proceedings in the trial Court upon the judgment or order appealed from ....’ [Citation.] Thus, generally, the taking of an appeal by the filing of the notice of appeal deprives the trial Court of jurisdiction of the cause and vests jurisdiction with the appellate Court until issuance of a remittitur by the reviewing Court. [Citations.] When the remittitur issues, the jurisdiction of the appellate Court terminates, and the jurisdiction of the trial Court reattaches.” (Andrisani v. Saugus Colony Limited (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 517, 523.)

In ruling on the merits of the petition for writ cause of action, the Court addressed the jurisdiction of the Court to do so. The Court concluded that it had jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the case:

“An appeal from an injunction pendente lite does not affect the power of the Court to hear and decide the case on the merits, even though some of the same issues as were involved in the injunction pendente lite were disposed of by the later judgment.” (Nomm v. Nomm (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 663, 664; accord, Doudell v. Shoo (1911) 159 Cal. 448, 455 [appeal of temporary injunction “did not operate to deprive the Court of power to proceed to a final hearing of the case”]; In re Marriage of Tim & Wong (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1049, 1053; see also Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 191 [appeal of denial of preliminary injunction does not stay trial Court proceedings on the merits].)

Before this discussion, the Court raised the question of whether it had jurisdiction to rule on the preliminary injunction itself when the Court’s denial of a temporary restraining order was on appeal. The Court of Appeal resolved that issue specific to this case as discussed in the order granting the preliminary injunction. However, the Court’s inquiry into this jurisdictional question now has been again triggered by the problem presented in this motion for reconsideration, whether considered as a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008 or under section 533:

“Except as provided in Sections 917.1 to 917.10, inclusive, and in Section 116.810, the perfecting of an appeal stays proceedings in the trial Court upon the judgment or order appealed from or upon the matters embraced therein or affected thereby, including enforcement of the judgment or order, but the trial Court may proceed upon any other matter embraced in the action and not affected by the judgment or order.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 916, subd. (a).)

The “order appealed from” is the preliminary injunction that is subject of this motion to dissolve on reconsideration.

“[W]here a preliminary injunction has been appealed to the Court of Appeal, the trial Court is without jurisdiction to modify or dissolve the preliminary injunction during pendency of its appeal.” (Waremart Foods v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local 588 (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 145, 154.)

This Court is therefore without jurisdiction to reconsider, modify, or dissolve the preliminary injunction now on appeal.

Also subject to this motion for reconsideration is the Court’s July 9, 2025, order denying Sable’s motion to stay the cease and desist order. The Court’s ruling on July 9, 2025, includes the following:

“There is some tension between subdivisions (a) and (b) of [Pub. Resources Code] section 30803. Each subdivision authorizes a complementary motion to the other, but each applies somewhat different standards. In the context of this motion, the granting of a motion to enjoin violation of a cease and desist order is directly contrary to a motion to stay enforcement of the same cease and desist order.

Sable argues that this tension is resolved by considering its motion here, under subdivision (b), separately from the Commission’s motion under subdivision (a). Resolving the tension in that way, however, leads to a resolution that depends on whose motion is heard first: Here, Sable argues that finding in its favor on its motion under subdivision (b) would properly lead to the dissolution of the preliminary injunction issued under subdivision (a). However, by the same reasoning, if the Court had first issued a stay of the cease and desist order, the Commission would be entitled to bring a motion under subdivision (a), applying the standards only of subdivision (a), and have a preliminary injunction issued that would properly lead to the dissolution of the stay issued under subdivision (b). Because the clear purpose of the Coastal Act is the protection of the coastal environment while allowing permitted coastal development, the issuance of a preliminary injunction or of a stay of a cease and desist order should not depend upon which party brought which motion first.

“The principle set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 533 resolves this tension as it applies in the current context. Section 533 codifies the inherent powers of Courts to modify or to dissolve preliminary injunctions ‘when the circumstances and situation of the parties have so changed as to render such action just and equitable. This inherent power … may be exercised either where there has been a change in the controlling facts upon which the injunction rested, or the law has been changed, modified or extended, or where there the ends of justice would be served by modification.’ [Citations.] Section 533 neither permits nor encourages successive

motions where the facts, law, and circumstances are unchanged from the Court’s granting of the preliminary injunction.

“As the Court noted in ruling on the Commission’s motion, Sable could have, but did not, bring its motion for a stay at that time. Sable instead strategically waited until after the Court ruled on the Commission’s motion to bring this motion and to present its evidence in full. (Motion, at p. 8, fn. 1 [‘Plaintiffs did not file any opposition to the application for preliminary injunction or a previous motion to stay because it was our mistaken belief that the Court had enough evidence and argument to deny the preliminary injunction and did not wish for Plaintiffs to file additional papers.’].)” (Minute Order, filed July 9, 2025, at pp. 5-6.)

Thus, in resolving the motion to stay, the Court determined that the motion to stay was inextricably intertwined with the Court’s determination of the preliminary injunction. In particular, Sable argued that granting the stay required dissolution of the preliminary injunction. Under these circumstances, it is clear that the Court’s prior determination to deny the stay constitutes “matters embraced therein or affected thereby” vis-à-vis the preliminary injunction. For the same reason, the Court concludes that, pending disposition of the appeal of the preliminary injunction, it is without jurisdiction to reconsider its ruling on the denial of the motion to stay.

(3)       Moving Forward

In response to the Court’s request, the parties have filed briefs as to their positions on how to resolve the remaining issues. Sable asserts that there remain issues for adjudication as to Sable’s declaratory relief and inverse condemnation causes of action that are not resolved by the Court’s determination of the writ of mandate cause of action. Following this position, Sable asserts that the matter would need to be resolved by an evidence-based motion for summary judgment/ summary adjudication or by trial. Prior to such an evidence-based determination, Sable seeks to fully open discovery. The Commission asserts otherwise, arguing that Sable’s claims are foreclosed by the Court’s denial of Sable’s petition for writ. The Commission suggests that it file a motion for judgment on Sable’s SAC and another motion for judgment on the Commission’s FACC.

The Court notes that it has already ruled on a motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the Commission’s FACC. The Court determined that, at a minimum, there are remedial issues that require resolution before the Court can issue a judgment. Consequently, the Court does not find that a further motion from the Commission on those claims would be helpful at this time. However, a motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Sable’s SAC would be an appropriate procedural vehicle regardless of how that motion is resolved. If the motion is resolved in favor of the Commission, then these causes of action would be fully resolved. If the motion is resolved in favor of Sable, the resolution of the motion should provide a framework for the factual issues to be resolved at trial (and for which discovery would be appropriate).

The Court will therefore instruct the Commission to file a motion for judgment on the pleadings to address remaining claims in Sable’s SAC. In addressing such a motion, the Court raises the following additional issues:

The claims asserted by Sable in its FAC (and continued in the SAC) relate specifically to the April 10 Orders. (See, e.g., SAC, ¶ 2 [“This action challenges the Coastal Commission’s issuance of Notice of Violation ….”].) In anticipation of this hearing, the Court requested that Sable state what activity (both Sable’s work and the Commission’s orders—contemplated, occurring, or completed) is the basis for Sable’s claim and an explanation of how this activity is different from activity upon which the April 10 Orders were based. (Minute Order, filed Dec., 3, 2025, p. 12.) Sable responded by stating that “[t]he rights and responsibilities between, Plaintiff, the Commission and the County of Santa Barbara, as it relates to future pipeline repair and maintenance is central to Sable’s remaining claims.” (Stable Statement re Issues Pending, at p. 4.) Sable further states that the Court’s ruling “fails to provide any forward-looking clarity to Plaintiffs’ vested rights under the CDPs and their ability to conduct repair and maintenance activities on the pipelines that may differ in scope from prior repair activities (such as the number of repairs being performed over a limited period of time).” (Ibid.) From Sable’s discussion of this issue in its filings in response to the Court’s request, it does not appear that Sable seeks adjudication over any particular proposed action or activity, but instead seeks a broader adjudication of rights and duties.

The Court requests the parties to address the following in the briefing and context of the Commission’s motion for judgment on the pleadings:

1.         To the extent Sable seeks adjudication of a specific proposed action or type of action, what is the role, if any, of a further administrative proceeding (e.g., a request for a CDP) in that adjudication? Put differently, must Sable exhaust administrative remedies to obtain a judicial determination?

2.         To the extent Sable seeks an adjudication other than of a specific proposed action or type of action, is such a requested adjudication beyond the scope of declaratory relief as hypothetical or speculative?

(4)       Motion to Compel

The Court will continue the motion to compel the deposition of Cassidy Teufel to the same hearing date as the Commission’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.