Sable Offshore Corp. and Pacific Pipeline Company v. California Coastal Commission

Case Number

25CV00974

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 12/03/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

1) Motion for for Judgment on the Pleadings as to its First Amended Cross-Complaint; 2) Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint; 3) Motion to Compel Deposition

Tentative Ruling

For Plaintiffs and Petitioners Sable Offshore Corp. and Pacific Pipeline Company: Jeffrey D. Dintzer, Garrett B. Stanton, Daniel G. Seabolt, Alston & Bird LLP; Trevor D. Large, Fauver, Large, Archbald & Spray LLP

                                   

For Defendant and Respondent California Coastal Commission: Rob Bonta, Norman N. Franklin, Wyatt E. Sloan-Tribe, Office of the California Attorney General

RULING

(1) For the reasons set forth herein, the motion of cross-complainant California Coastal Commission for judgment on the pleadings as to its first amended cross complaint is denied.

(2) For the reasons set forth herein, the motion of Plaintiffs for leave to file a second amended complaint is granted, with the following qualifications: (i) The sustaining of the demurrer of Defendant California Coastal Commission to the sixth cause of action of the first amended complaint, without leave to amend, is deemed to apply to the sixth cause of action of the second amended complaint; and (ii) the answer of the Commission to the first amended complaint is deemed to apply to the second amended complaint and the Commission is deemed to deny all material allegations of the amendments to the first amended complaint contained within the second amended complaint (so no new answer is required to be filed).

Plaintiffs shall file and serve a clean copy of the second amended complaint, substantially in the form attached to the motion, on or before December 10, 2025.

(3) The Court requests further briefing as set forth herein. Sable shall file and serve its brief re further issues on or before December 17, 2025. The Commission shall file and serve its response brief on or before January 14, 2025. Plaintiffs shall file and serve its reply brief on or before January 21, 2026. The Court sets a hearing on the further issues/ case management conference for January 21, 2026, at 10:00 a.m.

(4) Plaintiffs’ motion to compel is continued to January 21, 2026.

Background

As alleged in cross-complainant’s verified amended cross-complaint (FACC):

Cross-Defendants Sable Offshore Corp., and Pacific Pipeline Company (collectively, Sable) are the owner of the Las Flores Pipelines, which include the pipeline segments designated as CA-324 and CA-325 (collectively, the Pipelines), portions of which are located within the coastal zone in an unincorporated area of Santa Barbara County (County). (FACC, ¶¶ 1, 2.)

The Pipelines were built more than thirty years ago. (FACC, ¶ 3.) The Pipelines were constructed pursuant to coastal development permits (CDPs) issued by the County in 1986. (Sable Request for Judicial Notice [RJN], exhibits 4, 5.)

The Pipelines operated until 2015, when the Pipelines’ failure resulted in the Refugio Oil Spill. (FACC, ¶¶ 3, 4.)

Sable is pursuing the proposed restart of the Pipelines. (FACC, ¶ 5.) To that end, Sable has been engaged in work on, and associated with, the Pipelines, including excavation with heavy equipment, removal of major vegetation, grading and widening of roads, installation of metal plates and other fill material within wetlands, dewatering and discharge of water, pipeline removal, replacement, and reinforcement, and installation of shutoff valves. (FACC, ¶ 6.) Sable has also been engaged in offshore development, including placing sand and cement bags on the seafloor below and adjacent to out-of-service offshore oil and water pipelines. (Ibid.) This activity has occurred without the requisite authorization under the California Coastal Act of 1976 (Coastal Act, Pub. Resources Code, §§ 30000 et seq.). (Ibid.)

The California Coastal Commission (Commission) became aware that Sable was engaged in “Pipeline anomaly work” in September 2024. (FACC, ¶ 27.) A “pipeline anomaly” is a pipeline segment with some deviation from its original configuration, i.e., damage or deterioration, typically identified with a specialized instrument that examines the pipeline’s conditions while traveling through the pipeline. (FACC, ¶ 26.) The Commission staff investigated and determined that the work appeared to be unpermitted development in violation of the County’s local coastal program (LCP) and the Coastal Act. (FACC, ¶ 27.)

The Commission first sent a communication to the County requesting that it address Sable’s apparent Coastal Act violations. (FACC, ¶ 28.) When the County declined to take action, the Commission sent a notice of violation (NOV) to Sable. (Ibid.) After unsuccessful communications with Sable, the Commission’s Executive Director issued an Executive Director Cease and Desist Order (EDCDO) pursuant to Public Resources Code section 30809. (FACC, ¶¶ 28-30.) Sable complied with parts of this order. (FACC, ¶ 30.)

On November 21, 2024, Commission enforcement staff sent Sable an email stating that any work on the offshore portions of its Pipelines (Offshore Pipelines) would require a CDP from the Commission. (FACC, ¶ 31.) Sable did not submit such an application. (Ibid.)

On November 22, 2024, and December 6, 2024, Sable submitted applications to the

County for “Zoning Clearances” for the onshore Pipeline anomaly work. (FACC, ¶ 32.) In mid-December 2024, Commission staff received reports that Sable was conducting work on the Offshore Pipelines, without having complied with the direction in the November 21 email to first secure Coastal Act authorization. (Ibid.)

On February 10, 2025, the Commission’s EDCDO expired by operation of law. (FACC, ¶ 32.) On February 11, 2025, Commission staff sent Sable a second NOV, this time addressing Sable’s unpermitted work on the Offshore Pipelines. (Ibid.)

On February 12, 2025, the County sent a written response to Sable regarding its Zoning Clearance applications stating its conclusion that the Pipeline anomaly work was authorized under two CDPs the County issued for the construction and operation of the Pipelines in 1986. (FACC, ¶ 33.) On February 14, 2025, Sable sent a letter to the Commission stating its position that, based on the County’s determination, “no further authorization under the Coastal Act or LCP is required for Sable to proceed” with its Pipeline anomaly work. (Ibid.) The Commission received reports that Sable had, in fact, recommenced its work on the Pipelines. (Ibid.)

On February 16, 2025, the Commission sent Sable a Notice Prior to Issuance of an EDCDO, stating the Commission’s disagreement with Sable’s conclusions contained in its February 14, 2025 letter, and advising Sable that its resumption of Pipeline anomaly work may result in issuance of a second EDCDO. (FACC, ¶ 33.)

On February 18, 2025, the Commission’s Executive Director issued a second EDCDO ordering, in part, Sable to halt all Pipeline anomaly work until it obtained a CDP. (FACC, ¶ 34.) This time, Sable did not comply with this order at all and continued work without a CDP. (Ibid.) This second EDCDO also included notice that Commission staff planned to bring proposed orders to the Commission. (FACC, ¶ 35.) Pursuant to the Commission’s regulations, the EDCDO provided a Statement of Defense form that Sable was invited to complete to present any defenses Sable

wished to raise against Commission staff’s proposed action. (Ibid.) Sable submitted its Statement of Defense on March 10, 2025. (Ibid.)

Also on February 18, 2025, Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in this action.

On April 10, 2025, the Commission held a public hearing on the Coastal Act violations undertaken by Sable. (FACC, ¶ 36.) The Commission took evidence and heard testimony from its own enforcement, technical and legal staff, Sable’s representatives, and the public. (Ibid.) The Commission thereafter voted unanimously to issue Cease and Desist Order (CDO) No. CCC-25-CDO-01, and Restoration Order (RO) No. CCC-25-RO-01, and voted 9 to 2 to assess Administrative Penalty (AP) No. CCC-25-AP3-01 against Sable. (Ibid.) The Commission amended the motion contained in the staff report only as to the amount of administrative penalties. (Ibid.) These orders are collectively referred to as the “April 10 Orders.”

On April 10, 2025, the Commission filed a demurrer to the Plaintiffs’ original complaint.

On April 11, 2025, a Commission staff member conducted site visits near Arroyo

Hondo Preserve, Refugio State Beach, and the entrance of Las Flores Canyon to determine whether Sable had ceased its Pipeline anomaly work. (FACC, ¶ 37.) The Commission staff member witnessed that Sable was continuing to conduct work in violation of the Commission’s CDO. (Ibid.)

On April 16, 2025, Plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint (FAC). The FAC asserts six causes of action: (1) petition for writ of traditional mandamus, or alternatively for administrative mandamus; (2) declaratory relief; (3) damages for inverse condemnation; (4) declaratory relief (impairment of Plaintiffs’ vested rights); (5) declaratory relief (inverse condemnation); and (6) for declaratory and equitable relief pursuant to Public Resources Code section 30803.

Also on April 16, 2025, the Commission filed its original cross-complaint against Sable.

On May 15, 2025, the Commission filed its FACC. The FACC asserts five causes of action: (1) equitable relief to restrain violation of cease and desist order; (2) equitable relief to restrain violation of a restoration order; (3) equitable relief to enforce administrative civil penalty order CCC-25-AP3-01; (4) declaratory relief for violation of CDO CCC-25-CD-01; and (5) declaratory relief for violation of RO CCC-25-RO-01.

On June 16, 2025, Sable filed a demurrer to the FACC.

On July 9, 2025, the Commission filed its answer to Sable’s FAC.

On July 23, 2025, the Court overruled Sable’s demurrer to the FACC.

On August 7, 2025, Sable filed its answer to the FACC, admitting and denying allegations therein and asserting 17 affirmative defenses.

On August 18, 2025, Sable filed its motion to compel the deposition of Deputy Director Cassidy Teufel. This motion is opposed by the Commission.

On October 6, 2025, Sable filed its motion for leave to file a second amended complaint (SAC). This motion is opposed by the Commission.

On October 15, 2025, the Court addressed the merits of Sable’s motion for issuance of writ of mandate. The Court adopted its tentative ruling finding in favor of the Commission and against Sable on Sable’s first cause of action for issuance of a writ of mandate. The Court also rejected Sable’s request for a ruling at that hearing, taking up the matter at the hearing on December 3. The Court also continued Sable’s motion to compel to December 3 and noted that Sable’s motion for leave to file a SAC was also set for hearing on December 3.

On November 6, 2025, the Commission filed its motion for judgment on the pleadings seeking a judgment in its favor on its FACC. This motion is opposed by Sable.

Analysis:

(1)       Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

“A party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (b)(1).) “The motion provided for in this section may only be made on one of the following grounds: [¶] (A) If the moving party is a Plaintiff, that the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause or causes of action against the Defendant and the answer does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense to the complaint.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(A).) “The grounds for motion provided for in this section shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the Court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (d).)

“ ‘Motions for judgment on the pleadings are usually made by Defendants. In such instances the motion is the equivalent of a general demurrer, and on appeal from the judgment the appellate Court will assume the truth of all facts properly pleaded in the complaint. [Citation.] Motions by a Plaintiff for judgment on the pleadings, which are less common, are the equivalent of a demurrer to an answer, and the standard of review is obverse: the appellate Court will assume the truth of all facts properly pleaded in the answer and will disregard the controverted allegations of the complaint. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Engine Manufacturers Assn. v. State Air Resources Bd. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1022, 1034.)

“A motion by Plaintiff for judgment on the pleadings is in the nature of a general demurrer, and the motion must be denied if the Defendant’s pleadings raise a material issue or set up affirmative matter constituting a defense. [Citations.] For the purpose of ruling on the motion, the trial Court must treat all of Defendant’s allegations as being true, and since the moving party admits the untruth of his own allegations insofar as they have been controverted, all such averments must be disregarded whether there is a direct and specific denial or an indirect denial by virtue of affirmative allegations of a contrary state of facts.” (MacIsaac v. Pozzo (1945) 26 Cal.2d 809, 812–813.)

            (A)       Requests for Judicial Notice

In support of the motion, the Commission requests that the Court take judicial notice of this Court’s ruling of October 15, 2025. Sable objects to this request on the grounds that the Commission has failed to properly seek judicial notice. “Any request for judicial notice must be made in a separate document listing the specific items for which notice is requested and must comply with rule 3.1306(c).” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1113(l).)

In this case, the request for judicial notice is set forth in a separate document, but the separate document is inexplicably attached to the motion (Motion, at pp. 20-46) rather than filed separately.

The request for judicial notice will be granted. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)(1).) The happenstance of having the request appended to the motion rather than being separately filed does not, in this instance, prejudice any party or make disposition of this matter more difficult for the Court.

            (B)       Meet and Confer

Sable argues that the motion should be rejected because there was an insufficient meet and confer in advance of filing the motion.

“Before filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to this chapter, the moving party shall meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion for judgment on the pleadings for the purpose of determining if an agreement can be reached that resolves the claims to be raised in the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 439, subd. (a).)

The timing of the filing of the motion left little time for meeting and conferring. If the Court found that the meet and confer process was insufficient, the Court could either require the parties to further meet and confer or order the motion off calendar, without prejudice, as improperly filed without a complying meet and confer declaration. The Court is not, however, authorized to deny the motion on the basis of an insufficient meet and confer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 439, subd. (a)(4).) Without determining whether the meet and confer process was statutorily sufficient, given the nature of the motion and the positions of the parties, the Court finds that any delay to require a further meet and confer would not be productive.

The Court will therefore address the merits of the motion at this time.

            (C)       Jurisdiction

In opposition to the motion, Sable raises the issue of whether this Court has jurisdiction to address this matter because of Sable’s pending appeal of the grant of a preliminary injunction.

“As a general rule, ‘the perfecting of an appeal stays proceedings in the trial Court upon the judgment or order appealed from ....’ [Citation.] Thus, generally, the taking of an appeal by the filing of the notice of appeal deprives the trial Court of jurisdiction of the cause and vests jurisdiction with the appellate Court until issuance of a remittitur by the reviewing Court. [Citations.] When the remittitur issues, the jurisdiction of the appellate Court terminates and the jurisdiction of the trial Court reattaches.” (Andrisani v. Saugus Colony Limited (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 517, 523.)

As this Court noted in addressing the preliminary injunction, there was an open question as to whether granting or denying a preliminary injunction was within the Court’s jurisdiction when the denial of the same order as a temporary restraining order was on appeal. That issue was resolved by the Court of Appeal as to this case as discussed in the Court’s order granting the preliminary injunction.

“An appeal from an injunction pendente lite does not affect the power of the Court to hear and decide the case on the merits, even though some of the same issues as were involved in the injunction pendente lite were disposed of by the later judgment.” (Nomm v. Nomm (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 663, 664; accord, Doudell v. Shoo (1911) 159 Cal. 448, 455 [appeal of temporary injunction “did not operate to deprive the Court of power to proceed to a final hearing of the case”]; In re Marriage of Tim & Wong (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1049, 1053; see also Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 191 [appeal of denial of preliminary injunction does not stay trial Court proceedings on the merits].)

The Court retains jurisdiction to address the merits of the Commission’s motion.

            (D)       Judgment on the Pleadings

As set forth in the notice of motion, the Commission seeks a judgment in its favor against Sable on the Commission’s FACC. (Notice, at p. 2.) The basis for this motion is the Court’s ruling of October 15, 2025, in favor of the Commission and against Sable on Sable’s first cause of action for issuance of writ of mandate in Sable’s FAC. The Commission argues that the Court’s October 15 ruling is preclusive; Sable argues that different standards apply.

An important distinction here is that the Commission is not by this motion seeking to adjudicate the remainder of Sable’s claims in Sable’s FAC; the Commission is seeking to adjudicate its own claims as a matter of law. The procedural vehicle chosen by the Commission, however, is not up to the task of resolving the Commission’s FACC, notwithstanding the resolution of overlapping issues.

At issue before the Court on October 15, 2025, was Sable’s petition for issuance of a writ of mandate. The Court has determined that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in issuing its April 10 Orders. In reaching that determination, among other things, the Court rejected Sable’s arguments that work conducted by Sable was authorized by the 1986 CDPs and that the Commission lacked statutory authority to issue the CDO. The Court made its determination based upon the administrative record leading up to the issuance of the April 10 Orders.

As discussed further below in the context of rulings, the effect of the Court’s ruling on Sable’s first cause of action is to determine that Sable had, as of the time of the April 10 Orders, violated the Coastal Act. Because the resolution of that cause of action was based upon the administrative record, the parties did not present evidence, and the Court did not consider, subsequent activity by Sable. The Commission seeks in its FACC injunctive and declaratory relief. Among other things, the Commission asks the Court to “[i]ssue a declaration of rights and responsibilities of the parties with respect to CDO No. CCC-25-CD-01” (FACC, prayer, ¶ A), and to “enter … permanent injunctions requiring Sable to cease and desist the undertaking of its current and planned development …” (FACC, prayer, ¶ C).

In order for the Court to determine the full scope of the rights and responsibilities of the parties with respect to the April 10 Orders and whether, and to what extent, a permanent injunction is appropriate, the Court must assess the facts and circumstances as they exist now, at the time of adjudication, not merely as they existed at the time of the issuance of the April 10 Orders. The Court’s determination of Sable’s cause of action for writ of mandate does not fully determine the facts and circumstances now.

As discussed above, the standards for determining a cross-complainant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings requires the Court to determine that Sable’s answer to the FACC does not raise any material issue or set up affirmative matter constituting a defense. Because there remain issues necessary to the judgment sought by the Commission in this motion that are controverted by Sable in its pleadings and not fully resolved by the Court’s October 15 ruling, the motion for judgment on the pleadings must be denied. (Cf. Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1047 [demurrer cannot be sustained to part of a cause of action or to a particular type of damage or remedy].)

(2)       Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint

Sable seeks leave to file its proposed second amended complaint (PSAC).

“The Court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding by adding or striking out the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect; and may, upon like terms, enlarge the time for answer or demurrer. The Court may likewise, in its discretion, after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other particulars; and may upon like terms allow an answer to be made after the time limited by this code.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (a)(1); accord, § 576.)

The PSAC makes changes to the FAC to:

(i)        Update counsel;

(ii)       Replace “Verified Amended” with “Second Amended Verified” where the current pleading is identified;

(iii)      Update the dates of signature;

(iv)      Amend paragraph 158 of the text to add the following italicized language:

“Plaintiffs are entitled to damages in the amount in excess of $347,000,000 and attorneys’ fees for the Coastal Commission’s constitutional violation under Sections 1983 and 1988 of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1871. Additionally, Plaintiffs are entitled to reputational damages in an amount to be determined.”

(v)       Amend paragraph 11 of the prayer to add the following italicized language:

“For damages in the amount in excess of $347,000,000 for just compensation and interest thereon, according to proof, for the temporary and permanent taking of Plaintiffs’ property in violation of Article I, Section 19 of the California Constitution and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Additionally, Plaintiffs are entitled to reputational damages in an amount to be determined.”

The motion is opposed by the Commission. In support of its opposition the Commission requests that the Court take judicial notice of the Court’s October 15 ruling in this matter (this time as a separately filed document). The request for judicial notice is granted. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).) The Commission argues that the Court’s October 15 ruling rejects the foundational contentions of the FAC and so the PSAC fails to state a claim against the Commission.

In the current procedural posture, there is no prejudice to the Commission to permitting the amendment. The Court has not yet resolved the remaining causes of action of the FAC, although, as the Commission points out, the Court previously sustained, without leave to amend, the sixth cause of action of the FAC which is repeated in the PSAC. If the Court resolves those causes of action against Sable as suggested by the Commission, the proposed amendments in the PSAC will not be material to such resolution. If the Court determines that any aspect of the FAC otherwise remains, the amendments simply provide additional allegations that would be addressed on the merits regardless of whether the amendments are permitted or not. There is therefore no basis to deny the motion. (See Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1048 [“it is an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend where the opposing party was not misled or prejudiced by the amendment”].)

The motion will be granted subject to the Court’s reaffirmation that the Commission’s demurrer to the sixth cause of action has been sustained without leave to amend (so that the filing of the PSAC does not revive such cause of action) and that the Commission’s answer to the FAC is deemed to apply to the PSAC and to deny all material allegations set forth in the amendments.
 

(3)       Moving Forward

            (A)       October 15 Ruling

In response to the Court’s tentative ruling for the October 15, 2025, hearing, Sable argued that the Court applied the wrong standard. In particular, Sable argued that the proper standard is independent judgment. (Sable Response, filed Oct. 15, 2025, pp. 2-3.) Sable did not make this argument in either its opening trial brief or in its reply. (Sable Opening Trial Brief, p. 8 [setting forth standard of review]; Sable Reply Trial Brief, p. 6 & fn. 1 [arguing that issues are jurisdiction and authorization].) This issue was therefore not expressly addressed in the Court’s October 15 written ruling.

To address Sable’s response, the Court supplements its October 15, 2025, ruling on the first cause of action of Sable’s FAC as follows:

Alternatively, upon a review of the administrative record and the arguments of the parties and upon the exercise of the Court’s independent judgment, the Court agrees with and adopts as its own the factual findings of the Commission in issuing the April 10 Orders. Based on those factual findings and the analysis set forth in the October 15, 2025, ruling, on this alternative basis, the Court concludes that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in issuing the April 10 Orders and that in all other respects Sable has failed to meet its burden as to the first cause of action for issuance of a writ of mandate. On this alternative basis, the petition for administrative mandate as set forth in the first cause of action is denied.

            (B)       Remaining Claims

As discussed above, the Court’s resolution of Sable’s writ petition cause of action has consequences for the remaining causes of action both in the FAC (soon SAC) and in the FACC. (Note: The Court will continue to refer to the FAC as the operative pleading. Because the amendments to the FAC in the PSAC do not affect the claims or relief except as to the particular damages stated in the amendments, this discussion applies with equal force to the SAC when filed.)

As discussed in the context of the Commission’s FACC, further evidentiary proceedings are necessary to determine the scope of declaratory and equitable relief that the Court may award.

The Court has now resolved both the first cause of action for writ of mandamus and the sixth cause of action for declaratory and equitable relief pursuant to Public Resources Code section 30803. This leaves the second, fourth, and fifth causes of action for declaratory relief, and the third cause of action for damages. As set forth in the prayer of the FAC, Sable seeks:

“[A] declaration that the Coastal Commission’s, NOVs, EDCDOs, and April 10 Orders because they are contrary to the Coastal Commission’s obligations and authority under the Public Resources Code, including sections 30810 and 30809(a).” (FAC, prayer, ¶ 4.)

“[A] declaration that the Coastal Commission’s, NOVs, EDCDOs, and April 10 Orders because they violate and usurp the County’s delegated coastal development permitting authority concerning the Pipelines under the County’s LCP, pursuant to Public Resources Code section 30519 et seq.” (FAC, prayer, ¶ 5.)

“[A] declaration that the Coastal Commission’s, NOVs, EDCDOs, and April 10

Orders because they are unsupported by evidence and inconsistent with prior authoritative conclusions and findings.” (FAC, prayer, ¶ 6.)

“[A] declaration that the Coastal Commission’s NOVs, EDCDOs, and April 10 Orders are unlawful and void as they infringe upon and violate Plaintiffs’ vested rights.” (FAC, prayer, ¶ 7.)

“[A] declaration that the Coastal Commission’s NOVs, EDCDOs, and April 10 Orders are unlawful and void as they violate Article I, Section 19 of the California Constitution and the takings clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.” (FAC, prayer, ¶ 8.)

“[A] preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting the Coastal Commission from taking any action in the furtherance of enforcing any Notice of Violation for the Anomaly Repair Work or span remediation maintenance activities at the Las Flores Pipelines and SYU Pipelines, respectively, as the Coastal Commission lacks the authority to pursue any such remedies.” (FAC, prayer, ¶ 9.)

“[A] preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting the Coastal Commission from taking any action in the furtherance of enforcing any Executive Director Cease and Desist Order for the Anomaly Repair Work or span remediation maintenance activities at the Las Flores Pipelines and SYU Pipelines, respectively, as the Coastal Commission lacks the authority to pursue any such remedies.” (FAC, prayer, ¶ 10.)

“[D]amages for just compensation and interest thereon, according to proof, for the temporary and permanent taking of Plaintiffs’ property in violation of Article I, Section 19 of the California Constitution and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” (FAC, prayer, ¶ 11.)

With respect to the declarations sought in prayer paragraphs 4, 5, and 6, the Court assumes that the requested declaration is that the respective orders are invalid for the reasons stated notwithstanding missing language stating what declaration is requested. (See FAC, ¶¶ 147, 175.)

Sable asserts that its claims for declaratory relief and inverse condemnation are broader than the issues determined by the writ petition and a separate adjudication is appropriate, citing (Protecting Our Water & Environmental Resources v. County of Stanislaus (2020) 10 Cal.5th 479 (POWER).) In POWER, the issue was the application of review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA; Pub. Resources Code, § 2100 et seq.) in which a county ordinance categorically classified a subset of well construction permits as ministerial projects for which CEQA review is not required. (POWER, at p. 487.) The POWER Plaintiffs challenged the classification practice, alleging that permit issuances are actually discretionary projects requiring CEQA review. (Ibid.)

In POWER, the declaratory relief case was submitted to the trial Court on stipulated facts. (POWER, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 492.) The trial Court ruled that county’s approval of all nonvariance permits was ministerial. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that issuance of well construction permits was a discretionary decision. (Ibid.) The California Supreme Court granted review and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal in part. (Id. at p. 501.)

In addressing the standard of review, the POWER Court stated:

“It is true that when reviewing a particular issuance decision for abuse of discretion the agency’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, while its factual determinations are reviewed deferentially for substantial evidence. When an agency determines a particular project is ministerial, it would typically rely on one or more factual determinations. But County is not claiming the ministerial exemption applies to a particular permit. Instead, it claims the exemption applies to an entire category of permits, as a matter of law.

“Of course, we do not simply ignore County’s interpretation. It is one of the several tools available to us in determining the legal effect of the incorporated state standards. [Citation.] But, as we said in [Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, 12], the amount of deference due is ‘situational.’ [Citation.] It depends on factors indicating that the agency has a comparative interpretive advantage over Courts and that its interpretation is ‘ “probably correct.” ’ [Citations.] County fails to establish that those factors warrant adopting its interpretation here. It is ultimately for the Courts to determine the scope and meaning of an ordinance as a matter of law.” (POWER, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 499.)

The POWER Court concluded:

“In summary, when an ordinance contains standards which, if applicable, give an agency the required degree of independent judgment, the agency may not categorically classify the issuance of permits as ministerial. It may classify a particular permit as ministerial (CEQA Guidelines, § 15268, subd. (a)), and develop a record supporting that classification.” (POWER, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 501.)

“The Court of Appeal holding that all permit issuances under Chapter 9.36 of the Stanislaus County Code are discretionary is reversed. Plaintiffs are not entitled to a judicial declaration to that effect nor to an injunction requiring County to treat all such permit issuances as discretionary. [¶] However, Plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration that County’s blanket ministerial categorization is unlawful. The Court of Appeal holding that Plaintiffs were entitled to such relief is affirmed. The matter is remanded to the Court of Appeal for it to evaluate the questions it declined to answer and to reassess Plaintiffs’ entitlement to relief.” (POWER, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 501–502.)

The POWER decision does not discuss the scope of declaratory relief available, but resolves a conflict between CEQA and the county code there under discussion in the context of a declaratory relief action. POWER only provides an example of where declaratory relief may be appropriate.

Based on the Court’s resolution of the first cause of action, the Court has determined that the Commission’s orders, as made, are not contrary to the Commission’s obligations and authority under the Public Resources Code (FAC, prayer, ¶ 4), that the Commission’s orders do not violate and usurp the County’s delegated coastal development permitting authority concerning the Pipelines under the County’s LCP, pursuant to Public Resources Code section 30519 et seq. (FAC, prayer, ¶ 5), and that the Commission’s orders are supported by evidence and are not inconsistent with prior authoritative conclusions and findings (FAC, prayer, ¶ 6). Thus, the declaratory relief sought by Sable’s second cause of action appears to be fully addressed in the negative. (See FAC, ¶¶ 147-149.) No further evidentiary proceedings are necessary to resolve these requests.

Based on the Court’s resolution of the first cause of action, the Court has determined that the work being done that gave rise to the April 10 Orders, in the manner in which it was being done, was not within the scope of work authorized by the prior permits under the Coastal Act. The Court therefore has determined that Sable has no vested rights that authorize such work as and how done. The Commission’s orders are thus not unlawful and void for infringing on vested rights. (FAC, prayer, ¶ 7.) In making this determination, the Court has not determined whether other work is or is not authorized by the prior permits obtained by Sable.

Thus, the declaratory relief sought by Sable’s fourth cause of action is at least partially addressed in the negative. (See FAC, ¶¶ 160-169.) In its reply brief on the writ cause of action, Sable argues that it challenges the pattern and practice of the Commission usurping the County’s delegated permitting authority. By its determination that the Commission has not usurped the County’s permitting authority in the instance of the April 10 Orders, the Court has necessarily determined that the Commission has authority to act at least in the instance involving the work that was subject to the April 10 Orders. It is unclear at this point what Sable seeks as declaratory relief outside of this context that may be properly entertained by the Court, and in particular what action that Sable seeks to declare as authorized. The Court does not determine hypothetical disputes; at the same time individual requests need to go through the administrative procedure before resort to judicial determination.

The remaining declaration sought by Sable is tied to its cause of action for damages based upon inverse condemnation. As with the potential remainder of the fourth cause of action, it is unclear to what extent, if any, these causes of action are based upon work that is contemplated, occurring, or completed and not otherwise resolved by the Court as herein discussed.

In order to move forward the Court requests that the parties provide briefing as follows:

(1)       Based upon the Court’s determinations as discussed above, Sable shall provide a statement as to what claims are raised by its FAC that remain for adjudication. With respect to each such claim, Sable shall state what activity (both Sable’s work and the Commission’s orders—contemplated, occurring, or completed) is the basis for such claim and an explanation of how this activity is different from the activity upon which the April 10 Orders were based. Sable shall also provide a statement as to how the discovery sought (discussed further below) is relevant to the remaining issues. Sable shall further provide a proposal as to the procedural vehicle to resolve these remaining issues.

(2)       The Commission shall respond to Sable’s statement, particularly identifying any factual dispute underlying any disagreement with Sable’s statement. The Commission shall also address Sable’s proposal for resolution.

(3)       Sable may reply to the Commission’s response.

The parties shall meet and confer on these issues in advance of the parties’ briefing.

            (C)       Discovery

Also pending before the Court is Sable’s motion to compel the deposition of Cassidy Teufel. The necessity and scope of such a deposition under the present circumstances depends upon how the Court is moving forward. The motion to compel will be continued.