Erica Becerra vs Santa Barbara Metropolitan Transit District

Case Number

25CV00547

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 01/30/2026 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

CMC; Motion to Quash

Tentative Ruling

For the reasons set forth herein, the motion of defendant Santa Barbara Metropolitan Transit District to quash service of summons is granted in part and denied in part. The motion is granted to quash purported service of summons on April 23, 2025. The motion is denied in all other respects, including as to service on May 30, 2025. Plaintiff shall give notice of this order and shall file proof of service of such notice. Defendant shall file and serve its responsive pleading within 15 days after service on it of written notice of this order.

Background:

Plaintiff Erica Becerra filed this action for personal injury against defendant Santa Barbara Metropolitan Transit District (District) on January 24, 2025.

On April 23, 2025, Becerra filed a proof of service of the summons and complaint stating that service was accomplished on April 23, 2025, by substituted service on “David ‘Doe’ ”, where the summons and complaint was that day mailed to the District.

On May 30, 2025, counsel for both parties appeared at a case management conference in this action. The case management conference was continued to October 17, 2025.

On May 22, 2025, Becerra filed a second proof of service of the summons and complaint stating that service was accomplished by personal service on “David ‘Doe’ ” on April 23, 2025.

On June 2, 2025, Becerra filed a third proof of service of the summons and complaint stating that service was accomplished by personal service on “David Serrano – HR/ Risk Manager, Authorized to Accept” on May 30, 2025.

On July 2, 2025, District filed this motion to quash service of summons and complaint. The notice of motion states: “This motion is made on the ground that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant due to improper service of process of a Complaint and Summons filed on January 24, 2025 and not effectively served until May 30, 2025, 126 days following the filing date in violation of California Rules of Court Rule 3.110(b). In addition, material inconsistencies in the Complaint, including conflicting dates of the alleged incident, further prejudice Defendant’s ability to respond.” (Motion, at p. 2.)

The motion is opposed by Becerra.

Analysis:

“A defendant, on or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause allow, may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes: [¶] (1) To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subd. (a)(1).)

“When a defendant challenges the court’s personal jurisdiction on the ground of improper service of process ‘the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the existence of jurisdiction by proving, inter alia, the facts requisite to an effective service.’ ” (Summers v. McClanahan (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 403, 413, fn. omitted.)

The District challenges the effectiveness of service on April 23, 2025. Because of subsequent service and disputes concerning the nature of such service, the court will assume for purposes of this motion that service on April 23, 2025, was ineffective.

Becerra’s June 2, 2025, proof of service shows personal service by a registered process server on the District on May 30, 2025. (Floveyor Internat., Ltd. v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 789, 795 [“The filing of a proof of service creates a rebuttable presumption that the service was proper.”].) The later service on May 30, 2025, does not validate an earlier ineffective service, but constitutes separate service. “[A] defendant need only be served with summons once ….” (Engebretson & Co. v. Harrison (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 436, 441.) There is “no rule which prohibits double service if the efficacy of one mode is in reasonable doubt ….” (Buckner v. Industrial Acc. Commission (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 619, 624.)

As quoted above, the District has acknowledged that the May 30, 2025, service was effective service. (Motion, at p. 2; Code Civ. Proc., § 417.10, subd. (d).) The District asserts, however, that the service was untimely under California Rules of Court, rule 3.110(b) and, according to the District, that untimeliness invalidates the service.

“The complaint must be served on all named defendants and proofs of service on those defendants must be filed with the court within 60 days after the filing of the complaint. When the complaint is amended to add a defendant, the added defendant must be served and proof of service must be filed within 30 days after the filing of the amended complaint.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.110(b).)

Failure to follow the requirement of rule 3.110(b), however, does not invalidate otherwise effective service. “If a party fails to serve and file pleadings as required under this rule, and has not obtained an order extending time to serve its pleadings, the court may issue an order to show cause why sanctions shall not be imposed.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.110(f).) Dismissal is generally available as a sanction only after two or three years of failing to effect service. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 583.210, subd. (a), 583.420, subd. (a)(1).) The dismissal sanction is not available here. Consequently, the untimeliness of service under rule 3.110(b) does not invalidate the effectiveness of such service. Moreover, under these circumstances, the court exercises its discretion not to issue an order to show cause based upon the timing of service.

In addition, the record also supports a finding that the District’s appearance at the case management conference, including the filing of a substantive case management conference statement more than a month before filing this motion to quash, constitutes a general appearance waiving service of summons. (See Mansour v. Superior Court (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1750, 1757.) The fact that the District’s case management conference statement identified that the District was specially appearing and would be making a motion to quash is generally insufficient to avoid a general appearance.

“ ‘A general appearance by a party is equivalent to personal service of summons on such party.’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.50, subd. (a).) The statutory list of acts constituting an appearance (id., § 1014 [filing an answer, demurrer, motion to strike, etc.] ) is not exclusive; ‘rather the term may apply to various acts which, under all of the circumstances, are deemed to confer jurisdiction of the person. [Citation.] What is determinative is whether defendant takes a part in the particular action which in some manner recognizes the authority of the court to proceed.’ [Citation.]” (Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1127, 1147; see also Szynalski v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1, 11 [“a party’s characterization of an appearance as a ‘special appearance’ is not conclusive for purposes of determining whether the party ‘consented’ to the court’s personal jurisdiction by appearing in an action”]; Roy v. Superior Court (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 337, 345 [prior or concurrent motion to quash necessary to preserve challenge to personal jurisdiction as to acts otherwise constituting a general appearance].)

The court will grant the motion to quash the purported service on April 23, 2025, but otherwise deny the motion to quash as to later service of summons.

The District also complains that the text of the complaint contains inconsistencies affecting its ability to respond. This is not a matter of personal jurisdiction. To the extent this remains an issue, this issue must be addressed by appropriate challenge to the pleading. (See Stancil v. Superior Court (2021) 11 Cal.5th 381, 397–398 [motion to quash may not be used to argue merits or sufficiency of allegations of a complaint outside of jurisdictional issues].)