Tentative Ruling: Matter of Nelly Mercado and Albert N Mercado Trust

Case Number

24PR00029

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Thu, 07/23/2026 - 09:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion: Compel Petitioner Ryan Mercado's Compliance with Court's 2/19/26 Order; Motion: Compel Responses to Special Interrogatories (Set Two)

Tentative Ruling

(1) The motion of respondent Nelly Mercado to compel petitioner Ryan Mercado’s compliance with the court’s February 19, 2026, order is denied.

(2) The motion of petitioner Ryan Mercado to compel respondents to provide further verified responses to special interrogatories, set two, is granted. On or before August 16, 2026, respondents Tamara Skov and Shannon Dalton shall serve verified, code compliant further responses to petitioner’s set two special interrogatories nos. 33 and 38, without the objections overruled herein except as to those based on the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine.

Background:

Petitioner Ryan Mercado (Ryan) alleges in this case that they are the grandson of Nelly Mercado (Nelly) and Albert N. Mercado (Albert N), and a residual beneficiary of The Nelly Mercado and Albert N. Mercado Trust (the Trust), which was established on November 5, 1993, and amended and restated on August 20, 2021. (Note: To avoid confusion due to common familial surnames, the court refers to the parties and other individuals by their first names. No disrespect is intended.) AlbertN died on October 26, 2022. Ryan alleges that they were appointed as a successor trustee in the event that Ryan’s father, Albert William Mercado (Albert W), or Nelly are no longer able to serve as trustees.

Ryan further alleges that the terms of the Trust require the trustees to divide the assets into a Survivor’s Trust, a Marital Trust, and a Decedent’s Trust upon the death of Albert N, with the Survivor’s Trust to be funded with Nelly’s interest in the community estate and separate property. The Decedent’s Trust was to be funded with Albert N’s interest in the community estate and separate property. The assets of the Trust were purportedly not sufficient to trigger the funding of the Marital Trust. Ryan asserts that, though Albert N passed away on October 26, 2022, it is not clear whether the division of assets into the sub-trusts occurred.

Upon the passing of Albert N, Giancarlo Mercado (Giancarlo) became a successor co trustee with Nelly. Giancarlo, who is the son of Albert N and Nelly, is alleged to have acted as co-trustee in the months following Albert N’s death until Giancarlo’s death on January 22, 2023. Following Giancarlo’s death, Nelly allegedly appointed her son, Albert W, as co-trustee of the Trust, with the effective date of the appointment being January 22, 2023.

Ryan further alleges that on February 10, 2023, Nelly and Albert W executed a notarized and recorded an affidavit of change of trustee; that on April 4, 2023, Nelly and Albert W executed a notarized amendment of successor trustee, appointing Ryan as successor trustee upon the death or incapacitation of either Nelly or Albert W; and that in the summer of 2023, Nelly stopped communicating with Albert W regarding the Trust.

On September 26, 2023, Nelly allegedly resigned as Trustee and unilaterally appointed private professional fiduciaries Tamara Skov (Skov) and Shannon Dalton (Dalton) of Fiduciary Services as successor co-Trustees of the Trust. Ryan asserts that the appointment of Skov and Dalton was not consistent with the Trust’s procedures, and that Nelly appointed those individuals without the consent or approval of Albert W, which, according to Ryan, is not allowed under the terms of the Trust.

Ryan asserts that Nelly is declining to fund the Decedent’s Trust based on the advice of neighbors who have a vested interest in Nelly’s financial decisions, and that in July 2023, without the consent or approval of Albert W, Nelly arranged for the sale of real property located in Sherman Oaks that was held by an entity wholly owned by the Trust. In addition, Ryan has requested, but not received, an accounting from Skov and Dalton.

Ryan filed their verified petition against respondents Nelly, Skov, and Dalton (collectively, Respondents) on January 22, 2024, for: (1) a report and accounting, (2) an order ascertaining trustees and instruction regarding removal of purported trustees, (3) an order returning trustee fees taken by Skov and Dalton, (4) damages for breach of fiduciary duty, (5) adjudication of rights as to trust property, and (6) an order compelling the trustees to fund the Decedent’s Trust.

Respondents have each filed their respective responses to the petition, disputing its allegations and alleging additional facts regarding the circumstances surrounding the purpose and management of the Trust, among other things.

Court records further discussed below reflect that the parties have filed many discovery motions in this case.

On May 6, 2025, Ryan filed a motion (the May 6 Ryan Motion) for a protective order, an order appointing a discovery referee, and for an award of sanctions against Nelly’s counsel of record. Nelly, Skov, and Dalton each filed oppositions to the May 6 Ryan Motion.

On June 5, the court entered an order denying the May 6 Ryan Motion, and reserving a ruling on Ryan’s request for sanctions to July 31, 2025.

On May 19, Nelly separately filed four discovery motions (collectively, the May 19 Nelly Motions): (1) for an order requiring Ryan to provide further responses to Nelly’s set one form interrogatory (the Nelly Set One FI) nos. 2.5 and 2.6; (2) for an order requiring Ryan to provide a further response to Nelly’s set one request for admission no. 50; (3) for an order requiring Ryan to provide further responses to Nelly’s set one special interrogatory nos. 9, 15, 36 through 38, and 40 through 43; and (4) for an order requiring Ryan to provide further responses to Nelly’s set one requests for production of documents (the Nelly Set One RFP) nos. 1, 2, 5 through 19, 21, and 24 through 27.

Ryan did not file oppositions to the May 19 Nelly Motions, each of which were calendared for hearing on July 31, 2025.

On July 31, 2025, the court entered a minute order (the July 31 Order) adopting its tentative ruling granting in part and denying in part the May 19 Nelly Motions as further set forth in that order. Though the court denied monetary sanctions in favor of or against any party with respect to the May 19 Nelly Motions, the court awarded monetary sanctions in favor of Nelly, Skov, and Dalton and against Ryan in regard to the May 6 Ryan Motion.

On August 12, Nelly filed a motion for an order (the August 12 Nelly Motion) deeming the truth of the matters set forth in Nelly’s set two requests for admission directed to Ryan, and for an award of monetary sanctions.

On August 13, Skov and Dalton filed a motion for an order compelling Ryan to provide responses to set one form and special interrogatories, and for monetary sanctions; and separately filed a motion for an order compelling Ryan to provide written responses to a set one request for production of documents and to produce documents (collectively, the August 13 Skov/Dalton Motions).

On August 14, Nelly separately filed two motions (collectively, the August 14 Nelly Motions): (1) for an order (the August 14 Nelly RFP Motion) requiring Ryan to provide responses to Nelly’s set two request for production of documents (the Nelly Set Two RFP), and to produce responsive documents; and (2) for an order (the August 14 Nelly Interrogatory Motion) compelling Ryan to provide responses to Nelly’s set two form interrogatories (the Nelly Set Two FI) and special interrogatories.

On September 29, Ryan separately filed two notices of the service by Ryan of various discovery responses.

On October 2, Skov and Dalton filed a motion for an order (the October 2 Skov/Dalton Motion) compelling Ryan to provide further responses to set two form interrogatories, and for monetary sanctions.

On October 6, Nelly separately filed two discovery motions (collectively, the October 6 Nelly Motions): (1) for an order compelling Ryan to comply with the July 31 Order as to Nelly Set One RFP nos. 1, 2, 5 through 19, and 24 through 27, and for monetary sanctions (the October 6 Nelly RFP Motion); and (2) for an order compelling Ryan to comply with the July 31 Order as to request for admission no. 50 and Nelly Set One FI no. 17.1, and for monetary sanctions.

On October 9, Ryan filed an opposition to the August 12 Nelly Motion.

On October 21, Ryan filed an objection to all “sanctions motions filed by Excello Law LLP and Claire Mitchell.” (Oct. 21, 2025, Objection at p. 2.)

The August 12 Nelly Motion, the August 13 Skov/Dalton Motions, the August 14 Nelly Motions, the October 2 Skov/Dalton Motion, and the October 6 Nelly Motions were each calendared for hearing on November 13, 2025.

On November 4, Nelly filed a motion for an order (the November 4 Nelly Motion) compelling Ryan to provide further responses to Nelly’s set three form interrogatories (the Nelly Set Three FI) and for monetary sanctions. Ryan filed an opposition to the November 4 Nelly Motion, which was calendared for a hearing on February 19, 2026.

Also on November 4, Skov and Dalton filed a notice stating that Ryan had not filed any opposition to the October 2 Skov/Dalton Motion.

On November 7, Ryan filed a supplemental objection to the August 12 Nelly Motion.

On November 10, Ryan filed an objection to the October 2 Skov/Dalton Motion.

On November 13, after a hearing, the court entered a minute order (the November 13 Order) adopting its tentative ruling denying the August 12 Nelly Motion as moot; and granting the August 13 Skov/Dalton Motions, the August 14 Nelly RFP Motion, the August 14 Nelly Motions, the October 2 Skov/Dalton Motion, and the October 6 Nelly Motions.

On December 10, Ryan filed a motion for relief from the November 13 Order (the Ryan Motion for Relief), which was calendared for hearing on February 19, 2026, and which was opposed by Nelly, Skov, and Dalton.

On January 21, 2026, Nelly filed a motion for terminating and monetary sanctions against Ryan (the Nelly Terminating Motion), which was also calendared for hearing on February 19, 2026. Ryan opposed the Nelly Terminating Motion.

On February 19, 2026, the court entered a minute order (the February 19 Order) denying the Ryan Motion for Relief and the Nelly Terminating Motion. The court directed counsel for Nelly to prepare a proposed order.

On March 3, the court signed and on March 4 entered, an order: denying the Ryan Motion for Relief; requiring Ryan to serve all discovery responses required by the November 13 Order, and to pay sanctions in the amount of $4,345, on or before March 5, 2026. Further, the court denied without prejudice the Nelly Terminating Motion, and reserved ruling on Nelly’s request for monetary sanctions in connection with the Nelly Terminating Motion. On that same date, the court issued a notice that a hearing on the November 4 Nelly Motion was set for April 30, 2026.

On April 28, Nelly filed a motion for an order (the April 28 Nelly Motion) compelling Ryan to comply with the February 19 Order as to all discovery responses required by the November 13 Order, and for monetary sanctions. Ryan has filed an opposition to the April 28 Nelly Motion.

On April 30, the court entered a minute order adopting its tentative ruling denying the November 4 Nelly Motion as to the request for an order compelling further responses, and granting that motion as to the request for an award of monetary sanctions. The court also granted a motion filed by Ryan on March 12, 2026, for an order requiring the parties to participate in mediation.

On June 3, Ryan filed a motion for an order (the June 3 Ryan Motion) compelling Skov and Dalton to provide further verified responses to Ryan’s set two special interrogatories (the Ryan Set Two SI) nos. 33 and 38. Skov and Dalton have filed an opposition to the June 3 Ryan Motion.

The April 28 Nelly Motion and the June 3 Ryan Motion were each calendared for hearing on June 25, 2026, and continued to July 23, 2026. (See June 25, 2026, Minute Order.)

In support of the April 28 Nelly Motion, Nelly’s counsel, Claire K. Mitchell (attorney Mitchell), asserts that the relevant orders are the July 31 Order, the November 13 Order, and the February 19 Order, copies of which are attached to the request for judicial notice (RJN) filed in support of the April 28 Nelly Motion. (Mitchell Dec., ¶ 4; RJN, ¶¶ 1-3 & exhibits A-C.) Attorney Mitchell’s declaration also includes a discussion of the “many” discovery motions filed by Nelly in this case, including the August 14 Nelly Motions, the October 6 Nelly RFP Motion, and the Nelly Terminating Motion. (Mitchell Dec., ¶¶ 8-11.)

Attorney Mitchell states that Ryan never served responses to the Nelly Set Two FI; that Ryan failed to provide a response to the Nelly Set Two RFP; and that on February 27, 2026, Ryan served responses to Nelly’s set two special interrogatories; the Nelly Set Two RFP; and further supplemental responses to “Form Interrogatory No. 17.1 (RFA 50)” and “RFP Nos. 1-2, 5-19, and 24-27.” (Mitchell Dec., ¶¶ 6, 9-10, 12 & exhibit C.) Attorney Mitchell further asserts that some of the responses served by Ryan on February 27, 2026, are deficient; that attorney Mitchell wrote a letter to Ryan dated March 13, 2026, which identified those deficiencies including that Ryan had failed to provide any responses to the Nelly Set Two FI and that some of Ryan’s responses to the Nelly Set One RFP and the Nelly Set Two RFP remained deficient. (Mitchell Dec., ¶ 13 & exhibit D.)

On March 19, 2026, Ryan served amended or supplemental discovery responses addressing some of the deficiencies identified in attorney Mitchel’s March 13, 2026, letter. (Mitchell Dec., ¶ 14 & exhibit E.) As Ryan had purportedly failed to cured those issues, on March 23, 2026, attorney Mitchell sent Ryan an email setting forth outstanding deficiencies including that Ryan had not provided any responses to the Nelly Set Two FI; that Ryan had not amended his responses to the Nelly Set One RFP to confirm that all responsive documents had been produced; and that Ryan had not complied with code requirements in his responses to Nelly Set Two RFP nos. 30, 33, 35, and 36 because those responses did not unequivocally state the reason the responsive documents were not in Ryan’s possession or custody. (Mitchell Dec., ¶ 15 & exhibit F.)

On March 23, 2026, Ryan wrote to attorney Mitchell stating that he had no intention of serving any further responses and that Ryan had addressed all issues. (Mitchell Dec., ¶ 16 & exhibit G.)

In support of the June 3 Ryan Motion, Ryan states that they served Skov and Dalton with the Ryan Set Two SI on March 30, 2026, and that on May 1, Skov and Dalton served verified responses to those interrogatories. (Ryan Dec., ¶¶ 2-3 & exhibits A-B.) Following efforts to meet and confer, Skov and Dalton served supplemental verified responses to the Ryan Set Two SI on May 20, 2026. (Ryan Dec., ¶ 4 & exhibit C.)

Between May 4 and May 23, 2026, Ryan, Skov, and Dalton engaged in a series of meet and confer communications concerning Ryan Set Two SI nos. 33 and 38. (Ryan Dec., ¶ 5 & exhibit D.) During those communications, Skov and Dalton requested additional time to provide supplemental responses, which were ultimately served on May 20, 2026. (Ryan Dec., ¶ 6.)

Following service of the supplemental responses, Ryan sought clarification regarding Ryan Set Two SI nos. 33 and 38. (Ryan Dec., ¶ 7.) Skov and Dalton stated, among other things: “There is no supplementation required regarding [Ryan Set Two SI] [n]o. 38. The verified answer that we provided is accurate and complete. We stand by it.” (Ryan Dec., ¶ 8.) With respect to Ryan Set Two SI no. 33, Skov and Dalton stated, among other things: “Accordingly, we do not intend to provide further supplementation.” (Ryan Dec., ¶ 9.)

Analysis:

(1) The April 28 Nelly Motion

Noted above, the discovery that is the subject of the April 28 Nelly Motion is the Nelly Set Two FI; Nelly Set One RFP nos. 1, 2, 5 through 19, and 24 through 27; and Nelly Set Two RFP nos. 30, 33, 35, and 36. (Notice at p. 2; Memorandum at pp. 4-6; Separate Statement [Nelly Set One RFP] at pp. 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19, 21, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30, 33, 35, 37, 38 & 40; Separate Statement [Nelly Set Two RFP] at pp. 2-5.)

“The Civil Discovery Act [the Act] sets out six methods by which litigants can obtain pretrial disclosure of relevant information: (a) depositions; (b) interrogatories; (c) inspections of documents, things, and places; (d) physical and mental examinations; (e) requests for admissions; and (f) exchanges of expert trial witness information. [Citation.] The procedures relevant to discovery under each of these six methods are outlined in different chapters of the Act.” (City of Los Angeles v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP (2024) 17 Cal.5th 46, 61 (PricewaterhouseCoopers).) Relevant here, Chapter 13, codified as Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.010 through 2030.410, governs interrogatories, and Chapter 14, codified as Code of Civil Procedure sections 2031.010 through 2031.060, governs inspection demands. (See Ibid.)

Though the April 28 Nelly Motion is authorized under the Act, as to each method or set of discovery described above, the order requested in that motion is keyed to the responses of Ryan, or a purported failure by Ryan to respond, to the Nelly Set Two FI, the Nelly Set One RFP, and the Nelly Set Two RFP, each of which constitute separate and particular methods of discovery under the Act. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290, subds. (a) & (b) [interrogatories]; §§ 2031.300 & 2031.310, subds. (a) & (b) [inspection demands].) As further discussed above, different provisions of the Act separately authorize motions to compel further responses to specific methods or sets of discovery. For these reasons, the April 28 Nelly Motion effectively combines three motions under the Act with respect to three separate methods or sets of discovery described above. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1003 [“[e]very direction of a court or judge, made or entered in writing, and not included in a judgment, is denominated an order. An application for an order is a motion”].)

The fee to file a motion applies to “[d]iscovery motions under Title 4 (commencing with Section 2016.010) of Part 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” (Gov. Code, § 70617, subd. (a)(4).) “Regardless of whether each motion or matter is heard at a single hearing or at separate hearings, the filing fees required by subdivisions (a), (c), (d), and (e) apply separately to each motion or other paper filed.” (Gov. Code, § 70617, subd. (f).) Because each request for an order compelling a party to provide further responses to a specific set of discovery is a separately authorized motion, a separate filing fee is required for each motion whether or not they are presented in a single notice with combined supporting papers or presented with separate notices and supporting papers.

Though, generally, a party is not prohibited from combining papers supporting some types of motions, such as Nelly has done here in regard to the April 28 Nelly Motion, there exists a procedural problem regarding the payment of filing fees for that motion. For example, the court’s records reflect, without dispute, that Nelly paid one filing fee for the three separately authorized motions combined and presented in the April 28 Nelly Motion. (See, e.g., Mitchell Dec., ¶ 19 [describing the payment of one filing fee for the April 28 Nelly Motion].) “Officers of the state, or of a county or judicial district, shall not perform any official services unless upon the payment of the fees prescribed by law for the performance of the services, except as provided in this chapter.” (Gov. Code, § 6100.) “An unbroken line of decisions by our Supreme Court holds that it is mandatory for court clerks to demand and receive the fee required by statute before documents or pleadings are filed.” (Duran v. St. Luke’s Hospital (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 457, 459.)

For all reasons discussed above, the present record reflects that Nelly has not paid the required fee before filing the April 28 Nelly Motion.

In addition, and notwithstanding the procedural problem described above, each chapter of the Act “authorizes sanctions for certain conduct constituting misuse or abuse of different discovery methods.” (PricewaterhouseCoopers, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 61.) Relevant here, the August 14 Nelly Interrogatory Motion sought to compel Ryan to provide responses to the Nelly Set Two FI. The November 13 Order granted the August 14 Nelly Interrogatory Motion, but denied an award of monetary sanctions as to that motion. Further, though the February 19 Order denied the Nelly Terminating Motion, the court stated that its ruling “is without prejudice to Nelly filing an additional motion for further, incremental sanctions if Ryan does not serve [the] outstanding responses on or before March 5, 2026.”

Though Ryan contends in their opposition to the April 28 Nelly Motion that they have “repeatedly served verified responses, supplemental responses, amended responses, and additional document productions”, and provides a “chronology of those supplementation and meet-and-confer efforts” (see opp. at p. 2 & exhibit A), Ryan presents no information, evidence, or argument showing the service of any responses to the Nelly Set Two FI as required by the November 13 Order. The opposition also includes no factual or legal argument showing why there exists a substantial justification for Ryan’s ostensible failure to provide any responses to the Nelly Set Two FI as compelled by the November 13 Order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subd. (a); Cornerstone Realty Advisors, LLC v. Summit Healthcare REIT, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 771, 790 (Cornerstone).)

Relevant here, “[i]f a party ... fails to obey an order compelling answers, the court may make those orders that are just, including the imposition of an issue sanction, an evidence sanction, or a terminating sanction under [Code of Civil Procedure] Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010). In lieu of or in addition to that sanction, the court may impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010).” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290, subd. (c).)

Though there is no evidence or information to show or suggest that any failure by Ryan to comply with the November 13 Order was willful, the present record is, for all reasons discussed above, sufficient to show or suggest that Ryan has not complied with that order as to the Nelly Set Two FI. (See Puritan Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 877, 883–884 [general discussion interpreting former statute]; see also Aghaian v. Minassian (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 603, 618–620 [discussing circumstances where a finding of willfulness is required].) “Misuses of the discovery process include ... [d]isobeying a court order to provide discovery.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010, subd. (g).) “The court may impose a monetary sanction ordering that one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process, or any attorney advising that conduct, or both pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subd. (a).)

Assuming without deciding that an award of monetary sanctions would be appropriate in regard to any failure by Ryan to serve responses to the Nelly Set Two FI (and the court presently makes no findings in that regard), “[m]onetary sanctions for engaging in misuse of the discovery process may only be imposed based on attorney fees and costs ‘incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct.’ [Citation.]” (Cornerstone, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 790, original italics.) “The amount of monetary sanctions is limited to the ‘reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees’ that a party incurred as a result of the discovery abuse. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 791, original italics.)

Wholly absent from the April 28 Nelly Motion is any information or evidence showing the amount of attorney fees and costs incurred by Nelly as a result of Ryan’s failure to provide responses to the Nelly Set Two FI. That motion also fails to explain how attorney fees were incurred by Nelly as a result of any discovery abuses by Ryan in regard to the Nelly Set Two FI, or the reasonable expenses incurred by Nelly as a result of that discovery abuse.

For example, attorney Mitchell states that they spent in excess of 8 hours preparing the April 28 Nelly Motion, and that they anticipate expending at least two hours to review any opposition, prepare a reply, and attend the hearing, for a total of at least 10 hours. (Mitchell Dec., ¶ 17.) The Mitchell declaration fails to present any information or evidence showing the amount of the fees that were incurred as a result of any failure by Ryan to provide responses to the Nelly Set Two FI and instead, combines all of the attorney fees incurred by Nelly as a result of a purported failure by Ryan to provide code compliant response to the Nelly Set Two FI, the Nelly Set One RFP, and the Nelly Set Two RFP. For this reason, the April 28 Nelly Motion fails to show what, if any, attorney fees were incurred by Nelly as a result of any discovery abuse in regard to the Nelly Set Two FI.

The April 28 Nelly Motion also includes a request for an order compelling Ryan to serve responses or further responses to the three separate methods or sets of discovery described above. That request is, for all reasons discussed below, procedurally inappropriate under the circumstances present here.

The notice of the April 28 Nelly Motion states that the requests for orders compelling Ryan to provide responses to the Nelly Set Two FI, and further responses to the Nelly Set One RFP and Set Two RFP, are each made pursuant to subdivision (i) of Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310. (Notice at p. 2, ll. 4-13.) Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310 does not apply to form interrogatories such as the Nelly Set Two FI, and does not authorize a motion to compel responses those interrogatories. Instead, subdivision (i) under which the April 28 Nelly Motion is brought provides that, to the extent a party fails to obey an order compelling a further response to inspection demands, “the court may make those orders that are just, including the imposition of an issue sanction, an evidence sanction, or a terminating sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010).” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (i).)

Moreover, to the extent the April 28 Nelly Motion seeks an order compelling Ryan to provide further responses to the specific Nelly Set One RFP and Nelly Set Two RFP listed in Nelly’s supporting separate statement, that motion is authorized under subdivision (a), and not subdivision (i), of Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310, and must also comply with the provisions of subdivision (b) and (c) of that section. For these and all further reasons discussed above, the motion is procedurally defective and implicates due process concerns. (Kayne v. The Grande Holdings Limited (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1476 [general discussion]; Kinda v. Carpenter (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1277 [discussing notice requirements].)

The undisputed available information and evidence also shows or suggests that Ryan served further responses to the Nelly Set One RFP on February 27, 2026. (Mitchell Dec., ¶ 12 & exhibit C at pdf pp. 58 & 73.) In addition, attorney Mitchell’s declaration also indicates or suggests that the amended or supplemental responses served by Ryan on March 13, 2026, pertain to the Nelly Set Two RFP, only. (Mitchell Dec., ¶¶ 14-15 [stating that Ryan did not amend their responses to the Nelly Set One RFP] & exhibit E.) For these reasons, with respect to the Nelly Set One RFP, there exists some question as to whether the April 28 Nelly Motion was filed within the time prescribed in section 2031.310, or whether Nelly has “waive[d] any right to compel a further response to” the Nelly Set One RFP. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (c) [setting forth time within which notice of a motion to compel further responses must be given].)

Further, by combining a motion for monetary sanctions under subdivision (i) of Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310 with a motion to compel responses or further responses as to three methods of discovery separately authorized under the Act, Nelly has failed to sufficiently “specify for the court and the opposing party the grounds upon which [Nelly] seeks relief[]” (Luri v. Greenwald (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1125), or to “sufficiently define the issues for the information and attention of the adverse party and the court[]” (Hernandez v. Nat. Dairy Products Co. (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 490, 493.)

For all reasons discussed above, the April 28 Nelly Motion is procedurally deficient and inappropriate, and will be denied including as to any request for an award of monetary sanctions. The court’s ruling herein is without prejudice to the filing of a timely motion to compel Ryan’s responses or further responses to the Nelly Set Two FI, the Nelly Set One RFP, or the Nelly Set Two RFP, if appropriate, or an appropriate separate motion for sanctions for any purported misuse of the discovery process by Ryan, including any failure of Ryan to obey a court order compelling answers to discovery.

(2) The June 3 Ryan Motion

“The party to whom interrogatories have been propounded shall respond in writing under oath separately to each interrogatory by ... [¶] [a]n answer containing the information sought to be discovered[]”, “[a]n exercise of the party’s option to produce writings[]”, or “[a]n objection to the particular interrogatory.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.210, subd. (a)(1)-(3).) Each response “shall be as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits.” (Code Civ. Proc. §2030.220, subd. (a).)

“If an interrogatory cannot be answered completely, it shall be answered to the extent possible.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.220, subd. (b).) “If the responding party does not have personal knowledge sufficient to respond fully to an interrogatory, that party shall so state, but shall make a reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information by inquiry to other natural persons or organizations, except where the information is equally available to the propounding party.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.220, subd. (c).)

“If only a part of an interrogatory is objectionable, the remainder of the interrogatory shall be answered.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.240, subd. (a).) “If an objection is made to an interrogatory or to a part of an interrogatory, the specific ground for the objection shall be set forth clearly in the response. If an objection is based on a claim of privilege, the particular privilege invoked shall be clearly stated. If an objection is based on a claim that the information sought is protected work product under Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 2018.010), that claim shall be expressly asserted.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.240, subd. (b).)

A party propounding interrogatories may move for an order compelling further responses if that party deems that “[a]n answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete[]”, that “[a]n exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate[]”, or that “[a]n objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general.” (Code Civ. Proc., §2030.300, subd. (a)(1)-(3).) Notice of the motion must be “given within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the propounding party and the responding party have agreed in writing...”, and the motion “shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subds. (b)(1) & (c).)

The information and evidence presented in the June 3 Ryan Motion is sufficient to show “a reasonable and good faith attempt, either in person, by telephone, or by videoconference, to informally resolve each issue presented by the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.040, subd. (a); see Ryan Dec., ¶¶ 5-10.) In addition, the opposition of Skov and Dalton to the June 3 Ryan Motion does not show, with reasoned argument, why the June 3 Ryan Motion was not filed within the time prescribed in Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.300.

The separate statement submitted in support of the June 3 Ryan Motion identifies Ryan Set Two SI no. 33. That interrogatory asks Skov and Dalton to “[i]dentify each person involved in any decision regarding the timing or implementation of the COURT’S OCTOBER 2024 ORDER regarding the allocation and funding of the Decedent’s Trust, and state that person’s role in such decision.” (Sep. Stmt. at p. 2.) In their May 1, 2026, response, Skov and Dalton assert objections on the grounds that Ryan Set Two SI no. 33 “is overly broad, unduly burdensome and ambiguous[]”; that “because of its overly broad wording this interrogatory could be construed as violating the attorney work product doctrine or attorney client privilege[]”, that “the request seeks information in the possession, custody or control of third parties, including but not limited to Morgan Stanley[]”, and that “the interrogatory is compound in violation of Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.060.” (Ibid.)

In their May 20, 2026, supplemental response to Ryan Set Two SI no. 33, Skov and Dalton incorporate the objections described above, and state: “The parties involved with the “decision” appear to be persons at Morgan Stanley whose identities are unknown with certainty to Responding Parties. Based on information and belief, Responding Parties identify the names of persons at Morgan Stanley that are within their knowledge and information, including Michael C. Gretchen, retained counsel for Morgan Stanley; Michael McGinnis, First Vice President and Financial Advisor for Morgan Stanley Wealth Management; and Joy Pearson, First Vice President and Risk Officer for Morgan Stanley Wealth Management. In addition, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.230, Responding Parties refer Propounding Party to documents produced in response to Request for Production of Documents, Set Two, reflecting Responding Parties’ communications with Morgan Stanley related to the funding of the Decedent’s Trust pursuant to the Court's October 2024 Order produced at Bates SkDa01000- SkDa01147.” (Sep. Stmt. at p. 3.)

The reasons to compel a further response to Ryan Set Two SI no. 33 set forth in Ryan’s supporting separate statement include that the roles of the individuals identified in Skov and Dalton’s response to that interrogatory is not stated or identified, including as to those individuals reflected in Skov and Dalton’s implementation-related communications including those ostensibly dated on December 12, 2024, and March 10 and 11, 2025; and that Skov and Dalton did not confirm whether they contend the identified individuals played no role. (Sep. Stmt. at p. 4.)

In their responding separate statement, Skov and Dalton contend that Ryan has distorted the substance of Ryan Set Two SI no. 33; that Skov and Dalton have asserted appropriate objections to Ryan Set Two SI no. 33 in regard to its wording and appropriately invoked their right to refer to documents related to the funding of the Decedent’s Trust; that Skov and Dalton have answered the substance of Ryan Set Two SI no. 33 by stating that the decision to delay was attributable to Morgan Stanley and its personnel and identifying each person who was involved in that decision; and that Skov and Dalton have produce all of their documents on the topic to enable Ryan to cull the information sought in Ryan Set Two SI no. 33. (Resp. Sep. Stmt. at pp. 4-6.)

As to the objections of Skov and Dalton to Ryan Set Two SI no. 33, the party resisting discovery bears the burden to show cause justifying its objections by “supplying supporting evidence....” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 549 (Williams); see also West Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 422 (West Pico) [objecting party must “show cause why the questions are not within the purview of the code section”].) The opposition of Skov and Dalton presents no information or evidence “showing the quantum of work required” by Skov and Dalton to respond to Ryan Set Two SI no 33, or why there exists “an intent to create an unreasonable burden or that the ultimate effect of the burden is incommensurate with the result sought.” (West Pico, supra, 56 Cal.2d at p. 417.)

In addition, “some burden is inherent in all demands for discovery.” (West Pico, supra, 56 Cal.2d at p. 418.) Though a court may limit discovery if it determines that the burden to respond to that discovery outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, Skov and Dalton must “supply the basis for this determination.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 549; Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 431; Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.020, subd. (a).) For these and all further reasons further discussed above, the opposition of Skov and Dalton fails to supply that information.

Skov and Dalton also fail to present any “facts from which the trial court might find that [Ryan Set Two SI no. 33 was] interposed for improper purposes” or showing “cause why the questions are not within the purview of the code section.” (Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220; West Pico, supra, 56 Cal.2d at p. 422.) The court also does not find that Ryan Set Two SI no. 33, on its face, is ambiguous, overly broad, or compound. (See also Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 538 [the right to discovery is “broad” and “construed liberally....”].)

For all reasons discussed above, the court will overrule the objections of Skov and Dalton to Ryan Set Two SI no. 33 on the grounds that the interrogatory is overly broad, unduly burdensome, ambiguous, and compound.

Skov and Dalton also fail to present any information, evidence, or reasoned argument justifying their objection that the information sought in Ryan Set Two SI no. 33 is in the possession, custody, or control of third parties, including Morgan Stanley. For example, the response of Skov and Dalton to that interrogatory does not state or indicate why Skov or Dalton do not have personal knowledge which is sufficient to allow a full response to Ryan Set Two SI no. 33, or whether Skov and Dalton have made a reasonable and good faith effort to obtain that information as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.220, subdivision (c). For these and all further reasons discussed above, the court will overrule the objection of Skov and Dalton that Ryan Set Two SI no. 33 seeks information in the possession, custody, or control of any third party.

The opposition of Skov and Dalton also fails to explain, with supporting information, evidence, or reasoned argument, why “the answer to [Ryan Set Two SI no. 33] would necessitate the preparation or the making of a compilation, abstract, audit, or summary of or from the documents of [Skov and Dalton]”, or why “the burden or expense of preparing or making it would be substantially the same for [Ryan] as for [Skov and Dalton]....” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.230.) There is also some question as to whether the general description or information provided in the response of Skov and Dalton to Ryan Set Two SI no. 33 provides sufficient detail to permit Ryan to locate and identify the documents from which a response may be ascertained. (Ibid.)

For the same reasons discussed above, the June 3 Ryan Motion raises an issue as to the completeness of the information provided by Skov and Dalton in their response to Ryan Set Two SI no. 33, including as to whether the absence of any information regarding each person involved in any decision regarding the timing or implementation of the court’s order, or that person’s role in any such decision, arises from that information being unknown to Skov or Dalton or from that information being improperly omitted from the response. For these additional reasons, neither the court nor Ryan can ascertain whether the response of Skov and Dalton to Ryan Set Two SI no. 33 is as complete and straightforward as reasonably available information permits.

For all reasons discussed above, the court will grant the June 3 Ryan Motion as to Ryan Set Two SI no. 33, and will order Skov and Dalton to provide a verified, code compliant further response to that interrogatory without the objections overruled herein except as to those objections based on the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine.

Ryan Set Two SI no. 38 asks Skov and Dalton to state “whether a standalone accounting for the Decedent’s Trust has been prepared at any time from May 1, 2025 through the present.” (Sep. Stmt. at p. 5.) In their response, Skov and Dalton assert similar objections on the grounds that Ryan Set Two SI no. 38 “is overly broad, unduly burdensome and ambiguous[]”, and that “because of its overly broad wording this interrogatory could be construed as violating the attorney work product doctrine or attorney client privilege.” (Ibid.) The substantive response of Skov and Dalton states “No.” (Ibid.)

The reasons for compelling a further response to Ryan Set Two SI no. 38 asserted in the supporting separate statement of Ryan include that at the April 30, 2026, hearing, Skov and Dalton’ counsel represented to the court that a rough draft of the standalone accounting which is the subject of Ryan Set Two SI no. 38 existed or had been prepared, and would be completed within 60 days; that Ryan sought clarification regarding whether any draft, preliminary, or partial Decedent’s Trust accounting existed during the relevant period; that Skov and Dalton did not provide the requested clarification; and that the existence or nonexistence of a draft, preliminary, or partial accounting bears directly on the status and completion of the first Decedent’s Trust accounting and may assist in evaluating the status of the accounting process or any uncertainty concerning the completion of that accounting. (Sep. Stmt. at pp. 5-7.)

In their response, Skov and Dalton assert that their answer to Ryan Set Two SI no. 38 was true as of May 1, 2026; that any statement by Skov and Dalton’s counsel that Skov and Dalton were preparing their next accounting, or that a substantial part of that accounting was in rough draft or would be completed in 60 days, does not invalidate that response because, at that time, there was only a partial draft in process; and that the first “standalone” account for the Decedent’s Trust was filed after Skov and Dalton answered Ryan Set Two SI no. 39. (Resp. Sep. Stmt. at pp. 7 8.)

As to the identical objections asserted by Skov and Dalton in their response to Ryan Set Two SI no. 38, the same reasoning and analysis apply. For the same reasons further discussed above, and with the exception of those that are based on the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine, the court will overrule the objections of Skov and Dalton to Ryan Set Two SI no. 38.

Because the information included in the responding separate statement of Skov and Dalton is not included in those parties’ response to Ryan Set Two SI no. 38, it is unclear whether at the time Skov and Dalton served their response to Ryan Set Two SI no. 38, some draft or portion of the accounting described in that interrogatory was complete. Further, Skov and Dalton fail to explain why the plain, express language of Ryan Set Two SI no. 38 excludes rough or partial drafts of the “standalone accounting” described in that interrogatory. Instead, Ryan Set Two SI no. 38 asks Skov and Dalton to state whether an accounting had been prepared at any time. For these and all further reasons discussed above, the present record suggests or indicates that the response of Skov and Dalton to Ryan Set Two SI no. 38 is not “as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to” Skov and Dalton permitted, and that the interrogatory has not been answered “to the extent possible.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.220, subds. (a), (b).)

“Where the question is specific and explicit, an answer which supplies only a portion of the information sought is wholly insufficient. Likewise, a party may not provide deftly worded conclusionary answers designed to evade a series of explicit questions.” (Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783, superseded by statute on another ground as stated in Guzman v. General Motors Corp. (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 438, 444.) For these and all reasons discussed above, the court will grant the June 3 Ryan Motion as to Ryan Set Two SI no 38, and will require Skov and Dalton to serve a verified, code compliant further response to that interrogatory without the objections overruled herein.

The June 3 Ryan Motion requests an order “[a]warding no monetary sanctions.” (Notice at p. 3, ¶ 3.) For these reasons, and as the court will grant that motion for all reasons discussed above, the court declines to award sanctions in favor of or against Ryan, Skov, or Dalton. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.040 & § 2030.300, subd. (d).)

(3) Procedural Matters

“[T]he court may, upon the written motion of any party, or of its own motion, appoint a referee ... pursuant to the provisions of subdivision (b) of [Code of Civil Procedure] [s]ection 640 [¶] [w]hen the court in any pending action determines that it is necessary for the court to appoint a referee to hear and determine any and all discovery motions and disputes relevant to discovery in the action and to report findings and make a recommendation thereon.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 639, subd. (a)(50.) “A discovery referee must not be appointed under Code of Civil Procedure section 639(a)(5) unless the exceptional circumstances of the particular case require the appointment.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.920(c).)

“The power to impose a reference on non-consenting parties and require them to pay for easing the court’s workload is a powerful tool in the court’s arsenal: it permits the court to avoid massive paperwork, clear crowded dockets of repetitive and snarly motions, and can induce parties to take a more reasonable approach to discovery to keep costs from mounting. ‘When the Legislature amended section 639 and enacted section 645.1 in 1981, it obviously intended to give the overburdened trial courts the opportunity to utilize the paid expertise of retired judges in the resolution of complicated, time-consuming discovery disputes.’ [Citations.]” (Taggares v. Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 94, 104 & fn. 7 (Taggares).)

“Unless both parties have agreed to a reference, the court should not make blanket orders directing all discovery motions to a discovery referee except in the unusual case where a majority of factors favoring reference are present. These include: (1) there are multiple issues to be resolved; (2) there are multiple motions to be heard simultaneously; (3) the present motion is only one in a continuum of many; (4) the number of documents to be reviewed (especially in issues based on assertions of privilege) make the inquiry inordinately time-consuming.” (Taggares, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 105.)

As further discussed above, the undisputed present record reflects that the April 28 Nelly Motion and the June 3 Ryan Motion are part of a continuum of the many discovery motions further described above. (See also Mitchell Dec. [April 28 Nelly Motion], ¶ 8 [stating that Nelly has filed “many discovery motions in this case.”].) Several of the discovery motions described above, including the April 28 Nelly Motion and the June 3 Ryan Motion, were calendared to be heard simultaneously, and required the court to expend significant time to review numerous documents and resolve multiple issues.

The court also notes that the May 6 Ryan Motion requests an order appointing a discovery referee pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 639 “to oversee and enforce discovery conduct moving forward[.]” (May 6 Ryan Motion at pdf p. 3.) Though Ryan is, and at the time of filing of the May 6 Ryan Motion was, self represented in this litigation, that motion did not present any information or evidence showing that Ryan is indigent or unable to pay the fees of a discovery referee. (See Hood v. Superior Court (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 446, 449–450 [general discussion].)

In addition, though Nelly’s opposition the May 6 Ryan Motion argued that there was no basis for the appointment of a discovery referee because “the parties proceeded in an orderly fashion to exchange discovery, engage in settlement discussions, and otherwise properly advance the case forward[]” (Nelly May 20, 2025, Opp. at p. 9), Nelly had not, at the time of filing that opposition, filed the May 19 Nelly Motions, the August 12 Nelly Motion, the August 14 Nelly Motions, the October 6 Nelly Motions, the November 4 Nelly Motion, the Nelly Terminating Motion, or the April 28 Nelly Motion. The opposition of Nelly to the May 6 Ryan Motion also presents no evidence, information, or argument showing why Nelly is indigent or unable to pay the fees of a discovery referee.

The same analysis applies in regard to the opposition of Skov and Dalton to the May 6 Ryan Motion. For example, Skov and Dalton had not filed the August 13 Skov/Dalton Motions or the October 2 Skov/Dalton Motion as of the date of filing of their opposition to the May 6 Ryan Motion. (See also May 21, 2025, Skov/Dalton Opp. at p. 13 [stating that “there are no pending or anticipated discovery disputes”].) That opposition also did not show any inability to pay the fees of a discovery referee, and instead asserted that it would be “unfair” to charge the Trust for the costs of a discovery referee which “appears to be a frivolity”; and that Skov and Dalton “would agree to the appointment of a discovery referee in order to accommodate [Ryan] ... provided that all costs for such a referee are allocated solely to [Ryan].” (Ibid.)

Court records also reflect that on June 4, 2026, Nelly filed a status report stating that Nelly intends to file a “further [m]otion against Ryan, in connection with his deficient responses to” the Nelly Set Three FI, which, as further detailed above, were the subject of the November 4 Nelly Motion. (Jun. 4, 2026, Nelly Status Report at p. 3.)

“Where one or more of the above factors unduly impact the court’s time and/or limited resources, the court is clearly within its discretion to make an appropriate reference.” (Taggares, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 106.) For all reasons discussed above, the multiple discovery issues and many discovery motions that have arisen and been filed in this case have unduly impacted the court’s time and limited resources. Therefore, to the extent any discovery motions are filed in the future, the court intends to consider whether the appointment of a discovery referee is necessary and appropriate. The court encourages the parties to resolve any future discovery disputes to avoid the necessity for a discovery referee.