Danielle Knights vs Thomas V Aguirre

Case Number

24CV07217

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 02/27/2026 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

CMC; Demurrer and Motion to Strike

Tentative Ruling

(1)       The demurrer of defendant Thomas V. Aguirre, M.D., to the first amended complaint is overruled. Defendant shall file his responsive pleading on or before March 13, 2026.

(2)       The motion of defendant Thomas V. Aguirre, M.D., to strike portions of the first amended complaint is denied.   

Background:

On December 20, 2024, plaintiff Danielle Knights initiated this action by filing a complaint against defendant Thomas V. Aguirre asserting four causes of action for (1) sexual battery, (2) gender violence under Civil Code section 52.4, (3) sexual harassment under Civil Code section 51.9, and (4) sexual assault.

On July 31, 2025, plaintiff filed her operative first amended complaint (FAC) asserting the same four causes of action.

As alleged in the FAC:

Defendant is a physician with a primary area of practice in gastroenterology. (FAC, ¶ 5.) Plaintiff had a consultation with defendant on October 26, 2016, for Crohn’s disease. (Id., ¶ 6.) Plaintiff was 23 years old at the time of the appointment. (Ibid.)

During the appointment, plaintiff told defendant that she had been asymptomatic for a couple of years due to opiate use. (FAC, ¶ 7.) Plaintiff also disclosed that she was in a treatment facility receiving care for opiate addiction. (Ibid.) Plaintiff believed this was relevant information to share with defendant because she was experiencing “Crohn’s flare ups” after being in remission for a couple of years. (Ibid.)

Defendant asked plaintiff questions about her addiction and then commented on her looks, saying something to the effect that she did not look like a drug addict and was a pretty girl. (FAC, ¶ 8.)

Defendant then directed plaintiff to lay on her back on the medical bed for an abdominal exam. (FAC, ¶ 9.) The examination was routine until the very end when defendant used his hand to lift plaintiff’s underwear and pants to view her vagina. (Ibid.) In doing so, defendant made unconsented flesh-to-flesh contact with her groin. (Ibid.) Defendant did not provide plaintiff any warning or explanation as to why this was necessary and did not say anything about it afterwards. (Ibid.) This left plaintiff in shock. (Ibid.)

Defendant’s conduct was not undertaken for the purpose of delivering health care. (FAC, ¶ 9.) This conduct was undertaken for defendant’s own sexual gratification. (Ibid.) This conduct had no relation to defendant’s professional expertise as a gastroenterologist or to his examination related to plaintiff’s Crohn’s disease. (Ibid.)

After the examination, plaintiff sat up quietly and attempted to listen to defendant’s recommendations concerning laboratory work and a colonoscopy. (FAC, ¶ 10.) Still in shock, and fearful something else might happen, plaintiff listened and waited for the appointment to end. (Ibid.) Plaintiff left the appointment with feelings of confusion, discomfort, and that she had been violated. (Ibid.)  

Defendant demurs to the FAC on the grounds that each cause of action (COA) in the FAC fails to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. Defendant also moves to strike plaintiff’s punitive damages allegations, arguing that pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.13 a claim for punitive damages may not be maintained against a health care provider absent a court order. Plaintiff has filed oppositions to both the demurrer and motion to strike.

Analysis:

(1)       Standard on Demurrer

“Because the function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of a pleading as a matter of law, we … assume the truth of the allegations in the complaint, but do not assume the truth of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law. [Citation.] It is error for the trial court to sustain a demurrer if the plaintiff has stated a cause of action under any possible legal theory, and it is an abuse of discretion for the court to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if the plaintiff has shown there is a reasonable possibility a defect can be cured by amendment.” (California Logistics, Inc. v. State of California (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 242, 247.) “The reviewing court gives the complaint a reasonable interpretation, and treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded.” (Payne v. National Collection Systems, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1037, 1043.) “[I]n ruling on a demurrer the trial court may take into account in addition to the complaint itself any matter that may be properly considered under the doctrine of judicial notice.” (Cruz v. County of Los Angeles (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 1131, 1133-1134.)

(2)       First COA for Sexual Battery

Defendant demurs to the first COA on the grounds that there are no allegations that defendant acted with intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact with an intimate part of plaintiff’s body and there are no allegations that defendant contacted an intimate part of plaintiff’s body. (Demurrer, p. 2, ll. 1-7.)

Sexual battery under Civil Code section 1708.5 includes:

“(1) Acts with the intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact with an intimate part of another, and a sexually offensive contact with that person directly or indirectly results.

“(2) Acts with the intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact with another by use of the person’s intimate part, and a sexually offensive contact with that person directly or indirectly results.

“(3) Acts to cause an imminent apprehension of the conduct described in paragraph (1) or (2), and a sexually offensive contact with that person directly or indirectly results.” (Civ. Code, § 1708.5, subds. (a)(1)-(3).) 

“ ‘Intimate part’ means the sexual organ, anus, groin, or buttocks of any person, or the breast of a female.” (Civ. Code, § 1708.5, subd. (d)(1).) “ ‘Offensive contact’ means contact that offends a reasonable sense of personal dignity.” (Id., subd. (d)(2).)

“A person who commits a sexual battery upon another is liable to that person for damages, including, but not limited to, general damages, special damages, and punitive damages.” (Civ. Code, § 1708.5, subd. (b).)

Plaintiff alleges a sexually offensive contact with her groin, the element of intent, and imminent apprehension of sexually offensive contact with an intimate part of her body. (FAC, ¶¶ 7-10.) Plaintiff alleges that this contact was unrelated to the medical issues for which she sought consultation. (FAC, ¶¶ 9-10.) The elements of a COA for sexual battery have been alleged. (See Civ. Code, § 1708.5.)  The court will overrule the demurrer to the first COA for sexual battery.

(3)       Second COA for Gender Violence

Defendant demurs to the second COA on the grounds that there are no allegations of a criminal offense that has an element of use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force or a physical intrusion or physical invasion of a sexual nature under coercive conditions. (Demurrer, p. 2, ll. 8-11.)

Gender violence includes “[a] physical intrusion or physical invasion of a sexual nature under coercive conditions, whether or not those acts have resulted in criminal complaints, charges, prosecution, or conviction.” (Civ. Code, § 52.4., subd. (c)(1).) “Any person who has been subjected to gender violence may bring a civil action for damages against any responsible party.” (Civ. Code, § 52.4, subd. (a).)

Here, the FAC alleges that defendant physically touched the skin of plaintiff’s groin after lifting her pants and underwear without consent for purposes of sexual gratification unrelated to medical treatment. (FAC, ¶¶ 7-10.) The FAC alleges physical intrusion or physical invasion of a sexual nature under coercive conditions. The elements of a COA for sexual violence have been alleged. (See Civ. Code, § 52.4.) The court will overrule the demurrer to the second COA for gender violence.

(4)       Third COA for Sexual Harassment

Defendant demurs to the third COA on the grounds that there are no allegations that defendant made sexual advances, solicitations, sexual requests, demands for sexual compliance, or engaged in other verbal, visual, or physical conduct of a sexual nature or of a hostile nature based on gender. (Demurrer, p. 2, ll. 12-15.)

A physician is liable for sexual harassment against a patient if he “has made sexual advances, solicitations, sexual requests, demands for sexual compliance by the plaintiff, or engaged in other verbal, visual, or physical conduct of a sexual nature or of a hostile nature based on gender, that were unwelcome and pervasive or severe.” (Civ. Code, § 51.9, subd. (a)(2).) “[T]the words ‘pervasive or severe’ are to be given ‘the same meaning that those words have in the employment context.’ ” (Ramirez v. Wong (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1480, 1487.) “An isolated incident of harassing conduct ‘may qualify as ‘severe’ when it consists of ‘a physical assault or the threat thereof.’ ” (Id. at p. 1488; see also Thomas v. Regents of University of California (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 587, 609.)

Here, the FAC alleges that there was one instance of nonconsensual skin-to-skin contact with plaintiff’s groin that occurred when defendant, for purposes of sexual gratification, lifted her pants and underwear without consent. (FAC, ¶¶ 7-10.) The FAC alleges nonconsensual physical conduct of a sexual nature based on gender. The elements of a COA for sexual harassment have been alleged. (See Civ. Code, § 51.9.) The court will overrule the demurrer to the third COA for sexual harassment.
 

(5)       Fourth COA for Sexual Assault

Defendant demurs to the fourth COA on the grounds that there are no allegations that defendant acted with intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact with an intimate part of plaintiff’s body or threatened to touch plaintiff in a harmful or offensive way. (Demurrer, p. 2, ll. 16-18.)

“The essential elements of a cause of action for assault are: (1) defendant acted with intent to cause harmful or offensive contact, or threatened to touch plaintiff in a harmful or offensive manner; (2) plaintiff reasonably believed she was about to be touched in a harmful or offensive manner or it reasonably appeared to plaintiff that defendant was about to carry out the threat; (3) plaintiff did not consent to defendant’s conduct; (4) plaintiff was harmed; and (5) defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff's harm.” (So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 668-669.) The court has already addressed the application of Civil Code section 1708.5 above.

Here, the FAC alleges that defendant caused offensive, nonconsensual touching of plaintiff’s groin without consent and that plaintiff was harmed. (FAC, ¶¶ 7-10.) The elements of a COA for sexual assault have been alleged. The court will overrule the demurrer to the fourth COA for sexual assault.
 

(6)       Motion to Strike Prayer for Punitive Damages

Defendant moves to strike plaintiff’s punitive damages allegations on the basis that plaintiff did not first obtain a court order in compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 425.13.

“Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof ….” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).) “The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to [s]ection 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: [¶] … [s]trike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).) “In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)

“[A] claim for punitive damages against a health care provider is subject to section 425.13 only ‘if the injury that is the basis for the claim was caused by conduct that was directly related to the rendition of professional services.’ ” (Little Co. of Mary Hospital v. Superior Court (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 261, 267.) “[T]he essential inquiry in determining whether section 425.13 applies is not the label of the claim, but the context in which the claim arises.” (Ibid.) “By contrast, a cause of action against a health care provider for sexual battery would not, in most instances, fall within the statute because the defendant’s conduct would not be directly related to the manner in which professional services were rendered.” (Central Pathology Service Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th 181, 192.)

Here, the FAC alleges that “Defendant’s conduct was not undertaken for the purpose of delivering health care, but for his own sexual gratification, and had no relation to Defendant’s professional expertise as a gastroenterologist, or to his gastroenterology examination related to Plaintiff’s Crohn’s disease.” (FAC, ¶ 9.) The SAC alleges that “Plaintiff did not understand defendant to be a gynecologist, did not raise any issues related to her reproductive system, and did not consent to him touching her groin or conducting any examination related to her reproductive system.” (FAC, ¶ 10.) Based on the allegations in the FAC, the alleged injury is not directly related to the medical services at issue and section 425.13 does not apply.

For all these reasons, the court will deny the motion to strike.