Christopher Gregoire vs General Motors LLC

Case Number

24CV06798

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 02/20/2026 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

CMC; Demurrer and Motion to Strike

Tentative Ruling

(1) For all reasons stated herein, defendant General Motors LLC’s demurrer to the first amended complaint is overruled.

(2) For all reasons stated herein, defendant General Motors LLC’s motion to strike is denied.

Background:

On December 4, 2024, plaintiff Christopher Gregoire initiated this action by filing a complaint against defendant General Motors LLC (GM). This is a breach of warranty action under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act pertaining to the purchase and warranty of a vehicle.

On June 2, 2025, plaintiff filed his operative first amended complaint (FAC) asserting five causes of action for: (1) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (d); (2) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (b); (3) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (a)(3); (4) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability; and (5) fraudulent inducement – concealment.

As alleged in the FAC:

On July 18, 2018, plaintiff entered into a warranty contract with GM regarding a 2018 Chevrolet Tahoe (Vehicle). (FAC, ¶ 6.) The Vehicle was manufactured and distributed by GM. (Ibid.) The Vehicle was purchased by plaintiff from Home Motors in Santa Maria, GM’s authorized dealer. (Ibid.)

The warranty contract included the bumper-to-bumper warranty, powertrain warranty, and emission warranty. (FAC, ¶ 7.) A copy of the warranty contract is attached to the FAC as exhibit A. (FAC, Ex. A.)

Defects and nonconformities to warranty manifested themselves within the applicable express warranty period, including transmission defects, engine defects, electrical defects, and other defects and non-conformities. (FAC, ¶ 11.) Plaintiff experienced symptoms of these defects including harsh shifting, slipping, shuddering, hesitation on acceleration, jerking, transmission failure, and loss of power. (FAC, ¶ 21.) Plaintiff discovered GM’s wrongful conduct alleged herein shortly before he filed the complaint. (FAC, ¶ 23.)

GM knew that the 6-speed transmission installed on the Vehicle was defective but failed to disclose this fact to plaintiff. (FAC, ¶ 60.) GM concealed these defects, minimized the scope, cause, and dangers of the defects, and refused to investigate, address, and remedy the defects. (FAC, ¶ 35.)

On July 31, 2025, GM filed a demurrer to the FAC arguing that the first four causes of action in the FAC are barred by the statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure section 871.21, subdivision (b). GM argues that the fifth cause of action for concealment is barred by the statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (d). GM also argues that the fifth cause of action for concealment fails to state the elements with sufficient specificity or allege a transactional relationship with GM giving rise to a duty to disclose. GM also filed a motion to strike the prayer for punitive damages. The demurer and motion to strike are opposed.

Analysis:

(1)       Standard on Demurrer

“Because the function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of a pleading as a matter of law, we … assume the truth of the allegations in the complaint, but do not assume the truth of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law. [Citation.] It is error for the trial court to sustain a demurrer if the plaintiff has stated a cause of action under any possible legal theory, and it is an abuse of discretion for the court to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if the plaintiff has shown there is a reasonable possibility a defect can be cured by amendment.” (California Logistics, Inc. v. State of California (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 242, 247.) “The reviewing court gives the complaint a reasonable interpretation, and treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded.” (Payne v. National Collection Systems, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1037, 1043.) “[I]n ruling on a demurrer the trial court may take into account in addition to the complaint itself any matter that may be properly considered under the doctrine of judicial notice.” (Cruz v. County of Los Angeles (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 1131, 1133-1134.)

(2)       Statute of Limitations Under Section 871.21, Subdivision (b)

Plaintiff filed this action on December 4, 2024. (Complaint.) Code of Civil Procedure section 871.21 became effective on January 1, 2025. (Code Civ. Proc., § 871.21.) “[A] statute may be applied retroactively only if it contains express language of retroactivity or if other sources provide a clear and unavoidable implication that the Legislature intended retroactive application.” (McClung v. Employment Development Dept. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 467, 475.) Section 871.21 and the related code sections do not expressly indicate this new limitations period should be retroactively applied to actions pending as of January 1, 2025. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 871.20-871.30.) GM has not cited the court to any source indicating a clear and unavoidable legislative intent for retroactive application of this statute to pending actions. The court has not independently located any such source.

Additionally, section 871.21, subdivision (b), only “applies to an action, brought against a manufacturer who has elected under Section 871.29 to proceed under this chapter ….” (Code Civ. Proc., § 871.20, subd. (a).) GM has not filed a request for judicial notice in support of this motion demonstrating that GM made such an election pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 871.20, 871.29, or 871.30. GM has not noted any other citation demonstrating such election can be ascertained from the face of the FAC or any matter subject to judicial notice.

Since GM has not offered any other basis in support of its demurrer to the first four causes of action in the FAC, the court will overrule GM’s demurrer to the first, second, third, and fourth causes of action.

(3)       Statute of Limitations for the Fifth Cause of Action for Concealment

“[I]t is difficult for demurrers based on the statute of limitations to succeed because (1) trial and appellate courts treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded and (2) resolution of the statute of limitations issue can involve questions of fact. Furthermore, when the relevant facts are not clear such that the cause of action might be, but is not necessarily, time-barred, the demurrer will be overruled. [Citation.] Thus, for a demurrer based on the statute of limitations to be sustained, the untimeliness of the lawsuit must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint and matters judicially noticed.” (Schmier v. City of Berkeley (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 549, 554.)

The statute of limitations for fraud is three years. (Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (d).) However, a cause of action for fraud does not accrue “until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the fact constituting the fraud or mistake.” (Ibid.) The limitations period begins once the plaintiff has actual or constructive notice or information of circumstances to put a reasonable person on inquiry. (Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1110-1111.)

Here, the “[d]efects and nonconformities to warranty manifested themselves within the applicable express warranty period.” (FAC, ¶ 11.) The warranty contract was effective as of July 18, 2018. (FAC, ¶ 6.) The warranty period ranged from three to eight years, depending on the coverage. (FAC, ¶ 7, Ex. A.) Plaintiff alleged learning of GM’s misconduct shortly before filing the complaint. (FAC, ¶ 21.) The defects were actively concealed by GM. (FAC, ¶¶ 62-67.) The complaint was filed on December 4, 2024. (Complaint.) The court cannot determine based on the face of the FAC that the fifth cause of action for concealment is necessarily time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (d).

The court will overrule the demurrer to the fifth cause of action as to these grounds.

(4)       Elements of Concealment

GM argues that plaintiff has not plead the elements of concealment. “[T]he elements of an action for fraud and deceit based on concealment are: (1) the defendant must have concealed or suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant must have been under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) the defendant must have intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) the plaintiff must have been unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff must have sustained damage.” (SCC Acquisitions Inc. v. Central Pacific Bank (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 859, 864.)

In the context of consumer allegations that a car manufacturer concealed known defects, a cause of action for fraudulent concealment/inducement is sufficiently alleged against the manufacturer where: “vehicles (including the one plaintiffs purchased) were defective; [manufacturer] knew of the defects and the hazards they posed; [manufacturer] had exclusive knowledge of the defects but intentionally concealed and failed to disclose that information; [manufacturer] intended to deceive plaintiffs by concealing known [defects]; plaintiffs would not have purchased the car if they had known of the defects; and plaintiffs suffered damages in the form of money paid to purchase the car.” (Dhital v. Nissan North America, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828, 844 (Dhital).)

Here, the FAC alleges: the Vehicle was part of a class of vehicles that were defective (FAC, ¶¶ 11-12, 21, 59-71); GM knew of the defective transmission and hazards this created (FAC, ¶¶ 59-61); GM had unique knowledge of the defects but failed to disclose them (FAC, ¶¶ 62-66); GM acted with intent to deceive by concealing the defects from plaintiff (FAC, ¶ 67); had plaintiff known of the defects he would not have purchased the Vehicle (FAC, ¶¶ 68-70); and plaintiff was damaged as a result of his purchase (FAC, ¶ 71). The elements of concealment have been alleged. (See Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 838-844.)

The court will overrule the demurrer to the fifth cause of action as to these grounds.

(5)       Transactional Relationship with GM

GM argues the FAC does not allege a transactional relationship with plaintiff that could give rise to a duty to disclose by GM. “There are ‘four circumstances in which nondisclosure or concealment may constitute actionable fraud: (1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts. [Citation.]’ ” (LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 336.) Aside from a fiduciary relationship, “[e]ach of the other three circumstances in which nondisclosure may be actionable presupposes the existence of some other relationship between the plaintiff and defendant in which a duty to disclose can arise.” (Id. at pp. 336-337.)

Contrary to GM’s arguments, the FAC alleges that GM manufactured and distributed the Vehicle, and that plaintiff purchased the Vehicle from GM’s authorized agent. (FAC, ¶ 6.) These allegations are sufficient at the pleading stage to establish a transactional relationship between plaintiff and GM for purposes of the concealment claim. (See Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 844.)

Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, 284 (Bigler-Engler), cited by GM, involved a defective medical device prescribed by the plaintiff’s physician. The manufacturer in Bigler-Engler “had no knowledge that this … device (and its associated outdated warnings and directions) had been provided to [the plaintiff].” (Id. at p. 313.) Bigler-Engler is distinguishable because here it is alleged that GM did have knowledge that plaintiff was sold a defective Vehicle and did enter into a transaction with plaintiff via the warranty and the sale by GM’s authorized agent.

The court also reviewed Antonov v. General Motors LLC (C.D. Cal., Jan. 19, 2024), 2024 WL 217825, at *10 (Antonov), cited by GM. Antonov found the allegations of transactional relationship insufficient where the plaintiff alleged “only that he acquired the Vehicle ‘from an authorized dealer and agent’ of [d]efendant and the dealership was ‘authorized by [defendant] to do business in the State of California on behalf of [defendant].’ ” (Id. at p. *11.) Here, unlike Antonov, plaintiff alleges additional facts including that the Vehicle was purchased from Home Motors in Santa Maria on July 18, 2018, and that this business was an authorized dealer for GM. (FAC, ¶ 6.) Applying California’s pleading standards, the court finds these allegations are sufficient at the pleading stage. (See Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 844 [“Plaintiffs alleged that they bought the car from a Nissan dealership, that Nissan backed the car with an express warranty, and that Nissan’s authorized dealerships are its agents for purposes of the sale of Nissan vehicles to consumers. In light of these allegations, we decline to hold plaintiffs’ claim is barred on the ground there was no relationship requiring Nissan to disclose known defects.”].)

Rattagan v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2024) 17 Cal.5th 1 (Rattagan), cited by GM, is distinguishable and does not compel the result sought by GM. Rattagan involved a case brought by a corporate attorney hired to assist in a ride-share platform in Argentina against the company that contracted with him to perform this work. (Rattagan, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 13-18.) Rattagan held in response to a certified question from United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that, “[a] plaintiff may assert a fraudulent concealment cause of action based on conduct occurring in the course of a contractual relationship if the elements of the claim can be established independently of the parties’ contractual rights and obligations, and the tortious conduct exposes the plaintiff to a risk of harm beyond the reasonable contemplation of the parties when they entered into the contract.” (Id. at p. 38.) “The guiding and distinguishing principle is this. If the alleged breach is based on a failure to perform as the contract provides, and the parties reasonably anticipated and allocated the risks associated with the breach, the cause of action will generally sound only in contract because a breach deprives an injured party of a benefit it bargained for. However, if the contract reveals the consequences were not reasonably contemplated when the contract was entered and the duty to avoid causing such a harm has an independent statutory or public policy basis, exclusive of the contract, tort liability may lie.” (Id. at p. 27.)

Here, the concealment/inducement cause of action is based on conduct that occurred before the contract was completed that induced plaintiff to enter into this contract. (FAC, ¶¶ 63-64, 68, 71.) Plaintiff did not reasonably contemplate that GM or its agents were selling him a car with known transmission defects, rendering the Vehicle dangerous to operate. (See FAC, ¶¶ 21, 61.) The injury resulting from the alleged fraud is not the failure to repair the Vehicle under the warranty. Rather, the alleged injury is that plaintiff would not have purchased the Vehicle or entered into the warranty contract had plaintiff known he was being defrauded. (FAC, ¶¶ 63-64, 68, 71.) This alleged harm is independent of GM’s contractual obligations under these circumstances. (See Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 838-844.)

The court will overrule the demurrer to the fifth cause of action as to these grounds.

(6)       Motion to Strike

“Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof ….” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).) “The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to [s]ection 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: [¶] … [s]trike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).) “In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255 (Clauson).)

As to punitive damages, “[i]n an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim.” (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166.) “In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff.” (Clauson, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 1255.) “ ‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff ….” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) Fraud means “an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Id., subd. (c)(3).)

Here, the FAC alleges that GM intentionally concealed known defects from plaintiff at the time of sale including that the Vehicle had transmission defects rendering the Vehicle a safety hazard. (See FAC, ¶¶ 60-67.) The SAC alleges that GM knew the Vehicle was not suited for its intended use but nonetheless fraudulently induced plaintiff to purchase it by concealing these known defects. (See ibid.) This is sufficient to allege malice and fraud. (See Civ. Code, § 3294, subds. (c)(1), (c(3).)

The court will deny GM’s motion to strike the prayer for punitive damages.