The People of the State of California v. National CPR Foundation, LLC, et al.

Case Number

24CV05905

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 02/04/2026 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses of Defendants

Tentative Ruling

For Plaintiff The People of the State of California: John T. Savrnoch, Office of the Santa Barbara County District Attorney, Michael A. Hestrin, Evan H. Goldsmith, Office of the Riverside County District Attorney

                                   

For Defendants National CPR Foundation LLC and Michael Angelo Paladino: Sean Ponist, Cary D. McReynolds, Jessica L. Davis, Ponist Law Group, P.C.

RULING

(1) For the reasons stated herein, the motion of plaintiff to compel further responses from defendants is granted, in part. Except as herein granted, the motion is otherwise denied.

(2) On or before February 23, 2026, defendant National CPR Foundation LLC, shall serve verified, code compliant further responses to plaintiff’s set one inspection demand nos. 22 through 26, without the objections overruled herein.

(3) On or before February 23, 2026, defendants shall each serve verified, code compliant further responses to plaintiff’s set two form interrogatories no. 15.1, without the objections overruled herein.

(4) For the reasons stated herein, the court awards sanctions in favor of plaintiff The People of the State of California and against defendants’ National CPR Foundation LLC, and Michael Paladino, in the amount of $6,375, payable to plaintiff’s counsel. Payment of sanctions is due by March 4, 2026.

(5) The Court confirms: This is a Bench Trial. Trial Date of 7/22/26; trial commences 7/23/26; 14 trial days reserved, i.e. 7/23 through 8/14. MSC 6/5/26 at 8:30 via Zoom in #5. Final CMC 4/8/26 at 8:30 in this department.

Background

On October 22, 2024, plaintiff The People of the State of California (the People) filed a complaint against defendant Michael Angelo Paladino (Paladino), individually and as the managing member of defendant National CPR Foundation LLC (the Foundation), alleging six causes of action for violations of Business and Professions Code section 17500, and eleven cause of action for violations of Business and Professions Code section 17200.

The causes of action alleged in the complaint arise from the operation by the Foundation and Paladino (collectively, Defendants) of an online certification program for cardiopulmonary resuscitation or “CPR”. In the complaint, the People allege that, since June 17, 2019, Defendants have operated the online program in a manner that falsely and misleadingly represents to consumers that the program meets guidelines or standards of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and the American Heart Association, is accredited, and is accepted by all employers who require CPR certification, among other representations. (Compl., ¶¶ 1-9 & 33-48.)

On March 17, 2025, Defendants filed a verified answer to the complaint (the answer).

On April 1, former counsel for Defendants filed a motion for an order relieving them as the attorneys of record for the Foundation, and separately filed a motion for an order relieving them as the attorneys of record for Paladino (collectively, the motions to be relieved).

On April 18, Defendants filed an amended answer to the complaint (the amended answer), and separately filed a request for judicial notice in support of that amended answer.

On April 21, Defendants filed an amended request for judicial notice in support of their amended answer and separately filed exhibits to that request.

On April 25, Defendants filed a document entitled “Case Management Statement in Opposition to Motion To Be Relieved As Counsel”.

On April 30, after a hearing, the court adopted its tentative ruling granting the motions to be relieved. On that same date, the People filed a motion for an order striking as to the Foundation, the answer, amended answer, and the request for judicial notice described above (the motion to strike), which was made on the grounds that the Foundation is an artificial entity that cannot represent itself.

On May 14, the court signed and entered an order relieving former counsel for Paladino as the attorneys of record in this action, and on May 20, signed and entered an order relieving former counsel for the Foundation as the attorneys of record.

On June 4, Defendants, through newly retained counsel, filed a notice stating that they do not oppose the motion to strike; requesting that the court strike the answer, amended answer, and request for judicial notice in their entirety as to both Defendants; and requesting that the court extend Defendants’ time to respond to the complaint.

On June 11, the court entered a minute order adopting its tentative ruling granting the motion to strike, and ordering the answer, the amended answer, and the request for judicial notice stricken. Further, the court granted Defendants leave to file an amended pleading no later than July 2, 2025. (See June 13, 2025, Order.)

On October 20, Defendants filed a verified answer to the complaint, responding to its allegations and asserting twenty-two affirmative defenses.

On November 21, Defendants filed a first amended verified answer and affirmative defenses to the complaint.

On November 24, Defendants filed a motion for an order relieving them from any waiver of objections to written discovery propounded by the People (the Waiver Motion). The People did not oppose that motion.

On January 5, 2026, the People filed a motion for an order (the motion or present motion) compelling Defendants to further respond to the People’s set one inspection demands (the Set One Demand), numbers 22 through 26, and the People’s set two form interrogatories (the Set Two FI), number 15.1. The present motion seeks an award of sanctions against Defendants in the amount of $14,850.

The hearing on the present motion was reset to February 4 pursuant to the court’s January 7, 2026, minute order.

On January 23, the court ordered the Waiver Motion off-calendar as mooted by a stipulation by the parties filed on January 14, which states that the People agree to relieve Defendants from any waiver of objections resulting from a failure to timely respond to the People’s set one written discovery. (Jan. 14, 2026, Stip. at p. 3, ¶ 3; Jan. 23, 2026, Order After Ex-Parte Hearing.)

The present motion is supported by a declaration of the People’s counsel, Christopher B. Dalbey (attorney Dalbey), who states that on April 29, 2025, the People served set one form interrogatories (the Set One FI) and the Set One Demand on the Foundation and Paladino. (Dalbey Dec., ¶ 2 & Exhs. 1-4.) Attorney Dalbey further states that Defendants served responses to the Set One FI and Set One Demand on June 13. (Dalbey Dec., ¶ 3 & Exhs. 5-8.)

Dalbey asserts that on October 29, 2025, the People served the Set Two FI on the Foundation and Paladino. (Dalbey Dec., ¶ 4 & Exhs. 9-10.) Defendants served their responses to the Set Two FI on December 2. (Dalbey Dec., ¶ 5 & Exhs. 11-12.)

Attorney Dalbey spoke with Defendants’ counsel, Sean Ponist (attorney Ponist) on January 2, 2026. (Dalbey Dec., ¶ 6.) Attorney Ponist agreed that Defendants would waive the two extra court days of notice provided by Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6, subdivision (a)(1)(B). (Ibid.) That same day, attorney Dalbey memorialized counsel’s agreement in an email. (Ibid.)

The motion is also supported by a declaration of attorney Evan H. Goldsmith (attorney Goldsmith) who states that on June 30, 2025, the People emailed a stipulated protective order to defense counsel for review. (Goldsmith Dec., ¶ 2.) Attorney Goldsmith further states that on July 3, the parties agreed that the People’s motion to compel deadline regarding the People’s set one discovery would be 45 days after production was complete or after Defendants’ notice of the commencement of a 45-day clock. (Goldsmith Dec., ¶ 3.)

According to attorney Goldsmith, Defendants’ counsel notified the People on July 3, 2025, that Defendants were hiring a third-party document management company to assist with Defendants’ production. (Goldsmith Dec., ¶ 4.) On October 30, the People sent a meet and confer letter to Defendants’ counsel regarding the People’s set one discovery. (Goldsmith Dec., ¶ 5 & Exh. 1.)

Attorney Goldsmith asserts that on December 16, the People received a signed copy of a stipulated protective order from Defendants, and that on December 23, the parties met and conferred concerning Defendants’ objections to the Set One Demand Set Two FI no. 15.1. (Goldsmith Dec., ¶¶ 6-7.) According to attorney Goldsmith, Defendants stated they were going to stand by their objections. (Goldsmith Dec., ¶ 7.)

Defendants oppose the motion. In support of that opposition, Defendants’ counsel, Jessica L. Davis (attorney Davis), states that the People have propounded a total of 98 discovery requests: 18 form interrogatories, 21 special interrogatories, 31 requests for admission, and 28 requests for production. (Davis Dec., ¶ 2.) Attorney Davis asserts that Defendants have provided substantive answers to all of those requests with the exception of two areas relating to financial privacy and duplicative discovery, which attorney Davis contends form the basis of the motion. (Davis Dec., ¶ 3.) Attorney Davis further states that Defendants have produced over 160,000 pages of discovery. (Davis Dec., ¶ 4.)

Analysis

The separate statement submitted by the People in support of the motion shows that the discovery at issue in this proceeding consists of Set One Demand nos. 22 through 26 and Set Two FI no. 15.1. (Sep. Stmt. at pp. 4, 7, 10, 13, 15 & 18 [as to the Foundation] & 21, 24, 26, 29, 32, 35, 37-38 & 40 [as to Paladino].) Set One Demand nos. 22 through 26 are directed to each of the Defendants, and request that Paladino and the Foundation each produce documents from October 23, 2020, to the present, consisting of: balance sheets; profit and loss statements; cash flow statements; credit or loan applications submitted by the Foundation or Paladino to any creditor or potential creditor; and lease applications for office space or other real property submitted by the Foundation or Paladino to any lessor or potential lessor. (Ibid. & p. 6 [definition of “RELEVANT TIME PERIOD”]; see also Dalbey Dec., Exh. 1 at p. 7 & Exh. 2 at pp. 6-7.)

Each of the responses of the Foundation and Paladino to Set One Demand nos. 22 through 26 state: “Responding Party objects that the request improperly seeks private, protected and/or confidential information including, but not limited to, private financial information and documents as well as taxpayer records protected by the taxpayer privilege. (Calif. Const., Art 1, §1, Ameri-Medical Corp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1287-1288, Connecticut Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 23 Cal.4th 807, 817, Roberts v. Gulf Oil Corp. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 770, 797, Hecht, Solberg, Robinson, Goldberg & Bagley LLP v. Superior Court (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 579, 594, Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1138, 1441, Schnabel v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 704, Webb v. Standard Oil Co. (1957) 49 Cal.2d 509, 512-513, Sav-On Drugs, Inc. v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1, 6-7, Deary v. Hendrick (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1078.) Responding Party further objects that the request is unduly burdensome, oppressive and harassing.” (Sep. Stmt. at pp. 7-8, 10, 13, 15-16, 18-19 [responses of the Foundation] & 24, 27, 29-30, 32 & 35 [responses of Paladino].)

As to Set One Demand nos. 22 to 26, the motion must “set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.” (Code Civ. Proc. §2031.310, subd. (b)(1).) Relevant here based on the response set forth above, which does not include a claim of privilege or attorney work product, “that burden is met simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance.” (TBG Ins. Services Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.)

The People contend that good causes exists for the requests stated in Set One Demand nos. 22 through 26 because the financial information and condition of a defendant is relevant and discoverable in law enforcement prosecutions brought pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq. (the Unfair Competition Law or “UCL”) and Business and Professions Code section 17500 et seq. (the false advertising law or “FAL”); because a defendant’s financial condition and information are factors to be considered to determine the amount of civil penalties under the UCL and FAL; and because a protective order is in place. (Sep. Stmt. at pp. 8-10.)

The People also assert that the financial documents described in the Set One Demand could lead to other evidence showing Defendants’ assets, liabilities, and net worth. (Sep. Stmt. at p. 10.) As to the credit and lease applications requested in Set One Demand nos. 25 and 26, the People contend that those applications should “bolster” this information and are also valuable in regard to how Defendants presented their finances when seeking credit or leases on favorable terms. (Sep. Stmt. at pp. 18 & 21, etc.. )

The People seek in this action “civil penalties for Defendants’ violations of applicable statutes and regulations, and restitution of all monies wrongfully obtained from California customers.” (Compl., ¶ 9.) Relevant here, Business and Professions Code section 17206 provides: “Any person who engages, has engaged, or proposes to engage in unfair competition shall be liable for a civil penalty not to exceed two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) for each violation, which shall be assessed and recovered in a civil action....” ((Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17206, subd. (a).) Business and Professions Code section 17536 provides: “Any person who violates any provision of this chapter shall be liable for a civil penalty not to exceed two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) for each violation, which shall be assessed and recovered in a civil action....” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17536, subd. (a).)

The statutes set forth above also provide that the court “shall impose a civil penalty for each violation” of the UCL and FAL, and that “[i]n assessing the amount of the civil penalty, the court shall consider any one or more of the relevant circumstances presented by any of the parties to the case, including, but not limited to, the following: the nature and seriousness of the misconduct, the number of violations, the persistence of the misconduct, the length of time over which the misconduct occurred, the willfulness of the defendant’s misconduct, and the defendant’s assets, liabilities, and net worth.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17206, subd. (b); Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17536, subd. (b).)

Under the statutory scheme contemplated by the UCL and FAL and described above, which make the imposition of penalties mandatory, evidence of a defendant’s financial condition is relevant to a determination of civil penalties. (People v. First Federal Credit Corp. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 721, 728 (First Federal).) Defendants appear to concede this issue in their responding separate statement. (See, e.g., Resp. Sep. Stmt. at p. 11, l. 23-p. 12, l. 2 [noting that Defendants’ financial information can be presented to the court after a determination of liability].)

Though a defendant bears the burden to present evidence of its financial condition or status for the court to consider when determining an appropriate civil penalty under the UCL and FAL, Defendants fail to explain why the People are not entitled to discover that information before a determination of liability is made, including in regard to any restitution sought by the People in this action. (People v. Superior Court (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 710, 712-713; see also First Federal, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 729; People ex rel. Bill Lockyer v. Fremont Life Ins. Co. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 508, 531 [trial court may order restitution of money acquired by violations of the UCL].)

For all reasons discussed above, evidence of the Foundation’s financial condition, including its assets and liabilities, is relevant to, among other things, the assessment of penalties to be imposed for proven violations. For these reasons, the People have met their burden to demonstrate good cause for the requests stated in Set One Demand nos. 22 through 26 as to the Foundation.

As to Paladino, who is an individual, wholly absent from the motion is any reasoned argument showing why information or documents regarding Paladino’s personal assets, liabilities, or net worth are relevant under the circumstances present here, considering that Paladino has a reasonable expectation of privacy in their personal finances and other sensitive or confidential financial information. (Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 40 Cal.4th 360, 368, 372 [privacy protections extend to confidential or sensitive financial information].) Moreover, the motion fails to address whether or to what extent any leases or credit applications submitted by Paladino and sought by the Set One Demand may implicate third-party privacy rights. (See County of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles County Employee Relations Com. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 905, 926-932 [general discussion].)

The court further notes that the complaint alleges that Paladino is the sole managing member of the Foundation who purportedly controlled, directed, authorized, or ratified the purportedly unlawful conduct at issue in these proceedings. (Compl., ¶ 11.) For these reasons, it would appear that the documents sought from Paladino are derivative of those sought from the Foundation.

For all reasons discussed above, the People have failed to meet their burden to show good cause for the requests stated in Set One Demand nos. 22 through 26 as to Paladino, which on their face demand Paladino’s personal financial information and documents. For these reasons, the court will deny the motion as to Set One Demand nos. 22 through 26 directed to Paladino.

As the People have met their burden to show good cause for Set One Demand nos. 22 through 26 as to the Foundation, the burden now shifts to the Foundation to justify its objections to these requests. (Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.)

In the responding separate statement submitted in support of the opposition to the motion, the Foundation contends that the definition of the terms “YOU” and “YOUR” appearing in Set One Demand nos. 22 through 26 renders these demands overbroad, burdensome, and oppressive. (Resp. Sep. Stmt. at p. 11.) The record reflects that the definition of “YOU” and “YOUR” includes the Foundation’s “parents, subsidiaries, principals, operating divisions, present or former owners, partners, employees, servants, officers, directors, agents, representatives, attorneys, accountants, independent contractors, and any other persons or entities acting on its behalf or under its direction, authorization, or control.” (Sep. Stmt. at p. 8, ¶ 10.)

In its reply, the People assert that the Foundation raises objections to the definition of the terms “YOU” and “YOUR” for the first time here, and could have raised this issue during the parties’ meet and confer process. The People further assert that the Foundation could have objected to the definition of these terms and produced only the financial records of the Foundation, which the People assert also would have notified it of any unintended implications. In addition, the People assert that the Foundation did not assert its objection to the terms “YOU” and “YOUR” in its written responses. For this reason, the People argue, that objection has been waived.

As the objections raised in the Foundation’s responses to Set One Demand nos. 22 through 26 include that those requests are burdensome, oppressive, and harassing, the court does not find that the Foundation has waived those objections including as to the terms “YOU” and “YOUR” appearing in those demands.

Based on the points advanced by the People and described above, it appears that the People acknowledge that the definition of the terms “YOU” and “YOUR” appearing in the Set One Demand is broad and may implicate third-party privacy rights. Under these circumstances, and considering the ostensible relevance of the documents described in Set One Demand nos. 22 through 26 as further discussed above, the court deems the terms “YOU” and “YOUR” to mean the Foundation, which is the entity against whom civil penalties under the UCL and FAL are sought.

Apart from the issues discussed above, the Foundation fails to set forth any reasoned factual or legal argument showing why Set One Demand nos. 22 through 26 are otherwise burdensome or oppressive. For example, the Foundation does not explain the quantum of work required to respond to those demands, why the People intend to create an unreasonable burden by propounding Set One Demand nos. 22 through 26, or why the effect of any such burden is incommensurate with the results sought. (See West Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417.) For these reasons, the court will overrule the Foundation’s objections that Set One Demand nos. 22 through 26 are burdensome, oppressive, or harassing.

The Foundation also objects to Set One Demand nos. 22 through 26 on the grounds that those requests seek private, protected, or confidential information and taxpayer records.

“[C]orporations do not have a right of privacy protected by the California Constitution. Article I, section 1 of the California Constitution protects the privacy rights of ‘people’ only. ‘ “[T]he constitutional provision simply does not apply to corporations.” ’ [Citations.] While corporations do have a right to privacy, it is not a constitutional right. The corporate right to privacy is a lesser right than that held by human beings and is not considered a fundamental right.

“Because the corporate privacy right is not constitutionally protected, the issue presented in determining whether [Set One Demand nos. 22 through 26] infringe that right is resolved by a balancing test. The discovery’s relevance to the subject matter of the pending dispute and whether the discovery ‘ “appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” ’ is balanced against the corporate right of privacy. [Citations.] Doubts about relevance generally are resolved in favor of permitting discovery.” (SCC Acquisitions, Inc. v. Superior Court (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 741, 755-756 & fn. 4, fn. 3 omitted.)

Considering that the discovery in Set One Demand nos. 22 through 26 is, as to the Foundation, relevant to the subject matter of this dispute, the court finds that, at this stage of the proceedings, the balance tips in favor of permitting that discovery notwithstanding any right to privacy that may be asserted by the Foundation.

The present record described above also reflects that the parties here have agreed to a protective order. The Foundation fails to explain why that protective order does not mitigate any privacy concerns raised by the Foundation in its responses to Set One Demand nos. 22 through 26. For these and all further reasons discussed above, the court will overrule the Foundation’s objection that Set One Demand nos. 22 through 26 seek private, protected, or confidential information.

The Foundation further objects to Set One Demand nos. 22 through 26 on the grounds that those requests seek information protected by the taxpayer privilege. Even if the court were to determine that discovery of the Foundation’s tax returns and records is not permissible based on the privilege ostensibly asserted by the Foundation (and the court presently makes no findings in this regard), the Foundation fails to explain why Set One Demand nos. 22 through 26 seek the discovery of any privileged tax returns or records. (See Schnabel v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 704, 719-720 [discussion of circumstances under which privilege applies].) For these reasons, the court will overrule the Foundation’s objections to Set One Demand nos. 22 through 26 based on the taxpayer privilege.

The responses of the Foundation to Set One Demand nos. 22 through 26 include only the objections discussed herein, which the court will overrule. For these and all further reasons discussed above, the court will grant the motion, in part as to the Set One Demand directed to the Foundation, and require the Foundation to serve verified, further responses to Set One Demand nos. 22 through 26, without the objections overruled herein. The verified further responses of the Foundation to Set One Demand nos. 22 through 26 must comply with code requirements.

As to Set Two FI no 15.1, which is also directed to each of the Defendants, the People request that Defendants “[i]dentify each denial of a material allegation and each special or affirmative defense in your pleadings” and for each, to:

“(a) state all facts on which you base the denial or special or affirmative defense;

“(b) state the names, ADDRESSES, and telephone numbers of all PERSONS who have knowledge of those facts; and

“(c) identify all DOCUMENTS and other tangible things that support your denial or special or affirmative defense, and state the name, ADDRESS, and telephone number of the PERSON who has each DOCUMENT.” (Sep. Stmt. at pp. 38 & 40.)

In their respective responses to Set Two FI no. 15.1, Defendants each state: “Responding Party objects to this request on the grounds that this request was previously propounded in the People’s Form Interrogatories, Set One and the same request may not be propounded twice. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 2030.300(c), § 2031.010; see also, Professional Career Colleges, Magna Institute, Inc. v. Stewart (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 490, 494; Vidal Sassoon, Inc. v. Halpern (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 681, 685; Sexton v. Mullikin Med. Ctr. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410; and Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civ. Proc. Before Trial (TRG 2021) ¶ 8:1146.)” (Sep. Stmt. at pp. 38 [response of the Foundation] & 41 [response of Paladino].)

“The statute does not require any showing of good cause for the serving and filing of interrogatories.” (Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220.) Further, “the burden of justifying any objection and failure to respond remains at all times with the party resisting an interrogatory.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 541.)

In their responding separate statement, Defendants contend that Set One FI no. 15.1 previously propounded by the People, and Set Two FI no. 15.1 at issue in the present motion, each request information concerning Defendants’ material denials and affirmative defenses. (Resp. Sep. Stmt. at pp. 58 & 61.) Defendants further contend that the People should have propounded supplemental interrogatories pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.070 instead of the same interrogatory twice. (Ibid.) For these reasons, Defendants contend, Set Two FI no. 15.1 is duplicative and not permissible.

For all reasons discussed herein, Defendants have failed to show why Set Two FI no. 15.1 seeks the same information as Set One FI no. 15.1, or is duplicative. For example, the undisputed present record reflects that, in each of their separate responses to Set One FI no. 15.1, which sought the same information and documents described above as to any denials or special or affirmative defenses asserted in the stricken answer and amended answer, Defendants each stated: “The answer and amended answer of Responding Party have been stricken; accordingly, this interrogatory is not applicable.” (Sep. Stmt. at pp. 38 & 41.)

Defendants also do not dispute that the People propounded the Set Two FI after Defendants filed a new verified answer and first amended verified answer to the complaint as further discussed above. Defendants fail to explain why Set Two FI no. 15.1 relates to prior pleadings which were stricken. Defendants also appear to concede, in their respective responses to Set One FI no. 15.1, that at the time of those responses, there was no answer “at issue”. (Opp. at p. 10, ll. 19-22.)

Defendants also fail to offer any information or argument showing why the verified answer or first amended verified answer filed by Defendants on, respectively, October 20 and November 21, 2025, asserts the same denials or affirmative defenses as those asserted in the answer or amended answer which Defendants requested be stricken in their entirety, including as to Paladino, notwithstanding that the motion to strike was directed to only those responsive pleadings filed by the Foundation.

For all reasons discussed above, Defendants have failed to show why Set Two FI no. 15.1 propounds “the same question” as Set One FI no. 15. (Cf. Professional Career Colleges, Magna Institute, Inc. v. Superior Court (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 490, 493-494.) Defendants also fail to show why Set Two FI no. 15.1 is or could be intended to discover any information concerning Defendants’ responses to Set One FI no. 15.1, which state only that the answer and amended answer were stricken. As Defendants have, for the reasons discussed above, failed to justify their objection to Set Two FI no. 15.1 on the grounds that interrogatory was previously propounded and may not be propounded twice, the court will overrule that objection.

Defendants’ respective responses to Set Two FI no. 15.1 include only the objection further discussed above, which the court will overrule. As Defendants have failed to include any other response to Set Two FI no. 15.1, the same reasoning and analysis apply. For all reasons discussed above, the court will grant the motion as to Set Two FI no. 15.1, and order Defendants to each serve verified, code compliant further responses to that interrogatory, without the objections overruled herein.

Sanctions

Noted above, the motion includes a request for an award of sanctions against Defendants in the amount of $14,850.

Subject to exceptions which do not appear to apply here, the court “shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a further response to” interrogatories or a demand, “unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300, subd. (d), & 2031.310, subd. (h).)

Though Paladino has successfully opposed the motion as to Set One Demand nos. 22 through 26 as further discussed herein, Defendants have not shown why those demands lack good cause as to the Foundation, or why the Foundation’s objections to those demands are justified. In addition, Defendants have failed to show sufficient cause or justification for their objection to Set Two FI no. 15. The additional points raised in Defendants’ opposition do not persuade the court that the imposition of monetary sanctions would be unjust under the circumstances present here.

The court has reviewed the information provided in the Dalbey declaration which reflects that, excluding time expended to meet and confer with Defendants’ counsel, attorney Dalbey expended 12 hours to prepare the motion, and expects to spend another six hours to prepare a reply and prepare for oral argument. (Dalbey Dec., ¶ 9.) Attorney Dalbey requests an hourly rate of $425. (Ibid.)

Attorney Goldsmith states that they expended 10 hours to prepare the motion, and expect to expend another 6 hours to prepare a reply and oral argument. (Goldsmith Dec., ¶ 10.) Attorney Goldsmith requests an hourly rate of $450. (Ibid.)

“The principle of reasonableness means a trial court has discretion to reduce the amount of fees and costs requested as a discovery sanction in order to reach a reasonable award.” (Cornerstone Realty Advisors, LLC v. Summit Healthcare Reit, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 771, 791.) The amount of the sanctions needs to reflect the reasonable expenses incurred as a result of the misuse of any discovery process by Defendants. While the court agrees that counsel for the People necessarily spent, and will spend, time to prepare the motion, to review and respond to Defendants’ opposition, and to prepare for and attend the hearing, the time expended by counsel, which exceeds 20 hours solely to prepare the motion, appears excessive considering the nature of the issues presented and the number of discovery requests at issue.

In addition, apart from the general and conclusory information described above, the People offer no information showing the specific nature of the work performed by either attorney Dalbey or attorney Goldsmith in connection with, among other things, preparing the motion. Instead, the overly conclusory description of the hours expended by attorneys Dalbey and Goldsmith suggests that the existence of inefficient, overlapping, or duplicative efforts which are not subject to compensation. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)

Under the totality of the circumstances present here including the court’s experience with addressing attorney fee issues and knowledge and familiarity with the local legal market, and absent information describing the nature of the time expended by counsel for the People, the court finds that 15 hours of total time at the reasonable hourly rate of $425 (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009), for a total of $6,375, reflects a reasonable amount of attorney fees incurred as a result of the filing of the motion and Defendants’ misuse of the discovery process for which monetary sanctions are appropriately awardable.