Michael Marks et al vs Marc Bloostein
Michael Marks et al vs Marc Bloostein
Case Number
24CV05482
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Wed, 12/10/2025 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings
Motion to Compel; OSC re Sanctions
Tentative Ruling
Courtney Writer, Ira Steinberg, Sinny Thai for Plaintiff/cross Defendant
Kevin Nimmons for Defendant/cross complainant
Issues
Motion to Compel; OSC re Sanctions
RULINGS
1. The Trial Date of 3/18/26 is confirmed.
2. Mr. Marks deposition shall be taken in-person by Kevin Nimmons at the law office of Reicker, Pfau, Pyle & McRoy LLP in Santa Barbara, California on 12/17/25, from 9:30 am to 5:00 pm.
3. The Motion to Compel is granted. Marks shall serve amended responses, without objection, to Special Interrogatories (Set One) Nos. 10–12, 14–16 (collectively “SROGs”) no later than 12/24/25.
4. The requests for monetary sanctions are denied.
Analysis
The Complaint was filed in 10/2024; the Answer was filed in 11/2024 [along with the cross-complaint]; on 2/5/25 the trial date was set for 12/10/25; confirmed on 8/6/25; on 10/31/25 the Court granted an Ex Parte motion and made the following orders: The current Trial and Mandatory Settlement Conference Dates are Vacated. The Discovery deadlines shall remain, based on the original Trial Date of 12-10-2025. The Court set a Case Management Conference for 11/19/25 for Status Hearing and Setting a New Trial Date.
On 11/13/25 the Court made the following orders after an ex parte hearing: “The ex parte request is granted in part. The deposition of Plaintiff Michael Marks and Plaintiff's expert Frederick R. Jones. Jr. will both be taken in-person by Kevin Nimmons at the law office of Reicker, Pfau, Pyle & McRoy LLP in Santa Barbara, California on November 18, 2025, from 9:30 am to 5:00 pm. The request for sanctions is denied.
The deposition of Michael Marks did not go forward as ordered.
On 11/19/25 the Court set December 10, 2025, 10:00 AM (1) re: Motion to Compel and (2) re: Order to Show Cause: re: Evidentiary Sanctions as to Michael Marks.
On 11/24/25 after another ex parte motion the trial date was continued to 3/11/25 [due to an error by Defendant's counsel at the Case Management Conference on November 19, 2025].
Motion to Compel
Filed 9/11//25; 13 pages; read and considered; summarized; moved for an order compelling Marks to serve amended responses, without objection, to Special Interrogatories (Set One) Nos. 10–12, 14–16 (collectively “SROGs”). Bloostein makes this motion on the grounds that the discovery in question is relevant to the subject matter of the action and that Marks unjustifiably failed to provide proper, non-evasive and complete responses as required under the Civil Discovery Act. This motion is made under Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.300, and on the grounds that that Marks’ answers to each of the above-referenced SROGs are evasive or incomplete, and/or the objections to each of the SROGs are without
merit or too general. Bloostein also seeks monetary sanctions against Marks and his
counsel of record, jointly and severally, in the amount of $6,882.00 under California Code of Civil Procedure for their failure to act with substantial justification, making evasive responses to discovery, and misuse of the discovery; the Motion is based upon the Notice of Motion, the attached supporting Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Declaration of Alec R. Simpson, the exhibits attached thereto, the concurrently filed Separate Statement, as well as the pleadings and Court’s records in the case.
This case involves a driveway and access easement that the dominant tenement holder,
Bloostein, seeks to widen to conform with Montecito Fire Protection District’s (“Fire Department”) standards and to realign and straighten the curved driveway to make it safer and more user-friendly. Marks, the servient tenement owner, objects. Accordingly, when Marks brought the instant suit, Bloostein cross-complained seeking, among other things, declaratory relief that he “may widen the driveway in the Current Easement consistent with [his] plans, including to meet the requirements of the Fire Department.” To support Bloostein’s claims, he propounded Special Interrogatories seeking to better understand Marks’ contentions on whether the driveway should conform to the Fire Department’s
requirements. These routine contention interrogatories sought all facts, witnesses, and documents that support Marks’ contentions and were well within the scope of the instant action.
In response, Marks interposed various boilerplate objections that are inapplicable and
inappropriate. Despite Bloostein making this rationale abundantly clear and providing substantial legal authorities supporting his position in the parties’ meet-and-confer
efforts, Marks refused to produce supplemental responses to these particular contention interrogatories. Bloostein is entitled to adequate responses to his discovery requests, as well
as attorneys’ fees and costs incurred to file this motion to obtain long-overdue discovery responses.
Opposition
The Opposition to the Motion to Compel was filed 11/25/25; 8 pages; summarized: argues Defendant intentionally damaged Plaintiffs’ residential real property when he destroyed
stonewalls and mature landscaping to alter a paved roadway located on Plaintiffs’ property. Defendant had no right to do so. Rather, Defendant merely has an easement of limited scope to use the roadway for ingress and egress only. Marks fully answered special interrogatories regarding his contentions about Defendant’s unlawful actions. The only interrogatories Marks did not answer relate to legal requirements for the development of Defendant’s own separate property. That information is known or should be known by Defendant. Even if it is not, Marks has no obligation to conduct legal research for Defendant about Defendant’s property. Nonetheless, Defendant moved to compel further responses to these legal contention interrogatories. The Motion lacks merit for several reasons. Among other things, each interrogatory inquiries about a document called “Montecito Fire Protection District Supplemental Standard No. 3.” The fatal problem is the document was not attached to the interrogatories. Nor is it readily available. Marks simply cannot answer interrogatories about an unknown document. The Court should deny this Motion for lack of merit, including Defendant’s baseless request for monetary sanctions.
The Declaration of Ira Steinberg in support of Marks’ opposition to compel was filed 11/25/25; summarized: The interrogatories at issue in this motion referred to a “Montecito Fire Protection District Supplemental Standard No. 3.” That alleged document is neither attached to the interrogatories, nor readily available. Bloostein did not attach the requisite declaration of necessity to propound more than 35 interrogatories.
Reply
Defendant filed a Reply in support of his motion to compel further responses to his special Interrogatories [set one] on 12/3/25; 8 pages; summarized; argues that after engaging in the meet and confer process, Bloostein filed his Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set One, (the “Motion”). The Motion sought to compel further responses to Special Interrogatory Nos. 10–12 and 14–16 (the “SROGs”) that sought all facts, documents, and witnesses that support his contentions — if he indeed makes such contentions — that Bloostein does not need to comply with the specific local fire department regulation. In response, Marks filed his opposition to the Motion (the “Opposition”). Although the Opposition attempts to explain its evasion of providing straightforward responses to the SROGs, it is flawed in numerous ways. First, the Opposition interposes objections not asserted in Marks’ initial responses to the SROGs, and as such, these objections are waived. Second, even if the Court permits these tardy objections, they are meritless insofar as they make demonstrably false contentions: (1) that Bloostein propounded over 35 interrogatories, (2) and the local fire regulation at issue — Montecito Fire Department Development Standard No. 3 (“Standard No. 3”) — was not attached to the interrogatories nor readily available. The facts state otherwise. Bloostein propounded 26 special interrogatories. (See Declaration of Alec R. Simpson in support of Bloostein’s Motion to Compel Further Responses, Exhibit 1.) Further, the contents of Standard No. 3 were readily available had Marks simply googled the specific regulation or gone to www.montecitofire.com/development-standards.
Additionally, if an objection is not stated in response to written discovery, that objection is waived.
Here, in Marks’ responses to each of the SROGs, he objected as follows: Marks objects that the interrogatory is vague, ambiguous, and overbroad. Marks further objects that the interrogatory seeks a legal conclusion. Marks further objects that the interrogatory seeks information that is neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Marks further objects to the extent the interrogatory calls for information protected by attorney-client privilege or which constitutes protected attorney work product.
The Opposition, however, now asserts the SROGs violate Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.060, subdivision (d) because they are not “full and complete in and of itself.” Marks further argues, without explanation, this incompleteness renders the SROGs as excessive because responding to it would require over 35 interrogatories for which there is no declaration supporting the necessity to propound more than 35 interrogatories. Finally, Marks argues the SROGs are not complete because Standard No. 3 was not attached nor is it readily accessible.
None of these objections were in Marks’ original response, and as such, are waived.
Even assuming arguendo that Marks’ belated attempts to shoehorn these new objections under the “vague, ambiguous, and overbroad” objections, they are still without merit. Each answer in the response must be “as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits. If an interrogatory cannot be answered completely, it shall be answered to the extent possible.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.220, subds., (a), (b).
The Opposition’s contention that answering the SROGs would require over 35 interrogatories is disingenuous. The crux of this entire dispute comes from Bloostein’s desire to make a road, which leads to his property, comply with Standard No. 3 by widening and realigning the driveway. It is absurd that Marks, for the first time in the Opposition, objects to the SROGs on the grounds that it requires him to respond to each and every section of MFD Standard No. 3.1 This argument is belied by the Opposition’s own assertion that because Standard No. 3 was not attached with the SROGs nor readily available, that “Marks simply cannot answer the [SROGs] when he had no idea what the [Standard No. 3] says.”
Marks cannot know that Standard No. 3 would require more than 35 interrogatories when he also argues he does not know what Standard No. 3 states. This argument has no merit.
Further discrediting the Opposition’s argument that the Standard No. 3 was not “readily available” is that a web-search of Montecito Fire Department Development Standard #3, yields the standard in the first result. Feigning the difficulty to access such a document is a violation of a responding party’s duty under the rules of discovery. (Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 782 (finding he responding party must make a reasonable effort to obtain whatever information is sought; and if unable to do so, must specify why the information is unavailable and what efforts the responding party made to obtain it).) Moreover, the Opposition and Marks’ responses both fail to state why MFD Standard No. 3 was unavailable to Marks and what efforts he made to obtain it.
The Opposition makes objections for the first time that were waived. However, even after examining the validity of the objections, they are entirely misplaced because they fail to uphold the responding party’s duties under the rules of discovery.
The Opposition contends that Marks should not be required to provide further responses to the SROGs because they seek responses in connection to Bloostein’s property, not Marks’ property. It is improper for party responding to discovery to provide “deftly worded conclusionary answers designed to evade a series of explicit questions.” (Deyo, supra, 84 Cal.App.3d at 783.)
Here, the Opposition does exactly this when Marks is well aware of the reason he began this lawsuit stems from Bloostein developing his property and bringing the driveway leading to his property in compliance with Standard No. 3. Extending the driveway to the Bloostein property, the dominant tenement holder, is certainly “in connection with the development of the Bloostein Property[.]” (Declaration of Alec R. Simpson in Support of Motion to Compel.) To assert, as the Opposition does, that Marks “has no idea what requirements other property owners face or must comply with in developing their own property” is purposefully evasive when the SROGs identify the specific Standard No. 3 and Marks is aware he’s continually protested Bloostein’s development to bring the at-issue driveway into compliance with Standard No.3 by realigning and widening it. Thus, Marks failed to uphold his duty to provide complete and straightforward responses.
Moreover, any inference that the SROGs require Marks to perform legal research is equally unavailing. Code Civil Procedure section 2030.010 specifically permits the use of contention interrogatories: “(a) Any party may obtain discovery within the scope delimited by Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 2017.010), and subject to the restrictions set forth in Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 2019.010), by propounding to any other party to the action written interrogatories to be answered under oath. (b) An interrogatory may relate to whether another party is making a certain contention, or to the facts, witnesses, and writings on which a contention is based. An interrogatory is not objectionable because an answer to it involves an opinion or contention that relates to fact or the application of law to fact or would be based on information obtained or legal theories developed in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial.” Therefore, Bloostein is well within his rights to propound such contention interrogatories as the SROGs specifically seek all facts, witnesses, and documents that support his contentions – not a request to perform legal research.
Marks’ evasive responses to the SROGs on the grounds that he should not have to respond to any interrogatory regarding Bloostein’s property is improper and evasive. The Court should not lend any credence to such arguments, and instead, grant the Motion in its entirety.
In sum, the Opposition is without merit and the Court should grant Bloostein’s Motion to Compel Further Responses in its entirety.
Monetary sanctions should be issued for Marks’ misuse of the discovery process. The SROGs are relevant, narrowly tailored, and expressly authorized under Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.010. The Declaration of Alec R. Simpson in Support of Bloostein’s Motion to Compel sets forth the time, rate, and justifications for each. The Opposition contends the request for the monetary sanctions is excessive but provides no support. Thus, the Court should award of monetary sanctions as requested in the Motion.
Evidentiary Sanctions Analysis
The OSC
Marks failed to appear for his deposition; the Court should stand by its warning that if he failed to appear he faced evidentiary sanctions. Thus, he should be excluded from testifying.
Response
Filed 11/26/25; read and considered; supported by the Declaration of Michael Marks. Summarized: I am a Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant and one of the named Plaintiffs in this action. I am familiar with the facts in this matter and, if called upon to do so, I could and would competently testify to the following. This Declaration is submitted in advance of and in response to the Order to Show Cause as to why the Court should not impose evidentiary sanctions against Michael Marks for Failure to Appear at his Deposition.
On or around Saturday, October 25, 2025, I learned that my son was hospitalized in Orange County for a medical emergency. My wife and I were in Santa Barbara at the time and close to three hours away. We rushed to be by his side at the hospital. My wife and I were our son’s primary caretakers and did not know how long he was going to be in the hospital and could not leave his side. When I realized that I could not attend my deposition scheduled for October 28, 2025, I immediately informed my attorneys of my sudden emergency. I then offered to appear for my deposition on November 4, 2025, thinking that my son would be discharged by then. However, my son was ultimately hospitalized until November 5 before being transferred to an out-of-state facility. I did not imagine that my son would be hospitalized for such a long period of time and unfortunately, had to cancel my deposition again. Knowing then that our son was in a safe place, my wife and I felt comfortable enough that we could leave on a long planned trip to the east coast. This trip was structured around an event that was not changeable. Therefore, when I learned that this Court required me to appear in-person for my deposition on November 18, a date when I would still be on the east coast, I asked the Court if it could be a remote deposition or, alternatively, I offered December 11 and 12 for my in-person deposition. Unfortunately, Defendant and the Court insisted that my deposition take place in person.
After receiving this ruling from the Court, I offered to cut my trip short and fly back to appear for my deposition on November 21, 2025, but I learned that Defendant wished to
abide by the Court’s order. I reasoned that the November 21, 2025, date was before the discovery cut-off on November 25, 2025, and it did not prejudice Defendant. I further offered to appear for deposition on December 2, 3 or 4. These are all dates that were previously offered by Defendant in their emergency papers. I remain willing and available to appear for my deposition on December 2, 3, or 4, as I was on November 21.
I have always wished to attend my deposition to explain my side of this dispute. This is not just a dispute with my neighbor over a $22,000 sandstone wall. My neighbor, Defendant, wishes to re-route a private road located on my property to remove the existing safety
feature of a small curve that slows cars as they approach the entrance to my driveway from uphill. This is not a blind curve. This road has been in place, for the benefit of all and without issue for over 20 years. It was designed, engineered and permitted by our predecessors in interest and reaffirmed by all parties in the 2013 Easement Agreement. It was then expanded, modified and approved yet again by the Montecito Fire Department in 2019 when my house was constructed. The proposed re-routing would now allow vehicles to speed by as my family and I try to enter and exit our private driveway onto a private road. I am a 74 year old man. My reactions, unfortunately, are not what they once were, and I don’t anticipate any improvement as my wife and I age. The thought of being subjected to this added burden when I am 80 and hopefully beyond, not to mention right now, is troubling. While I wish to live in peace and harmony with my neighbors, I believe it is also necessary to exercise reasonable precautions for my family’s safety and well-being.
I sincerely apologize to the Court for the delay and for any inconvenience caused by cancelling my depositions. My intent was not to be evasive. I simply needed to tend to an
unforeseen family emergency. As noted above, however, I have attempted to provide alternative dates even while my scheduling visibility was day to day at best. My efforts were sincere but hampered by the situation. I respectfully request that the Court not impose sanctions that would preclude me from presenting my testimony at deposition and trial.
Reply
Filed 12/3/25; Bloostein, requests the Court to impose evidentiary sanctions on Marks, due to Marks failure to appear at a Court ordered deposition on November 18, 2025 from 9:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., as ordered by the Court at the ex parte hearing on November 13 comply with the Court's order. Despite the Court's order and warnings, Mr. Marks willfully refused to attend his deposition on November 18—instead going "on a long planned trip to the east coast." Despite clear warnings, Plaintiff chose to remain out-of-state for no apparent reason other than a "long planned trip to the east coast." At the November 13 ex parte hearing, Mr. Marks' counsel, Ms. Sinny Thai, told the Court that Mr. Marks could not appear at the November 18 Court-ordered deposition. The Court heard Ms. Thai and refused to change the Court's order. Mr. Marks chose to violate the Court order knowing that the Court had ordered him to appear and knowing that evidentiary sanctions were probable. Mr. Marks and his counsel have engaged in a pattern to avoid depositions in this case, including the deposition of Mr. Marks' expert, Mr. Frederick Jones, Jr. Accordingly, Defendant respectfully requests that the Court impose evidentiary sanctions by prohibiting Mr. Marks from testifying at trial.
The Court’s Conclusions
The Motion to Compel is not a difficult analysis. It should be granted in its entirety. The argument made in support of that ruling is preponderating. The Court has elected not to award sanctions.
The Motion for Evidentiary Sanctions is a more difficult analysis. The excuse given by Marks why he did not attend his deposition is a surprise to the Court even after reading everything he has said. But he contends he has always wished to attend his deposition to explain his side of this dispute and he did make alternative dates available. Because of that the Court should give him one more chance. The Court has elected not to award sanctions.
The Court will set the date.