Tentative Ruling: Eric Hawkins, et al. v. Volvo Cars of North America, LLC
Case Number
24CV04527
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Mon, 06/15/2026 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, and Expenses
Tentative Ruling
Eric Hawkins, et al. v. Volvo Cars of North America, LLC
Case No. 24CV04527
Hearing Date: June 15, 2026
HEARING: Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, and Expenses
ATTORNEYS: For Plaintiffs Eric Hawkins and Tisha Hawkins: Michael H. Rosenstein, Sepehr Daghighian, Mitchel A. Brim, California Consumer Attorneys, P.C.
For Defendant Volvo Car USA LLC: Michael J. Hurvitz, Tammara N. Bokmuller, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP
TENTATIVE RULING:
The motion of plaintiffs for attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses is granted, in part. The court awards plaintiffs attorney’s fees in the amount of $41,655 and costs and expenses in the amount of $2,067.46. Except as herein granted, the motion is otherwise denied. Plaintiffs shall submit a corrected proposed order for the court’s review and signature, that conforms to the ruling herein.
Background:
Plaintiffs Eric Hawkins and Tisha Hawkins (collectively, Plaintiffs) allege that on August 1, 2021, they purchased a 2021 Volvo XC90 (the vehicle) that was accompanied by express warranties, pursuant to which Volvo Cars of North America, LLC, undertook to preserve or maintain the utility or performance of the vehicle or provide compensation if there was a failure in such utility or performance. The vehicle was delivered to Plaintiffs with defects and nonconformities to the warranty, including HVAC system defects, exterior and body component defects, infotainment system defects, and hybrid system defects.
Plaintiffs filed their complaint against defendant Volvo Cars of North America, LLC, on August 16, 2024, asserting three causes of action: (1) violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act – breach of express warranty; (2) violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act – breach of implied warranty; and (3) violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act section 1793, subdivision (b).
On October 23, 2024, Volvo Car USA LLC (Volvo), filed an answer to the complaint, generally denying its allegations and asserting affirmative defenses.
On October 17, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a notice of conditional settlement of the entire case.
On February 17, 2026, Plaintiffs filed a motion for an award of attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses pursuant to Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (b). In support of that motion, Plaintiffs’ counsel, Sepehr Daghighian (attorney Daghighian), who is a partner at California Consumer Attorneys, P.C. (CCA), states that Plaintiffs contacted CCA to make Volvo repurchase or replace the vehicle. (Daghighian Dec., ¶¶ 2, 22.) CCA reviewed the vehicle’s repair history, analyzed Plaintiffs’ claims, agreed to represent Plaintiffs on a contingent basis, and agreed to advance Plaintiffs’ litigation costs, assuming the risk that CCA would not recoup attorney’s fees and costs for several years, if at all. (Daghighian Dec., ¶ 22.) Attorney Daghighian provides a description of the legal services provided to Plaintiffs by CCA. (Daghighian Dec., ¶¶ 23-34.)
Attorney Daghighian indicates that this case settled on or about October 17, 2025, with the acceptance of a Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer (the 998 Offer) by Plaintiffs. (Daghighian Dec., ¶¶ 33-36.) The settlement did not resolve attorney’s fees and costs, and as part of that settlement, the parties expressly agreed that Plaintiffs could seek an award of reasonably fees and costs as a prevailing party under Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d). (Daghighian Dec., ¶¶ 36.)
Following the settlement, CCA corresponded with opposing counsel in an effort to informally resolve the issue of attorney’s fees and costs, which could not be resolved informally. (Daghighian Dec., ¶¶ 24 & 37-38.)
Volvo has filed an opposition to the motion.
Analysis:
As a preliminary matter, the court notes that the motion relies on rulings or decisions of other trial courts, including federal district courts, to show why the hourly rates of CCA are reasonable. (Memorandum at p. 9.) The supporting declaration of attorney Daghighian also includes a discussion of those decisions or rulings, copies of which are attached to that declaration. (Daghighian Dec., ¶¶ 16-24 [misnumbered as “14”] & exhibits D-L.)
“Trial court decisions are not precedents binding on other courts under the principle of stare decisis.” (Harrott v. County of Kings (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1138, 1148.) The isolated written trial court rulings attached to the Daghighian declaration have “no precedential value” and “cannot properly be cited in support of a legal argument, absent exceptions not applicable here.” (Santa Ana Hospital Medical Center v. Belshe (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 819, 831; San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. v. County of San Diego (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1163, 1184.) Furthermore, court orders entered in other actions which are not in any way related to this case have no relevance to the issue of whether the attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses incurred and sought by Plaintiffs are compensable. (Evid. Code, § 350; Mangini v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063, overruled on other grounds in In re Tobacco Cases II (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1257, 1276.)
The Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, codified as Civil Code section 1790 et seq. (the Act), provides: “If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).) “Making attorney fees available to prevailing buyers (but not prevailing manufacturers or retail sellers) is designed to ‘ “provide[] injured consumers strong encouragement to seek legal redress in a situation in which a lawsuit might not otherwise have been economically feasible.” ’ [Citation.]” (Duff v. Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 491, 501 (Duff).)
In its opposition to the motion, Volvo states that “Plaintiffs are entitled to seek reasonable fees and costs as the prevailing parties under the parties’ settlement.” (Opp. at p. 1, ll. 20-21.) Volvo further states that it “does not challenge Plaintiffs’ ability to seek a fee award. The issue is whether the amount requested was reasonably incurred.” (Opp. at p. 1, ll. 23-24.)
Though the Act “does not define the term prevailing party[]” (Duff, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 501), it is the court’s understanding based on the assertions by Volvo described above, that Volvo does not dispute that Plaintiffs are a prevailing buyer for purposes of section 1794, subdivision (d), of the Act. For these same reasons, it is also the court’s understanding that Volvo does not dispute Plaintiffs’ right to recover, if allowed by the court, costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees for actual time expended and if reasonably incurred, pursuant to the Act.
Though “trial courts enjoy considerable discretion in awarding attorney fees” (Duff, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 504), in awarding attorney fees under the Act, “the trial court must exercise its discretion ... subject to the legal standards that apply to its decision[]” (Reck v. FCA US LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 682, 690 (Reck)). Determining a reasonable attorney fee award in cases brought pursuant to the Act ‘ “ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ [which is] the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” ’ [Citation.] The lodestar may ‘then be adjusted based on factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value of the legal services provided.’ [Citation.] The lodestar method ‘anchors the trial court’s analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney’s services,’ and thus ensures the amount awarded is not arbitrary. [Citation.]” (Tidrick v. FCA US LLC (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1147, 1157–1158 (Tidrick).)
“The court must initially determine the actual time expended and then ‘ascertain whether under all the circumstances of the case the amount of actual time expended and the monetary charge being made for the time expended are reasonable.’ [Citation.] ‘These circumstances may include, but are not limited to, factors such as the complexity of the case and procedural demands, the skill exhibited and the results achieved. If the time expended or the monetary charge being made for the time expended are not reasonable under all the circumstances, then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount.” (Reck, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at pp. 691–692.)
“A prevailing buyer has the burden of ‘showing that the fees incurred were “allowable,” were “reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation,” and were “reasonable in amount.” ’ [Citation.]” (Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.)
Attorney Daghighian states that CCA attorneys “keep contemporaneous time records of the work performed on cases and bill in increments of tenths-of-an-hour....” (Daghighian Dec., ¶ 6.) Attorney Daghighian further states that they “reduced [CCA’s] billing for numerous inter-office conferences and other administrative tasks, which occurred throughout this litigation[]”; that CCA “[does] not bill for paralegal and administrative work[]” and “do[es] not typically bill for the countless inter-office communications that occur throughout litigation[]”; that CCA’s “billing practice is to reduce such items in our bills as a courtesy to our clients”; and that in this case, attorney Daghighian offered the same courtesy. (Daghighian Dec., ¶ 7.)
Attorney Daghighian asserts that they expended 5.2 hours in this case. (Daghighian Dec., ¶ 7.) Information appearing in attorney Daghighian’s declaration also shows that attorney Michael H. Rosenstein (attorney Rosenstein), who is also a partner at CCA, expended 1.7 hours in this case; attorney Brian T. Shippen-Murray, a former senior associate attorney who remains of counsel to CCA, expended 0.4 hours in this case which are waived on CCA’s invoice; associate attorney Michael William Oppenheim expended 0.1 hours in this case which CCA has also waived; associate attorney Mitchel A. Brim (attorney Brim) expended 53.7 hours in this case; and associate attorney Miguel A. Ortiz (attorney Ortiz) expended 5.7 hours in this case. (Daghighian Dec., ¶¶ 8-12.)
Generally, the court begins its lodestar analysis by reviewing the attorney’s time records which, if verified, are “entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous[.]” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396 (Horsford).) Attached to attorney Daghighian’s declaration is an invoice from CCA to plaintiff Eric Hawkins dated February 8, 2026 (the CCA invoice), which attorney Daghighian asserts reflects the work performed by CCA and the expenses incurred in this case. (Daghighian Dec., ¶ 13, exhibit A.)
The court has reviewed the CCA invoice, which demonstrates that Plaintiffs’ counsel expended time to, among other things, confer with Plaintiffs regarding the vehicle; review and summarize Plaintiffs’ purchase and repair records; analyze Plaintiffs’ claims under the Act; draft the complaint; prepare for and attend case management conferences; draft discovery, review Volvo’s discovery responses, and engage in meet and confer regarding discovery issues; attend a deposition; engage in settlement communications with defense counsel; review and analyze the 998 Offer; and to prepare the present motion. (Daghighian Dec., exhibit A at pp. 1-5.)
The CCA invoice submitted in support of the motion appears, on its face, to reflect the actual time billed by each attorney identified above. Available evidence and information also shows or suggests that the time expended by those attorneys was recorded contemporaneously with the services described in that invoice, that CCA does not bill for paralegal or administrative work, and that the CCA invoice has been audited to remove or reduce fees which may be unnecessary, duplicative, or excessive. (See Daghighian Dec., ¶¶ 6-7.) For these reasons, and as there is no information appearing on the face of the CCA invoice to suggest that record is erroneous or inaccurate, the CCA invoice is entitled to credence. (Horsford, supra, 132 Cal. App. 4th at p. 396.)
For all reasons discussed above, the present record and the court’s own calculations indicate or suggest that the hours actually expended in this case by the CCA attorneys identified above, when excluding those hours which CCA has waived or has not actually expended, total 66.3 (5.2 + 1.7 + 53.7 + 5.7).
The CCA invoice also includes hours which attorney Daghighian expects to expend to review Volvo’s opposition to the present motion, to draft a reply to that opposition, and to prepare for and attend the hearing on the motion. (Daghighian Dec., exhibit A at p. 5.) Attorney Daghighian anticipates they will expend 7.5 hours completing those tasks. (Ibid.)
In its opposition to the motion, Volvo contends that the CCA invoice reflects time that is “out of proportion” for what Volvo asserts are “routine tasks”; includes rate reductions which demonstrate why a reduction of Plaintiffs’ request to an amount reasonably incurred instead of the amount billed is appropriate; reflects “block-billed”, vague, duplicative, administrative, excessive, or not yet incurred time warranting a substantial reduction in the fees requested by Plaintiffs; includes entries which combine multiple tasks making meaningful review difficult; includes attorney time for administrative tasks or template-based discovery; and reflects inefficiency in the form of duplicative work in regard to case management filings, discovery, client communications, and supplemental document review. (Opp. at pp. 4-5.)
“In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564 (Premier).)
The opposition of Volvo is supported by a declaration of its counsel, Corey M. Tolmasoff (attorney Tolmasoff), who states that they have reviewed the motion, the Daghighian declaration, and the billing entries and expenses reflected in the CCA invoice. (Tolmasoff Dec., ¶ 3.) Attached to that declaration is a spreadsheet (the Volvo spreadsheet) which attorney Tolmasoff asserts reflects the time entries and expense items challenged by Volvo, the basis for each objection, and a calculation of what Volvo contends reflects the reasonable time, rates, and the reasonable amount recoverable by Plaintiffs. (Tolmasoff Dec., ¶ 4 & exhibit A.) The Volvo spreadsheet is based on attorney Tolmasoff’s review of the CCA invoice; identifies what attorney Tolmasoff contends are excessive, block-billed, duplicative, administrative, or clerical entries; provides the rate reductions proposed by Volvo; and excludes anticipated future time which has not yet been incurred. (Tolmasoff Dec., ¶ 5.)
Pursuant to the Volvo spreadsheet, attorney Tolmasoff calculates a reasonable fee award of $25,950, which includes 46.9 hours of compensable time. (Tolmasoff Dec., ¶ 6 & exhibit A.)
Though the opposition of Volvo challenges, on a point-by-point basis, specific items or entries contained in the CCA invoice, cites those entries where Volvo contends “block-billed”, combined, vague, ambiguous, administrative, or excessive items appear in the CCA invoice, and includes an explanation of why the itemized billings contained in the CCA invoice are not appropriate or excessive, the points and arguments advanced in the opposition do not persuade the court, for the reasons further discussed below, that the attorney’s fees claimed in the motion are excessive, unnecessary, duplicative, or unreasonable.
For example, even if the court were to assume the truth of attorney Tolmasoff’s contention that CCA is a high-volume Song-Beverly practice, the use of discovery templates or forms by CCA suggests to the court that the time expended by Plaintiffs’ counsel was efficient rather than excessive, when considering the time that would likely be expended to create entirely new documents or discovery requests. In addition, the court would expect counsel to expend time reviewing and modifying a template or form to conform each document to the specific facts and theories alleged in this case. For these reasons, to the extent the CCA invoice reflects the use of templates or forms by a high-volume practice, the court does not find that the entries contained in the CCA invoice necessarily show that Plaintiffs’ counsel expended excessive, duplicative, or unreasonable time to prepare documents, or that the fees incurred for those efforts warrant the reductions proposed by Volvo.
The court is also not persuaded by the remaining arguments presented by Volvo, including in regard to the manner in which CCA staffed this case, whether any tasks could or should have been completed by administrative staff, whether any “block billed” time is improper, and whether the time expended on various tasks reflected in the CCA invoice is appropriate.
For example, absent any evidence to refute the information and evidence presented in attorney Daghighian’s declaration or the accuracy of the CCA invoice, the available information and evidence is sufficient to indicate or suggest that CCA employed a “collaborative process” when performing litigation tasks in this case. (Premier, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 562.) Furthermore, to the extent the CCA invoice contains some amount of block billing, those entries are sufficiently itemized and not so vague so as to prevent the court from determining whether the tasks performed by counsel are compensable or the hours expended were unreasonable or excessive. (See Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1010.) The opposition of Volvo also does not explain why other CCA staff were available or could have completed any particular task in a more efficient manner, or why the time spent by Plaintiffs’ counsel on those tasks is not reasonable.
For all reasons discussed above, the court finds, based on the available information and evidence presented here, that the 5.2 hours expended by attorney Daghighian, the 1.7 hours expended by attorney Rosenstein, the 53.7 hours expended by attorney Brim, and the 5.7 hours expended by attorney Ortiz in this case are reasonable under the circumstances present here.
Further, “the court’s discretion in awarding attorney fees is, initially ..., to be exercised so as to fully compensate counsel for the prevailing party for services reasonably provided to his or her client.” (Horsford, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 395.) “[I]t is well established that plaintiffs and their attorneys may recover attorney fees for fee-related matters.” (Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 580.) The same analysis applies with respect to Plaintiffs’ request for attorney’s fees for the time attorney Daghighian anticipates they will expend to review, analyze, and draft a reply to the opposition of Volvo, and the prepare for and attend the hearing as further detailed above. (Daghighian Dec., ¶ 7 & exhibit A at p. 5.) For all reasons discussed above, the court also finds that 7.5 hours for those tasks is reasonable.
“ ‘The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.’ [Citation.] The relevant ‘community’ is generally based on where the services are rendered, i.e., where the court is located.[Citation.] Accordingly, the reasonable hourly rate in this case is that charged by consumer attorneys practicing in the local legal community in [Santa Barbara] County.” (Tidrick, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 1157.)
The present record reflects that the hourly rate charged by attorney Daghighian in this case is $625. (Daghighian Dec., ¶ 7 & exhibit A.) The hourly rate of attorney Rosenstein is $700. (Daghighian Dec., ¶ 8 & exhibit A.) The hourly rate of attorney Brim is $550. (Daghighian Dec., ¶ 11 & exhibit A.) The hourly rate of attorney Ortiz is $525. (Daghighian Dec., ¶ 12 & exhibit A.)
The declaration of attorney Daghighian includes a biography for each of the attorneys who worked on this case. (Daghighian Dec., ¶¶ 4-5, 8, & 11-12.) Attorney Daghighian also explains the manner in which they established the rates of CCA, which includes attorney Daghighian’s consideration of a “United States Consumer Law Attorney Fee Survey Report” published in 2019 reflecting hourly rates charged by other attorneys in California with comparable experience, and other reports reflecting hourly rates for attorneys in the Los Angeles area. (Daghighian Dec., ¶¶ 14-16 & exhibits B, C.)
Volvo contends in its opposition to the motion, that the hourly rates sought in the motion are “premium rates for what was, in substance, a routine warranty case that settled before trial.” (Opp. at p. 4.)
Though the motion presents no information or evidence showing why the hourly rates described above are based on the reasonable hourly rates prevailing in Santa Barbara County, or charged by consumer attorneys practicing in that legal community, the court finds, based on its own familiarity with the relevant legal market and information provided by attorney Daghighian regarding the skill and relevant experience of the attorneys who expended time in this case, that the hourly rates charged by attorneys Daghighian, Rosenstein, Brim, and Ortiz are reasonable for the Santa Barbara area. (In re Tobacco Cases I (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 570, 587-588 (In re Tobacco Cases I) [the trial court may also rely on its own experience and knowledge to determine the reasonable value of the attorney’s services].)
For all reasons discussed above, the court finds that 12.7 hours of attorney Daghighian’s time at the reasonable hourly rate of $625; 1.7 hours of attorney Rosenstein’s time at the reasonable hourly rate of $700; 53.7 hours of attorney Brim’s time at the reasonable hourly rate of $550; and 5.7 hours of attorney Ortiz’s time at the reasonable hourly rate of $525, for an award of attorney’s fees in the total amount of $41,655, is reasonable based on the hours spent by Plaintiffs’ counsel on this matter as further described above, counsel’s hourly rates, the nature of this litigation, Plaintiffs’ success in reaching a settlement, and counsel’s experience in the type of work demanded. (See In re Tobacco Cases I, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at pp. 581-582, 587.)
The motion also requests a multiplier. “[T]he statutory language of [Civil Code] section 1794, subdivision (d), is reasonably compatible with a lodestar adjustment method of calculating attorney fees, including use of fee multipliers.” (Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 818.)
Relevant here, the lodestar “may be adjusted by the court based on factors including ... (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. [Citation.] The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132 (Ketchum).)
“Of course, the trial court is not required to include a fee enhancement to the basic lodestar figure for contingent risk, exceptional skill, or other factors, although it retains discretion to do so in the appropriate case; moreover, the party seeking a fee enhancement bears the burden of proof. In each case, the trial court should consider whether, and to what extent, the attorney and client have been able to mitigate the risk of nonpayment, e.g., because the client has agreed to pay some portion of the lodestar amount regardless of outcome. It should also consider the degree to which the relevant market compensates for contingency risk, extraordinary skill, or other factors.... [W]hen determining the appropriate enhancement, a trial court should not consider these factors to the extent they are already encompassed within the lodestar.” (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1138, original italics.)
Plaintiffs assert that a fee multiplier will account for what Plaintiffs contend is an “exceptional result”, delay in payment, and the contingent risk posed in this case. Plaintiffs further assert that this case presented a risk that they would not prevail; that this risk was compounded by the fact that Plaintiffs’ counsel advanced all litigation costs and expenses without reimbursement; that had Plaintiffs not prevailed, their counsel would have suffered a loss of countless hours in uncompensated work and thousands in out-of-pocket expenses; and that counsel undertook a tangible and substantial risk in undertaking representation in this case. (Memorandum at p. 13; see also Daghighian Dec., ¶ 39.)
In its opposition, Volvo argues that this case was not novel, complex, or unusually difficult, and instead involves a routine matter under the Act which settled before trial. Volvo further contends that the record does not suggest that counsel displayed extraordinary skill beyond what would ordinarily be expected in competent lemon-law litigation, or show why this case precluded other employment. Volvo also notes that the Act does not provide reciprocal exposure for Volvo’s fees if Plaintiffs do not prevail.
Under the totality of the circumstances present here, the court finds that a fee multiplier is not warranted. For example, there is no evidence or information to show or suggest that this case presented novel or difficult questions. Instead, the available information and evidence indicate that this matter involved a standard “lemon law” case brought pursuant to the Act. Though the court does not question the skill or experience of Plaintiffs’ counsel, nothing in the present record suggest that this case required extraordinary skill beyond the skill employed by Plaintiffs’ counsel.
Furthermore, though the motion does not include any information regarding the substance of the 998 Offer, the time within which this case settled relative to the date of filing of Plaintiffs’ complaint suggests to the court that a fee enhancement is not appropriate here. The motion also fails to explain why this case precluded counsel from other employment. As to any delay in payment arising from the contingent nature of counsel’s representation of Plaintiffs, the court finds that those delays are adequately compensated by the lodestar and the Act’s fee-shifting provision further described above. For these and all further reasons described above, the court will deny the request of Plaintiffs for a fee enhancement.
The motion also includes a request for an award of costs which total $2,573.44. As further discussed above, the Act authorizes the recovery of “costs and expenses ... determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).) “[I]n enacting Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d) the Legislature intended the phrase ‘costs and expenses’ to cover items not included in ‘the detailed statutory definition of “costs” ’ set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5. [Citation.]” (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 42; see also Levy v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 807, 813 (Levy) [noting “that the language of the Act is mandatory” in regard to the recovery of costs if reasonably incurred].)
The CCA invoice contains a section titled “Expenses” which appears to include the costs requested in the motion. Those expenses are generally described as “attorney service” and court filing fees in regard to the complaint, summons, a proof of service, a stipulation and order, and a “CMS” (which the court understands to refer to a case management statement), and were ostensibly incurred by Plaintiffs on August 16, August 18, August 29, and September 3, 2024, and on March 12 and 21, 2025. (Daghighian Dec., exhibit A at p. 6.) The expenses also include a court reporter invoice ostensibly from “Network Depo” which was incurred on July 7, 2025. (Ibid.)
The CCA invoice also includes expenses for “attorney service fees” ostensibly charged by Advanced Attorney Services and Rapid Legal on December 29 and 31, 2024, and January 27, January 31, and October 17, 2025. (Daghighian Dec., exhibit A at p. 6.) The CCA invoice does not contain a description of those expenses apart from the general information described above, or any information indicating why or the purpose for which those expenses were incurred in this case
In addition, the motion, including the declaration of attorney Daghighian, presents no information or evidence to show that the expenses listed in the CCA invoice and described above were reasonably incurred in connection with the commencement and prosecution of this action, or why. (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).) For these and all further reasons discussed above, Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to show why the court should allow recovery of the expenses reflected in the CCA invoice.
Notwithstanding that Plaintiffs have not met their burden as to the expenses reflected in the CCA invoice, Volvo, who asserts that it does not object to properly documented and reasonably incurred costs, contends that the CCA invoice reflects that $2,067.46 in costs are reasonably supported. (Opp. at p. 7, ll. 20-24; Tolmasoff Dec., ¶ 7 & exhibit A.) The court understands that contention, which is supported by attorney Tolmasoff’s declaration, as a concession by Volvo that the recovery by Plaintiffs of expenses in the amount of $2,067.46 is appropriate, and authorized under the Act. It is also the court’s understanding that Volvo does not dispute that costs in the amount of $2,067.46 were reasonably incurred by Plaintiffs in connection with the commencement and prosecution of this case.
For all reasons discussed above, the court disagrees with the assertion in Plaintiffs’ reply that “[e]vidence of the costs was provided in the [CCA invoice] and attested to by [attorney] Daghighian[]”, or that each of the costs “is listed with an explanation sufficient enough to apprize the Court of its necessity.” (Reply at p. 6, ll. 6-8, original unchanged.) Moreover, by effectively forcing the court to cross-reference billing entries to determine which, if any, expenses reflected in the CCA invoice were reasonably incurred and why, it appears that Plaintiffs seek to shift their burden to the court. (See Reply at p. 6, ll. 8-12.) For these and all further reasons discussed above, Plaintiffs have failed to show why the remaining costs reflected in the CCA invoice, apart from those described above which Volvo does not dispute, were reasonably incurred in connection with the commencement and prosecution of this case. (See Levy, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 813 [“the statute requires payment only of those costs and fees ‘determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution’ of the underlying action.”].)
For all reasons discussed above, the court will grant the motion, in part, and award Plaintiffs attorney’s fees in the amount of $41,655, and costs and expenses in the amount of $2,067.46. The court will otherwise deny the motion.
Plaintiffs have filed with the court written objections to material contained in the declaration of attorney Tolmasoff. The court considers only that evidence which is admissible and relevant to the issues presented.
Further, the court has reviewed the proposed order submitted by Plaintiffs with the motion, and does not intend to sign it. The court will order Plaintiffs to submit a corrected proposed order for the court’s review and signature, that conforms to the ruling herein.