Y.A. v. Alma A. Medina-Figueroa, et al.

Case Number

24CV03490

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 12/10/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

(1) Motion of Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant for Attorney’s Fees; (2) Motion of Defendants and Cross-Complainants to Tax Costs

Tentative Ruling

For Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant Y.A.: Sebastian M. Medvei, Medvei Law Group, APC

                                   

For Defendants and Cross-Complainants Alma A. Medina-Figueroa and Multiservice Santa Barbara, LLC: Russell Brown, RBX Law, PC

RULING

(1) Motion of Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant for Attorney’s Fees – For all the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff Y.A.’s motion for attorney’s fees is denied without prejudice to Plaintiff refiling the motion for attorney’s fees after final judgment or other final disposition of this action.

                  

(2) Motion of Defendants and Cross-Complainants to Tax Costs – For all the reasons stated herein, Defendants’ motion to tax costs is granted without prejudice to Plaintiff refiling the memorandum of costs after final judgment or other final disposition of this matter.

Background

On June 21, 2024, Plaintiff Y.A. initiated this action by filing a complaint against Defendants Alma A. Medina-Figueroa (Medina-Figueroa) and Multiservice Santa Barbara, LLC (MSB) asserting one cause of action for violation of the Immigration Consultants Act (ICA).

As alleged in the complaint:

Defendants Medina-Figueroa and MSB are engaged in the business of an immigration consultant as defined by the ICA. (Compl., ¶ 14.)

Defendant Medina-Figueroa is the principal, primary operator, and controller of MSB. (Compl., ¶ 1.)

Plaintiff consulted with and retained Medina-Figueroa to assist with an immigration matter. (Compl., ¶ 9.) Plaintiff paid Medina-Figueroa at least $2,800 to obtain citizenship for Plaintiff’s husband and permanent residency (green card) for Plaintiff. (Ibid.)

After consulting with Medina-Figueroa and making payment, Plaintiff discovered that Medina-Figueroa had not taken any action on Plaintiff’s case. (Compl., ¶ 10.) Medina-Figueroa advised that upon further review of Plaintiff’s case, immigration background, and eligibility, Medina-Figueroa was not sure whether Plaintiff was eligible for permanent residency status. (Ibid.)

Plaintiff requested the return of the money and documents, but Medina-Figueroa refused. (Compl., ¶ 10.)

Defendants violated the ICA by providing legal advice without a law license, providing services outside the scope permitted by the ICA, charging improper fees not allowed under the ICA, failing to provide written contracts in compliance with the ICA, and failing to provide receipts and accountings in conformity with the ICA. (Compl., ¶15.)

On July 29, 2024, Defendants Medina-Figueroa and MSB answered the complaint, asserting a general denial and setting forth 20 affirmative defenses.

On July 29, 2024, Defendants Medina-Figueroa and MSB filed a cross-complaint against Plaintiff asserting one cause of action for declaratory relief seeking a declaration of the parties’ rights and obligations under their contract.

On August 5, 2024, Defendants filed a first amended cross-complaint (FACC) against Plaintiff alleging one cause of action for declaratory relief. The FACC attached the contract at issue as an exhibit.

On September 10, 2024, Plaintiff filed a demurrer to the FACC on the grounds that, as alleged, Defendants Medina-Figueroa is not a party to a contract with Plaintiff and Plaintiff never claimed the contract between Plaintiff and MSB was invalid. Defendants opposed this motion.

On October 16, 2024, the Court sustained Plaintiff ‘s demurrer to the FACC with leave to amend as to Defendant Medina-Figueroa and overruled the demurrer as to Defendant MSB.

On November 5, 2024, Defendants Medina-Figueroa and MSB filed a second amended cross-complaint (SACC) against Plaintiff, alleging one cause of action for declaratory relief.

As alleged in the SACC:

On July 5, 2023, Plaintiff Y.A. and Defendant MSB entered into a contract whereby MSB would provide services to Plaintiff pertaining to requests under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and translations. (SACC, ¶ 1, Ex. 1.)

Defendant Medina-Figueroa is the sole owner, operator, and member of MSB. (SACC, ¶ 2.)

Plaintiff informed Defendant Medina-Figueroa that Plaintiff was not under an order of removal and that Plaintiff had not been charged with human smuggling. (SACC, ¶ 8.)

Contrary to the representations made by Plaintiff, Plaintiff has a 2004 order of removal due to a conviction for human smuggling. (SACC, ¶ 9.)

Upon learning of these circumstances, Medina-Figueroa referred Plaintiff to a lawyer for legal services pursuant to the ICA. (SACC, ¶ 13.)

Plaintiff sent Defendant Medina-Figueroa a written request to cancel the contract on April 1, 2024. (SACC, ¶ 11.) Plaintiff alleged that Medina Figueroa failed to satisfy her obligations under the contract. (Ibid.) Plaintiff requested a refund. (Ibid.) Plaintiff contends there is no valid contract between the parties. (SACC, ¶ 15.)

Defendant Medina-Figueroa completed the work under the contract by submitting FOIA requests, reviewing the results, and contacting Plaintiff regarding the information received in response to the FOIA requests. (SACC, ¶¶ 10, 12.)

Defendants seek a declaration that the contract is a valid and legally enforceable and setting forth the parties’ rights and responsibilities under the contract. (SACC, ¶ 15.)

In addition to declaratory relief, the SACC seeks the recovery from Plaintiff of “attorneys fees and costs pursuant to The Contract.” (SACC, p. 5 at ll. 1-8.)

On June 6, 2025, Plaintiff filed a demurrer to the SACC on the grounds that Defendant Medina-Figueroa is not a party to any contract with Plaintiff and the contract is void for illegality.

On July 1, 2025, Defendants filed a notice of non-opposition informing the Court and parties that Defendants did not oppose Plaintiff’s demurrer to the SACC: “PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: Cross-Complainants do not oppose Cross-Defendants Demurrer to their Second Amended Cross-Complaint.” (Not. Non. Opp., July 1, 2025.)

On August 13, 2025, the Court sustained Plaintiff’s demurrer to the SACC without leave to amend.

On September 17, 2025, the Court filed a judgment of dismissal dismissing the SACC with prejudice.

On September 18, 2025, Plaintiff filed a memorandum of costs requesting the recovery of filing and motion fees in the amount of $914.74.

On September 29, 2025, Defendants filed a motion to tax costs set for this hearing on December 10, 2025. Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate the costs were incurred defending the cross-action and there was no prevailing party on Plaintiff’s underlying complaint. This motion is opposed.

On November 12, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion for attorney’s fees as the prevailing party on the cross-action. This motion is set for this hearing on December 10, 2025. Plaintiff seeks attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $18,635. This motion is unopposed.

Analysis

“Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (b).) This right extends to costs incurred in a cross-action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (a)(1).) Attorney’s fees are allowable as costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032 when authorized by contract, statute or law. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10.)

“In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney’s fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees in addition to other costs ... Reasonable attorney’s fees shall be fixed by the Court, and shall be an element of the costs of suit….” (Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (a).)

“The inclusion of section 1717 fees as an element of costs is significant because costs are awarded at the end of an action. … [T]he Legislature intended attorney’s fees under section 1717 to be awarded only at the conclusion of all litigation in a case, either in a final judgment or some other final disposition. … “[T]he Legislature’s attempt to create consistency between section 1717 and the procedures for a prevailing party to collect costs reinforces our conclusion that attorney’s fees are intended to be part of costs and therefore awarded, like all costs, at the conclusion of the litigation of an action.” (Chen v. Valstock Ventures, LLC (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 957, 970-974.)

“A complaint and cross-complaint are treated as independent actions for most purposes, except with respect to the requirement of one final judgment. [Citation.] Where a complaint and cross-complaint involving the same parties have been filed, there is no final, appealable judgment until both have been resolved.” (Westamerica Bank v. MBG Industries, Inc. (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 109, 132 (italics in original).)

Here, Plaintiff filed the original complaint against Defendants on June 21, 2024. This complaint is still pending in this action. Although the Court granted Plaintiff’s demurrer to the SACC against Defendants without leave to amend, the there is no final judgment or other final disposition of this action. Plaintiff’s memorandum of costs and motion for attorney’s fees are therefore premature.

For all the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees is denied without prejudice to Plaintiff refiling this motion after final judgment or other final disposition of this action. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1702(b)(1).) Defendants’ motion to tax costs is granted without prejudice to Plaintiff refiling the memorandum of costs after final judgment or other final disposition of this action. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1700(a)(1).)