Jennifer Renga vs John Lawrence Freeman

Case Number

24CV03179

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 03/13/2026 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motions to Compel; Motion for Summary Adjudication

Tentative Ruling

(1) For the reasons stated herein, the motion of plaintiff for summary adjudication is denied.

(2) For the reasons stated herein, the motion of plaintiff to compel further responses to special interrogatories, set two, and the motion of plaintiff to compel further responses to request for production of documents, set two, are each ordered off-calendar.

Background:

The first amended complaint (FAC) filed by plaintiff Jennifer Renga on August 8, 2024, is the operative pleading. In the FAC, plaintiff alleges twelve causes of action against defendant John Lawrence Freeman: (1) retaliation in violation of Government Code section 12900 (the California Fair Employment and Housing Act or FEHA) (2) retaliation in violation of California state law (Civil Code section 1942.5); (3) breach of contract; (4) breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (5) breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment; (6) failure to use reasonable care to protect tenants in violation of California state law (Civil Code section 1714); (7) trespassing in violation of Civil Code section 1954; (8) nuisance; (9) negligence; (10) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (11) constructive eviction; and (12) violation of Civil Code section 52.1 (the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act). As alleged in the FAC:

On August 18, 2022, pursuant to a rental agreement between the parties, plaintiff entered into possession of premises located at 1711 Grand Avenue in Santa Barbara, California (the premises) which is owned, maintained, operated, and managed by defendant. (FAC, ¶¶ 10-11, 14 & 16.)

On March 25, 2023, plaintiff fell down a stairway within the premises, causing plaintiff to sustain severe injuries and to be hospitalized for over a month. (FAC, ¶ 19.) Plaintiff initiated a claim against defendant’s homeowner’s insurance policy for damages related to the injuries plaintiff sustained from the fall (the Claim). (Id. at ¶¶ 19 & 31.) On March 19, 2024, plaintiff signed a release prepared by defendant’s insurance carrier regarding the Claim. (Id. at ¶¶ 46-48.)

Beginning in November 2023, after receiving notice of the Claim, defendant and his girlfriend, Tina, began sending messages to plaintiff urging plaintiff not to pursue her legal rights with respect to the Claim, and threatening to evict plaintiff, to take away plaintiff’s “section 8”, to tell the housing authority that plaintiff has a problem with substance abuse, and to turn off plaintiff’s hot water and electricity, among other things. (FAC, ¶¶ 20, 22-26, 30-33, 36, 39.) Defendant also demanded that plaintiff vacate the premises, and presented plaintiff with termination notices and notices to quit the premises. (Id. at ¶¶ 30, 32, & 36.)

In addition, Tina admitted to slashing a tire on plaintiff’s car. (FAC, ¶ 27.) On two occasions, defendant entered the premises without prior warning or permission, yelling at plaintiff and calling her a “cunt”, among other things. (Id. at ¶¶ 35-36.) Defendant also blocked plaintiff’s access to her parking space, preventing her from leaving the premises. (Id. at ¶ 37.)

Though plaintiff complained about and asked defendant to cease, defendant’s conduct, defendant ignored plaintiff’s requests. (FAC, ¶ 41 & 43.) As a result of defendant’s conduct, plaintiff experienced symptoms of “PTSD”, had difficulty eating and sleeping, and lived in constant fear. (Id. at ¶¶ 28, 38, 42.) Plaintiff was forced to move out of the premises on February 29, 2024. (Id. at ¶ 45.)

On September 9, 2024, defendant filed an answer to the FAC, generally denying its allegations and asserting forty-four affirmative defenses.

On November 4, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment (the Defendant MSJ), on the grounds that plaintiff signed a release of the claims and causes of action alleged in the FAC. That motion was opposed by plaintiff.

On February 28, 2025, the court issued a minute order adopting its tentative ruling denying the Defendant MSJ.

On August 7, 2025, plaintiff filed a motion (the MSA) for an order adjudicating the following issues: (1) that defendant’s twenty-eighth affirmative defense does not preclude the claims made in this action because “the general language of the release is superseded by the specific language limiting the release to claims, demands, actions, causes of action, or suits arising from a fall suffered by [plaintiff] while on [defendant’s] property[]”; and (2) that defendant’s twenty-ninth affirmative defense does not preclude the claims made in this action because “[plaintiff’s] general release of claims did not generally or specifically release [defendant] from liability for his conduct at issue in this [a]ction.” (Notice at p. 1, ll. 9-16.)

The MSA was calendared for hearing on December 12, 2025. Defendant opposes the MSA.

On December 12, the court issued a minute order continuing the MSA to March 13, 2026.

On December 23, plaintiff filed a motion for an order (the SI Motion) compelling defendant to serve verified, further responses, without objections to plaintiffs set two special interrogatories (the SI), nos. 17 through 22; and a motion for an order (the RFP Motion) compelling defendant to serve verified, further responses, without objections, to plaintiffs requests for production of documents (the RFP), nos. 21 through 32. The SI Motion and the RFP Motion (collectively, the Discovery Motions) each seek an award of monetary sanctions against defendant and their counsel.

Defendant opposes the Discovery Motions, which were each calendared for hearing on February 13, 2026.

On February 13, 2026, the court issued a minute order, pursuant to an agreement of counsel, continuing the MSA and the Discovery Motions to March 13.

The MSA:

The parties do not dispute, or reasonably dispute, that on March 25, 2023, plaintiff fell at the premises and sustained personal injuries. (Opp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 1 & evidence cited therein [not reasonably disputed on this point].) On March 29, 2024, plaintiff signed a “Release” (the 2024 Release). (Opp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 2 & evidence cited therein [not reasonably disputed on this point].)

Defendant’s insurance carrier, State Farm Insurance Company (State Farm), drafted the 2024 Release. (Opp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 17.) At the time plaintiff signed the 2024 Release, she was represented by attorney Anthony Kastenek (attorney Kastenek). (Opp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 3 & evidence cited therein [not reasonably disputed on this point].) Neither State Farm nor defendant were provided with notice of the legal claims at issue in this lawsuit until they received a representation letter from plaintiff’s present counsel dated April 17, 2024. (Opp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 18.)

Plaintiff alleges in the FAC that the claims made in this lawsuit relate to conduct that began on or about November 2023; that none of the causes of action or claims for damages are based on the injury plaintiff sustained as a result of falling down the stairs on March 25, 2023; and that this lawsuit does not seek damages for physical or other injuries caused by that fall. (Opp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 6.) Plaintiff also alleges that the 2024 Release relates only to the fall, and injuries she sustained due to the fall, that occurred on March 25, 2023, and not to any incidents that occurred between November 2023 and February 2024. (Opp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 7 & evidence cited therein [not reasonably disputed on this point].)

The second paragraph of the 2024 Release states that plaintiff “ ‘agrees to be responsible for and to satisfy out of the proceeds of this settlement, any and all liens, known and unknown, and/or subrogated interests, for medical treatment, health care and related expenses, and attorney’s fees, incurred by, or on behalf of the undersigned, for any bodily injury arising from the accident described herein above.’ ” (Opp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 9.)

The third paragraph of the 2024 Release states that plaintiff “ ‘hereby declares that the terms of this settlement have been completely read and are fully understood and voluntarily accepted for the purpose of making a fill and final compromise adjustment and settlement of any and all claims, disputed or otherwise, known or unknown, on account of the injuries and damages above mentioned, and for the express purpose of precluding forever any further or additional claims arising out of the incident described above.’ ” (Opp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 10 & evidence cited therein [not reasonably disputed on this point].)

In the answer to the FAC, defendant pleads as the twenty-eighth affirmative defense, that the 2024 Release bars the claims of the present lawsuit. (Opp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 12.) Defendant asserts as the twenty-ninth affirmative defense, that plaintiff released defendant from the claims of this suit. (Opp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 13.)

The above summary is not intended to be exhaustive, and the court considers all admissible evidence submitted in support of and in opposition to the MSA.

The Discovery Motions:

In support of each of the Discovery Motions, plaintiff separately submits declarations of their counsel, Zachary Cantor (attorney Cantor), which are identical or effectively identical. For this reason, the court will address those declarations collectively.

Attorney Cantor states that on November 8, 2025, plaintiff served defendant with the SI and the RFP (collectively, the Discovery). (Cantor Decs., ¶¶ 3 & Exs. A [the SI] & B [the RFP].) Defendant served responses to the Discovery on December 8. (Cantor Decs., ¶¶ 4 & Exs. C [responses to SI] & D [responses to RFP].) Those responses consist of objections that are asserted “verbatim” to each request, and do not include any substantive response. (Ibid.)

On December 8, attorney Cantor sent a meet and confer letter (the Letter) to defendant’s counsel addressing defendant’s objections to the Discovery, and demanding substantive responses by December 23. (Cantor Decs., ¶¶ 5 & Exs. E.) Defendant has not provided supplemental responses; has not contacted attorney Cantor’s office to discuss the discovery dispute; and has not responded to the Letter, necessitating the filing of the Discovery Motions. (Cantor Decs., ¶¶ 6.)

The oppositions of defendant to the SI Motion and the RFP Motion are each supported by separate declarations of defendant’s counsel, Rogelio Ruiz (attorney Ruiz), which also contain identical or nearly identical information. For the same reasons discussed above, the court will address those declarations collectively.

Attorney Ruiz does not appear to dispute or effectively dispute information included in attorney Cantor’s declaration in regard to the service of the Discovery or the Letter. (See, e.g., Ruiz Decs., ¶¶ 2-5 & Exs. C-F.)

Attorney Ruiz states that on December 23, defendant provided amended responses to some of the Discovery, and defendant’s counsel provided a responsive meet and confer letter (the Response Letter). (Ruiz Decs., ¶¶ 5-7 & Exs. G-I.) Though the Letter demanded that defendant provide responses by December 23, plaintiff did not honor that date and “preemptively” served the Discovery Motions before receiving defendant’s amended responses or the Response Letter. (Ruiz Desc., ¶ 8.)

Analysis:

(1)       The MSA

“A party may move for summary adjudication as to ... one or more affirmative defenses ..., ... if the party contends ... that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action [or] that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action[.] A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of ... an affirmative defense[.]” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) A motion for summary adjudication “shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(2).)

“When a plaintiff moves for summary adjudication on an affirmative defense, the court shall grant the motion ‘only if it completely disposes’ of the defense. [Citation.] The plaintiff bears the initial burden to show there is no triable issue of material fact as to the defense and that he or she is entitled to judgment on the defense as a matter of law. In so doing, the plaintiff must negate an essential element of the defense, or establish the defendant does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain evidence needed to support the defense.” (See’s Candy Shops, Inc. v. Superior Court (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 889, 899–900, original italics.)

“The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) If the moving party carries the initial burden of production “to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any genuine issue of material fact ... he causes a shift: the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.” (Id. at p. 845.)

In the opposing separate statement submitted in support of defendant’s opposition to the motion, defendant asserts that plaintiff’s supporting separate statement should be stricken or disregarded by the court because plaintiff has failed to state specifically in the notice of motion and repeat, verbatim, in their separate statement, the specific affirmative defenses at issue in separate section headings. (Opp. Sep. Stmt. at p. 1, l. 26-p. 2, l. 6.)

“If summary adjudication is sought, whether separately or as an alternative to the motion for summary judgment, the specific cause of action, affirmative defense, claims for damages, or issues of duty must be stated specifically in the notice of motion and be repeated, verbatim, in the separate statement of undisputed material facts.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(b).) In addition, a separate statement in support of a motion for summary adjudication must “separately identify:

“(A) Each cause of action, claim for damages, issue of duty, or affirmative defense that is the subject of the motion; and

“(B) Each supporting material fact claimed to be without dispute with respect to the cause of action, claim for damages, issue of duty, or affirmative defense that is the subject of the motion.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(d)(1)(A)-(B).)

Though the notice of the MSA identifies the two affirmative defenses for which plaintiff seeks summary adjudication, the supporting separate statement does not repeat those defenses. Instead, the supporting separate statement states that plaintiff “hereby submits her Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Adjudication on the TWO ISSUES[]”, and lists those facts without indicating which fact is claimed to be without dispute with respect to each affirmative defense. (See, e.g., Sep. Stmt. at p. 1.) As the supporting separate statement fails to list the issues or separately identify each affirmative defense that is the subject of the present motion, and each supporting material fact claimed to be without dispute as to that defense, the motion fails to comply with court rules. (Truong v. Glasser (2009) 181 Cal.App.4th 102, 118 (Truong).)

Though the failure to comply with the requirements of a separate statement may constitute sufficient ground to deny the MSA (Collins v. Hertz Corp. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 64, 73), “the court’s power to deny summary judgment on the basis of failure to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350 is discretionary, not mandatory[]” (Truong, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 118). Considering that the MSA seeks summary adjudication of only two affirmative defenses which are each identified in the notice, and that it is the court’s understanding, based on the manner in which the supporting separate statement is presented, that plaintiff contends that each supporting fact identified in that statement is without dispute with respect to both of the affirmative defenses identified in the notice of the MSA, the court will, under the circumstances present here, exercise its discretion to consider the MSA.

Plaintiff contends that the court has “already determined” that the affirmative defense of waiver does not apply to the claims alleged by plaintiff in these proceedings. To support this contention, plaintiff cites the court’s November 4, 2024, ruling denying the Defendant MSJ.

In the absence of any reasoned legal argument explaining why the court’s denial of the Defendant MSJ constitutes a determination that a particular affirmative defense does not apply to the claims at issue in these proceedings, the court understands plaintiff’s contention to rely on the doctrine of issue preclusion, which “prohibits the relitigation of issues argued and decided in a previous case, even if the second suit raises different causes of action.” (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 824, original italics.) Issue preclusion applies to bar a second suit raising different causes of action “(1) after final adjudication (2) of an identical issue (3) actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit and (4) asserted against one who was a party in the first suit or one in privity with that party.” (Id. at p. 825, original italics.)

The MSA is not a “second suit” for purposes of issue preclusion. Furthermore, in denying the Defendant MSJ, the court did not decide the issue of whether the 2024 Release did or did not apply to bar the claims asserted by plaintiff in this action. Instead, the court determined that defendant had failed to meet their burden to produce evidence showing why the 2024 Release constitutes a complete defense or bar to each of the causes of action alleged in the FAC.

Notwithstanding the matters further discussed above, the court will deny the MSA for all reasons discussed below.

“On a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, the pleadings delimit the scope of the issues, and the function of affidavits, declarations, or other supporting evidence is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Superior Court (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1132; see also FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 380–382 [noting that a defendant’s answer to a complaint supplements the measure of the materiality in a summary judgment proceeding, and that a moving party plaintiff must “show that there is no material factual dispute with respect to the defenses proffered by the defendant.”].)

The twenty-eighth defense raised in defendant’s answer to the FAC states: “[p]laintiff’s claims are barred because plaintiff signed a general release with a waiver of Civil Code section 1542, et seq, which included release and waiver of any and all claims that preceded the signing of the general release....” (Answer at p. 5, ll. 21-25.) The twenty-ninth defense raised in defendant’s answer states: “[p]laintiff’s claims are barred as [p]laintiff released defendant from the claims now alleged.” (Answer at p. 5, ll. 26-28.)

The opposing separate statement submitted by defendant sets forth additional material facts which defendant contends are pertinent to the disposition of the MSA. Those additional facts include that on June 23, 2023, plaintiff and defendant entered into a release (the 2023 Release) of all claims related to the March 25, 2025, incident or fall (the Incident) alleged in the FAC. (Opp. Sep. Stmt., AF no. 1 & evidence cited therein.) A copy of the 2023 Release is included as an exhibit to defendant’s declaration submitted in support of the opposition to the motion. (Freeman Dec., ¶ 5 & Ex. A.)

The additional facts identified in defendant’s opposing separate statement also include that, in consideration for the 2023 Release, defendant gave plaintiff a BMW vehicle; paid for insurance and maintenance for that vehicle; and reduced plaintiff’s rent. (Opp. Sep. Stmt., AF no. 2 & evidence cited therein.) Plaintiff subsequently “reneged” on the 2023 Release, and filed a claim with defendant’s insurance company in November 2023. (Opp. Sep. Stmt., AF no. 3 & evidence cited therein.)

“To create a triable issue of material fact, the opposition evidence must be directed to issues raised by the pleadings.” (Distefano v. Forester (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1264.) Though the twenty-eighth and twenty-ninth defenses plead, expressly and by inference, the existence of a release or releases which purportedly bars the claims alleged by plaintiff in the FAC (see Baker v. Ferrel (1947) 78 Cal.App.2d 578, 579 [“a release is an affirmative defense which must be specially pleaded”]), the twenty-ninth affirmative defense does not specifically identify the specific release or releases at issue, such as by describing or stating the title or date of each release at issue. The twenty-eighth affirmative defense expressly asserts that the release pleaded in that defense contains a waiver of Civil Code section 1542.

The 2023 Release attached to defendant’s declaration does not, on its face, include an express waiver of Civil Code section 1542. In addition, the points advanced in defendant’s opposition to the present motion indicate that the subject of the twenty-eighth affirmative defense pleaded in defendant’s answer is the 2024 Release, and not the 2023 Release. (See, e.g., Opp. at p. 2, ll. 3-21.) To the extent defendant contends that the twenty-eighth affirmative defenses include a release that does not contain a waiver of Civil Code section 1542, defendant’s separate statement “is not a substitute for an amendment of the [answer].” (Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1201, fn. 5.) Defendant “ ‘cannot bring up new, unpleaded issues in his or her opposing papers.’ [Citation.]” (Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1253.)

 The twenty-ninth affirmative defense generally pleads that plaintiff released the claims alleged in the FAC, and is not expressly limited to a release that contains a waiver of Civil Code section 1542. Further, defendant contends that “[n]othing in the [2023 Release] or the [2024 Release] limits the release of all claims to bodily injuries from [the Incident].” (Opp. at p. 8, ll. 14-15.)

For all reasons discussed above, the present record indicates, reflects, or suggests that each of the affirmative defenses to which the MSA is directed each plead, or can be reasonably interpreted to plead, the 2024 Release as a bar to the causes of action alleged in the FAC. The record further reflects that the twenty-ninth affirmative defense also includes or relies on the 2023 Release as a bar to those causes.

Wholly absent from the MSA is any reasoned argument addressing the 2023 Release. (See, e.g., Solis v. Kirkwood Resort Co. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 354, 360 (Solis) [discussing prior releases].) For this reason, and notwithstanding whether plaintiff could advance meritorious argument showing that the 2023 Release does not bar the claims alleged in the FAC, the MSA fails to completely dispose of the twenty-ninth defense pleaded in defendant’s answer to the FAC.

Moreover, to the extent the motion requests, as to the twenty-ninth affirmative defense, partial summary adjudication as to the 2024 Release only, or as to whether any defense based on the 2024 Release has merit, “there [is] no statutory basis for such an order.” (Paramount Petroleum Corp. v. Superior Court (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 226, 243; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1) [“[a] motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of ... an affirmative defense....”].) For these and all further reasons discussed above, the court will deny the motion for summary adjudication of the twenty-ninth defense pleaded in the answer of defendant to the FAC.

As to the motion for summary adjudication of the twenty-eighth defense, there exist contradictory or competing inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence which raise a triable issue of material fact. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)

Though the first paragraph of the 2024 Release is not set forth in full in the supporting separate statement, the parties do not, and cannot, reasonably dispute that the first paragraph of that release states that “[plaintiff] hereby fully and forever release and discharge[s] [sic] [defendant], who does not admit any liability to the undersigned but expressly denies any liability, from any and all claims, demands, damages, actions, causes of action or suits of any kind or nature whatsoever, and particularly on account of all injuries known and unknown, which have resulted or may in the future develop from an incident on or about the 25 day of March, 2023, at or near [the premises].” (Opp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 8 & evidence cited therein [not reasonably disputed on this point].) The parties also do not reasonably dispute that the claims alleged in the FAC arise from conduct which began in November of 2023, or prior to the date the 2024 Release was executed by the parties on March 19, 2024. (Sep. Stmt., UMF nos. 2 & 6 & evidence cited therein.)

“In the absence of extrinsic evidence, the scope of a release is determined by the express language of the release. [Citation.] The express terms of the release must be applicable to the particular negligence of the defendant, but every possible specific act of negligence of the defendant need not be spelled out in the agreement. [Citation.] When a release expressly releases the defendant from any liability, it is not necessary that the plaintiff have had a specific knowledge of the particular risk that ultimately caused the injury. [Citation.] If a release of all liability is given, the release applies to any negligence of the defendant. ‘ “It is only necessary that the act of negligence, which results in injury to the releasor, be reasonably related to the object or purpose for which the release is given.” [Citation.]’ The issue is not whether the particular risk of injury is inherent in the ... activity to which the release applies, but rather the scope of the release.” (Benedek v. PLC Santa Monica, LLC (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1357 (Benedek).)

The allegations of the FAC “constitute judicial admissions. As such they are conclusive concessions of the truth of a matter and have the effect of removing it from the issues.” (Uram v. Abex Corp. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1425, 1433.) The causes of action alleged in the FAC arise from conduct by defendant that began in November of 2023. (FAC, ¶ 20; see also Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 6 & evidence cited therein.) The FAC alleges that the conduct occurred subsequent to, or as result of, the filing of the Claim by plaintiff; that the conduct was intended to retaliate against and harass plaintiff for filing the Claim; that the 2024 Release states that plaintiff releases defendant from “any and all claims, .... actions, causes of action or suits of any kind” resulting from the Incident which is the subject of the Claim; and that the parties executed the 2024 Release six months after the conduct began. (FAC, ¶¶ 21-22, 24-25, 27, 31, 34- 35, 42 & 43; see also Sep. Stmt., UMF nos. 1-2, 6-7 & evidence cited therein.)

Though plaintiff asserts in the MSA that the 2024 Release cannot bar the present action because defendant’s subsequent conduct is not a natural consequence of the Incident, and was not contemplated in the drafting or signing of that release, and because the 2024 Release includes no reference to any claims asserted in this action, the 2024 Release includes general language pursuant to which plaintiff agreed to release “any and all” claims or causes of action “of any kind or nature whatsoever....” (Cantor Dec., Ex. A [paragraph one].) “ ‘[Releases] of this kind are not to be shorn of their efficiency by any narrow, technical, and close construction.... If parties intend to leave some things open and unsettled, their intent so to do should be made manifest.’ [Citation.] ‘The rule for releases is that absent special vitiating circumstances, a general release bars claims based upon events occurring prior to the date of the release.’ [Citation.]” (Villacres v. ABM Industries Inc. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 562, 589.)

The MSA also argues that the 2024 Release is narrowed specifically to, and was intended to conclude, only those claims specifically arising from the injuries plaintiff sustained as a result of the Incident, and that an “unambiguous reading of the plain language of the agreement is the only claims barred are those resulting from [the Incident].” (Memorandum at p. 1, ll. 16-17.) “Release agreements are governed by the generally applicable law of contracts.” (Neverkovec v. Fredericks (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 337, 348 (Neverkovec).) “However broad may be the terms of a contract, it extends only to those things concerning which it appears that the parties intended to contract.” (Civ. Code, § 1648.)

To support the MSA’s contention that the 2024 Release does not concern the conduct giving rise to the causes of action alleged in the FAC, plaintiff states that when they signed that release, it was their “understanding that the claims barred by it would be limited to the injuries [plaintiff] sustained as a result of [the Incident]. [Plaintiff] did not believe the subsequent conduct of [d]efendant that occurred between November 2023 and February 2024 would be included, because the [2024 Release] specified that its purpose was to settle all claims resulting from [the Incident].” (Renga Dec., ¶ 4.)

Plaintiff also submits a declaration of attorney Kastenek, who states that they represented plaintiff for a personal injury claim related to the Incident; that after attorney Kastenek submitted a demand to State Farm on behalf of plaintiff, State Farm tendered its policy limits; and that upon the tender of those limits, State Farm drafted the 2024 Release for the Claim. (Kastenek Dec., ¶¶ 3 & 5-6.)

Attorney Kastenek further states that it was not their “understanding that any subsequent conduct of [d]efendant that occurred between November 2023 and February 2024 was included in [the 2024 Release] as the [2024] Release specified that its purpose was to settle all claims resulting from [the Incident]—and referred to the ‘incident’ three times throughout the one-page release agreement.” (Kastenek Dec., ¶ 11.) According to attorney Kastenek, the 2024 Release “did not include claims arising from any other locus of facts between the two parties[]” and the claims released by the 2024 Release “specifically included the injuries sustained by [plaintiff] when she fell at the [premises] on March 25, 2023.” (Kastenek Dec., ¶¶ 9-10.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 1856 (the parol evidence rule) does not exclude “evidence of the circumstances under which the agreement was made or to which it relates, ... or to explain an extrinsic ambiguity or otherwise interpret the terms of the agreement....” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1856, subd. (g); Bionghi v. Metropolitan Water Dist. of So. California (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1364 [discussing analysis].)

In support of their opposition to the motion, defendant states that they helped plaintiff after the Incident; that in consideration of the 2023 Release, defendant gave plaintiff a vehicle, paid for insurance and maintenance for that vehicle, and reduced plaintiff’s rent; and that plaintiff “subsequently reneged” on [the 2023 Release] and filed a claim with [defendant’s] insurance company in November 2023. (Freeman Dec., ¶¶ 3-7.) Defendant further states that, because plaintiff had “reneged” on the 2023 Release “and had become more difficult as a tenant”, defendant wanted their attorney and insurance company “to obtain a full and complete release of all known and unknown claims plaintiff had raised and may raise against” defendant. (Freeman Dec., ¶ 9.) State Farm obtained the 2024 Release from plaintiff. (Freeman Dec., ¶ 10 & Ex. B.)

Defendant also asserts that they understand the terms “particularly on account of all injuries known and unknown” to mean “in addition to all and unknown claims, plaintiff in particular released the claims from the [Incident], but did not limit the release to other known and unknown claims arising out of the tenancy at [defendant’s] property, including the harassment claims [plaintiff] now alleges in the instant action.” (Freeman Dec., ¶ 12.)

Defendant further asserts that they “understood and intended that the [2024 Release] included all known and unknown claims against [defendant] so that plaintiff could not turn around and sue [defendant] for claims that had subsequently arisen from [plaintiff’s] fall, filing an insurance claim related to the fall, and the alleged harassment and retaliation by [defendant] for filing the insurance claim. (Freeman Dec., ¶ 13.) It was also defendant’s “understanding and intent that the [2024 Release] cover all claims ‘arising out’ of the fall, including [plaintiff] filing an insurance claim and the alleged harassment and retaliation in response to filing an insurance claim.” (Freeman Dec., ¶ 14.)

Defendant states: “[p]laintiff never informed [defendant] or [defendant’s] insurer when [plaintiff] signed the release, that [plaintiff] only intended to release her body injury claims from the fall and not any other claims that occurred after the fall. If I had known that [p]laintiff intended to file another claim against me that was arising out of the fall, namely the alleged harassment in response to her filing a claim against my insurance, I would have instructed my insurer not to enter into the settlement and release with plaintiff.” (Freeman Dec., ¶ 15.) Defendant did not know that plaintiff did not intend to release all claims against defendant including those raised in this action; and that defendant relied on the 2024 Release to release all claims against defendant. (Freeman Dec., ¶¶ 17 & 20.)

“The fundamental goal of contractual interpretation is to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties. [Citation.] If contractual language is clear and explicit, it governs. [Citation.] On the other hand, ‘[i]f the terms of a promise are in any respect ambiguous or uncertain, it must be interpreted in the sense in which the promisor believed, at the time of making it, that the promisee understood it.’ [Citations.]” (Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1264–1265.) “[E]ven an apparently unambiguous general release is properly interpreted in light of the surrounding circumstances.” (Neverkovec, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 350.)

“The determination of whether a release contains ambiguities is a matter of contractual construction. [Citation.] ‘An ambiguity exists when a party can identify an alternative, semantically reasonable, candidate of meaning of a writing. [Citations.] An ambiguity can be patent, arising from the face of the writing, or latent, based on extrinsic evidence.’ [Citation.] The circumstances under which a release is executed can give rise to an ambiguity that is not apparent on the face of the release. (Benedek, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 1357.)

In addition, “ ‘testimony by the releasing party regarding who he thought he was releasing, while it may serve to explain the situation, does not determine the legal effect of the release. [Citation.] How a reasonable person would view the other party’s understanding of the release is generally a matter of inference based on the extrinsic evidence. Unless that extrinsic evidence is in conflict, the question is one of law. [Citation.] On a motion for summary judgment, the court may determine which inferences are “reasonably deducible from the evidence,” and may grant summary judgment if there is no conflict with other reasonable inferences or evidence.’ [Citation.]” (Solis, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 361, original italics.)

Under the totality of the circumstances presented her, and for all reasons discussed above, the language of the 2024 Release is reasonably susceptible to the alternative meanings proffered by the parties. (Benedek, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 1357; Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 33, 37–38 [general discussion].) For these reasons, the present record reflects that the 2024 Release contains or may contain a latent ambiguity. The available evidence and information also gives rise to competing inferences reasonably deducible from that evidence and information in regard to the meaning of the 2024 Release, and the parties’ interpretation of its scope in light of the circumstances surrounding the parties’ execution of that release. As the parties have each presented alternative, reasonable interpretations of the scope or meaning of the 2024 Release, and as there exist competing inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence presented, a trier of fact “must resolve its meaning.” (Solis, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 361.)

For all reasons discussed above, there exists a triable issue of material fact as to the meaning or scope of the 2024 Release which precludes summary adjudication of the twenty-eighth affirmative defense pleaded in defendant’s answer to the FAC. Therefore, the court will deny the MSA as to that affirmative defense.

The court also notes that the FAC, and the supporting separate statement, show that the claims alleged in the FAC relate to conduct that began in November of 2023 “forward”. (FAC, ¶ 20; Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 6.) Absent any reasoned argument showing the meaning of the term “forward”, the MSA also fails to address, with reasoned discussion and analysis, whether any conduct occurring after plaintiff signed the 2024 Release gives rise to the causes of action alleged in the FAC, or why any causes of action arising from conduct that occurred after the parties signed the 2024 Release are not barred by that release. For these additional reasons, the MSA fails to completely dispose of the twenty-eighth affirmative defense.

Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections:

Plaintiff raises objections to statements or material contained in the declaration of defendant submitted in support of defendant’s opposition to the motion. “In granting or denying a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, the court need rule only on those objections to evidence that it deems material to its disposition of the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (q).)

The court will overrule plaintiff’s objection nos. 2, 3, and 8.

As to objection nos. 1, 4, and 7, California Rules of Court, rule 3.1354 states: “Each written objection must be numbered consecutively and must:

“(1) Identify the name of the document in which the specific material objected to is located;

“(2) State the exhibit, title, page, and line number of the material objected to;

“(3) Quote or set forth the objectionable statement or material; and

“(4) State the grounds for each objection to that statement or material.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1354(b)(1)-(4).)

Though objection nos. 1, 4, and 7 identify defendant’s declaration and the paragraph numbers within that declaration that contain the statements or material objected to, those objections quote or set forth multiple statements or material contained within each paragraph. For these reasons, objection nos. 1, 4, and 7 fail to follow the format set forth in rule 3.1354 (b).) Plaintiff’s failure to comply with court rules forces the court to guess whether plaintiff objects to the quoted statements or materials in whole or in part, and the specific ground or grounds for each objection.

Because plaintiff’s objection nos. 1, 4, and 7, fail to comply with the formatting rules set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 3.1354, the court will decline ruling on those objections. (Hodjat v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1, 8.)

(2)       The Discovery Motions

Plaintiff does not appear to dispute that the Letter requests that defendant “serve complete, verified, substantive responses to [SI] [n]os. 17-22 and [RFP] [n]os. 21-32, without objections, by December 23, 2025[]”, and that defendant served amended responses to the Discovery on December 23. (Cantor Decs., Exs. E; Pl. Reply at p. 2, ll. 2-3 [noting the service of “amended” responses by defendant].) The present record also reflects that the SI Motion and the RFP Motion, respectively, request orders compelling defendant to serve further responses, without objections, to SI nos. 17 through 22 and RFP nos. 21 through 32. (Notice of SI Motion at p. 2, ¶ I; Notice of RFP Motion [same].)

Where a responding party provides discovery requested in a motion to compel and the moving party proceeds with that motion, the court has substantial discretion to determine how to rule on the motion based on the circumstances of the case. (Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 408-409.) The court may take the motion off-calendar, deny the motion as moot or unnecessary, or narrow its scope to the issue of sanctions. (Id. at p. 409; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1348(a) [sanctions may be imposed “even though … the requested discovery was provided … after the motion was filed”].)

Absent a dispute by plaintiff, the present record indicates that defendant provided amended responses to the Discovery at issue in the Discovery Motions by the deadline stated in the Letter, and on the same day plaintiff filed the Discovery Motions. The court further notes that the grounds for the Discovery Motions include that the discovery sought by those motions is “directly relevant” to plaintiff’s pending “Application for Right to Attach Order and Writ of Attachment” (the Application). (Notice of SI Motion & RFP Motion at p. 2, ll. 15-17.) Court records reflect that on February 4, 2026, plaintiff filed a notice of withdrawal of the Application.

Under the totality of the circumstances present here, and for all reasons further discussed above, the court will order the Discovery Motions off-calendar. The court’s ruling herein is without prejudice to any motion to compel that may be filed by plaintiff in the future, in regard to defendant’s amended responses to the Discovery.