Tentative Ruling: Kelly Ovieda vs Moss Motors LTD et al

Case Number

24CV02343

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 05/08/2026 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion: Final Approval of Class Action Settlement

Tentative Ruling

For the reasons stated herein, the motion of plaintiff for final approval of class and collective action settlement is granted in accordance with this ruling. Counsel shall appear at the hearing of this motion and be prepared to discuss all matters remaining for the court at this time, including those matters described herein.

Background:

Plaintiff Kelly Ovieda (Plaintiff) filed their complaint against defendants Moss Motors Ltd., (Moss) and Milard Group Ltd. (Milard) (collectively, Defendants) on April 24, 2024, alleging ten causes of action: (1) violation of Labor Code sections 510 and 1198; (2) violation of Labor Code sections 226.7 and 512, subdivision (a); (3) violation of Labor Code section 226.7; (4) violation of Labor Code sections 1194, 1197, and 1197.1; (5) violation of Labor Code sections 201 and 202; (6) violation of Labor Code section 204; (7) violation of Labor Code section 226, subdivision (a); (8) violation of Labor Code section 1174, subdivision (d); (9) violation of Labor Code sections 2800 and 2802; and (10) violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq.

The complaint alleges that Plaintiff was employed by Defendants as an hourly, non-exempt employee from June 2008 through September 2021. (Compl., ¶¶ 8 & 18-19.) During Plaintiff’s employment, Defendants failed to compensate Plaintiff for all regular and overtime earned wages, to provide uninterrupted rest and meal periods, to pay minimum wages, to maintain or provide accurate wage statements and payroll records, to reimburse necessary business-related expenses, and to provide wages owed upon discharge or resignation. (Compl., ¶ 20 & 26-46.) Plaintiff brings the complaint on her own behalf, and on behalf of all current and former hourly-paid or non-exempt employees who worked for Defendants from four years preceding the filing of the complaint. (Compl., ¶¶ 13-14.)

Moss, who records reflect was formerly known as Milard, filed an answer to the complaint on June 25, 2024, generally denying its allegations and asserting thirty affirmative defenses.

On June 23, 2025, Plaintiff filed an unopposed motion (the preliminary approval motion) for an order: (1) preliminarily approving a “Class Action Settlement Agreement And Class Notice” (the Settlement Agreement); (2) conditionally certifying a class for settlement purposes; (3) appointing Plaintiff as the representative of the class; (4) appointing counsel for Plaintiff as class counsel; (5) approving a proposed class notice; and (6) scheduling a final approval hearing.

After a hearing held on December 12, the court entered a minute order (the Order), adopting its tentative ruling granting the preliminary approval motion. Pursuant to the Order, the court made a provisional finding that the settlement was fair, adequate, reasonable, in the best interests of the putative class, and within the range of acceptable settlements that could be ultimately given final approval by the court.

In granting the preliminary approval motion, the court preliminary approved a non-reversionary gross settlement amount or “GSA” of $612,685, subject to an escalator clause, to settle and release the claims of Plaintiff on behalf of a class of persons (the Class) who are currently or were formerly employed by Moss in California as non-exempt employees from April 24, 2020, through the date of preliminary approval (the Class Period).

The court also approved the appointment of ILYM Group, Inc. (ILYM) as the third-party settlement administrator.

The court noted in the Order, that the net settlement amount available for distribution to the Class is the GSA less: (1) attorney’s fees in the amount of $204,207.91, or an amount not to exceed 33.33 percent of the GSA (the Class Counsel Fees Payment), to be paid, upon motion, to KJT Law Group, LLP, (KJT) and Lawyers for Justice, PC, (LJPC) (collectively, Class Counsel); (2) a “Class Representative Service Payment” in the amount of $7,500, to be paid to Plaintiff as the “Class Representative”; (3) litigation costs not to exceed $15,000 (the Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment), and to be paid to Class Counsel upon motion; and (4) administration expenses (the Administrator Expenses Payment) in an amount not to exceed $6,550, to be paid to ILYM.

The court further noted that, after deducting the amounts described above, the remaining amount of approximately $379,427.09 (the Net Settlement Amount or NSA) would be distributed, in pro rata shares, to those members of the Class who did not timely request exclusion from the Class (the Participating Class Members). The payments to be distributed to the Participating Class Members would be based on the number of workweeks each member worked during the Class Period. The preliminary approval motion showed that each pro rata share of the NSA (the Individual Class Payment) would be calculated at different rates depending on whether the workweeks were worked by the member prior to or after December 1, 2023. Further, thirty-three percent of each Individual Class Payment would be subject to tax withholding.

In their preliminary approval motion, Plaintiff presented evidence of a numerous, ascertainable class with a well-defined community of interest estimated to include approximately 148 individuals who were ostensibly ascertained from the payroll records of Moss, and who worked a total of 15,931 workweeks during the Class Period. The court found that Plaintiff was subject to the same purported policies or practices of Moss as alleged in the complaint, and that Plaintiff appeared to have claims typical of the Class and to be able to adequately represent the class. The preliminary approval motion demonstrated reasonable support for provisional certification of the settlement class.

The preliminary approval motion also described the risks associated with protracted litigation in regard to the defenses asserted by Moss and the potential difficulties in certifying the class, which appeared to the court to be substantial. Absent any evidence to suggest that the Settlement Agreement was the product of collusion, the court also found that the Settlement Agreement was the result of an adversarial, arms-length mediation and subsequent negotiations by the parties, and that the claims to be released by the Participating Class Members were appropriately limited.

The motion was also sufficient to show that Class Counsel has substantial experience with similar litigation matters.

The court reviewed the Notice of Proposed Class Representative Action Settlement (the Class Notice) to be provided and distributed to the members of the Class. The court found the Class Notice easy to understand, sufficient to apprise the members of the Class of the pendency of and the claims and defenses asserted in the present action and the rights and obligations of the members of the Class in connection with the proposed settlement, sufficient to notify those members of their right and opportunity to opt out of or present objections to the Settlement Agreement, and complied with due process. Accordingly, the court approved the notice plan set forth in the Settlement Agreement.

As further discussed in the Order, though the Settlement Agreement provides that any unpaid residue resulting from checks for Individual Class Payments which are not cashed within 180 days and voided, will be paid to an undisclosed, mutually agreed upon cy pres in the name of the individual member of the Class, neither the Settlement Agreement nor the motion included any information showing whether any proposed cy pres distribution of unpaid residue was appropriate. The court interpreted the provisions of the Settlement Agreement in that regard to require Plaintiff to show, before any such distribution is made, that the recipient of the distribution satisfies the terms of Code of Civil Procedure section 384, which the court will determine at an appropriate time.

Based on the evidence and information presented in the preliminary approval motion, the court found that the Settlement Agreement was fair, reasonable, adequate and in the best interests of the putative class; that the notice plan set forth in that agreement constitutes sufficient notice to the Class of the present action, the terms of the Settlement Agreement, as well as the date and location of the final approval hearing; and that the Settlement Agreement was entitled to preliminary approval.

The court provisionally certified the settlement class, appointed Plaintiff as the “Class Representative” for settlement purposes, appointed Plaintiff’s counsel as counsel for the settlement class or Class Counsel; and approved the notice and settlement administration deadlines.

The court set a final settlement hearing on May 1, 2026, which the court continued to May 8.  

On April 9, 2026, Plaintiff filed an unopposed motion for an order: finally adjudicating the settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate; granting final approval of the Settlement Agreement; directing ILYM to distribute the settlement benefits to the members of the Class in accordance with the Settlement Agreement; approving and directing payment of the amount of $204,560.04 to Class Counsel for attorneys’ fees; approving and directing payment of the sum of $11,342.31 to Class Counsel for litigation costs; approving and directing payment of the Class Representative Service Payment to the Class Representative in the sum of $7,500; approving and directing payment of the sum of $6,550 to ILYM for fees and costs to administer the settlement; entering final judgment; and reserving the court’s jurisdiction to implement, enforce, or administer the Settlement Agreement.

The motion is supported by the declaration of Amanda Howard, who is a Case Manager for ILYM. (Howard Dec., ¶ 1.) Howard asserts that the duties performed, and to be performed after final approval, by ILYM include: translating documents into Spanish; printing and mailing the court approved “Notice of Class Action Settlement and Hearing Date for Final Court Approval” (the Class Notice Packet) in English and Spanish; receiving and processing requests for exclusion and objections to the settlement; resolving disputes over workweeks worked during the Class Period; establishing a QSF account and calculating individual settlement award amounts; processing and mailing settlement award checks; handling tax withholdings as required; preparing, issuing, and filing tax returns and other applicable tax forms; handling the distribution of any unclaimed funds pursuant to the Settlement Agreement; and other tasks as mutually agreed to by the parties or ordered by the court. (Howard Dec., ¶ 3.)

Howard states that on December 15, 2025, ILYM received the approved Class Notice Packet from Class Counsel, and prepared a draft of the formatted Class Notice Packet, which was approved by counsel for the parties prior to mailing. (Howard Dec., ¶ 4.)

On December 29, 2025, ILYM received the class data file from counsel for Moss, which contained the name, social security number, last known mailing address, and the number of workweeks for each Class Member. (Howard Dec., ¶ 5.) That data file was uploaded to ILYM’s database and checked for duplicates and discrepancies. (Ibid.) The “Class List” contained unique records for 150 individuals who worked a total of 17,757 workweeks. (Ibid.) Because the number of workweeks exceeded the number set forth in the Settlement Agreement by more than 10 percent, the escalator clause of the Settlement Agreement was triggered, increasing the GSA pro rata at the “Class B” per workweek value, and resulting in a new GSA of $613,741.40. (Howard Dec., ¶ 6.)

Howard assert that all 150 names and addresses contained in the Class List were processed against the National Change of Address (NCOA) database maintained by the United States Postal Service (USPS), for purposes of updating and confirming the mailing addresses of the Class Members before mailing the Class Notice Packet. (Howard Dec., ¶ 7.) To the extent that an updated address was found in the NCOA database, that updated address was used for mailing the Class Notice Packet. (Ibid.) To the extent that no updated address was found in the NCOA database, the original address provided by Moss’ counsel was used for the mailing of the Class Notice Packet. (Ibid.)

On January 12, 2026, the Class Notice Packet was mailed by first class mail, in both English and Spanish, to all 150 individuals contained in the Class List. (Howard Dec., ¶ 8 & exhibit A [copy of the mailed Class Notice Packet].) As of the date of Howard’s declaration, eleven Class Notice Packets have been returned to ILYM’s office, of which none included any forwarding address. (Howard Dec., ¶ 9.) ILYM performed a computerized skip trace on the returned Class Notice Packets that did not have a forwarding address, in an effort to obtain an updated address for the purpose of re-mailing the Class Notice Packet. (Ibid.) As a result of that skip trace, five updated addresses were obtained, and the Class Notice Packets were promptly re-mailed to those Class Members by first class mail. (Ibid.)

A total of six Class Notice Packets have been deemed undeliverable because no updated addresses were found during skip trace efforts. (Howard Dec., ¶ 11.) In addition, ILYM has received one request for exclusion as of February 26, 2026, which is the deadline to request exclusion from the Settlement Agreement. (Howard Dec., ¶ 12.) ILYM has not received any objections to the Settlement Agreement, or any disputes from any member of the Class. (Howard Dec., ¶¶ 13-14.)

ILYM estimates that the NSA available to Participating Class Members is $380,131.46, which Howard calculated by subtracting from the escalated GSA: attorneys’ fees in the amount of $204,560.04; the amount of $15,000 allocated for litigation costs and expenses; the Class Representative Service Payment in the amount of $7,500; and the Administrator Expenses Payment in the amount of $6,550. (Howard Dec., ¶ 15.)

Howard states that 93 percent of the NSA ($353,522.26) was allocated on a pro rata basis to “Class A”, which is comprised of the Participating Class Members who worked during the Class Period prior to December 1, 2023.  (Howard Dec., ¶ 16.) Seven percent of the NSA ($26,609.20) was allocated pro rata to “Class B”, which is comprised of those Participating Class Members who worked on or after December 1, 2023, during the Class Period. (Ibid.) In addition, a Participating Class Member may receive Class A and Class B payments if they worked before and after December 1, 2023. (Ibid.) As of the date of the Howard declaration, there are 149 Class Members who worked 17,665 workweeks, who did not submit a timely and valid exclusion request, and who are therefore deemed to be Participating Class Members. (Howard Dec., ¶ 17.) Class A consists of 138 members who worked 11,902 workweeks, and Class B consists of 75 members who worked 5,763 workweeks. (Ibid.)

Howard further states that the Individual Class Payment is allocated on a pro rata basis using workweeks; that the highest Individual Class Payment to a Participating Class Member in Class A is currently estimated to be approximately $5,584.12; that the average Individual Class Payment is currently estimated to be approximately $2,561.76; and that the lowest Individual Class Payment is currently estimated to be $59.41. (Howard Dec., ¶¶ 18-19.) Those amounts are subject to employee tax and withholding. (Howard Dec., ¶ 19.)

The highest Individual Class Payment to a Participating Class Member in Class B is currently estimated to be approximately $494.05,; the average Individual Class Payment is currently estimated to be approximately $354.79; and the lowest Individual Class Payment is currently estimated to be approximately $9.23. (Howard Dec., ¶ 20.) Those amounts are also subject to employee-side tax and withholding. (Ibid.)

ILYM’s fees and costs for the administration of the Settlement Agreement, including anticipated fees and costs for completion of the settlement administration, total $6,550. (Howard Dec., ¶ 21.) ILYM’s work in connection with this matter will continue with the calculation of the settlement award payments, issuance and mailing of the settlement award checks, the necessary tax filing and reporting on such payments, and any other tasks that mutually agreed to by the parties or ordered by the court. (Ibid.)

Plaintiff’s counsel, Christopher A. Adams (attorney Adams), states that KJT prosecuted this litigation on a contingent-fee basis, with the risk that it would not receive any compensation. (Adams Dec., ¶ 3.) While KJT devoted their time and resources to this matter, they have forgone other legal work for which they would have been compensated. (Ibid.) Attorney Adams also provides a description of the experience of KJT in litigating employment matters and Labor Code violations in both individual and class action cases, including those cases in which KJT was appointed as class counsel for settlement purposes. (Adams Dec., ¶¶ 4 & 10.)

The general tasks performed by KJT include client intake; conducting necessary research; reviewing and responding to correspondence and participating in attorney conferences; preparing and responding to discovery requests; interviewing putative members of the Class; analyzing documents; attending mediation and negotiating settlement; and drafting law and motion papers, among other tasks. (Adams Dec., ¶  5.)

Attorney Adams’ hourly rate is $850 per hour. (Adams Dec., ¶ 11.) Attorney Adams provides a description of their education, skill, and experience in litigation matters. (Ibid.)

The hourly rate of attorney Vache Thomassian, who is one of the founding partners of KJT, is $725 per hour. (Adams Dec., ¶ 12.) Attorney Adams provides a description of the education, skill, and experience of attorney Thomassian. (Ibid.)

Attorney Levon Yepremian’s hourly rate is $700. (Adams Dec., ¶ 13.) Attorney Yepremian has solely practiced employment law. (Ibid.)

The hourly rate of paralegal Izamary Ramirez is $175 per hour. (Adams Dec., ¶ 14.) Attorney Adams asserts that Ramirez has been a paralegal with KJT since 2019 and in this role, has managed and maintained a caseload consisting of over 100 cases. (Ibid.)

The hours billed in this case by attorneys Adams, Thomassian, and Yepremian, and by paralegal Ramirez, total 265.4. (Adams Dec., ¶¶ 6-7.) Based on those hours and the hourly rates of each individual described above, the lodestar fee of KJT through April 8, 2026, totals $173,682.50. (Adams Dec., ¶ 6.)

KJT has also expended $9,702.72 in unreimbursed costs and expenses in connection with the prosecution of this litigation, which is less than the amount allocated in the Settlement Agreement. (Adams Dec., ¶ 15 & exhibit A.) No surcharges have been added to any cost or expense. (Ibid.)

Based on the experience of Class Counsel, attorney Adams asserts that the payments that will be recovered by the Class A and Class B members of the Class, as described in the Howard declaration and above, are higher than the net recovery per class member for similar wage-and-hour cases in California considering the claims, defenses, and class size in this action. (Adams Dec., ¶ 23.)

Attorney Adams asserts that, after all court-approved deductions are made from the escalated GSA, the NSA to be distributed proportionately to the Participating Class Members is estimated to be $383,789.15. (Adams Dec., ¶ 25.)

Plaintiff’s counsel Ryan Slinger (attorney Slinger), who is a member of LJPC, notes that, as of the date of filing of the present motion, no Participating Class Member has objected to the Settlement Agreement, including the payments to be made from the GSA described above. (Slinger Dec., ¶ 4.)

Attorney Slinger provides a description of the investigation, research, and other tasks performed by LJPC prior to the filing of this case. (Slinger Dec., ¶ 6.) Attorney Slinger states that LJPC was preparing the case for class certification and trial prior to reaching the settlement, and describes the information, documents, and data reviewed by LJPC during this litigation, among other tasks. (Slinger Dec., ¶¶ 7-8.)

Attorney Slinger asserts that the fees sought by Class Counsel represent 33.33 percent of the escalated GSA pursuant to a contingency fee agreement entered into between Plaintiff and Class Counsel, and are commensurate with the risks undertaken by Class Counsel in commencing this case; the time, effort, and expense that Class Counsel dedicated to this case; the skill and determination of Class Counsel; the results that Class Counsel achieved throughout the litigation; the value of the settlement; and other cases that Class Counsel have turned down in order to devote their time and efforts to this matter. (Slinger Dec., ¶ 11.) Attorney Slinger also notes that the Individual Class Payments to be made from the NSA average more than $2,561.76. (Slinger Dec., ¶ 12.)

According to attorney Slinger, LJPC has expended at least 43 hours in this matter. (Slinger Dec., ¶ 13.) Attached to attorney Slinger’s declaration is an “Attorney Task and Time Chart” setting forth the nature of the legal services provided by the attorneys at LJPC, and the time expended to perform those services. (Slinger Dec., ¶ 13 & exhibit A.) Attorney Slinger asserts that the work performed in this case and the background of LJPC and its attorneys support a blended hourly rate of $850. (Slinger Dec., ¶ 14.)

Attorney Slinger’s declaration also includes a detailed description of the experience of LJPC attorneys, including attorneys Edwin Aiwazian, Arby Aiwazian, and Joanna Ghosh, in prosecuting consumer and employment class actions involving wage and our claims, among other claims. (Slinger Dec., ¶¶ 15-19.)

LJPC also seeks reimbursement of litigation costs and expenses in the amount of $1,639.59. (Slinger Dec., ¶ 20 & exhibit B.)

According to attorney Slinger, Plaintiff spent a substantial amount of time and effort discussing her employment with Class Counsel, gathering and providing relevant documents and information, and providing facts and evidence to support the prosecution of the claims, and was available whenever Class Counsel needed her and actively tried to obtain and provide information that would help obtain a recovery in this matter. (Slinger Dec., ¶ 21.)

Analysis:

As a threshold matter, the present motion includes conflicting information regarding the NSA available for distribution to the Participating Class Members.

The motion shows that the Settlement Agreement’s escalator clause was triggered, which has resulted in a new GSA in the amount of $613,741.50. (Adams Dec., ¶ 24; Howard Dec., ¶ 6.) It is the court’s understanding that, to the extent the court approves the payment of the Class Counsel Fees Payment in the new amount of $204,560.04, the Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment in the amount of $11,342.31, the Class Representative Service Payment in the amount of $7,500, and the Administrator Expenses Payment in the amount of $6,550 from the new GSA, the NSA available for distribution to the Participating Class Members is $383,789.15, and not the amount reflected in paragraph 15 of the Howard declaration.

To the extent any party contends that the court’s understanding in regard to the amount of the NSA available for distribution to the Participating Class Members is incorrect, that party shall appear at the hearing on the present motion to identify this issue, and to explain why the court’s understanding is incorrect, and the correct amount of the NSA available for distribution to the Participating Class Members.

“Before final approval, the court must conduct an inquiry into the fairness of the proposed settlement.” ( (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(g).) “If the court approves the settlement agreement after the final approval hearing, the court must make and enter judgment. The judgment must include a provision for the retention of the court's jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the terms of the judgment. The court may not enter an order dismissing the action at the same time as, or after, entry of judgment.” (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(h).)

“[A] trial court has broad powers to determine whether a proposed settlement in a class action is fair.” (Mallick v. Superior Court (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434, 438.) “[A] presumption of fairness exists where: (1) the settlement is reached through arm’s-length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small.” (Dunk v. Ford Motor Company (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1802; Wershba v. Apple Computer (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 245.)

The first three elements which give rise to a presumption of fairness were established at the time of preliminary approval, as further discussed in the Order. No evidence has been presented which would alter the court’s preliminary determination of each of those elements.

With respect to the fourth element, the present motion shows that, after receiving the class data file, ILYM processed the names and addresses of the 150 individuals identified in that file, who worked a total of 17,757 work weeks, against information appearing in the NCOA database maintained by the United States Postal Service as further discussed above. To the extent an updated address was found in the NCOA database, that address was used to mail the Class Notice Packet to that class member. If no updated address was found in the NCOA database, ILYM used the address provided by Moss to mail the Class Notice Packet.

ILYM mailed the Class Notice Packet on January 12, 2026, to all of the individuals identified in the class list provided by Moss. Eleven of those packets were returned to ILYM as undeliverable and without a forwarding address. ILYM performed a computerized skip trace on those returned notice packets in an effort to obtain updated addresses, and obtained five updated addresses to which the Class Notice Packet was promptly re-mailed. A total of six notice packets have been deemed by ILYM to be undeliverable because no updated addresses were found notwithstanding the skip tracing performed by ILYM.

The deadline to request exclusion from and to file objections to the settlement was February 26, 2026. As of that date, ILYM has received one request for exclusion, and no objections. ILYM also has not received any disputes from any members of the Class.

Of the NSA described above, 93 percent was allocated to Class A Participating Class Members who worked before December 1, 2023, and 7 percent was allocated to the Class B Participating Class Members who worked on or after December 1, 2023. ILYM presents evidence showing that the estimated average Individual Class Payment to the Class A Participating Class Members is $2,561.76, and that the estimated average Individual Class Payment to the Class B Participating Class Members is $354.79.

ILYM states that its fees and costs for services rendered in connection with the administration of the settlement, which includes fees and costs already incurred as well as anticipated fees and costs for completion of the settlement administration, total $6,550, and that its work will continue after final approval.

The court must “independently satisfy[] itself that the consideration being received for the release of the class members’ claims is reasonable in light of the strengths and weaknesses of the claims and the risks of the particular litigation.” (Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 129.) Based on its review of the available evidence and arguments, the court is satisfied that the settlement is fair and reasonable in light of the strengths and weakness of the claims and the uncertainties of protracted litigation. In addition, as the percentage of individuals requesting exclusion is small, and ILYM received no objections to the settlement, the factors present here are sufficient to give rise to a presumption that the settlement is fair.

Plaintiff has also presented evidence that the settlement was based on extensive investigation and analysis of the factual records of this as further discussed in the Order, which permitted Class Counsel to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the case as well as to calculate damages and penalties. In addition, Plaintiff has presented evidence that the risks of complex and lengthy litigation are substantial. Class Counsel, who appear to have substantial experience with wage and hour class action matters, is satisfied that the terms and conditions of the settlement are fair, adequate, and reasonable and in the best interests of the class in light of the risks of significant delay and uncertainty associated with litigation and the defenses asserted by Moss.

Based on the information and evidence presented in the motion and under the totality of circumstances present here, it appears to the court that the settlement preliminarily approved was reached through an arm’s-length bargaining process between the parties; that investigation and discovery were sufficient to permit the attorneys and the court to act intelligently; that Class Counsel has substantial experience litigating class actions such as the present action; and that there were no objectors to the settlement.

“If the court has certified the action as a class action, notice of the final approval hearing must be given to the class members in the manner specified by the court. The notice must contain an explanation of the proposed settlement and procedures for class members to follow in filing written objections to it and in arranging to appear at the settlement hearing and state any objections to the proposed settlement.” (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(f).)
 

The court has reviewed the Class Notice Packet attached to the Howard declaration, and finds that the distribution of that packet by ILYM to class members meets due process requirements and was adequate.

For all reasons discussed above, the court finds that the settlement is fair, adequate, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class. Therefore, the court will grant the motion for final approval, and will affirm and approve the settlement and certification of the class for settlement purposes.

In addition, the court affirms and approves payment of the Administrator Expenses Payment to ILYM in the amount of $6,550.

As to the Class Representative Service Payment, absent any dispute, it appears from information contained in the present motion including attorney Slinger’s declaration, that Plaintiff has expended time and effort to assist Class Counsel in pursuing this matter with a small financial interest in the outcome of the litigation. For these reasons, the court finds that an award of $7,500 to Plaintiff is reasonable. The court will therefore approve payment of the Class Representative Service Payment in that amount. The court further affirms named plaintiff Kelly Ovieda as Class Representative.

Further, the court will reserve jurisdiction over the parties for the purposes of implementing, enforcing, and administering the settlement or enforcing the terms of the judgement.

Plaintiff’s request for an award of attorney’s fees is effectively made under the “common fund” doctrine. (See Laffitte v. Robert Half Internat. Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 488-489 (Laffitte) [general discussion].) The attorney’s fees sought in the motion total $204,560.04, which represents approximately 33.33 percent of the escalated GSA. The motion also seeks an award of litigation expenses in the amount of $11,342.31. The Settlement Agreement provides for attorney’s fees not to exceed 33.33 percent of the GSA, and litigation expenses not to exceed $15,000. (Adams Decl. [Preliminary Approval Motion], exhibit A, § 3.2.2.) 

“[T]he court’s task in a negotiated settlement of fees is to determine if the negotiated fee is fair. That task requires the court to review the settlement as a whole, including the fee award, to ensure that it was fairly and honestly negotiated, is not collusive and adequately protects the interests of the [parties].” (Robbins v. Alibrandi (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 438, 444.) In cases where a settlement agreement provides for a non-reversionary common fund with all net settlement proceeds used to pay class member claims, the trial court “may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the fund created.” (Laffitte, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 503.) “The choice of a fee calculation method is generally one within the discretion of the trial court, the goal under either the percentage or lodestar approach being the award of a reasonable fee to compensate counsel for their efforts.” (Id. at p. 504.) The court may also “double check the reasonableness of the percentage fee through a lodestar calculation.” (Ibid.)

“The trial court has broad discretion to determine the amount of a reasonable fee, and the award of such fees is governed by equitable principles.” (EnPalm, LLC v. Teitler (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 770, 774.) To determine a reasonable fee, the court considers “the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.” (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623-624.)

The attorney’s fees sought in the motion appear to fall within the range of an appropriate award from a common fund obtained on behalf of all class members. In addition, Class Counsel presents evidence of the lodestar amount of fees incurred with respect to the hours expended by KJT and LJPC, which totals $173,682.50 as to KJT, and $36,550 as to LJPC. Considering that the lodestar is greater than the amount of attorney’s fees requested in the motion, and under the totality of the circumstances present here including the contingent nature of the representation and its attendant risks, the court finds that the attorney’s fees requested in the motion are fair and reasonable. For these and all further reasons discussed above, the court will approve a total fee award as to the Class Counsel Fees Payment, in the amount of $204,560.04.

The court has also reviewed the documentation submitted by Class Counsel in regard to the litigation expenses requested in the motion. For all reasons discussed above, the court will approve an award of costs in the amount of $11,342.31.

The court has reviewed the proposed “Order and Judgment Granting Final Approval Of Class Action Settlement” (the Proposed Order) submitted by Plaintiff on April 9, 2026. The Proposed Order accurately sets forth the findings of this court, and the court intends to execute it following the hearing. Counsel is requested to present the court with a proposed date for the final hearing, and the submission of a final accounting and distribution of settlement funds. The court will require the final accounting and distribution report to be filed no later than 10 days prior to the scheduled hearing date, and will require the final report and declaration to include information and evidence sufficient to show that any cy pres distribution of unpaid residue is appropriate and authorized under Code of Civil Procedure section 384.