Tentative Ruling: Estate of Svetlana Leonidova Dayal vs Logix Federal Credit Union et al
Case Number
24CV01984
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Mon, 03/02/2026 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings
Demurrer; Motion: Strike
Tentative Ruling
Estate of Svetlana Leonidovna Dayal v. Logix Federal Credit Union, et al.
Case No. 24CV01984
Hearing Date: March 2, 2026
HEARING: (1) Demurrer of Defendants to Second Amended Complaint
(2) Motion of Defendants to Strike Portions of Second Amended Complaint
ATTORNEYS: For Plaintiff Svetlana Leonidovna Dayal: Self-represented
For Defendants Logix Federal Credit Union, Ana Fonseca, Timothy Jensen, and Wendy Vannoy: Elizabeth M. Sanguinetti, Litchfield Cavo LLP; Mark K. Worthge, Kaufman Dolowich
TENTATIVE RULING:
(1) The demurrer of defendants Logix Federal Credit Union, Ana Fonseca, Timothy Jensen, and Wendy Vannoy to each of the causes of action of plaintiff Svetlana Leonidovna Dayal’s second amended complaint, and to the complaint as a whole, is sustained without leave to amend.
(2) The motion of defendants to strike portions of the complaint is mooted by the sustaining of the demurrer and is ordered off calendar.
Background:
(1) Allegations of Second Amended Complaint
On November 23, 2021, plaintiff Svetlana L. Dayal (Dayal) purchased a 2020 BMW X6 (the Vehicle) from a dealership, Autobakers. (Second Amended Complaint [SAC], ¶ 15.) The price of the Vehicle was $22,498.00 of which $22,444.45 was to be paid by a loan from defendant Logix Federal Credit Union (Logix). (SAC, ¶ 15, 16 & exhibit B.) Logix asserted a lien against the Vehicle. (SAC, ¶ 17.)
Between 2021 and 2023, Dayal made monthly payments totaling approximately $10,000 in addition to a down payment to Autobakers. (SAC, ¶ 18.)
On March 12, 2024, Dayal tendered a “Demand Note” to Logix in the face amount of $14,275.22, which document included the words “payment in full. (SAC, ¶ 19 & exhibit C, capitalization altered.) The $14,275.22 was the payoff figure orally quoted by a Logix representative. (Ibid.)
On March 20, 2024, defendants caused Dayal’s Vehicle to be repossessed. (SAC, ¶ 20 & exhibit D.) Defendants responded by reporting to credit reporting agencies that Dayal had defaulted on an obligation, despite Dayal’s tender. (SAC, ¶ 21.)
On May 22, 2024, following defendants’ refusal to honor the tender and after the repossession, Dayal delivered a “Notice of Rescission” to Logix. (SAC, ¶ 22 & exhibit E.)
(2) Procedural History
On April 9, 2024, plaintiff “Estate of Svetlana Leonidovna Dayal” filed the original complaint in this action against defendants Logix Federal Credit Union, Ana Fonseca, Timothy Jensen, and Wendy Vannoy. The complaint asserted six causes of action: (1) conversion; (2) breach of contract; (3) recoupment; (4) defamation; (5) punitive damages; and (6) unjust enrichment. Plaintiff appears in this action self-represented.
On May 17, 2024, defendants filed their motion to compel arbitration. On September 9, 2024, the court denied the motion to compel arbitration.
On October 9, 2024, defendants filed their demurrer to the original complaint and concurrently filed a motion to strike portions of the complaint. The demurrer was noticed for hearing on January 6, 2025.
On November 15, 2024, defendants filed their motion to preclude Svetlana Leonidovna Dayal from acting as counsel for plaintiff in this matter. Defendants argued that a legal estate must be represented by counsel and may not be self-represented. Defendants concurrently filed a motion for protective order to stay discovery until the issue of self-representation is resolved. These motions were originally noticed for hearing on February 24, 2025, and were opposed by plaintiff.
On December 5, 2024, without first obtaining leave of court, plaintiff filed the FAC. The FAC identified the plaintiff as “Estate of Svetlana Leonidovna Dayal.” The FAC asserted six causes of action: (1) conversion; (2) breach of contract; (3) recoupment; (4) defamation; (5) fraudulent concealment; and (6) unjust enrichment. The difference from the original complaint is the fifth cause of action for fraudulent concealment. The filing of the FAC mooted the demurrer and motion to strike as to the original complaint. In ordering these motions off calendar, the court further ordered that any response to the FAC was due March 1, 2025.
On December 19, 2024, plaintiff filed a motion to compel further responses to discovery that was also the subject of the defendants’ motion for protective order. This motion was opposed by defendants on the grounds including those asserted in their motion for protective order.
On February 24, 2025, the court held a hearing on: (1) the defendants’ motion to preclude self-representation; (2) the defendants’ motion for protective order; and (3) the plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to discovery. At the hearing, the court continued the hearing on the discovery motions, noting that plaintiff could not proceed as a self-represented litigant as the “Executor for the Estate of Svetlana Leonidovna Dayal,” but could proceed as a self-represented litigant asserting claim on her own individual behalf.
On March 20, 2025, defendants filed a demurrer and a motion to strike as to the FAC. The demurrer and motion to strike were noticed for hearing on June 2, 2025.
On April 7, 2025, the court noted that resolution of the discovery motions depended in part on the resolution of the demurrer and motion to strike as to the FAC. The court continued the discovery motions to June 2 to be heard with the demurrer and motion to strike.
On June 2, 2025, the court sustained the general and special demurrers of defendants to the FAC, with leave to amend on or before June 17. The court denied the defendants’ motion to strike as moot. In ruling on the demurrer and motion to strike, the court denied plaintiff’s requests for judicial notice. The court also granted defendants’ motion for a protective order in part and denied plaintiff’s motions to compel.
On June 11, 2025, plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the court’s June 2, 2025.
On August 4, 2025, the court denied the motion for reconsideration. The court extended plaintiff’s leave to file a second amended complaint to October 3, 2025.
On October 2, 2025, plaintiff filed her SAC. The SAC asserts seven causes of action: (1) conversion; (2) breach of contract; (3) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (4) wrongful repossession; (5) defamation/ defamation per se; (6) fraudulent concealment; and (7) unjust enrichment. Among other things, in the SAC Dayal asserts her claims in her individual capacity.
On October 31, 2025, defendants filed their demurrer to the SAC and concurrently filed a motion to strike portions of the SAC.
On February 13, 2026, Dayal filed a combined opposition to the demurrer and motion to strike.
On February 23, 2026, defendants filed their replies.
Analysis:
The court notes that Dayal’s opposition to the demurrer is 18 pages long, and therefore more than the permitted 15 pages. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1113(d) [“Except in a summary judgment or summary adjudication motion, no opening or responding memorandum may exceed 15 pages.”].) The court also notes that the text of Dayal’s opposition applies to both the demurrer and motion to strike, notwithstanding its title. A single memorandum in support or in opposition is subject to the 15-page limit, even if the single memorandum combines opposition to more than one motion. The court will nonetheless consider the entire opposition here. The court reminds the parties of their obligations to follow all requirements of the Code of Civil Procedure and California Rules of Court, including those related to formatting.
(1) Demurrer
“We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed. [Citation.] Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. [Citation.]” (Evans v. City of Berkeley (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1, 6, internal quotation marks omitted.)
“[F]acts appearing in exhibits attached to the complaint will also be accepted as true and, if contrary to the allegations in the pleading, will be given precedence.” (Dodd v. Citizens Bank of Costa Mesa (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1624, 1627.)
(A) Breach of Contract and Repossession Causes of Action
Dayal’s second cause of action is for breach of contract. “A cause of action for breach of contract requires pleading of a contract, plaintiff’s performance or excuse for failure to perform, defendant’s breach and damage to plaintiff resulting therefrom.” (McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1489.)
The contract alleged by Dayal is the loan agreement (Loan Agreement), including a promissory note and security agreement. (SAC, ¶ 32 & exhibit B.) Under the terms of the Loan Agreement, Dayal “promise[d] to pay $22,444.45 to [Logix] plus interest on the unpaid balance until what You owe has been paid.” (SAC, exhibit B, at p. 27 [Loan Agreement, § 1].) Defendants argue that Dayal has not alleged plaintiff’s performance or excuse for failure to perform and has affirmatively alleged her failure to perform. Dayal asserts that she has alleged tender which is sufficient to pay off the loan.
“Plaintiff tendered performance intended to satisfy or discharge the obligation in full, including a negotiable instrument in the amount quoted by Logix for payoff, marked ‘Payment in Full’ (Exhibit C).” (SAC, ¶ 34.)
Exhibit C to the SAC is a transmittal letter and a document entitled, “Demand Note” (Exhibit C). (SAC, exhibit C, p. 42, capitalization altered.) After its title, Exhibit C provides a serial number and the “Issue Date” of March 12, 2024. (Ibid.) The text of Exhibit C below the “Issue Date” is:
“Upon demand, SVETLANA L DAYAL promises to pay LOGIX FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, or order, the exact sum of fourteen-thousand-two-hundred-seventy-five dollars and twenty-two cents ($14,275.22) in United States money or its equivalent.” (SAC, exhibit C, p. 42.)
Below this text is the statement “payment in full” in all capital letters. (SAC, exhibit C, p. 42.) Below that statement is the text, “This Note is valid for 180 days after issue date.” (Ibid.) Below that is Dayal’s name and signature. (Ibid.)
Dayal cites to provisions of the Civil Code relating to tender, including:
“An obligation is extinguished by an offer of performance, made in conformity to the rules herein prescribed, and with intent to extinguish the obligation.” (Civ. Code, § 1485.)
“An obligation for the payment of money is extinguished by a due offer of payment, if the amount is immediately deposited in the name of the creditor, with some bank or savings and loan association within this state, of good repute, and notice thereof is given to the creditor.” (Civ. Code, § 1500.)
According to Dayal, “Nothing in these statutes conditions a tender of payment upon the creditor’s subjective approval of the instrument used, so long as the amount due is offered in good faith.” (Opposition, at p. 5.) This statement assumes that tender of payment may be made other than as set forth in Civil Code section 1500 without the creditor’s agreement. This assumption is incorrect as applied to the facts alleged here because “[t]he giving of a note by a debtor for the amount of the debt does not constitute payment unless the parties agree.” (Arnolds Management Corp. v. Eischen (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 575, 580; accord, Washington Lumber & Millwork Co. v. McGuire (1931) 213 Cal. 13, 15.)
Dayal has alleged that she attempted to give a demand note as payment. Dayal also alleges that Logix did not accept this attempt at tender. (E.g., SAC, ¶¶ 36(a), 42(a).) Consequently, Dayal has not alleged the element of performance necessary for a claim for breach of contract. To the contrary, Dayal has alleged facts showing that she breached the contract by failing to make payment of money as required under the contract.
Dayal also alleges that Logix failed to provide valid consideration for the underlying promissory note. (SAC, ¶¶ 16, 26(a).) Dayal alleges that “Logix failed to provide actual consideration in exchange for the note, instead treating the note itself as an asset and funding the transaction by book-entry credit rather than delivery of value.” (SAC, ¶ 16.)
“Consideration consists of either a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee.” (San Luis Obispo Local Agency Formation Com. v. City of Pismo Beach (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 595, 600.) “[C]onsideration does not have to move to the promisor [citations] or from the promisee. [Citations.] One consideration may support the several promises of one end of the bargain.” (First Nat. Bank of Stockton v. Pomona Tile Mfg. Co. (1947) 82 Cal.App.2d 592, 603–604.)
The SAC alleges the Loan Agreement, which identifies Dayal’s repayment promises as based on a payment from Logix to Autobakers. (SAC, exhibit B, p. 27.) Autobakers is alleged to be the dealer from whom Dayal purchased and received the Vehicle. (SAC, ¶¶ 15, 32.) Dayal received consideration for the promises, i.e., the Vehicle without paying in cash the full purchase price, regardless of the manner by which Logix funded the transaction. Thus, the SAC alleges sufficient consideration to support the contract.
Dayal has not alleged sufficient facts to state a cause of action for breach of contract. The demurrer to the second cause of action for breach of contract will be sustained.
Dayal’s third cause of action is for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Defendants first argue that this cause of action is improper because leave to amend in the sustaining of the demurrers to the FAC did not permit new causes of action.
“Breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is nothing more than a cause of action for breach of contract.” (Habitat Trust for Wildlife, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cucamonga (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1306, 1344.) In the context of the SAC, the cause of action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is simply an alternative count to the existing cause of action for breach of contract. The cause of action is not improperly added.
“ ‘The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is limited to assuring compliance with the express terms of the contract, and cannot be extended to create obligations not contemplated by the contract.’ [Citation.]” (Pasadena Live v. City of Pasadena (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1089, 1094, italics omitted.)
As with the second cause of action, Dayal does not allege that she performed her obligations under the contract. Instead, Dayal alleges facts showing that she did, in fact, breach the contract by failing to make payments when due. Consequently, Dayal has failed to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant.
The demurrer to the third cause of action will be sustained.
Dayal’s first cause of action is for conversion. “A cause of action for conversion requires allegations of plaintiff’s ownership or right to possession of property; defendant’s wrongful act toward or disposition of the property, interfering with plaintiff’s possession; and damage to plaintiff.” (McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc., supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 1491.) The action for conversion is premised upon Dayal’s allegations that her repayment obligation was discharged by tender of the new demand note to Logix. (SAC, ¶¶ 25-26.) As discussed above, Dayal has not adequately alleged payment and discharge.
Dayal also alleges she entered into a security agreement in financing the Vehicle. (SAC, ¶¶ 15, 16 & exhibit B.) Under the security agreement alleged by Dayal, Logix had the right to repossess the Vehicle when Dayal was in default under the Note. (SAC, exhibit B [Security Agreement, § 9]; see also Cal. U. Com. Code, § 9609, subd. (a)(1).) As discussed above, Dayal has not alleged that she was not in default—i.e., that she had fully performed the payment obligations of the contract—prior to the repossession. Instead, Dayal has alleged facts showing that she was in default. Consequently, Dayal has not adequately alleged defendant’s wrongful act in repossessing the Vehicle and hence failed to adequately allege a cause of action for conversion. The demurrer to the first cause of action will be sustained.
Dayal’s fourth cause of action is for wrongful repossession. Dayal alleges that at the time of repossession her obligation had been satisfied or discharged by law and therefore the repossession lacked legal justification. (SAC, ¶ 49.) These alleged conclusions are contradicted by the more specific allegations discussed above showing that Dayal was actually in default at the time of the repossession. For the same reasons discussed above, Dayal fails to state a cause of action for wrongful repossession. The demurrer to the fourth cause of action will be sustained.
(B) Defamation
Dayal’s fifth cause of action is for defamation. “The tort of defamation ‘involves (a) a publication that is (b) false, (c) defamatory, and (d) unprivileged, and that (e) has a natural tendency to injure or that causes special damage.’ [Citation.]” (Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 720.)
Dayal alleges the defamatory statements as: “Defendants, individually and collectively, published and continue to publish false statements of fact about Plaintiff to one or more third parties, including national credit reporting agencies. Specifically, Defendants reported that Plaintiff had defaulted on an obligation to Logix when, in fact, Plaintiff, in good faith, had made substantial payments, tendered further performance (Exhibit C), thereby satisfying any obligation that may have existed.” (SAC, ¶ 53.)
As the court noted in ruling on the demurrer to this cause of action in the FAC, defendants argue in demurrer that if the alleged defamatory statements are of inaccurate credit reporting, such claims are generally preempted by the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.). (See Sanai v. Saltz (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 746, 773–774.) Dayal’s opposition addresses this issue with argument, but cites no authority for her position in opposition. This suggests that defendants’ position is supported and Dayal’s position is not. However, the court need not reach this issue because the allegation states that publication includes other third parties. (See Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1047 [“[A] demurrer cannot rightfully be sustained to part of a cause of action or to a particular type of damage or remedy.”].)
Regardless of whether defendants’ preemption argument is correct, the statements alleged as defamatory must be false. As discussed above, the SAC alleges facts to show that Dayal had defaulted on her repayment obligations. The court has also determined that her alleged tender of a demand note is not sufficient as a matter of law to satisfy her repayment obligations to Logix. Consequently, Dayal has not alleged a defamatory false statement. Dayal thus fails to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action for defamation.
The demurrer to the fifth cause of action will be sustained.
(C) Fraudulent Concealment
Dayal’s sixth cause of action is for fraudulent concealment. “The required elements for fraudulent concealment are (1) concealment or suppression of a material fact; (2) by a defendant with a duty to disclose the fact; (3) the defendant intended to defraud the plaintiff by intentionally concealing or suppressing the fact; (4) the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would have acted differently if the concealed or suppressed fact was known; and (5) plaintiff sustained damage as a result of the concealment or suppression of the material fact.” (Rattagan v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2024) 17 Cal.5th 1, 40.) “[F]raud must be pled specifically; general and conclusory allegations do not suffice.” (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.)
Dayal alleges the material facts concealed are:
“At the time of presenting the Agreement for signature, Defendants (through Doe 1 and/or Doe 2) concealed and/or suppressed material facts in Defendants’ exclusive knowledge and/or about which Defendants made partial, misleading representations, including that:
“a. Funding/consideration: Logix would treat Plaintiff’s executed note as a funding asset and satisfy the dealer by internal crediting/book-entry, rather than delivering Logix’s own money or value in exchange for Plaintiff’s note;
“b. Lien validity/conditions: Logix’s claimed security interest and lien would be asserted and enforced regardless of whether Plaintiff tendered payoff, and that Logix intended to reject payoff tender unless it conformed to undisclosed internal requirements;
“c. Tender/cure practices: Logix would not honor certain forms of payoff tender (including a payoff instrument in the amount Logix quoted) and would proceed to accelerate/repossess despite Plaintiff’s good-faith tenders and demand to cure;
“d. Repossession/reporting policy: Logix would initiate repossession without first resolving the tender dispute or acknowledging Plaintiff’s performance, and then proceed to report a default to credit reporting agencies, even after receipt of Plaintiff’s Notice of Rescission (Exhibit E); and
“e. Transaction characterization: The economic nature of the transaction- namely, that the note itself would be treated internally as an asset used to generate or record credit, and that no separate consideration from Logix would be delivered to Plaintiff in exchange for the note.” (SAC, ¶ 61.)
“A plaintiff establishes reliance ‘when the misrepresentation or nondisclosure was an immediate cause of the plaintiff’s conduct which altered his or her legal relations, and when without such misrepresentation or nondisclosure he or she would not, in all reasonable probability, have entered into the contract or other transaction. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘Reliance can be proved in a fraudulent omission case by establishing that “had the omitted information been disclosed, [the plaintiff] would have been aware of it and behaved differently.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Hoffman v. 162 North Wolfe LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1178, 1193–1194.) “After establishing actual reliance, the plaintiff must show that the reliance was reasonable by showing that (1) the matter was material in the sense that a reasonable person would find it important in determining how he or she would act [citation]; and (2) it was reasonable for the plaintiff to have relied on the misrepresentation.” (Id. at p. 1194.)
With respect to items (a) (funding/consideration) and (e) (transaction characterization), these allegations are insufficient to show reasonable reliance. As discussed above in the context of consideration, Dayal received the Vehicle from the dealer by virtue of the Loan Agreement with Logix. There is no factual basis alleged by which a reasonable person would find it important as to how Logix and the dealer accounted for their transaction as between themselves. Regardless of how Logix and the dealer accounted Dayal’s loan between themselves, Dayal would still have received the Vehicle and Dayal be obligated to repay the loan according to the terms of the Loan Agreement. Dayal fails to allege reasonable reliance as to these asserted concealments.
With respect to items (b) (lien validity/ conditions) and (c) (tender/ cure practices), these asserted concealments relate to Dayal’s assertion that her delivery of a demand note constituted tender of payment under the Loan Agreement. As discussed above, delivery of a note does not constitute payment under the terms of the Loan Agreement and does not constitute a tender of payment under the law. In particular, the Loan Agreement alleged by Dayal expressly requires payment and does not provide for alternative performance of the type asserted by Dayal. Consequently, the failure of Logix to disclose that it would not accept performance not contemplated by the agreement is not the fraudulent concealment of a material fact. Logix was under no obligation to reject in advance any or all alternatives that Dayal may offer to performance under the express provisions of the contract. For the same reason, a reasonable person would not rely upon the absence of such disclaimers in entering into the contract. Dayal fails to allege either a duty to make these statements or reasonable reliance upon the failure to make these statements.
With respect to item (d) (repossession/ reporting policy), the same analysis as to items (b) and (c) apply. As noted above, repossession is expressly provided in the security agreement as a remedy in the event of default. As with the issues regarding Dayal’s theory of tender, there is no factual basis alleged by which Logix has a duty to explain its repossession or reporting policies beyond the express provisions of the contract and there is no factual basis alleged by which there would be reasonable reliance upon the failure to make these statements.
Dayal has failed to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action for fraudulent concealment. The demurrer to the sixth cause of action will be sustained.
(D) Unjust Enrichment
Dayal’s seventh cause of action is for unjust enrichment.
Dayal alleges: “Defendants: (a) accepted and retained Plaintiff’s promissory note as an asset while failing to deliver lawful consideration in return; (b) collected approximately $10,000 in monthly payments from Plaintiff during the period of 2021-2023; (c) repossessed and sold Plaintiff’s Automobile in March 2024, thereby appropriating its value for themselves; and (d) continued to claim balances due and report derogatory credit information, further leveraging benefits at Plaintiff’s expense.” (SAC, ¶ 71.)
“Defendants’ retention of these benefits is inequitable because it was procured
through conduct including (a) failure to disclose material facts, (b) rejection of lawful tender without returning the payment instrument, and (c) repossession despite lack of valid consideration or security interest.” (SAC, ¶ 73.)
Defendants argue that there is no basis for this cause of action because Dayal received the benefit of her contract.
“ ‘Under the law of restitution, “[a]n individual is required to make restitution if he or she is unjustly enriched at the expense of another. [Citations.] A person is enriched if the person receives a benefit at another’s expense. [Citation.]” [Citation.] However, “[t]he fact that one person benefits another is not, by itself, sufficient to require restitution. The person receiving the benefit is required to make restitution only if the circumstances are such that, as between the two individuals, it is unjust for the person to retain it. [Citation.]” ’ [Citation.] As a matter of law, an unjust enrichment claim does not lie where the parties have an enforceable express contract.” (Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1370 (Durell).)
“ ‘ “There is no equitable reason for invoking restitution when the plaintiff gets the exchange which he expected.” ’ [Citation.] ‘If the money is paid in satisfaction of an obligation actually owed by the plaintiff, he or she is obviously not entitled to restitution even though the performance was induced by mistake or fraud.’ [Citation.].” (Durell, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 1371.)
As discussed above, under the facts alleged in the SAC, there is consideration for the Loan Agreement and therefore the absence of consideration is not a basis for a claim based in unjust enrichment. With respect to the claim for balances due and reporting derogatory credit information, those issues do not involve Logix retaining a benefit received at Dayal’s expense, and hence is not a basis for a claim in unjust enrichment. With respect to the retention of monthly payments made on the loan and the value of the sale of the Vehicle, these issues are addressed by the California Uniform Commercial Code:
“After default, a secured party may sell, lease, license, or otherwise dispose of any or all of the collateral in its present condition or following any commercially reasonable preparation or processing.” (Cal. U. Com. Code, § 9610, subd. (a).)
“A secured party shall apply or pay over for application the cash proceeds of disposition under Section 9610 in the following order to each of the following:
“(1) The reasonable expenses of retaking, holding, preparing for disposition, processing, and disposing, and, to the extent provided for by agreement and not prohibited by law, reasonable attorney's fees and legal expenses incurred by the secured party.
“(2) The satisfaction of obligations secured by the security interest or agricultural lien under which the disposition is made.” (Cal. U. Com. Code, § 9615, subd. (a)(1), (2).)
“If the security interest under which a disposition is made secures payment or performance of an obligation, after making the payments and applications required by subdivision (a) and permitted by subdivision (c), both of the following apply: [¶] … [¶] (2) Subject to subdivision (b) of Section 9626, the obligor is liable for any deficiency.” (Cal. U. Com. Code, § 9615, subd. (d)(2).)
Dayal has alleged that Logix has reported disposing of the collateral, i.e., selling the Vehicle, and applied the proceeds to the amount outstanding on the debt, which was not sufficient to pay off the debt (hence leaving a deficiency). (SAC, ¶¶ 20, 21 & exhibit D.) Dayal’s allegations regarding unjust enrichment address the failure to acknowledge her delivery of documents which, as discussed above, do not have the legal effect of discharging her repayment obligations. Dayal does not allege any facts that the provisions of the California Uniform Commercial Code have not been followed.
Dayal has not alleged facts sufficient to state a cause of action for unjust enrichment. The demurrer to the seventh cause of action will be sustained.
(E) Leave to Amend
This is a demurrer to Dayal’s second amended complaint. Dayal’s causes of action are based upon legal arguments that the court has rejected. Although Dayal requests leave to amend in her opposition, Dayal does not explain how the pleading of additional facts can overcome the legal issues discussed above. The court will sustain the demurrers without leave to amend.
(2) Motion to Strike
Defendants additionally move to strike portions of the SAC. The sustaining of the demurrer moots the motion to strike.