Salvador Mesa vs Fielding Graduate University

Case Number

24CV00853

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 05/23/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Hearing: Final Approval

Tentative Ruling

For reasons discussed herein, plaintiff’s motion for final approval of class action settlement is granted in part, and in accordance with this ruling. Except as granted herein, the motion is denied. Plaintiff shall submit a rule compliant proposed order as provided herein. Counsel shall appear at the hearing of this motion and shall be prepared to discuss the matters described herein, and any other matters remaining for the court at this time.

Background:

On May 7, 2024, with leave of court, plaintiff Salvador Mesa (Mesa) filed his operative first amended complaint (the FAC) against defendant Fielding Graduate University (Fielding) alleging twelve causes of action: (1) failure to pay minimum wages; (2) failure to pay wages and overtime under Labor Code section 510; (3) meal-period liability under Labor Code section 226.7; (4) rest-break liability under Labor Code section 226.7; (5) violation of Labor Code section 226, subdivision (a); (6) violation of Labor Code section 221; (7)violation of Labor Code section 204; (8) violation of Labor Code section 203; (9) failure to keep required payroll records under Labor Code sections 1174 and 1174.5; (10) failure to reimburse necessary business expenses under Labor Code section 2802; (11) violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq.; and (12) penalties pursuant to Labor Code section 2698 et seq. (the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 or PAGA).

In the FAC, Mesa alleges that he brings this action on behalf of himself and all current and former employees of Fielding within the State of California who, at any time from four years prior to the filing of this lawsuit, are or were employed as non-exempt, hourly employees, including those employed as accounts payable specialists and in similar and related positions, and on behalf of certain subclasses described in the FAC. (FAC, ¶¶ 1, 44(a)-(k) & 140.) Mesa further alleges that Fielding required employees, including Mesa, to work shifts exceeding eight hours, failed to provide full uninterrupted or duty-free rest periods and meal breaks, failed to pay appropriate wage rates, failed to provide paid sick days, failed to maintain and timely produce accurate payroll records in response to Mesa’s request, and required Mesa to incur necessary business expenses without reimbursement. (FAC, ¶¶ 4 & 9-41.)

Fielding answered the FAC on May 23, 2024, generally denying its allegations and asserting thirty-one affirmative defenses.

On December 17, 2024, Mesa filed an unopposed motion (the preliminary approval motion) for an order granting preliminary approval of: (1) a proposed class-wide settlement of this action as set forth in a “Class and PAGA Action Settlement Agreement” (the settlement agreement), a copy of which was attached as exhibit 1 to the declaration of Mesa’s counsel, Enoch. J. Kim (Kim), submitted in support of that motion; (2) the content and method for distribution of the notice of the settlement agreement entitled “NOTICE OF CLASS AND PAGA ACTION SETTLEMENT” (the Class Notice), a copy of which is attached to the settlement agreement as exhibit A; (3) the appointment of Mesa as the class representative for settlement purposes; (4) the appointment of Kim, Emil Davtyan, David Yeremian, Alvin B. Lindsay, and Melissa Rodriguez as “Class Counsel” for settlement purposes; and (5) the allocation of funds to the claims brought under PAGA. (Dec. 17, 2024, Notice at p. 1, ¶¶ 1-7.)

After a hearing held on January 10, 2025, the court granted the preliminary approval motion, provisionally finding the settlement agreement to be fair, adequate, reasonable, in the best interests of the putative class, and within the range of acceptable settlements that could be ultimately given final approval by the court.

In granting the preliminary approval motion, the court preliminarily approved a non-reversionary gross settlement amount of $600,000 (the gross settlement amount) to be paid by Fielding to settle and release all claims asserted by plaintiff on behalf of the “Class Members”, who were defined as all persons employed as non-exempt, hourly employees by Fielding within California from February 15, 2020, through September 16, 2024 (the Class Period), and, with respect to the claims alleged under PAGA, the “Aggrieved Employees”, which include all individuals who are or were employed by Fielding in California as non-exempt employees at any time between February 15, 2023, and September 16, 2024 (the PAGA Period).

In addition, the court appointed Apex Class Action (Apex) to serve as the settlement administrator, appointed Kim, Emil Davtyan, David Yeremian, Alvin B. Lindsay, and Melissa Rodriguez as “Class Counsel” for the settlement class; and appointed Mesa as the “Class Representative”. 

The court noted that the net settlement amount available for distribution to the Class Members and Aggrieved Employees, which Mesa and Class Counsel estimated to be $318,000, is the gross settlement amount described above less the following payments or allocations which Apex will deduct from the gross settlement amount subject to the court’s approval: (1) a service or enhancement award of $10,000 (the Class Representative Service Payment) to be paid to Mesa; (2) attorney’s fees in the amount of $200,000 (the Class Counsel Fee Payment) to be paid to Class Counsel; (3) reasonable litigation expenses and costs not to exceed $15,000 (the Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment) to be paid to Class Counsel; (4) settlement administration costs to be paid to Apex in an amount not to exceed $7,000 (the Administration Costs); (5) civil penalties under PAGA in the amount of $50,000 (the PAGA Penalties); (6) an allocation of $12,500 or 25 percent of the PAGA Penalties to the Aggrieved Employees; (7) an allocation of $37,500 or 75 percent to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency or LWDA (the LWDA PAGA Payment).

In preliminary approval motion, Mesa presented evidence and information which was sufficient to show the existence of a numerous, ascertainable class with a well-defined community of interest consisting of at approximately 149 current or former employees of Fielding who were purportedly subject to meal and rest break violations, unlawful employment policies and practices with respect to the payment of wages and the furnishing of accurate wage statements, and other violations alleged in the FAC. Based on the evidence and information presented by Mesa, the court found reasonable support for provisional certification of the settlement class.

Mesa also presented evidence and information to show that each Class Member’s individual settlement share or payment will be $2,134.23, based on the number of work weeks during the Class Period. Mesa further explained  that Apex will calculate each Aggrieved Employee’s pro rata share of the PAGA Penalties by dividing the amount allocated to the Aggrieved Employees by the total number of pay periods worked by all Aggrieved Employees during the PAGA Period, and multiplying that result by each “PAGA Pay Period”, which is defined in the settlement agreement as any pay period within the PAGA Period during which an Aggrieved Employee worked for Fielding for at least one day.

The court found that the notice plan set forth in the settlement agreement, including the Class Notice described above, provided sufficient notice of the present action, the terms of the settlement agreement including its release, and the date and location of the final settlement hearing. For these reasons, the court approved the Class Notice to be provided and distributed to the Class Members and Aggrieved Employees.

The information and evidence presented by Mesa was also sufficient to show that Class Counsel submitted a copy of settlement agreement to the LWDA on the same date the preliminary approval motion was filed, and that the LWDA had not indicated that it had any objection to the settlement agreement, or that it intended to intervene in this action.

The court scheduled a hearing for final approval of the settlement agreement on May 23, 2025. Further, the court noted that it would determine the reasonableness of the Class Representative Service Payment, the Class Counsel Fee Payment, the Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment, and the Administration Costs upon the filing of a noticed motion.

On May 1, 2025, Mesa filed the present motion for an order granting final approval of the settlement agreement, and, for purposes of settlement: (1) certifying the class as defined in the settlement agreement; (2) confirming Mesa as the class representative; (3) confirming the appointment of Class Counsel; (4) approving the Class Representative Service Payment; (5) approving Class Counsel’s application for the Class Counsel Fee Payment and the Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment; and (6) approving the Administration Costs.

In support of the present motion, Mesa submits the declaration of Ryan McNamee, who is a Case Manager for Apex. (McNamee Decl., ¶ 1.) McNamee states that the responsibilities of Apex with respect to this matter include or will include, upon the court’s granting of the motion: (a) mailing the Class Notice; (b) processing requests for exclusion from the settlement agreement submitted by Class Members; (c) resolving disputes asserted by Class Members regarding the number of workweeks recorded by Fielding during the Class Period, as stated on each individualized Class Notice; (d) calculating individual payment amounts; (e) processing and mailing settlement checks; (f) handling tax withholdings as required by law and the settlement agreement; (g) preparing, issuing, and filing tax forms and returns; (h) managing the distribution of any unclaimed funds pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement; and (i) undertaking additional tasks as agreed to by the parties or ordered by the court. (Id. at ¶ 3.)

McNamee further states that on January 13, 2025, Apex received from Class Counsel the Class Notice approved by the court, and a file consisting of the “Class Data” from Fielding, which included the Class Members’ names, social security numbers, last known mailing addresses, and the total number of relevant workweeks worked by each Class Member. (McNamee Decl., ¶¶ 4-5.)

Apex uploaded the Class Data to its database and performed a thorough review to identify any duplicates or potential inconsistencies. (McNamee Decl., ¶ 5.) The Class Data included a total of 149 individuals whose names and addresses were verified and updated against the National Change of Address (NCOA) database maintained by the United States Postal Service (USPS) to ensure their accuracy and validity before mailing the Class Notice. (Id. at ¶¶ 5-6.) To the extent an updated address was found in the NCOA database, that address was utilized for the mailing of the Class Notice. (Id. at ¶ 6.) To the extent Apex did not locate an updated address in the NCOA database, Apex used the original address provided by Fielding to mail the Class Notice. (Ibid.)

On February 11, 2025, the Class Notice was mailed to all 149 individuals listed in the Class Data by first class mail, in the form attached to the McNamee declaration as exhibit A. (McNamee Decl., ¶ 7.) McNamee states that 10 Class Notices were returned to Apex as undeliverable. (Id. at ¶ 8.) As to these 10 returned Class Notices, Apex conducted a computerized skip trace to acquire updated addresses which resulted in Apex obtaining 9 updated addresses to which the Class Notice was promptly re-mailed. (Id. at ¶¶ 8-9.) According to McNamee, one Class Notice is considered undeliverable because no updated address was found despite skip tracing. (Id. at ¶ 10.)

McNamee further states that Apex did not receive any requests for exclusion from, or objections to, the settlement agreement, or any disputes from Class Members, by the March 28, 2025, deadline for submitting any such requests, objections, or disputes. (McNamee Decl., ¶¶ 11-13.) As a result, McNamee asserts, there are 149 Class Members participating in the settlement agreement, which constitutes 100 percent of the Class Members. (Id. at ¶ 14.)

According to McNamee, the total number of workweeks worked by the participating Class Members during the Class Period is 15,370, and the net settlement amount available to these Class Members is estimated to total $316,800, which Apex calculated by subtracting the Class Counsel Fee Payment ($200,000), payment of the Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment, the Class Representative Service Payment ($10,000), the Administration Costs in the amount of $8,200, and the PAGA Penalties ($50,000), from the gross settlement amount of $600,000. (McNamee Decl., ¶ 15.)

McNamee estimates that the highest individual payment to be made to a participating Class Member, and which are subject to tax and withholdings, will be approximately $4,946.78, that the average individual payment will be approximately $2,126.17, and that the lowest individual payment will be approximately $20.61. (McNamee Decl., ¶ 16.) McNamee further notes that 25 percent of the PAGA penalties, or $12,500, will be allocated to the Aggrieved Employees, which consists of 93 individuals who worked a total of 2,816 weeks during the PAGA Period, whether or not they opt out of the settlement agreement. (Id. at ¶ 17.) As to the Aggrieved Employees, McNamee asserts that the highest individual payment of PAGA Penalties will be approximately $186.43, that the average individual payment will be approximately $134.41, and that the lowest payment will be approximately $4.44. (Id. at ¶ 18.)

McNamee states that the actual and estimated fees and costs incurred by Apex to administer the settlement agreement totals $8,200, and that Apex will proceed with additional tasks which include calculating settlement payments, issuing and mailing settlement checks, handling necessary tax filings and reporting, and any other tasks mutually agreed to by the parties or ordered by the court. (McNamee Decl., ¶ 19.)

The motion is also supported by the declaration of Kim, who is senior counsel and the manager of class action and PAGA settlement department at D. Law, Inc. (Kim Decl., ¶¶ 2-3.) Based on the individual payments estimated to be made to participating Class Members and described in the McNamee declaration and above, Kim contends that the settlement agreement has resulted in a substantial benefit to the Class Members. (Id. at ¶ 10.) Kim further contends that the participation rate of 100 percent indicates that the settlement is fair and adequate. (Id. at ¶ 13.)

As to Class Counsel’s request for the Class Counsel Fee Payment in the amount of $200,000, Kim contends that this action raised what Kim describes as “complex and contested” issues that Class Counsel was required to research and analyze to adequately assess Fielding’s liability and develop necessary evidence. (Kim Decl., ¶ 19.) According to Kim, Class Counsel was required to sift through “hundreds of pages of documents” and to “come up with creative approaches to these issues in litigating the case and, ultimately, negotiating and crafting the settlement.” (Id. at ¶¶ 19-20.) Kim further states that because Class Counsel took this case on a contingency-fee basis, the time expended on this matter prevented Class Counsel from investing time and effort into other cases. (Id. at ¶¶ 20-21.)

The hours expended by Class Counsel on this case total 158.40, and include time spent by attorneys Alvin B. Lindsay at the hourly rate of $800, Melissa Rodriguez at the hourly rate of $400, and David Yeremian at the hourly rate of $850. (Kim Decl., ¶¶ 22-24.) The time expended and hourly rates charged by Class Counsel and described above are set forth by Kim within a table that identifies the total hours expended by each attorney, and that attorney’s hourly rate. (Id. at ¶ 24.) The Class Counsel Fee Payment also includes a multiplier of approximately 2.22, which Kim contends is reasonable for this case. (Id. at ¶ 25.)

Kim further states that, though the court preliminarily approved a Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment in the amount of $15,000, the actual total costs incurred by Class Counsel total $17,686.87, as reflected in a log attached to the Kim declaration as exhibit 3. (Kim Decl., ¶ 32.)

Kim also asserts that the Class Representative Service Payment to Mesa in the amount of $10,000 is reasonable based on Mesa’s efforts and initiative in bringing and prosecuting the action, and the risks to Mesa of retaliation for confronting his former employer. (Kim Decl., ¶¶ 33-34.) Kim asserts that Mesa devoted a substantial amount of time helping Class Counsel to develop and prosecute this action, which included time spent conferring with Class Counsel on numerous occasions, gathering and providing information about Fielding, reviewing and producing documents, identifying witnesses, monitoring the litigation, and informing himself about the facts, issues, and law. (Id. at ¶¶ 33 & 35.) Kim contends that Mesa has diligently, adequately, and fairly represented the Class Members and has not placed his interests above any member of the putative class. (Id. at ¶ 36.)

Attached as exhibit 4 to the Kim declaration is a record showing that a copy of the settlement agreement was submitted electronically to the LWDA. (Kim Decl., ¶ 38 & Exh. 4.)

The present motion is unopposed.

Analysis:

The opening memorandum submitted in support of the present motion is 24 pages, which exceeds the 15 page limit set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 3.1113(d), by more than 50 percent. In addition, the memorandum does not include an opening summary of argument. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1113(f).) Court records reflect that Mesa has not filed an appropriate application for permission to file a longer memorandum. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1113(e).)

Moreover, California Rules of Court, rule 2.104, requires that “all papers filed must be prepared using a font size not smaller than 12 points.” The court’s review of the opening memorandum shows that it is prepared using a font size which is 11 points. Further, the court’s rough calculations show that the use of a smaller font size causes the memorandum to exceed 24 pages.

“A memorandum that exceeds the page limits of these rules must be filed and considered in the same manner as a late-filed paper.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1113(g).) California Rules of Court, rule 3.1300(d), permits the court, in its discretion, to refuse to consider a late-filed paper. Though, for present purposes, the court will exercise its discretion to consider the present motion notwithstanding the rule violations further described above, counsel is reminded of their obligation to comply with court rules.

After preliminary approval of the class action settlement and providing notice to the class, the final approval hearing is the final step in the approval process. During the final approval hearing, the court conducts a more detailed inquiry into the fairness of the proposed settlement. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(g).) If the court approves the settlement agreement at the final approval hearing, the court must make and enter a judgment that includes a provision for the court to retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the terms of the settlement. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(h).)

“[A] trial court has broad powers to determine whether a proposed settlement in a class action is fair.” (Mallick v. Superior Court (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434, 438.) A class action settlement is presumptively fair if it was reached through arm’s-length negotiations between experienced counsel after extensive investigation, litigation, and discovery. (Dunk v. Ford Motor Company (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1802; accord, Wershba v. Apple Computer (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 245 [a presumption of fairness exists where (1) the settlement is reached through arm’s-length bargaining, (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently, (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation, and (4) the percentage of objectors is small].)

Each of the first three elements described above regarding the presumption of fairness were established at the time of preliminary approval. No further evidence has been presented which would alter the court’s preliminary determination of each of these elements.

With respect to the fourth element described above, Mesa presents evidence showing that Apex did not receive requests for exclusion from the settlement agreement, objections to the settlement agreement, or any written disputes regarding individual workweeks or pay periods from the Class Members. This, and the additional factors discussed above, gives rise to a presumption that the settlement agreement is fair and adequate.  

The court must also determine the adequacy of a class action settlement by independently satisfying itself that the consideration being received for the release of the class members’ claims is reasonable in light of the strengths and weaknesses of the claims and the risks of the particular litigation. (Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 129.) The court has reviewed the evidence and arguments presented by Mesa, including with respect to the strengths and weakness of the claims and the uncertainties of protracted litigation. Based upon the totality of the circumstances present here, the court is satisfied that the settlement preliminarily approved is fair and reasonable, and will certify the class for settlement purposes only.

The court will further affirm named plaintiff Mesa as the Class Representative. In light of the time and efforts expended by Mesa in assisting Class Counsel to pursue this matter, at substantial risk should the action have been unsuccessful, and with a small financial interest in the outcome of the litigation, the court finds that the Class Representative Service Payment in the amount of $10,000 is reasonable. The court will therefore approve payment of the Class Representative Service Payment to Mesa, in the amount of $10,000.

The court further affirms and approves the allocation of $50,000 of the gross settlement amount to the claims for civil penalties asserted under PAGA, and the payment of $37,500 to the LWDA, as required by law.

The court will also approve the appointment of D.Law, Inc., as Class Counsel.

As to the Class Counsel Fee Payment of $200,000, there exists some question as to whether the attorney’s fees sought by Mesa are reasonable. Noted above, the opening memorandum exceeds the page limit permitted by court rules by more than 50 percent. Further, the memorandum advances points and arguments which unnecessarily duplicate and repeat points advanced in the preliminary approval motion, including with respect to the history of this action, Mesa’s investigations of the claims at issue, and the reasonableness of the settlement agreement. These points and arguments are also repeated in the Kim declaration. There exists no apparent or stated reason why the arguments advanced by Mesa in support of the motion could not have been made in a more concise and efficient manner.

In addition, though the court would typically consider the unauthorized submission of a memorandum which exceeds the page limits set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 3.1113(d), as an inadvertent oversight, the opening memorandum submitted in support of Mesa’s preliminary approval motion also exceeded 15 pages.

The manner in which Mesa has presented factual and legal arguments to support the present motion suggests to the court that there exists inefficiency rather than oversight in the preparation of a concise memorandum in support of the position advanced by Mesa. These ostensible inefficiencies and duplications also raise concerns with respect to whether or not there also exists any inefficiency or duplication in any other aspect of this litigation, and, therefore, the overall reasonableness of the attorney’s fees sought by Mesa. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132 [“inefficient or duplicative efforts” are not subject to compensation].)

Though the concerns noted above suggest that the attorney’s fees requested in the motion may be, to some extent, unreasonable, the information submitted by Mesa and his counsel reflects that the amount of the Class Counsel Fee Payment is approximately 33.33 percent of the gross settlement amount. Though Kim presents information which also shows that the lodestar amount of fees incurred by Mesa is $89,930, the Class Counsel Fee Payment includes a positive multiplier to account for, among other things, the contingent risk presented here. (See Laffitte v. Robert Half Internat. Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 489-490 [general discussion].)

“[T]he court’s task in a negotiated settlement of fees is to determine if the negotiated fee is fair. That task requires the court to review the settlement as a whole, including the fee award, to ensure that it was fairly and honestly negotiated, is not collusive and adequately protects the interests of the [parties].” (Robbins v. Alibrandi (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 438, 444.) Under the totality of the circumstances and considering the contingent nature of the representation and its attendant risks, the attorney’s fees and costs sought by Class Counsel appear to be fair and reasonable notwithstanding the concerns noted above. Therefore, the court will approve payment of the Class Counsel Fee Payment in the amount of $200,000.

As to the Administration Costs in the higher amount of $8,200, though the court finds that the distribution of the Class Notice by Apex appears to meet due process requirements and was adequate, Mesa indicated in the preliminary approval motion that the Administration Costs would not exceed $7,000. (See Memo ISO Preliminary Approval Motion at p. 5, ll. 26-27.) Based on these representations, and the information provided to the Class Members in the Class Notice, which has been distributed to the Class Members and Aggrieved Employees, the court preliminarily approved settlement administration costs not to exceed $7,000. (See McNamee Decl., ¶ 7 & Exh. A [Class Notice] at p. 2, ¶ 6.) Therefore, unless Mesa is willing to provide new notice to the Class Members and Aggrieved Employees disclosing the higher amount of Administration Costs for which Mesa now seeks approval, the court will approve payment of the Administration Costs in the amount of $7,000, only.

Mesa also represented in the preliminary approval motion that the Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment will not exceed $15,000. (See Memo ISO Motion For Preliminary Approval at p. 5, ll. 22-23.) The Class Notice also states that Class Counsel will apply to the court for costs in the amount of $15,000. (McNamee Decl., Exh. A at p. 2, ¶ 6.) Notwithstanding these representations, Mesa requests in the present motion that the court approve payment of litigation costs in the higher amount of $17,686.87, as further discussed above.

The same analysis and reasoning apply. For all reasons discussed above, unless Mesa is willing to provide new notice to the Class Members and Aggrieved Employees disclosing the higher amount of the Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment for which Class Counsel now seeks approval as stated in the Kim declaration, the court will approve payment of the Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment in the amount of $15,000, only.

For all reasons stated above, the court will grant the motion in part, and as follows: (1) the court grants final approval of the settlement agreement; (2) the court grants final certification of the settlement class for settlement purposes only; (3) the court finds that notice has been given to 149 class members with 1 notice packet deemed undeliverable; (4) the court appoints Apex Class Action as the settlement administrator; (5) the court finds that Apex has not received any objections to or requests for exclusion from the settlement, or disputes from any Class Members; (6) the court appoints Mesa’s counsel Enoch J. Kim, Emil Davtyan, David Yeremian, Alvin B. Lindsay, Melissa Rodriguez, and the law firm of D.Law, Inc., as settlement class counsel; (7) the court appoints plaintiff Salvador Mesa as the settlement class representative; (8) the court approves the terms of the settlement as to the claims for civil penalties alleged under PAGA, and the allocation of $50,000 to settle these representative PAGA claims; (9) the court approves an award of attorney’s fees (i.e., the Class Counsel Fee Payment) in the amount of $200,000; (10) the court approves an award of litigation expenses (i.e., the Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment) in the amount of $15,000; (11) the court approves an incentive award to Mesa (i.e., the Class Representative Service Payment) in the amount of $10,000; and (12) the court approves an award of settlement administration costs (i.e., the Administration Costs) to Apex in the amount of $7,000.

Further, the court will reserve jurisdiction over the parties for the purposes of implementing, enforcing, and or administering the settlement agreement or enforcing the terms of the judgement.

Except as otherwise granted, the motion is denied. The court has reviewed the proposed order and does not intend to sign it for reasons further discussed above. Mesa shall submit a proposed order for the court’s review that complies with California Rules of Court, rule 3.769, and which accurately reflects the court’s ruling herein including with respect to the amount of the Administration Costs and Class Counsel Litigation Expenses approved herein. Further, counsel shall appear at the hearing of the motion and shall be prepared to discuss a date for submission of a final report, and any other matters remaining at this time.