Dimitra Hearron et al vs Santa Barbara Community Housing Corporation

Case Number

24CV00660

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Mon, 02/23/2026 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion: Summary Judgment

Tentative Ruling

Dimitra Hearron, et al. v. Santa Barbara Community Housing Corporation

Case No. 24CV00660

           

Hearing Date: February 23, 2026                                          

HEARING:              Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment Or, In the Alternative, Summary Adjudication on All Causes of Action and Damages

                                                           

ATTORNEYS:        For Plaintiffs Dimitra Hearron, Sierra Hearron, and Zayden Ramirez: Self- Represented

                             For Defendant Santa Barbara Community Housing Corporation: Marc A. Trachtman, Donald S. Zalewski, Marc Trachtman Law, PC

TENTATIVE RULING:

The motion of defendant Santa Barbara Community Housing Corporation for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication on all causes of action and damages is granted, in part. The court grants the motion for summary adjudication in favor of defendant and against plaintiff Zayden Ramirez as to the first cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of habitability alleged in plaintiffs’ first amended complaint, and in favor of defendant and against plaintiffs as to the fourth cause of action for violations of Civil Code section 1942.4 alleged in plaintiffs’ first amended complaint. Except as herein granted, the motion is otherwise denied.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to give notice of this ruling.

Background: 

The first amended complaint (the FAC) filed on April 23, 2024, by plaintiffs Dimitra Hearron (Dimitra), Sierra Hearron (Sierra), and Zayden Ramirez (Zayden), a minor by and through Sierra, his guardian ad litem (collectively, Plaintiffs) is the operative pleading. (Note: The court refers to plaintiffs by their first names to avoid confusion due to common surnames. No disrespect is intended.)  The FAC alleges four causes of action against defendant Santa Barbara Community Housing Corporation (SBCHC): (1) breach of implied warranty of habitability; (2) negligence; (3) nuisance; and (4) violations of Civil Code section 1942.4. As alleged in the operative FAC:

SBCHC owns, operates, manages, maintains, and supervises residential property located at 47 Broadmoor in Santa Barbara, California (the Property), which is held out for rent to the general public. (FAC, ¶¶ 1, 8-9 & 12.) On June 11, 2004, Dimitra entered into an agreement with SBCHC (the Agreement) to lease Apt. #7 (the Unit) at the Property. (Id. at ¶¶ 1, 18.) Plaintiffs have been tenants at the Property and the Unit since June 2004. (Id. at ¶¶ 5 & 18.)

There exist at the Property, including in its common areas and in the Unit, conditions which affected its habitability and which were not caused by any wrongful or abnormal use of the Unit or Property by Plaintiffs. (FAC, ¶ 21.) These conditions include: cockroach and insect infestations and lack of insect control; pollution from roach feces floating in the air and being inhaled by Plaintiffs; bites from spiders and other insects; damaged or deteriorated carpeting; inoperable stoves, ovens, heating, and smoke alarms; broken kitchen cabinets, tiles, or flooring; water leaks or intrusion, excessive moisture, and water damage; toxic mold causing mold spores to float in the air and be inhaled by Plaintiffs; deteriorated window frames and walls; an unpermitted water heater; and building code and health and safety violations. (FAC, ¶¶ 14, 21, & 41.) Some of those conditions caused Plaintiffs to suffer serious health and medical problems. (FAC, ¶ 14(b)-(c) [roach feces and spider bites] & (m) [toxic mold].)

On March 24, 2023, the City of Santa Barbara Building and Safety Department notified SBCHC of violations of health and safety codes or housing laws. (FAC, ¶¶ 15, 44 & Exh. A [“Notice Of Violation Warning Letter” dated Mar. 24, 2023].) SBCHC failed to make repairs or abate the conditions for a period of more than 35 days after service of citations upon it and thereafter, demanded, attempted to collect, and collected rent from Plaintiffs. (Id. at ¶¶ 34, 45-46.)

The conduct of SBCHC and its failure to make repairs created conditions which interfered with Plaintiffs’ use of the Unit and Property, and caused Plaintiffs to suffer property damage, physical and emotional injuries, pain and suffering, and to incur medical and related expenses. (FAC, ¶¶ 16, 31-32, 34, 37.)

On August 8, 2024, SBCHC filed an answer to the FAC, generally denying its allegations and asserting forty one affirmative defenses, and a cross-complaint against fictitiously named “Roe” defendants 1 through 30, alleging causes of action for equitable or implied indemnity, contribution, and declaratory relief against those defendants.

Court records reflect that on May 28, 2025, then counsel of record for Plaintiffs, Gerald S. Ohn (attorney Ohn), filed a motion for an order permitting counsel to be relieved as Plaintiffs’ attorney of record in this action, and filed an amended motion to be relieved as counsel on May 30 (collectively, the motion to be relieved).

On August 25, the court granted the motion to be relieved, and signed and entered separate orders relieving attorney Ohn as counsel of record for Dimitra, Sierra, and Zayden, effective upon the filing of proof of service of each signed order upon each client. (Aug. 8, 2025, Minute Order & Orders Granting Motion.) On August 27, attorney Ohn filed proof of service of each of those orders on Plaintiffs.

On November 13, SBCHC filed a motion for an order granting summary judgment, or in the alternative summary adjudication against Plaintiffs as to all causes of action alleged in the FAC.

On February 2, 2026, the court entered an order adopting its tentative ruling on the motion as follows:

“The proof of service of the notice, motion, and papers submitted in support of the motion (collectively, the motion) filed by SBCHC on November 14, 2025, states that the motion was hand delivered to Dimitra at the Property on November 13.

“The proof of service also states that the motion was personally served on Zayden and Sierra by delivering the motion to a female individual identified as “Zoey Ramirez”, at the last known address listed in the orders granting attorney Ohn’s motion to be relieved as counsel for Sierra and Zayden. (Nov. 14, 2025, Proof of Service at pdf p. 1, ¶ 3; Aug. 25, 2025, Orders Granting Attorney’s Motion, ¶¶ 6.)

““Zoey Ramirez”, who is not a party or plaintiff in this action, is not listed as counsel of record for Plaintiffs. For these reasons, it is unclear to the court whether or why delivery of the motion to “Zoey Ramirez” at the address identified in the proof of service constitutes effective or timely service of the motion on Sierra and Zayden. Therefore, the court will continue the hearing on the motion to permit SBCHC to either file an amended proof of service listing effective and timely service of the motion as to Sierra and Zayden, or explain why service of the motion on Sierra and Zayden in the manner listed in the proof of service filed on November 14, is timely and effective as to these plaintiffs.”

Pursuant to the ruling set forth above, the court continued the motion to February 23; ordered SBCHC to, on or before February 9, either file an amended proof of service listing effective and timely service of the motion on Sierra and Zayden, or explain why service of the motion in the manner listed in the proof of service filed by SBCHC on November 14, 2025, is timely and effective as to those parties.

On February 2, SBCHC filed an amended proof of service that is signed under penalty of perjury by Mark Lonneman, who states they are an employee or independent contractor of a registered California process server. Lonneman asserts that on November 13, 2025, Lonneman served the notice, the motion, and the documents and exhibits submitted in support of the motion (collectively, the motion) on Sierra and Zayden by serving Zoey Ramirez (Z Ramirez), who Lonneman describes as a competent adult member of the household who agreed to accept service. (Feb. 2, 2026, Am. Proof of Service, ¶ 3.)

Lonneman also states in a separate declaration filed on February 2, that they served the motion on November 13, 2025, at a residence located at 120 East Alamar Avenue in Santa Barbara, California. (Feb. 2, 2026, Lonneman Dec.) Lonneman asserts that, on that date, they met with Z Ramirez, an adult female who stated that she was a resident at that address; that Sierra was Z Ramirez’s sister-in-law; that Sierra was not home; and that Z Ramirez agreed to accept service of the motion on Sierra’s behalf. (Ibid.) Lonneman asserts that they explained the general nature of motion being served. (Ibid.)

As of this writing, court records reflect that Plaintiffs have not filed an opposition to the present motion.

It is undisputed that Dimitra began renting the Unit at the Property on June 11, 2004. (Sep. Stmt., UMF No. 2 & evidence cited therein.) Sierra, who is Dimitra’s daughter, lived in the Unit with Dimitra until April of 2019, when Sierra moved in with the family of her boyfriend, Anthony Ramirez (A Ramirez). (Sep. Stmt., UMF No. 3 & evidence cited therein.) Zayden, who is the son of Sierra and A Ramirez, was born on October 13, 2020. (Sep. Stmt., UMF No. 4 & evidence cited therein.) Though Dimitra periodically watches Zayden as needed by Sierra, Zayden has never been a tenant of the Unit. (Ibid.)

Between January 1, 2019, and January 25, 2023, there were no complaints of mold by Dimitra. (Sep. Stmt., UMF No. 5 & evidence cited therein.) Each year, the Unit was inspected and evaluated by SBCHC and the Housing Authority of the City of Santa Barbara (the Housing Authority). (Sep. Stmt., UMF No. 6 & evidence cited therein.) At all times during Dimitra’s tenancy, the Unit complied with the standards set forth in Civil Code section 1941.1, subdivision (a), as evidenced by the Housing Authority not abating rent for the Unit due to habitability conditions. (Ibid.) Inspection reports or work orders for January 1, 2019, through January 25, 2023, also do not show evidence of mold. (Sep. Stmt., UMF No. 7 & evidence cited therein.)

On October 27, 2023, Dimitra complained about “maggots”. (Sep. Stmt., UMF No. 8 & evidence cited therein.) A pest control vendor inspected the Unit that same day and found no evidence of “maggots”. (Ibid.)

On March 21, 2024, Dimitra complained about cockroaches. (Sep. Stmt., UMF No. 9 & evidence cited therein.) A pest control inspection was promptly performed and treatment applied with no evidence of a cockroach infestation in the Unit. (Sep. Stmt., UMF No. 9 & evidence cited therein.)

Between January 25 and May 31, 2023, Dimitra complained of potential mold in her apartment, including in a bedroom with an exterior wall where Dimitra was housing a friend and his belongings since the Fall of 2021. (Sep. Stmt., UMF No. 10 & evidence cited therein.) SBCHC attempted to repair and abate those conditions, and provided a hotel to Dimitra during part of the time repairs were performed. (Sep. Stmt., UMF Nos. 11-12 & evidence cited therein.)

On March 24, 2023, C. Lennon (Officer Lennon), who is a Code Compliance Officer with the City of Santa Barbara Community Development Department (the SBCDD), issued a “Notice of Violation Warning Letter” (the Notice of Violation) to SBCHC that referenced potential mold and water damage. (Sep. Stmt., UMF No. 13 & evidence cited therein.) SBCHC attempted to immediately enter the Unit to abate or remedy the conditions cited in the Notice of Violation, but was prevented from entering by Dimitra who would not allow anyone in the apartment until April 2023. (Sep. Stmt., UMF No. 14 & evidence cited therein.) As a result, SBCHC was unable to abate or remedy the alleged mold and water intrusion issues until May 2023. (Sep. Stmt., UMF No. 15 & evidence cited therein.)

On May 22, 2023, SBCHC delivered an email to the SBCDD stating that all repairs were performed in the Unit. (Sep. Stmt., UMF No. 15 & evidence cited therein.) Officer Lennon noted in an “ENF Case Inspection History Summary” that the violations present in the Unit were abated on May 24, 2023. (Ibid.)

From March 1, 2022, through March 1, 2023, Dimitra paid $16 per month out of a total contract rent of $1,962 per month. (Sep. Stmt., UMF No. 16 & evidence cited therein.) From March 1 through July 31, 2023, Dimitra paid $228 per month out of total rent of $1,962 per month. (Sep. Stmt., UMF No. 17 & evidence cited therein.) From August 1, 2023, through March 1, 2024, Dimitra paid $213 per month out of total rent of $2,260 per month. (Ibid.) The Housing Authority never abated rent for the Unit. (Sep. Stmt., UMF No. 18 & evidence cited therein.)

None of Dimitra’s physical and medical complaints are the result of exposure to any mold. (Sep. Stmt., UMF No. 19 & evidence cited therein.) Sierra has alleged only emotional issues which are not due to mold exposure, and no physical or medical issues. (Sep. Stmt., UMF No. 20 & evidence cited therein.) Zayden has no known physical or medical issues related to mold exposure. (Sep. Stmt., UMF No. 21 & evidence cited therein.)

Analysis:

The proof of service of the motion filed by SBCHC on November 14, 2025, and the amended proof of service filed on February 2, 2026, each show that the motion was hand delivered to Dimitra at Unit on November 13, 2025. Service of the motion on Dimitra appears effective and timely.

The amended proof of service described above shows that the motion was left with Z Ramirez who is identified as an adult residing at the last known residence of Sierra and Zayden listed in the orders granting attorney Ohn’s motion to be relieved as counsel for those parties. (See Feb. 2, 2026, Am. Proof of Service at pdf p. 1, ¶ 3; Aug. 25, 2025, Orders Granting Attorney’s Motion, ¶¶ 6.) It can be inferred from the information appearing in the amended proof of service and the Lonneman declaration described above, that Z Ramirez is 18 years of age or older and resides with Sierra and Zayden at their residence. Considering that Zayden is a minor whose guardian ad litem in this action is Sierra, the court finds that service of the motion was effective and timely as to Sierra and Zayden. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1010 & § 1011, subd. (b).)

For the reasons discussed herein, the court will grant the motion for summary adjudication of the first cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of habitability in favor of SBCHC and against Zayden, and for summary adjudication of the fourth cause of action for violation of Civil Code section 1942.4, in favor of SBCHC and against Plaintiffs. The court will otherwise deny the motion.

“A party may move for summary judgment in an action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a)(1).) Relevant here, “[a] defendant ... has met that party’s burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) A defendant meets this burden by presenting evidence “that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action by showing that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence....” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 854-855 (Aguilar).) A defendant is not required “to conclusively negate an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action.” (Id. at p. 853.)

“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) A motion for summary adjudication “shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(2).)

“The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.) The party moving for summary judgment “bears the burden of persuasion that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Id. at p. 845.) “Initially, the moving party bears a burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any genuine issue of material fact. If he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift: the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.” (Ibid.)

“ ‘The pleadings delimit the issues to be considered on a motion for summary judgment. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1253 (Laabs).) “The complaint measures the materiality of the facts tendered in a defendant’s challenge to the plaintiff’s cause of action.” (FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 380; accord, Laabs, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1253.) The court “may examine the allegations of the complaint in order to define the issues of which the summary judgment disposes.” (Melchior v. New Line Productions, Inc. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 779, 791, fn. 6.)

The causes of action and theories of liability alleged in the FAC and described above are each factually predicated on, or arise from, the purported existence of each of the conditions described in the FAC and above, which the FAC alleges were present in both the Unit and the common areas of the Property. (FAC, ¶¶ 14(a)-(p), 17 & 21 [incorporating allegations re conditions into first cause of action], 26 & 29 [same re second cause of action], 33-34 [same re third cause of action] & 40-43 [same re fourth cause of action].) The FAC alleges that the presence of those “materially defective”, “dangerous”, and “harmful” conditions rendered the Unit unfit for habitation and untenantable; were detrimental to Plaintiffs’ health and safety; constitute violations of statutory or common law; and caused Plaintiffs to incur damages and economic loss, and to suffer physical, mental, and emotional injuries, among other things. (FAC, ¶¶ 1-2, 15-16, 21, 29-32, 34 & 37-38.)

As to the fourth cause of action for violations of Civil Code section 1942.4, Plaintiffs also allege that the Property lacked proper ventilation. (FAC, ¶ 41.)

For all reasons discussed above, the motion for summary judgment must present evidence which shows that Plaintiffs cannot establish one or more elements of the causes of action of the FAC, or that there exists a complete defense to those causes of action.
 

The memorandum submitted by SBCHC in support of the motion for summary judgment states that “[t]his case primarily involves an incident of moisture intrusion through an outside wall of one room in plaintiff’s apartment...”, and that “[e]verything else pled in the [FAC] is factually unsupportable.” (Memorandum at p. 1, ll. 3-6.) Accordingly, the motion, including evidence and information presented in the separate statement, describes or addresses only mold and water intrusion, and complaints asserted by Dimitra regarding mold, maggots, and cockroaches. (See, e.g., Sep. Stmt., UMF nos. 5 & 7-10.)

Wholly absent from the motion is any reasoned factual or legal argument, supported by evidence, addressing or disposing of the causes of action or theories of liability which arise from, among other things, spider and other insect bites; damaged carpeting; inoperable stoves, ovens, heating, and smoke alarms; broken cabinets and flooring; and an unpermitted water heater (collectively, the additional conditions). The motion also fails to present any evidence showing that Plaintiffs cannot establish one or more elements of the causes of action arising from the additional conditions, or that there is a complete defense to those causes of action.

Furthermore, apart from general asserting in a conclusory manner that the causes of action which arise from the additional conditions are factually unsupportable, the motion fails to present any evidence showing why those causes or theories are factually unsupportable. By way of example only, the motion includes no reasoned factual or legal argument showing why Plaintiffs do not possess or cannot reasonably obtain necessary evidence, why those causes of action have been abandoned by Plaintiffs, or why Plaintiffs did not suffer injuries from any of the additional conditions alleged in the FAC.

The examples provided above are intended to be illustrative but not exhaustive. Because the causes of action and theories of liability alleged in the FAC do not arise solely from an incident of moisture intrusion, and also arise from the alleged presence in the Unit and at the Property of the additional conditions further described above, including damages and injuries Plaintiffs purportedly suffered as a result of the presence of those additional conditions, SBCHC has, for all reasons discussed above, failed to meet its burden to show that all causes of action alleged in the FAC are without merit. (Oroville Hospital v. Superior Court (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 382, 398–399 [the trial court must determine the issue of law if it finds no triable issue of fact exists].)

The motion also seeks to summarily adjudicate the first cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of habitability. As grounds for summary adjudication of the first causes of action, SBCHC contends that the Unit met the standards set forth in Civil Code section 1941.1 during the applicable limitations period; that it promptly remedied any moisture intrusion issues; that it provided a hotel to Dimitra while those repairs were performed; that Dimitra cannot establish that she suffered any injury or damage as a result of mold exposure; that Zayden is not a tenant of the Unit and cannot make any habitability claims; that the statute of limitations expired on Sierra’s claim because Sierra has not lived in the Unit since April 2019; and that neither Sierra nor Zayden suffered compensable injuries. (Memorandum at pp. 8-9 & 11.)

As to Dimitra’s claim for breach of the implied warranty of habitability, the same reasoning and analysis set forth above applies here. For the same reasons discussed above, the court will deny the motion for summary adjudication of the first cause of action as to Dimitra.

As to Sierra’s claim for breach of the implied warranty of habitability, the separate statement states that Sierra’s emotional issues are not due to mold. Absent from the separate statement, and the opening memorandum, is any evidence showing that Sierra did not suffer any physical or emotional injuries arising from any of the additional conditions alleged in the FAC and described above. For these reasons, the motion fails to show, with evidentiary support, that Sierra’s claim for damages arising from any breach of the implied warranty of habitability is without merit.

In addition, it can be inferred from information and evidence appearing in the separate statement that Sierra was a tenant of the Unit until Sierra moved out in April of 2019. SBCHC contends, without citing the relevant statute, that a four year limitations period applies to a cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of habitability, and that the limitations period expired as to Sierra’s claim for breach of that warranty. Assuming without deciding that the first cause of action alleged in the FAC is subject to a four year statute of limitations, a civil action can be commenced within the applicable limitation period “after the cause of action shall have accrued....” (Code Civ. Proc., § 312.)

“The general rule for defining the accrual of a cause of action sets the date as the time ‘when, under the substantive law, the wrongful act is done,’ or the wrongful result occurs, and the consequent ‘liability arises....’ [Citation.] In other words, it sets the date as the time when the cause of action is complete with all of its elements [citations] — the elements being generically referred to by sets of terms such as ‘wrongdoing’ or ‘wrongful conduct,’ ‘cause’ or ‘causation,’ and ‘harm’ or ‘injury’ [citations].” (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 397; see also Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1110–1111 [general discussion of the “discovery rule”].)

Notwithstanding whether SBCHC could advance meritorious arguments showing that any cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of habitability by Sierra was complete as of April 2019, the separate statement does not include any evidence showing that, at the time Sierra moved out of the Unit, Sierra had suffered harm or injury as a result of the presence of each of the conditions alleged in the FAC. (San Diego Watercrafts, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 308, 315 (San Diego Watercrafts) [“the court may ignore evidence not disclosed in moving party’s separate statement of undisputed facts.”].) Because the motion fails to present evidence showing that Sierra’s cause of action for breach of the warranty of habitability was complete or had accrued as of the date Sierra moved out of the Unit, SBCHC has failed to meet its burden to show that Sierra’s cause of action was not brought within the limitations period asserted in the motion.

As to Zayden’s cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of habitability, that warranty “is implied by law in residential leases in this state ....” (Green v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 616, 637.) “The elements of a cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of habitability ‘are the existence of a material defective condition affecting the premises’ habitability, notice to the landlord of the condition within a reasonable time after the tenant’s discovery of the condition, the landlord was given a reasonable time to correct the deficiency, and resulting damages.’ [Citation.] The alleged defective condition must ‘affect the tenant’s apartment or the common areas which he uses.’ [Citations.] When the alleged defect is in a common area, the landlord’s duty to inspect and maintain the common area removes any excuse by the landlord regarding a lack of knowledge.” (Peviani v. Arbors at California Oaks Property Owner, LLC (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 874, 891.)

Though the evidence presented in the motion shows that Dimitra and Sierra were tenants of the Unit, the undisputed record shows that Zayden was not a tenant of the Unit, including during the time Sierra resided at the Unit. (Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 4 [showing that Zayden was born after Sierra moved out of the Unit, and was not a tenant of the Unit].) Furthermore, it can be inferred from the undisputed evidence that Zayden was not a party to any rental agreement for the Unit. (See also, Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 2 [stating that Dimitra began renting the Unit on June 11, 2004].)

For all reasons discussed above, the undisputed record reflects, expressly and by inference, that Zayden was never a tenant of the Unit. Because a cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of habitability requires that a defective condition affect a tenant’s apartment, or common areas used by the tenant, the court finds that SBCHC has met its burden to produce evidence showing that Zayden’s cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of habitability has no merit. The burden now shifts to Plaintiffs to produce evidence showing the existence of a triable issue of one or more material facts as to Zayden’s cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of habitability. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)

Noted above, Plaintiffs have not filed any opposition to the motion. As a result, Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to demonstrate the existence of any triable issues of material fact as to Zayden’s first cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of habitability. For these and all further reasons discussed above, the court will grant summary adjudication in favor of SBCHC and against Zayden as to the first cause of action alleged in the FAC.

As to the second cause of action for negligence, SBCHC asserts that Plaintiffs were not physically injured by any alleged act or omission by SBCHC or any condition present in the Unit; that the statute of limitations has run as to Sierra’s negligence claim for the same reasons discussed above; and that Plaintiffs cannot prove any breach of a legal duty owed by SBCHC, or causation, as to Zayden who did not reside at the Unit.

The motion contends, without citing the relevant statute, that a two year statute of limitations applies to Plaintiffs’ negligence claim asserted in the second cause of action. As the grounds for summary adjudication of the second cause of action are similar or the same as those further discussed above in regard to whether Plaintiffs’ cause of action for negligence accrued more than two years prior to the filing of the complaint, and as the motion presents no evidence showing when Plaintiffs’ negligence claims accrued or were complete, the same reasoning and analysis apply.

The court further notes that “[t]he threshold element of a cause of action for negligence is the existence of a duty to use due care toward an interest of another that enjoys legal protection against unintentional invasion. [Citations.]” (Bily v. Arthur Young & Co. (1992) 3 Cal.4th 370, 397.) “Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself.” (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a).)

Though the evidence presented in the motion shows that Zayden was not a tenant the Unit for purposes of any warranty of habitability, that evidence shows that Dimitra “watched over” Zayden as needed by Sierra. (Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 4.) It is unclear from the evidence presented in the separate statement whether Dimitra watched over Zayden at the Unit or another location, how often Zayden was present at the Unit while Dimitra watched over them, or whether any of the conditions alleged in the FAC were present at the Unit while Dimitra watched over Zayden. (See San Diego Watercrafts, supra, 102 Cal.App.4th at pp. 315–316.) Noted above, the present record also reflects that Sierra was a tenant of the Unit until April of 2019.

For all reasons discussed above, as the present record shows that Sierra was a tenant at the Unit and that Zayden was present at the Unit for some unknown periods of time, and does not show why Sierra or Zayden’s presence at the Unit did not cause them to suffer injury resulting any of the conditions alleged in the FAC, SBCHC has failed to meet its burden to produce evidence showing why the negligence cause of action alleged in the FAC is without merit, or why there exists a complete defense to that cause of action. For these and all further reasons discussed above, the court will deny summary adjudication of the second cause of action alleged in the FAC.

As to the third cause of action for nuisance, SBCHC advances the same or similar arguments as those further discussed above. (See, e.g., Memorandum at p. 13, ll. 3-11.) Therefore, the same reasoning and analysis apply.

Moreover, though SBCHC contends that there is no issue of public nuisance because a condition of the Unit does not affect the public generally, SBCHC fails to present any evidence addressing the allegation that the defective conditions at issue were also present at the Property. (See, e.g., FAC, ¶ 1 & 14.) For example, SBCHC presents no evidence showing why there is no merit to Plaintiffs’ claims that the conditions alleged in the FAC were present at the Property, including its common areas, or that the presence of those conditions at the Property or its common areas constitutes a public nuisance which “affects at the same time an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted upon individuals may be unequal.” (Civ. Code, § 3480.) For these and all further reasons discussed above, the court will deny summary adjudication of the third cause of action for nuisance alleged in the FAC.

The fourth cause of action alleges a violation of Civil Code section 1942.4. SBCHC contends that Civil Code section 1942.4 applies only in circumstances where a landlord collects or demands rent when the dwelling was subject to a written notification by a public health officer requiring that the substandard condition be corrected or abated; when the condition existed for 35 days after such notice; and when there is no good cause for delay in repairing or abating the condition. SBCHC argues that judgment should be granted in its favor as to the fourth cause of action alleged in the FAC because it remedied the violations claimed in the Notice of Violation by May 24, 2023; because any delay in remedying those violations was caused by Dimitra’s refusal to allow personnel to enter the Unit; and because Plaintiffs did not suffer any injury from items that were the subject of the Notice of Violation.

Under Civil Code section 1942.2, a landlord of a dwelling may not demand or collect rent if, prior to that demand:

“(1) The dwelling substantially lacks any of the affirmative standard characteristics listed in Section 1941.1 or violates Section 17920.10 of the Health and Safety Code, or is deemed and declared substandard as set forth in Section 17920.3 of the Health and Safety Code because conditions listed in that section exist to an extent that endangers the life, limb, health, property, safety, or welfare of the public or the occupants of the dwelling.

“(2) A public officer or employee who is responsible for the enforcement of any housing law, after inspecting the premises, has notified the landlord or the landlord’s agent in writing of his or her obligations to abate the nuisance or repair the substandard conditions.

“(3) The conditions have existed and have not been abated 35 days beyond the date of service of the notice specified in paragraph (2) and the delay is without good cause. For purposes of this subdivision, service shall be complete at the time of deposit in the United States mail.

“(4) The conditions were not caused by an act or omission of the tenant or lessee in violation of Section 1929 or 1941.2.” (Civ. Code, § 1942.4, subd. (a)(1)-(4).)

The fourth cause of action alleges: that the conditions described in the FAC were not caused by Plaintiffs; that SBCHC was notified by the City of Santa Barbara Building and Safety Division on March 24, 2023, of violations of applicable health and safety codes or housing laws; that SBCHC failed to timely make repairs for a period of more than 35 days after service of that notification; that the delay by SBCHC was without good cause; and that SBCHC violated Civil Code section 1942.4 by demanding, attempting to collect, or actually collecting, rent beyond 35 days after service of the notification. (FAC, ¶¶ 43-46.)

The available evidence and information described above, which is not disputed by Plaintiffs, shows that the Notice of Violation was issued on March 24, 2023, which is the date of the notification alleged in the fourth cause of action and described above. For this reason, the fourth cause of action alleged may be reasonably interpreted to arise from the issuance of the Notice of Violation, and a purported failure by SBCHC to timely abate those conditions.

The undisputed evidence and information presented in the motion also shows that SBCHC immediately attempted to enter the Unit to abate or remedy the conditions described in the Notice of Violation; that Dimitra would not allow anyone in the Unit until April of 2023; that SBCHC was unable to abate or remedy the conditions identified in the Notice of Violation until May of 2023; and that Officer Lennon determined that the violations were abated on May 24, 2023. (Sep. Stmt., UMF nos. 13-15.)

It appears to the court that there exist no triable issues of fact as to whether the conditions listed in subdivision (a)(1), (2), and (4) of Civil Code section 1942.4, existed prior to any alleged demand for or collection of rent by SBCHC. There also appear to be no triable issues of fact as to whether the conditions described in the Notice of Violation existed in the Unit and were not abated 35 days beyond the date the Notice of Violation was served on SBCHC. (Civ. Code, § 1942.4, subd. (3).)

In addition, though the FAC also alleges that SBCHC was notified of violations on March 24, 2023, “among other times...” (FAC, ¶ 44), absent a dispute by Plaintiffs, it can be inferred from other evidence presented in the separate statement, that the only written notice of any nuisance or substandard condition given to SBCHC by “[a] public officer or employee who is responsible for the enforcement of any housing law, after inspecting the premises...” is the Notice of Violation. (See, e.g., Sep. Stmt., UMF No. 6 [showing, among other things, that the Unit was inspected each year by the Housing Authority who did not abate the rent for the Unit due to habitability conditions].)

As to whether SBCHC has met its burden to show that Plaintiffs cannot establish that any delay in abating the conditions described in the Notice of Violation was without good cause, Civil Code section 1942.4 does not define “good cause” nor does SBCHC cite any case law addressing the meaning of good cause as that term is used in the statute (and the court is not presently aware of any such case law).

Generally, “good cause as a standard ‘is relative and depends on all the circumstances.’ [Citations.] A determination of good cause ‘ “‘should not be enshrined in legal formalism; [rather,] it calls for a factual exposition of a reasonable ground for the sought order.” ’ [Citations.] ‘As a general rule, ... “good cause” includes reasons that are fair, honest, in good faith, not trivial, arbitrary, capricious, or pretextual, and reasonably related to legitimate needs, goals, and purposes.’ [Citation.]” (Estate of Kerkorian (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 709, 721.) “In determining the meaning of ‘good cause’ in a particular context, the courts utilize common sense based upon the totality of the circumstances. Those circumstances include the purpose of the underlying statutory scheme.” (Laraway v. Sutro & Co., Inc. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 266, 274.)

The plain language of Civil Code section 1942.4 requires a landlord to, within the time prescribed in that statute, abate any nuisance or substandard conditions described in a written notice by a public officer or employee responsible for enforcing housing laws, before demanding or collecting rent. The statute allows for a delay in abating any such nuisance substandard conditions provided there exists good cause for any such delay.

SBCHC has presented evidence showing that it could not access the Unit until May 24, 2023, due to Dimitra’s refusal to allow anyone to enter the Unit until April of 2023. Plaintiffs present no evidence showing why, notwithstanding Dimitra’s refusal to allow entry to the Unit until April of 2023, SBCHC could have accessed the Unit prior to that date to abate the conditions described in the Notice of Violation within the time prescribed in Civil Code section 1942.4.

Under the totality of the circumstances present here, the court finds that, to the extent the fourth cause of action alleged in the FAC arises from a failure by SBCHC to abate the conditions described in the Notice of Violation within the time prescribed in Civil Code section 1942.4, SBCHC has produced evidence sufficient to show the existence of good cause for any delay in abating those conditions. In addition, Plaintiffs have presented no evidence which shows that the fourth cause of action arises from any other notice apart from the Notice of Violation. For these and all further reasons discussed above, SBCHC has met its burden of producing evidence showing that Plaintiffs cannot establish one or more elements of the fourth cause of action for violation of Civil Code section 1942.4.

For the same reasons discussed above, Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to produce evidence showing the existence of a triable issue of one or more material facts as to the fourth cause of action for violation of Civil Code section 1942.4 alleged in the FAC. Therefore, the court will grant the motion for summary adjudication of the fourth cause of action alleged in the FAC.