Michael P Sipiora vs Santa Barbara Graduate School

Case Number

24CV00466

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 01/30/2026 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion: Continue; Bifurcation; Protective Order; Motion to Compel

Tentative Ruling

For all reasons discussed herein:

1. Defendant Santa Barbara Graduate School, Inc.’s motion to continue the trial confirmation conference and related deadlines is taken off-calendar as moot. The date certain trial of September 16, 2026, is confirmed.

2. Defendant Santa Barbara Graduate School, Inc.’s motion to bifurcate the punitive damages phase from the liability phase of trial is granted. If it is found, in the first phase of trial, that plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages, the amount of punitive damages phase shall immediately trail the liability phase.

3. Plaintiff Michael P. Sipiora’s motion to compel production of documents responsive to fifth revised person most qualified deposition notice is granted in part and denied in part as follows:
   1. The motion is granted as to requests for production of documents Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 12, 19, 33, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 69, 70, and 71.
      1. Defendant shall serve all responsive documents, without objection except as to privilege, no later than February 27, 2026. The requests are limited and modified as agreed to by the parties in September 2025, and as set forth below under the headings “Recent Agreements Between the Parties” and “RFPs Nos. 12, 19, 33, 61, and 62.”
      2. For any document withheld based on a claim of privilege, defendant shall provide a privilege log, no later than February 27, 2026, with sufficient information to allow plaintiff and the court to evaluate the claim of privilege.
      3. Defendant is not to produce any settlement agreements pertaining to claims by third parties.
      4. Should any responsive documents contain social security numbers, wage information, medical information, or settlement discussions pertaining to third parties, for other claims, defendant shall redact that information prior to production of the documents.
      5. Absent further order of the court, any documents designated as confidential by defendant shall be subject to the stipulated protective order that was approved by the court on May 20, 2024.
      6. The court denies defendant’s request that the cost for production of electronically stored information be shifted to plaintiff.
   2. The motion to compel is denied as to requests for production of documents Nos. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 67, and 68.
   3. No monetary sanctions are imposed against or in favor of either party.

4. Defendant Santa Barbara Graduate School, Inc.’s motion for a protective order re plaintiff’s fifth revised notice of deposition of defendant’s person most qualified is denied as moot because any relief that would be ordered is encompassed by the ruling on plaintiff’s motion to compel.

Background: 

This action commenced on January 29, 2024, by the filing of the complaint by plaintiff Michael P. Sipiora (“plaintiff” or “Sipiora”) against defendant Santa Barbara Graduate School, Inc. dba Pacifica Graduate Institute (“defendant” or “Pacifica”).

On March 15, 2024, prior to an answer being filed, Sipiora filed his operative verified first amended complaint (“FAC”), alleging violations of the Government Code, Labor Code, Public Policy, and Breach of Contract. Sipiora alleges that he was employed with Pacifica as a professor, under a series of written contracts, for more than 10 years before he was effectively terminated on July 29, 2022, in retaliation for objecting to and complaining about Pacifica’s harassment and mistreatment of female members of Pacifica faculty, in violation of California law including the California Fair Employment and Housing Act.

On April 30, 2024, Pacifica filed its verified answer to the FAC, admitting some allegations and denying others. Pacifica also sets forth 21 affirmative defenses.

The following is a timeline of relevant motions, hearings, and other proceedings:

On October 11, 2024, plaintiff filed a motion to compel further responses to requests for production of documents, set two. On November 8, 2024, plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to requests for production of documents, set two, was granted in part and denied in part.

On December 19, 2024, plaintiff filed a motion for an order to show cause re: contempt, arguing that Pacifica violated the November 8, 2024 order. On December 19, 2024, plaintiff also filed a motion to compel a further response to form interrogatory 216.1.

On January 8, 2025, Pacifica filed a motion for a protective order re plaintiff’s second revised notice of deposition of defendant’s person most knowledgeable.

On February 4, 2025, plaintiff filed a motion to compel person most qualified (PMQ) deposition and further responses to requests for production of documents attached to the PMQ deposition notice.

On March 7, 2025, which was the original hearing date for the motions filed on December 19, 2024, January 8, 2025, and February 4, 2025, plaintiff’s counsel indicated that he did not see the tentative ruling posted to the court’s website, so the matters were continued to March 14, 2025. On March 14, 2025, plaintiff’s counsel requested another continuance, so that he could properly submit a request for oral argument, and the court continued the matters to March 28, 2025.

On March 28, 2025, the court: (1) denied plaintiff’s motion for an order to show cause re: contempt, (2) denied, without prejudice, plaintiff’s motion to compel a further response to form interrogatory 216.1, (3) granted, in part, Pacifica’s motion for a protective order regarding plaintiff’s second revised notice of deposition of defendant’s person most knowledgeable, and (4) denied, without prejudice, plaintiff’s motion to compel the deposition of Pacifica’s PMQ and further responses to requests for production of documents.

As relevant here, the March 28, 2025 ruling included: “[T]he motion of defendant for a protective order regarding plaintiff’s second revised notice of deposition of defendant’s person most knowledgeable is granted in part. The deposition of the person most knowledgeable of defendant shall proceed on the terms and conditions described herein. The parties shall meet and confer fully and in good faith, in accordance with this ruling, to select from the examination topics described in plaintiff’s second revised notice of deposition of defendant, one person and one topic for examination, and to reasonably narrow the scope of the requests for production contained in plaintiff’s second revised notice. Further, plaintiff shall serve a new deposition notice which reflects or describes the parties’ agreement, if any, as well as a date for the deposition. The deposition of defendant’s person most knowledgeable shall, for present purposes only, be precluded as to any remaining persons, issues, topics, or documents which are described in plaintiff’s second revised notice of deposition and not within the scope of the parties’ agreement, or to which the parties are unable to agree. The Court reserves any remaining matters for later determination and without prejudice to any future motions that may be filed by the parties as to these remaining matters. Except as herein granted, the motion of defendant for a protective order is otherwise denied.”

Also on March 28, 2025, plaintiff filed a motion to compel further responses to requests for production of documents, set four, and for production of the documents. On August 8, 2025, plaintiff’s motion was granted in part and denied in part.

On August 19, 2025, plaintiff filed an ex parte application for order extending time to hear discovery motion concerning discovery and to complete related discovery. By way of that ex parte application, plaintiff raised the following issues: (1) plaintiff’s fourth revised notice of deposition of defendant’s PMQ, and request for production of documents, and (2) plaintiff’s requests for production of documents Nos. 76 and 77. As relevant here, the ex parte was not a motion for anything other than permission to extend time to hear discovery motions and complete related discovery. In the ex parte application, plaintiff states that certain documents “will be filed with Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel PMQ Deposition of Defendant if this Ex Parte Application is granted.” (Ex Parte Application, p. 5, ll. 19-22.) On August 21, 2025, the ex parte application was granted, and hearing dates were scheduled for September 19, 2025.

On August 26, 2025, pursuant to the court granting the ex parte application on August 21, 2025, plaintiff filed his motion to compel production of documents responsive to requests Nos. 76 and 77. Prior to the hearing on the motion to compel production of documents responsive to requests Nos. 76 and 77, defendant produced the documents at issue, and as a result, the court, on September 19, 2025, solely issued monetary sanctions in favor of plaintiff and against defendant.

On September 23, 2025, plaintiff filed an ex parte application for order setting hearing date for motion to compel re production of documents responsive to fifth revised PMQ deposition notice. On September 29, 2025, the court granted plaintiff’s ex parte application for order setting hearing date for motion to compel production of documents responsive to fifth revised PMQ deposition notice.

On September 8, 2025, Pacifica filed its motion to continue trial.

On September 24, 2025, Pacifica filed its motion to bifurcate trial. The motion is unopposed.

On September 30, 2025, plaintiff filed his motion to compel production of PMQ documents and for monetary sanctions.

On October 2, 2025, Pacifica filed its opposition to the motion and for monetary sanctions for opposing the motion.

On October 2, 2025, Pacifica filed its motion for protective order. Plaintiff did not file opposition or any other response to the motion.

Analysis:

            Motion to Continue Trial

On September 8, 2025, Pacifica filed its motion to continue the trial confirmation conference and related deadlines. The hearing date set for that motion was January 30, 2026, which was the same date as the scheduled trial confirmation conference.

On September 24, 2025, Pacifica filed an ex parte application to continue the trial confirmation conference and related deadlines or, in the alternative, to advance the hearing date for the motion to continue. On September 29, 2025, the court denied Pacifica’s ex parte application.

Pacifica sought a writ of mandate to direct this court to vacate its September 29, 2025 order denying the ex parte. The appellate court advised this court to reconsider the order and enter a new order setting a date for trial that provides the parties sufficient time to complete discovery and exercise their rights to move for summary judgment.

On January 5, 2026, this court vacated the ex parte order of September 29, 2025, and set a date certain trial to commence at 9:00 a.m. on September 16, 2026, with all pretrial discovery and motion deadlines to be calculated from the revised trial date as though it were the original.

As trial has already been continued, the motion is moot and will be taken off calendar.

            Motion to Bifurcate

Pacifica moves, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 598 and 3295, subdivision (d), to bifurcate the punitive damages phase of trial from the liability phase of trial.

“The court may, when the convenience of witnesses, the ends of justice, or the economy and efficiency of handling the litigation would be promoted thereby, on motion of a party, after notice and hearing, make an order, no later than the close of pretrial conference in cases in which such pretrial conference is to be held, or, in other cases, no later than 30 days before the trial date, that the trial of any issue or any part thereof shall precede the trial of any other issue or any part thereof in the case, except for special defenses which may be tried first pursuant to Sections 597 and 597.5. The court, on its own motion, may make such an order at any time. Where trial of the issue of liability as to all causes of action precedes the trial of other issues or parts thereof, and the decision of the court, or the verdict of the jury upon such issue so tried is in favor of any party on whom liability is sought to be imposed, judgment in favor of such party shall thereupon be entered and no trial of other issues in the action as against such party shall be had unless such judgment shall be reversed upon appeal or otherwise set aside or vacated.

“If the decision of the court, or the verdict of the jury upon the issue of liability so tried shall be against any party on whom liability is sought to be imposed, or if the decision of the court or the verdict of the jury upon any other issue or part thereof so tried does not result in a judgment being entered pursuant to this chapter, then the trial of the other issues or parts thereof shall thereafter be had at such time, and if a jury trial, before the same or another jury, as ordered by the court either upon its own motion or upon the motion of any party, and judgment shall be entered in the same manner and with the same effect as if all the issues in the case had been tried at one time.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 598.)

“The court shall, on application of any defendant, preclude the admission of evidence of that defendant’s profits or financial condition until after the trier of fact returns a verdict for plaintiff awarding actual damages and finds that a defendant is guilty of malice, oppression, or fraud in accordance with Section 3294. Evidence of profit and financial condition shall be admissible only as to the defendant or defendants found to be liable to the plaintiff and to be guilty of malice, oppression, or fraud. Evidence of profit and financial condition shall be presented to the same trier of fact that found for the plaintiff and found one or more defendants guilty of malice, oppression, or fraud.” (Civ. Code, § 3295, subd. (d).)

“While the statute refers only to evidence of the defendant’s financial condition, in practice bifurcation under this section means that all evidence relating to the amount of punitive damages is to be offered in the second phase, while the determination whether the plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages (i.e., whether the defendant is guilty of malice, fraud or oppression) is decided in the first phase along with compensatory damages. [Citations.]” (Holdgrafer v. Unocal Corp. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 907, 919.)

“As an evidentiary restriction, section 3295(d) requires a court, upon application of any defendant, to bifurcate a trial so that the trier of fact is not presented with evidence of the defendant’s wealth and profits until after the issues of liability, compensatory damages, and malice, oppression, or fraud have been resolved against the defendant. Bifurcation minimizes potential prejudice by preventing jurors from learning of a defendant’s “ ‘deep pockets’ ” before they determine these threshold issues.” (Torres v. Automobile Club of So. California (1997) 15 Cal.4th 771, 777–778.)

The motion to bifurcate the punitive damages phase from the liability phase of trial will be granted.

            Motion to Compel Production of PMQ Documents re Fifth Revised Notice of Deposition of Defendant’s PMQ

This motion was filed on September 30, 2025, and was fully briefed by both parties. However, as the result of the temporary stay imposed by the appellate court, the hearing was taken off calendar. By way of plaintiff’s ex parte application, it was placed back on calendar.

Following multiple discussions, via telephone and emails, between counsel for plaintiff and Pacifica regarding the scope and an acceptable date, on August 26, 2025, plaintiff served a fifth revised deposition for Pacifica’s PMQ with requests for production of documents, scheduling a deposition date of September 17, 2025 ( The “depo notice”).

The depo notice specifies 14 topics for the deposition. Although Pacifica’s counsel represents that, “Plaintiff unilaterally selected PMQ examination topic No. 10, concerning Dr. Oksana Yakushko” (Medina Decl., ¶ 8), there has been no evidence submitted that shows the deposition was so limited. Contradicting the claim that the deposition was limited to topic No. 10 is that at the very end of the portion of the deposition transcript submitted by Pacifica, plaintiff’s counsel turns to the depo notice and begins with topic No. 1. (Id. at Exh. 10, p. 31, ll. 17-22.) As the complete deposition transcript was not provided to the court, it is unclear whether plaintiff went through each topic. Pacifica points to no evidence that suggests the deposition was limited to topic No. 10. Additionally, the objections to the depo notice, served by Pacifica on plaintiff, included objections for each of the topic categories, indicating that there was no agreement to limit the topics. If such an agreement, to limit the deposition to topic No. 10 existed, Pacifica has failed to provide any evidence of the agreement. Although the March 28, 2025 ruling limited PMQ depositions to one person and one topic, there was nothing precluding the parties from agreeing to a broader scope. Based on what the court has before it, it appears that the parties at least implicitly stipulated that Pacifica would produce a PMQ for all 14 topics.

The topics included in the depo notice are, as numbered by plaintiff: (1) “The reason or justification for YOUR decision to “ ‘suspend’ “ Plaintiff in July 2022, including identification of every PERSON involved in that decision and their role in that decision.” (2) The reason or justification for YOUR decision to terminate Plaintiff in July 2023, including identification of every PERSON involved in that decision and their role in that decision.” (10) “All grievances or complaints submitted to YOU by or on behalf of Dr. Oksana Yakushko on or after January 1, 2020 CONCERNING any alleged acts or omissions that would constitute a FEHA violation, including but not limited to grievances, complaints, or legal claims, and any reports, investigations, responses, and settlement agreements CONCERNING such grievances, complaints, or legal claims.” (24) “YOUR documents retention policy.” (26) “Any insurance policies to which YOU are a party and (a) which you have or may rely upon in defense of this civil action or (b) which you have tendered or may tender the defense of this civil action, including any COMMUNICATION with the insurer.” (27) “The alleged bas[is] for each of Defendant’s affirmative defenses, including all facts that allegedly support those defenses.” (28) “The alleged bas[is] for each denial asserted in Defendant’s Answer to Plaintiff’s Verified First Amended Complaint, including all facts that allegedly support those denials.” (29) “Defendant’s responses to Plaintiff’s Form Interrogatories – Employment Law.” (32) “All COMMUNICATION CONCERNING Peter Dunlap’s June 20, 2022 letter to the Faculty Affairs Committee (“FAC”) regarding a grievance/request for mediation, including but not limited to COMMUNICATION between the Peter Dunlap and Defendant CONCERNING the letter, DOCUMENTS CONCERNING the letter, and the response of Defendant to the letter including any steps taken by Defendant to investigate and/or address the grievances and issues identified by Peter Dunlap in the letter.” (33) “All COMMUNICATION CONCERNING Peter Dunlap’s June 29, 2022 request that the FAC committee mediate between himself and the clinical faculty, including but not limited to COMMUNICATION between the Peter Dunlap and Defendant CONCERNING the request, DOCUMENTS CONCERNING the request, and the response of Defendant to the request including any steps taken by Defendant to investigate and/or address the grievances and issues identified by Peter Dunlap in the request.” (34) “All COMMUNICATION CONCERNING any alleged ethical impropriety identified by FAC in relation to Peter Dunlap’s treatment by the faculty in 2022, including but not limited to COMMUNICATION between the Peter Dunlap and Defendant CONCERNING the alleged ethical impropriety, DOCUMENTS CONCERNING the alleged ethical impropriety, and the response of Defendant to the identification of any alleged ethical impropriety including any steps taken by Defendant to investigate and/or address any ethical impropriety allegedly identified by FAC.” (35) “All COMMUNICATION CONCERNING FAC’s proposal that Peter Dunlap file his grievance directly with the Provost, including but not limited COMMUNICATION between the Peter Dunlap and Defendant CONCERNING FAC’s alleged proposal, DOCUMENTS CONCERNING the alleged proposal, and the response of Defendant to the alleged proposal including any steps taken by Defendant to investigate and/or address FAC’s alleged proposal.” (37) “YOUR Employee and Faculty Handbooks as of June 2022 as they pertain to the filing or consideration of grievances.” and (38) “YOUR Employee and Faculty Handbooks as of July 2022 as they pertain to handling of faculty discipline, suspension, or termination.”

Standard on Motion to Compel Production of Documents:

“A trial court must be mindful of the Legislature’s preference for discovery over trial by surprise, must construe the facts before it liberally in favor of discovery, may not use its discretion to extend the limits on discovery beyond those authorized by the Legislature, and should prefer partial to outright denials of discovery.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 540.)

“Any party may obtain discovery within the scope delimited by Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 2017.010), and subject to the restrictions set forth in Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 2019.010), by taking in California the oral deposition of any person, including any party to the action. The person deposed may be a natural person, an organization such as a public or private corporation, a partnership, an association, or a governmental agency.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.010.)

“If a deponent fails to answer any question or to produce any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing under the deponent’s control that is specified in the deposition notice or a deposition subpoena, the party seeking discovery may move the court for an order compelling that answer or production.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.480, subd. (a).)

A motion to compel further responses to a demand for production of documents must “set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1); Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.) “[U]nless there is a legitimate privilege issue or claim of attorney work product, [the] burden [of showing good cause for the request] is met simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance.” (TBG Ins. Services Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 448; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.)

Plaintiff seeks production of documents (referred to in groups I – IV) responsive to: (1) requests Nos. 3-6 and 63-71 (Group I), (2) requests Nos. 61 and 62 (Group II), (3) requests Nos. 12, 19, 26, 33, 40, 47, and 54 (Group III), and (4) requests Nos. 7-11 (Group IV).

Recent Agreements Between the Parties:

On September 25, 2025, Pacifica informed plaintiff: “Defendant agrees to produce responsive documents for the following RFPs: 3, 4, 5, 6, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71. Defendant stands by its objections and will not produce any privileged documents including settlement agreements, or similar privileged and confidential documents, documents protected by the attorney client privilege, or attorney work product doctrine, or documents protected under the Evidence Code.” (Medina Decl., ¶  13 & Exh. 14.) Pacifica also stated that it was willing to produce documents responsive to requests Nos. 12, 19, 26, 33, 40, 47, and 54 if plaintiff was agreeable to narrowing their scope to specific subject matters and bear the costs for ESI production. (Ibid.) As for requests Nos. 61 and 62, Pacifica did not request a narrowing of the scope of the request, but did request that plaintiff bear the costs of production. (Ibid.)

On September 29, 2025, plaintiff responded to Pacifica, expressing some concerns over the date for production, anticipated withholding of documents, and an agreement to not seek production of documents to requests Nos. 26, 40, 47, and 54. (Medina Decl., ¶ 14 & Exh. 14.) Plaintiff also requested that if Pacifica contends that the production of the remaining requests would be too onerous or costly in scope, that Pacifica provide a basis for the claim and a good faith estimate of the cost of producing the documents. (Ibid.)

On September 30, 2025, Pacifica responded to plaintiff and stated the following:

“RFPs 3, 4, 5, 6, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72

We are agreeable to produce documents discussed in my email dated September 25, 2025 by October 31, 2025. To be clear, this means Defendant stands by its objections and will not produce any privileged documents or similar privileged and highly confidential documents, documents protected by the attorney client privilege, or attorney work product doctrine, or documents protected under the Evidence Code. We will provide a privilege log by 10/31/2025. Please confirm this is acceptable.

“RFPs 61 and 62

We request cost shifting on the basis that to obtain the information requested (reasons for not renewing employment agreements of Yakushko and Sandoval) would require Defendant obtain the mailboxes of several individuals/custodians you previously identified (Rojcewicz, Cambray, Mesa, Richards, Byers, Plaintiff, General Counsel between 1/1/2020 – present, Director of Human resources between 1/1/2020 – present, Yakushko and Sandoval). As I have represented to you and the Court before, Pacifica spent nearly $40,000 on an outside vendor (Cimplifi) to go through one mailbox (Plaintiff’s) for a specific period. This request, per your prior correspondence, would require Pacifica to pull, store, and review at the very least, ten (10) mailboxes to obtain the information requested. Please let us know if you are agreeable to bear the costs for this ESI production.

In the alternative, our proposal would be to limit this search to only Cambray’s mailbox as he was Yakushko and Sandoval’s supervisor and the decision maker. Sandoval resigned from her position, so for that reason I would propose searching in Cambray’s mailbox for the last couple months of her employment (July 1, 2021 – August 31, 2021). Dr. Yakushko’s employment contract was not renewed. I would propose searching Cambray’s mailbox during the last couple months of her employment (June 1, 2022 – July 31, 2022). Search terms would be for each respective individual: Yakushko, Oksana (or Jennifer, Sandoval), employment contract, employment agreement, contract, agreement, renew, renewal. If Plaintiff agrees to this limitation, we still expect Plaintiff to agree to pay the costs of this ESI search as we anticipate the costs of just pulling and storing Cambray’s mailbox alone will be costly.

“RFPs 12, 19, 26, 33, 40, 47, 54

You have agreed to not pursue RFPs 26, 40, 47, and 54. That leaves RFPs 12, 19, and 33. You have agreed to narrow the scope of these three RFPs to only the mailboxes of Rojcewicz and Cambray during the time period of June 2022 and July 2022. These RFPs request any “STATEMENT” about Plaintiff. With the 53 search terms or phrases you previously provided, we still believe this an onerous task. That said, we are working on extracting the mailboxes and will provide you an estimate of the costs as soon as we receive it. Once we know the size of these mailboxes we will be able to provide an estimate on time for production of these documents.” (Medina Decl., ¶ 15 & Exh. 14.)

RFP Nos. 3-6 and 63-71

Pacifica has agreed to produce all responsive documents responsive to RFP Nos. 3-6 and 63-71, “except as to those that are privileged, highly confidential documents, documents protected by the attorney client privilege, or attorney work product doctrine, or documents protected under the Evidence Code” by October 31, 2025. (Opp., p. 7, ll. 15-50.) Pacifica argues that the offer of production renders the motion as to those requests moot. However, it is somewhat unclear what Pacifica means by “highly confidential” and “protected under the Evidence Code,” because those terms could be interpreted in different ways by the parties.

The court has reviewed all of the RFPs and finds that plaintiff did not sufficiently narrow the requests as he was ordered to do on March 28, 2025. For example, request No. 3 seeks: “ All DOCUMENTS CONCERNING any grievances or complaints submitted to YOU by or on behalf of Dr. Oksana Yakushko on or after January 1, 2020 CONCERNING any alleged acts or omissions that would constitute a FEHA violation, including but not limited to grievances, complaints, or legal claims, and any STATEMENTS, reports, reviews, investigations, responses, evaluations, or settlement agreements CONCERNING such grievances, complaints, or legal claims.” The RFP that was addressed on March 28, 2025, stated essentially the same thing: “All DOCUMENTS CONCERNING any grievances or complaints submitted to YOU by or on behalf of Dr. Oksana Yakushko including but not limited to grievances, complaints, or legal claims, and any reports, investigations, characterizations, responses, discussions, reactions, evaluations, or settlement agreements CONCERNING such grievances, complaints, or legal claims.”

Because of plaintiff’s refusal to meaningfully and reasonably narrow the scope of the requests, the court would have been inclined to simply deny the motion to compel. However, as Pacifica has agreed to the production, the court will order that the document exchange take place as agreed, but with the following clarification:

Pacifica shall serve verified code-compliant responses, as modified by the parties’ agreements, without objection except as to privilege, to each of the requests. For any document that is withheld based on a claim of privilege, Pacifica shall serve a privilege log containing sufficient information for plaintiff to evaluate the claim of privilege. Pacifica is not ordered to produce any settlement agreements with any third-party, as such documents are entitled to protection as being confidential. This constitutional right of privacy to third-party information has previously been explained to plaintiff, in detail, by way of the court’s March 28, 2025, order. Plaintiff has provided no persuasive reason why his request for production of such information outweighs the third-party rights to privacy. For any other documents, should they contain social security numbers, wage information, medical information, or settlement discussions for other claims, that information shall be redacted by Pacifica prior to production. In addition, absent further court order, any documents produced in response to the RFPs shall be subject to the stipulated protective order, that was approved by the court on May 20, 2024, and not used or disclosed for any purpose other than the present action.

The court notes that both parties appear to agree that RFP Nos. 67 and 68 are no longer an issue because Pacifica has provided all responsive documents.

RFP Nos. 12, 19, 33, 61, and 62

Pursuant to meet and confer discussions, Pacifica has also agreed to produce all documents responsive to RFP Nos. 61 and 62, as limited by the parties. By way of the discussions, the parties agreed that RFP Nos. 61 and 62 would be limited to a “search [of] Dr. Cambray’s mailbox. The time period for Dr. Sandoval should

be June - August 2021 (3 months). The time period for Dr. Yakushko should be June – July 2022 (2 months).” (Medina Decl., Exh. 14.) “Search terms would be for each respective individual: Yakushko, Oksana (or Jennifer, Sandoval), employment contract, employment agreement, contract, agreement, renew, renewal.” (Ibid.)

In discussing RFP Nos. 12, 19, and 33, the parties remaining concerns are the expense of the production as well as the search terms to use in extracting the documents. Plaintiff has suggested   and using the following search terms: “contract, review, evaluation, investigation, disciplinary, grievance, complaint, suspension, termination, claim, report, review, investigation, response, evaluation, harassment, bully, abuse, abusive, disrespect, disrespectfulness, unprofessional, unprofessionalism, discrimination, discriminate, mistreatment, retaliation, retaliate, female, [and] gender.” (Medina Decl., Exh. 14.) Additionally: “Plaintiff will limit the requests to the email mailboxes of Peter Rojcewicz and Joseph Cambray during the time period June and July 2022.” (Ibid.) The court finds the proposed search terms and limitations reasonable. Pacifica will be ordered to produce the documents, as limited by the agreements, no later than October 31, 2025.

The only remaining issue with respect to RFP’s Nos. 12, 19, 33, 61, and 62 is Pacifica’s request that the court shift the cost of the production to plaintiff pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.480.

“(a) If a deponent fails to answer any question or to produce any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing under the deponent’s control that is specified in the deposition notice or a deposition subpoena, the party seeking discovery may move the court for an order compelling that answer or production. . . .

“(d) In a motion under subdivision (a) relating to the production of electronically stored information, the deponent objecting to or opposing the production, inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of electronically stored information on the basis that the information is from a source that is not reasonably accessible because of the undue burden or expense shall bear the burden of demonstrating that the information is from a source that is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or expense.

“(e) If the deponent from whom discovery of electronically stored information is sought establishes that the information is from a source that is not reasonably accessible because of the undue burden or expense, the court may nonetheless order discovery if the deposing party shows good cause, subject to any limitations imposed under subdivision (g).

“(f) If the court finds good cause for the production of electronically stored information from a source that is not reasonably accessible, the court may set conditions for the discovery of the electronically stored information, including allocation of the expense of discovery.

“(g) The court shall limit the frequency or extent of discovery of electronically stored information, even from a source that is reasonably accessible, if the court determines that any of the following conditions exists:

“(1) It is possible to obtain the information from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.

“(2) The discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative.

“(3) The party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information sought.

“(4) The likely burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs the likely benefit, taking into account the amount in controversy, the resources of the parties, the importance of the issues in the litigation, and the importance of the requested discovery in resolving the issues.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.480, subds. (a)(d)-(g).)

“If a deponent objects to the production of electronically stored information on the grounds that it is from a source that is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or expense and that the deponent will not search the source in the absence of an agreement with the deposing party or court order, the deponent shall identify in its objection the types or categories of sources of electronically stored information that it asserts are not reasonably accessible. By objecting and identifying information of a type or category of source or sources that are not reasonably accessible, the deponent preserves any objections it may have relating to that electronically stored information.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.460, subd. (d).)

By way of Pacifica’s objections to the depo notice, Pacifica did not object that the production, for any of the requests, is from a source that is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or expense. For example, the objection to RFP No. 12 states:

“Defendant objects on the grounds that this request is also overbroad in time and scope. Defendant further objects to the discovery request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous, and uncertain. Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks information that is neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and therefore exceeds the scope of permissible discovery. Defendant objects to this request to the extent it seeks information and/or documents protected by the attorney-client privilege or attorney work product doctrine. Defendant further objects to this request as it seeks information and/or documents containing confidential information, the disclosure of which may violate third-party constitutional rights of privacy. Plaintiff has not shown a particularized need for the confidential information sought. Finally, Defendant objects on the grounds this request is duplicative of Plaintiff’s Request for Production, Nos. 14 and 87.” (Medina Decl., Exh. 9.)

Because Pacifica failed to object that the information sought by plaintiff was not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or expense, Pacifica has waived that objection with respect to the RFPs. As such, the court will decline to shift the cost of production to plaintiff.

RFP Nos. 7-11

RFP Nos. 7-11 are the same as they were in the Second Revised Deposition Notice and plaintiff presents the identical argument that he did relative to that motion to compel as well as Pacifica’s motion for protective order.

The RFPs continue to remain overbroad in scope and implicate substantial privacy rights. The reasoning and relevant law for partially granting Pacifica’s motion for protective order, and denying plaintiff’s motion to compel, was fully set forth in the court’s March 28, 2025, order. Because plaintiff refused to narrow the scope of the RFPs, as he was ordered to do, the motion will be denied with respect to RFP Nos. 7-11.

            Motion for Protective Order

Pacifica’s motion for protective order concerns the same fifth revised notice of taking deposition of Pacifica’s PMQ as the motion to compel concerns.

Pacifica requests that the court sustain its objections to RFP Nos. 3-12, 19, 33, 61-66, and 69-71 so that the requested documents need not be produced, inspected, copied, tested, or sampled. Pacifica also requests that, to the extent that the court orders production of documents responsive to any of the RFPs, plaintiff be ordered to pay the cost of the storage, review, and production of all electronically stored information requested by RFP Nos. 3-12, 19, 33, 61-66, and 69-71.

“[T]he burden is on the party seeking the protective order to show good cause for whatever order is sought.” (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.)

All of the RFPs that the motion for protective order includes, were included in plaintiff’s motion to compel.

The court has thoroughly reviewed the motion for protective order, the arguments set forth therein, and the relief sought, including the continued request for cost shifting. Pacifica does not present any authority or argument that alters the ruling on the motion to compel and that ruling addresses all issues raised by the motion for protective order.

As any relief that would be ordered is encompassed by the ruling on plaintiff’s motion to compel, the motion for protective order is denied at this time.

            Monetary Sanctions

Each side has requested that monetary sanctions be imposed against the other.

“The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel an answer or production, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.480, subd. (j).)

“The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion for a protective order, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.420, subd. (h).)

Here, the court does not find either party blameless for the present dispute, or the ongoing discovery disputes that permeate this case. Plaintiff has continued to propound excessive and overbroad requests that clearly seek documents protected by third-party privacy rights. On the other hand, Pacifica is often unresponsive and only tends to meet and confer in good faith, to narrow the scope of discovery, after plaintiff files motions to compel.

The court considered imposing monetary sanctions on both parties, and their attorneys, for their continued abuse of the discovery process and blatant disregard of clear discovery rules that have been repeatedly explained by this court. However, this time, the court will find that the imposition of sanctions would be unjust under the present circumstances.

Counsel is again reminded:

“Civil discovery is intended to operate with a minimum of judicial intervention. “ ‘[I]t is a ‘ “central precept” ’ of the Civil Discovery Act . . . that discovery ‘ “be essentially self-executing[.]” ’ ” [Citations.]” (Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390.)