Tentative Ruling: Tyler Twisselman, et al. v. FCA US LLC
Case Number
24CV00336
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Mon, 04/27/2026 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs
Tentative Ruling
Tyler Twisselman, et al. v. FCA US LLC
Case No. 24CV00336
Hearing Date: April 27, 2026
HEARING: Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs
ATTORNEYS: For Plaintiffs Tyler Twisselman and Lindsy Twisselman: Michael H. Rosenstein, Sepehr Daghighian, Mitchel A. Brim, California Consumer Attorneys, P.C.
For Defendant FCA US LLC: Erin E. Hanson, Behrouz S. Arani, Alexis C. Santana, Clark Hill LLP
TENTATIVE RULING:
The motion of plaintiffs Tyler Twisselman and Lindsy Twisselman for attorney fees and costs is granted in the amount of $35,811.62, inclusive of attorney fees and costs. This amount shall be paid to counsel for plaintiffs on or before May 27, 2026. The motion is denied in all other respects.
Background:
On January 23, 2024, plaintiffs Tyler Twisselman and Lindsy Twisselman initiated this action by filing a complaint against defendant FCA US LLC setting forth three causes of action for (1) violation of Song-Beverly Act – breach of express warranty, (2) violation of Song-Beverly Act – breach of implied warranty, and (3) violation of Song-Beverly Act, Civil Code section 1793.2. As alleged in the complaint, on July 30, 2021, plaintiffs purchased a 2021 Jeep Grand Cherokee L (Vehicle) with express warranties provided by defendant. (Compl., ¶ 8.) The Vehicle was delivered with defects and nonconformities to the warranties including exterior and body component defects, electrical defects, and recalls. (Compl., ¶ 8.) Plaintiffs seek recovery of damages, rescission, civil penalties, attorney fees and costs, and other relief. (Compl., p. 7, ll. 20-27.)
On February 23, 2024, defendant filed an answer to the complaint generally denying the allegations therein and setting forth 26 affirmative defenses.
On March 20, 2025, the court entered a stipulated order vacating a settlement conference based on the recitals that the parties had reached settlement after a meditation.
On June 13, 2025, plaintiffs filed a notice of conditional settlement with an anticipated dismissal date of October 11, 2025.
On November 24, 2025, plaintiffs filed this motion for attorney fees and costs. The motion argues that the parties’ settlement permits plaintiffs to seek recovery of reasonable attorney fees and costs. Plaintiffs seek recovery of attorney fees in
the amount of $52,211.25, inclusive of a multiplier of “.5” in addition to the basic lodestar amount, and costs in the amount of $1,004.12, for a total of $53,215.37. Defendant opposes the motion arguing that the requested fees are unreasonable.
Analysis:
“If the buyer prevails in an action [for violation of the Song-Beverly Act warranty requirements], the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code, § 1794.) The parties do not dispute that plaintiffs are the prevailing parties and entitled to the recovery of attorney fees and costs. (See Opp., p. 2, ll. 11-12 [“Defendant does not contend that Plaintiff is not entitled to their legal fees ….”].) Defendant argues that plaintiffs’ counsel improperly billed on this case, billed for work that was not reasonable or necessary, or engaged in clerical tasks while still charging exorbitant rates for the work performed. Defendant argues that the requested fees should be reduced because this matter was not complex.
“At the outset, it is important to note that we are not concerned in this case with a customary statutory or contractual provision which merely provides for ‘reasonable attorney fees.’ The statute we are dealing with takes a somewhat different approach. It requires the trial court to make an initial determination of the actual time expended; and then to ascertain whether under all the circumstances of the case the amount of actual time expended and the monetary charge being made for the time expended are reasonable. These circumstances may include, but are not limited to, factors such as the complexity of the case and procedural demands, the skill exhibited and the results achieved. If the time expended or the monetary charge being made for the time expended are not reasonable under all the circumstances, then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount. A prevailing buyer has the burden of ‘showing that the fees incurred were ‘allowable,’ were ‘reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation,’ and were ‘reasonable in amount.’ ” (Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104 (Nightingale).)
Under the first step under Nightingale, the court must evaluate the actual time and costs expended on this matter. Attorney Brim spent 25.7 hours and it is anticipated he will spend another 2.5 hours for a total of 28.2 hours, attorney Daghighian spent 16.5 hours, attorney Hamblin spent 10.4 hours, attorney Shippen-Murray spent .4 hours, attorney Ortiz spent 1.8 hours, and attorney Rosenstein spent 3 hours. (Daghighian Decl., ¶¶ 4-13, Ex. A.) The court has reviewed the contemporaneous time records submitted by plaintiffs and finds the time spent on this matter is allowable and reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation. The court also finds that the costs in the amount of $1,004.12 are reasonable and necessary. (Ibid.) The court has evaluated the arguments presented by defendant including that the tasks performed by partners should have been performed by associates and that the associate time was inefficient. (See Opp., p. 5, l. 8 – p. 8, l. 7.) The court does not agree that partners are precluded from drafting discovery motions or preparing related meet and confer correspondence. The court evaluated the time spent by the associates and finds this time reasonable and not unreasonably duplicative.
Attorney Daghighian has 19 years of experience and is proposing a rate of $625 per hour. (Daghighian Decl., ¶¶ 5, 7.) Attorney Rosenstein has 30 years of experience and is proposing a rate of $700 per hour. (Id., ¶ 8.) Attorney Shippen-Murray has significant complex litigation experience and is proposing a rate of $550 per hour. (Id., ¶ 9.) Attorney Hamblin has been actively representing plaintiffs in the lemon law area since 2012 and is proposing a rate of $550 per hour. (Id. at ¶ 10.) Attorney Brim has been practicing law since 2005 and is proposing a rate of $550 per hour. (Id. at ¶ 11.) Attorney Ortiz was admitted to practice law in 2006, has significant litigation experience, and is proposing a rate of $525 per hour. (Id. at ¶ 12.) The court finds that these rates proposed by plaintiffs are reasonable and consistent with the rates in the community for similar work. (Id., ¶¶ 5-12, Exs. B-C.)
As to plaintiffs’ lodestar argument, “[t]he lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court based on factors including, as relevant herein, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.) “The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services.” (Ibid.)
The total amount of attorney fees incurred by plaintiffs to litigate this case is $34,807.50. (Daghighian Decl., ¶ 13, Ex. A.) The total amount of costs incurred by plaintiffs to litigate this case is $1,004.12. (Ibid.) The court declines to award a positive or negative multiplier under the circumstances of this case. The court notes the contingency risks taken by plaintiffs’ counsel. However, the court notes that the matter settled before trial preparation or expert depositions, there was not significant motion practice, and the matter was not particularly complex. The court in its discretion finds that the lodestar fee without a positive or negative multiplier is fair and reasonable under the circumstances presented in this motion. For all these reasons, the court will grant plaintiffs’ motion for attorney fees in the amount of $34,807.50 and costs in the amount of $1,004.12, for a total award of $35,811.62.