Morgan v. HipCamp, Inc., et al.

Case Number

24CV00291

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 03/06/2026 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Responses to Requests for Production, Set 3

Tentative Ruling

Morgan v. HipCamp, Inc., et al.                                

Case No. 24CV00291

           

Hearing Date: March 6, 2026                                                

HEARING:              Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Responses to Requests for Production, Set 3

ATTORNEYS:        For Plaintiff LeeAnn Morgan: Self-Represented

                                    For Defendant HipCamp, Inc.: Richard W. Vanis, Jr., Matthew J. Eschenburg, Morki Vanis & Jones LLP

                       

TENTATIVE RULING:

Plaintiff LeeAnn Morgan’s motion to compel responses to requests for production, set 3, is denied. Plaintiff’s request for monetary sanctions is denied. The court award’s monetary sanctions in favor of defendant HipCamp, Inc., in the amount of $1,200, payable by plaintiff LeeAnn Morgan to counsel for HipCamp, Inc., on or before April 6, 2026.

Background:

On January 22, 2024, plaintiff LeeAnn Morgan (Morgan) filed her original complaint.

On August 23, 2024, Morgan filed her operative second amended complaint (SAC) against defendants HipCamp, Inc. (Hipcamp), Freedog Farms @ Cactus Flower Ranch, LLC (Freedog), and Sierra Falso (Falso) setting forth causes of action for: (1) general negligence – against all defendants; (2) premises liability – against all defendants; (3) fraud – against Freedog and Falso; and (4) breach of contract – against all defendants.

As alleged in the SAC, Hipcamp is a recreational camping business modeled after “AirBnb.com,” but for campsites rather than residential dwellings. (Compl., Attach. No. 1 at p. 1.) Freedog operates a campground in Gaviota, California, registered with Hipcamp. (Ibid.) Falso is an owner of Freedog. (Ibid.) On February 14, 2022, plaintiff was injured while camping at Freedog’s campsite after falling due to a defective step outside of a camping trailer. (Id. at p. 2.)

On December 20, 2024, the court sustained defendants’ demurrers to the SAC in part without leave to amend. The only remaining causes of action in the SAC are the first cause of action general negligence and second cause of action for premises liability. The prayer for punitive damages in the SAC was stricken.

On February 24, 2025, Morgan filed a request for dismissal with prejudice as to defendant Freedog and Falso. The remaining defendant is Hipcamp.

On September 12, 2025, Morgan served her third set of requests for production on Hipcamp (RFPs). (Morgan Decl., ¶ 2  & Ex. A.) On October 13, 2025, Morgan received Hipcamp’s responses to the RFPs. (Morgan Decl., ¶ 3.) On October 21, 2025, Hipcamp served documents in response to the RFPs. (Morgan Decl., ¶ 7.)

On October 28, 2025, Morgan filed a motion to compel responses from HipCamp to the RFPs. “The motion will be made on the grounds that defendant Hipcamp, Inc. has failed to serve timely and complete responses to the above-described Requests for Production of Documents.” (Motion, p. 2, ll. 1-3.) It appears that Morgan’s motion concerns the production of certain insurance policies. (See Morgan Decl., ¶¶ 7-8.)

On January 16, 2026, Morgan informed counsel for Hipcamp that she was withdrawing this motion. (Eschenburg Decl., Ex. B [“This is to notify you that I am withdrawing the above Motion to Compel, Hearing date March 6, 2026.”].)

On February 16, 2026, Morgan informed Hipcamp that she was “reversing herself” and moving forward with the motion. (Eschenburg Decl., ¶ 12.)

On February 17, 2026, Morgan filed a separate statement that primarily pertains to form interrogatories, general, No. 4.1. The separate statement states in part, “only one discovery response is in dispute at this time Form Interrogatory No. 4.1.” (Sep. Stat., p. 3, ll. 11-15.) Form interrogatory No. 4.1 was not discussed in Morgan’s original motion.

On February 19, 2026, Hipcamp filed an opposition to the motion and separate statement filed by Morgan.

Analysis:

A propounding party may move to compel further responses to requests for production if the responding party’s statement of compliance is incomplete or evasive or an objection is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (a).) A motion to compel further responses must be accompanied by a separate statement and supported by a meet and confer declaration. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(a); Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2016.040, subd. (a), 2031.310, subd. (b)(2).) A propounding party may move for an order compelling inspection if the responding party fails to permit inspection in accordance with the responding party’s statement of compliance. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.320, subd. (a).)

Hipcamp argues that Morgan’s motion is procedurally defective. The court agrees. Morgan’s motion sought to compel further responses to the RFPs but was not accompanied by a separate statement. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(a).) Morgan told counsel for Hipcamp that she was withdrawing this motion on January 16. (See Eschenburg Decl., Ex. B.) Rather than withdraw the motion as represented to Hipcamp’s counsel, Morgan then filed a separate statement on February 17, indicating that she was moving to compel further responses to form interrogatory No. 4.1. (See Sep. Stat., p. 3, ll. 11-15.) Counsel for Hipcamp was then forced to file an opposition to what amounted to a new motion pertaining to a different set of discovery, but still linked to the hearing on March 6. This February 17 filing as to form interrogatory No. 4.1 (filed as a separate statement) was untimely as to the hearing date of March 6 whether considered as part of the original motion or as a new motion. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b).) Morgan did not support her original motion or the February 17 filing styled as a separate statement with a declaration indicating the parties had met and conferred over the issues by telephone, videoconference, or in person. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2016.040, subd. (a), 2030.300, subd. (b)(1), 2031.310, subd. (b)(2).) The court will deny Morgan’s motion on these bases.

Hipcamp seeks an award of monetary sanctions for the time expended in filing its opposition after Morgan informed Hipcamp that the motion would be withdrawn. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (h).) Misuses of the discovery process include “[u]sing a discovery method in a manner that does not comply with its specified procedures” and “[e]mploying a discovery method in a manner or to an extent that causes unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010, subds. (b) & (c).) The court finds that Morgan’s conduct in (a) filing a motion to compel without a separate statement or a compliant meet and confer declaration, (b) then informing Hipcamp’s counsel she was withdrawing the motion, (c) then filing a late separate statement on February 17 that primarily concerns a different set of discovery not referenced in the original motion, (d) but nonetheless continuing to move forward as to the March 6 hearing date, constituted misuses of the discovery process under these circumstances. (See ibid.) These actions were not taken with substantial justification and caused unnecessary expense to Hipcamp. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (h).)

“[M]ere self-representation is not a ground for exceptionally lenient treatment. Except when a particular rule provides otherwise, the rules of civil procedure must apply equally to parties represented by counsel and those who forgo attorney representation. [Citation.] … A doctrine generally requiring or permitting exceptional treatment of parties who represent themselves would lead to a quagmire in the trial courts, and would be unfair to the other parties to litigation.” (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985.)

Hipcamp was required to spend unnecessary resources due to Morgan’s misuse of the discovery process and unjustified conduct as discussed above. (See Eschenburg Decl., ¶ 13.) The court will award monetary sanctions to Hipcamp equating to four attorney hours at $300 per hour, for a total of $1,200. (See ibid.) This amount is based on the reasonable attorney time expended by Hipcamp in opposing this motion, the circumstances before the court, and the court’s experience with discovery matters.