Tentative Ruling: Maria Teresa Alcantara, CPA vs Ensign Services Inc et al
Case Number
23CV05084
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Mon, 03/16/2026 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings
1) Demurrer to Second Amended Complaint; 2) Motion: Strike to Second Amended Complaint
Tentative Ruling
Maria Teresa Alcantara v. Ensign Services, Inc., et al.
Case No. 23CV05084
Hearing Date: March 16, 2026
HEARING: (1) Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint
(2) Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint
ATTORNEYS: For Plaintiff Maria Teresa Alcantara: David S. Secrest, Law Offices of David S. Secrest, P.C.
For Defendants Powers Park Healthcare, Inc. dba Channel Islands Post-Acute, Ensign Services, Inc., and The Ensign Group, Inc.: Michael J. O’Connor, Jr., Glen A. Williams, Atkinson, Andelson, Loya, Ruud & Romo
TENTATIVE RULING:
(1) For the reasons stated herein, the demurrer of defendants to plaintiff’s second amended complaint is overruled.
(2) For the reasons stated herein, the motion of defendants to strike plaintiff’s second amended complaint is denied.
(3) On or before March 30, 2026, defendants shall file their answer to plaintiff’s second amended complaint.
Background:
On November 17, 2023, plaintiff Maria Teresa Alcantara filed a complaint against defendants Ensign Services, Inc. (Ensign), Channel Islands Post Acute, and Powers Park Healthcare Inc., alleging ten causes of action: (1) discrimination in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act or “FEHA” (disability, gender, race, and age); (2) harassment in violation of FEHA (hostile work environment); (3) retaliation in violation of FEHA; (4) violation of rights under the California Family Rights Act or “CFRA”; (5) failure to accommodate disability; (6) failure to engage in good faith, interactive exchange re accommodation of disability; (7) failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in violation of FEHA; (8) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; (9) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (10) declaratory judgment.
On July 10, 2024, Powers Park Healthcare, Inc. (Powers Park) filed an answer to the complaint in which Powers Park generally denies the allegations, asserts forty-five affirmative defenses, and asserts that it was erroneously named as two separate entities (Powers Park Healthcare, Inc., and Channel Islands Post-Acute).
On April 24, 2025, plaintiff filed an amendment to the complaint, substituting the Ensign Group, Inc. (Ensign Group) for the fictitious name of Doe 1.
On May 5, the court issued a minute order granting plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a first amended complaint, which was opposed by Powers Park.
On May 7, plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (FAC) against Ensign Services, Inc. (Ensign Services), Powers Park, and Channel Islands Post Acute (CIPA). The FAC alleges the same first through seventh causes of action described above; adds an eighth causes of action for retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5; alleges the causes of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy and intentional infliction of emotional distress as, respectively, the ninth and tenth causes of action; and omits the cause of action for declaratory judgment.
On October 6, the court issued a minute order sustaining the demurrer of Powers Park dba CIPA, Ensign Services, and Ensign Group, to the second, third, and eighth causes of action alleged in the FAC; denying as moot, a motion by those defendants to strike portions of the FAC; and granting plaintiff leave to amend. Plaintiff opposed that demurrer and motion to strike.
On October 24, plaintiff filed a second amended complaint against Ensign Services, CIPA, and Powers Park (collectively, Defendants), alleging the same first through fourth causes of action described above; alleging the cause of action for violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 as the fifth cause of action; alleging the causes of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy and intentional infliction of emotional distress as, respectively, the sixth and seventh causes of action; and omitting the causes of action for declaratory judgment, failure to accommodate disability, failure to engage in good faith interactive exchange re accommodation of disability, and failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in violation of FEHA. As alleged in the SAC:
Defendants own and operate 300 skilled nursing facilities, including CIPU which is located in Santa Barbara, California. (SAC, ¶ 14.) Plaintiff is a female over the age of 40 who was jointly employed by Defendants in various capacities, including as a Director of Nursing, from January 2, 2020, until December 31, 2021. (SAC, ¶¶ 2 & 4.)
While assigned to CIPA administrator Najib Yamak (Yamak), who was plaintiff’s manager and the highest-ranking local official within Defendants’ corporate structure, and until October of 2021, Yamak instructed and pressured plaintiff to submit false records or claims to Medicare by adding diagnoses to resident’s clinical records so as to increase the facility’s per-diem rate and inflate Medicare reimbursement. (SAC, ¶¶ 16-18, 20 & 23.) These added diagnoses were not based on documented clinical findings, physician orders, or specialist consults, and in many instances lacked any legitimate clinical basis or physician confirmation. (SAC, ¶ 19.) Plaintiff objected to, questioned, and refused to participate in this practice, including by informing Yamak that adding unsupported diagnoses was unlawful and violated Medicare rules. (SAC, ¶ 21.)
Ryan Goldbart (Goldbart) is an administrator at Victoria Care Center, Defendants’ skilled nursing facility in Ventura, California, who acted as the coordinator among Defendants’ various administrators. (SAC, ¶ 24.) In July of 2021, following a visit to CIPU by Goldbart, Yamak approached plaintiff to discuss a sensitive matter, and informed plaintiff during a private conversation, that he and Goldbart had discussed the possibility of inflating the medical condition of patients treated at skilled nursing facilities. (SAC, ¶¶ 23 & 25.) Yamak informed plaintiff that Goldbart had engaged in this activity at Victoria Care Center; that it had resulted in higher levels of reimbursement and income to that facility which, in turn, would lead to higher financial incentives for the administrator and the director of nursing; and suggested that Yamak and plaintiff agree to pursue this course of action. (SAC, ¶ 26.) In response, plaintiff objected and stated to Yamak that she would oppose this course of action knowing it was illegal, and would amount to fraud. (SAC, ¶ 27.)
Within the next couple of weeks, Yamak and plaintiff had another conversation in which Yamak revealed that Goldbart and the director of nursing at the Victoria Care Center were being subjected to an audit resulting from the fraudulent activities described above. (SAC, ¶ 28.) Sometime thereafter, Goldbart and Juvie Lopez, the Director of Nursing at Victoria Care Center, were terminated for engaging in that activity. (SAC, ¶ 29.) Yamak is currently the Administrator at another of Defendants’ skilled nursing facilities in Oxnard, California. (Ibid.)
In July of 2021, plaintiff was experiencing an exacerbation of hyperthyroidism, a pre-existing medical condition and disability which was causing plaintiff to suffer headaches and vision problems that required plaintiff to wear sunglasses indoors at work, and other symptoms that made performing plaintiff’s job duties more difficult. (SAC, ¶ 34.) Plaintiff received medical treatment for this condition from Dr. Scott Sanders, the Medical Director at CIPU. (Ibid.) Yamak and Defendants were aware of plaintiff’s medical condition and the need to accommodate her in the performance of her duties by providing time away from work for medical treatment, and allowing her to wear sunglasses inside at work. (Ibid.)
In October of 2021, plaintiff sought permission to take a leave of absence necessitated by the need to take care of her mother who was suffering from a serious medical condition following the sudden death of plaintiff’s father. (SAC, ¶ 36.) Yamak approved plaintiff’s leave of absence verbally but failed to document that leave of absence, and Defendants failed to provide plaintiff with paperwork for, or proper notice of her legal rights to a CFRA or other leave of absence. (Ibid.)
Plaintiff commenced her approved leave of absence on October 30, 2021. (SAC, ¶ 37.) Plaintiff’s father died on November 7, 2021, in the Philippines, after which Yama verbally advised plaintiff that her leave of absence was approved for two months. (SAC, ¶ 39.)
As a direct consequence of plaintiff’s opposition to and refusal to engage in illegal conduct, expressed need for accommodations for a disability and medical condition, and request for CFRA leave for plaintiff’s health condition and to care for a covered family member, Defendants undertook a series of retaliatory actions which include: issuing unwarranted verbal and written reprimands; undermining plaintiff’s authority by claiming that plaintiff made a scene at a staff event in October 2020 which required plaintiff to be escorted to the office for “insubordination”; portraying plaintiff as dishonest and unprofessional by accusing plaintiff of manufacturing a hotline complaint from April of 2021 and directing nurses to “falsify documentation”; mischaracterizing a discussion with an activities director during a state survey in May of 2021; soliciting critical “complaints” about plaintiff and repeating these at meetings to erode staff confidence; falsely accusing plaintiff of threatening a patient’s family member in October of 2021; excluding plaintiff from meetings and communications necessary to perform her duties; removing or diminishing plaintiff’s supervisory authority; assigning plaintiff unreasonable workloads and denying necessary staff support; publicly criticizing or humiliating plaintiff in front of subordinates; and initiating investigations or falsely accusing plaintiff of poor performance, among other things. (SAC, ¶ 45(a)-(f) & (k).)
Though Defendants assert that they had decided to terminate plaintiff prior to her request for time off for a family medical crisis, Defendants continued to pay plaintiff and extend leave. (SAC, ¶ 45(g).) While plaintiff was on leave, Defendants circulated statements that the facility performed better without plaintiff and that key nurses would resign if she returned. (SAC, ¶ 45(h).)
On December 30, 2021, while plaintiff was in the Philippines caring for her mother, Yamak fired Plaintiff over the phone, falsely stating that plaintiff was being terminated for “causing six nurses to quit (prospectively).” (SAC, ¶ 40.) Defendants concealed that the reasons were tied to plaintiff’s complaints about unlawful billing and CFRA by memorializing the separation as “Poor Job Performance”. (SAC, ¶¶ 45(i).)
At the time of her termination, plaintiff was 49 years of age, and suffered from hyperthyroidism, which was known to Defendants. (SAC, ¶ 15.) Shortly thereafter, Defendants replaced plaintiff with Assistant Director Bernie Butac, who is 34 years old and was given a salary that was significantly less than plaintiff’s salary. (SAC, ¶ 41.)
On November 25, Defendants filed a demurrer to the SAC on the grounds that the second, third, and fifth causes of action fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and are uncertain; and that the fifth cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations. Defendants concurrently filed a motion to strike the allegations which are the subject of the demurrer.
Plaintiff has filed a combined opposition to both the demurrer and motion to strike.
Analysis:
In ruling on a demurrer, the court determines whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Moore v. Regents of University of California (1990) 51 Cal.3d 120, 125.) “In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint against a general demurrer, we are guided by long-settled rules. ‘We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.’ [Citation.] Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “If the complaint states a cause of action under any theory, regardless of the title under which the factual basis for relief is stated, that aspect of the complaint is good against a demurrer.” (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38.)
Demurrer to the fifth cause of action:
The demurrer argues that the fifth cause of action for retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 is subject to a three year limitations period; that the limitations period expired on December 31, 2024, before the filing of the SAC; and that the “relation back” doctrine does not apply here because the SAC is not based on any of the same facts, circumstances, timing, or instrumentalities alleged in the original complaint. For these reasons, Defendants argue, the fifth cause of action is barred.
“A demurrer based on a statute of limitations will not lie where the action may be, but is not necessarily, barred. [Citation.] In order for the bar of the statute of limitations to be raised by demurrer, the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough that the complaint shows that the action may be barred.” (Marshall v. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1403.) “If the dates establishing the running of the statute of limitations do not clearly appear in the complaint, there is no ground for general demurrer.” (Roman v. County of Los Angeles (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 316, 324-325, italics omitted.)
The fifth cause of action incorporates the allegations set forth above (SAC, ¶¶ 107 & 109) and alleges: during plaintiff’s employment, plaintiff disclosed to Defendants’ managers her reasonable belief that Defendants were acting in violation of law, statute, regulations or ordinance; that plaintiff objected to and refused to participate in these actions; that Defendants thereafter engaged in the “hostile and retaliatory” actions alleged in the SAC and described above; and that plaintiff’s protected activity was a motivating reason for Defendants’ decision to discharge, or engage in adverse employment actions against, plaintiff. (SAC, ¶¶ 109 & 111.)
Labor Code section 1102.5 states that an employer “shall not retaliate against an employee for disclosing information, or because the employer believes that the employee disclosed or may disclose information, ... to a person with authority over the employee or another employee who has the authority to investigate, discover, or correct the violation or noncompliance, ... if the employee has reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a violation of state or federal statute, or a violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, or federal rule or regulation, regardless of whether disclosing the information is part of the employee’s job duties.” (Lab. Code, § 1102.5, subd. (b.) The statute further prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee “for refusing to participate in an activity that would result in a violation of state or federal statute, or a violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, or federal rule or regulation[]” or “for having exercised their rights under subdivision (a), (b), or (c) in any former employment.” (Lab. Code, § 1102.5, subds. (c)-(d).)
The demurrer appears to concede that the statute of limitations applicable to the fifth cause of action for violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 is found in Code of Civil Procedure section 338, which provides that “[a]n action upon a liability created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture” must be brought within three years. (Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (a); see Demurrer at p. 13, ll. 25-26.)
“The statute of limitations usually commences when a cause of action ‘accrues,’ and it is generally said that ‘an action accrues on the date of injury.’ [Citation.] Alternatively, it is often stated that the statute commences ‘upon the occurrence of the last element essential to the cause of action.’ [Citations.]” (Bernson v. Browning-Ferris Industries (1994) 7 Cal.4th 926, 931.)
Though the demurrer argues that the limitations period prescribed in Code of Civil Procedure section 338 expired on December 31, 2024, or three years after the date of plaintiff’s termination as alleged in the SAC, wholly absent from the demurrer is any discussion of whether the allegations of the SAC are sufficient to show whether plaintiff had discovered, or had a reason to discover, the facts essential for the claim alleged in the fifth cause of action as of the date plaintiff’s employment was terminated. Notwithstanding the absence of any reasoned argument on this point, absent a dispute by plaintiff, the court will, as the parties do here, assume that the accrual of the fifth cause of action on that date was not postponed by the “discovery rule”. (See Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 806–807 [general discussion].)
“An amended complaint is considered a new action for purposes of the statute of limitations only if the claims do not ‘relate back’ to an earlier, timely-filed complaint. Under the relation-back doctrine, an amendment relates back to the original complaint if the amendment: (1) rests on the same general set of facts; (2) involves the same injury; and (3) refers to the same instrumentality. [Citations.] An amended complaint relates back to an earlier complaint if it is based on the same general set of facts, even if the plaintiff alleges a different legal theory or new cause of action. [Citations.] However, the doctrine will not apply if the ‘the plaintiff seeks by amendment to recover upon a set of facts entirely unrelated to those pleaded in the original complaint.’ [Citation.]
“In determining whether the amended complaint alleges facts that are sufficiently similar to those alleged in the original complaint, the critical inquiry is whether the defendant had adequate notice of the claim based on the original pleading. ‘The policy behind statutes of limitations is to put defendants on notice of the need to defend against a claim in time to prepare a fair defense on the merits. This policy is satisfied when recovery under an amended complaint is sought on the same basic set of facts as the original pleading. [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (Pointe San Diego Residential Community, L.P. v. Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, LLP (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 265, 276–277 (Pointe).)
Noted above, the adverse employment action alleged in the SAC includes Defendants’ termination of plaintiff’s employment on December 31, 2021. The complaint also rests on Defendants’ termination to allege an adverse employment action, which the complaint alleges was based on the false or pretextual claim described above, and constitutes unlawful retaliation under FEHA. (Compl., ¶¶ 18, 26-27, 30, 69 & 71.) Both the SAC and the original complaint also allege that plaintiff suffers from a medical disability known to Defendants; that plaintiff requested a reasonable accommodation of that disability; and that Defendants refused to provide a reasonable accommodation. (Compl., ¶¶ 15, 24-25, 30, 43, 47 & 104; SAC, ¶¶ 15, 33, 35 & 45.)
The allegations giving rise to the fifth cause of action for violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 include: that plaintiff was approved for a two month leave of absence to care for her mother; that plaintiff was fired by Yamak while on leave, for causing six nurses to quit; that Yamak’s reasons for terminating plaintiff were a pretext; that plaintiff engaged in protected activity by, among other things, disclosing her reasonable belief that Defendants were acting in violation of FEHA by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation for plaintiff’s disability; and that Defendants retaliated against plaintiff because plaintiff engaged in that protected activity. (SAC, ¶¶ 39-45, 107 & 109-112.)
Though the original complaint does not include a cause of action for violation of Labor Code section 1102.5, it alleges a third cause of action for retaliation under FEHA. The complaint includes the same, or effectively the same, allegations as those appearing in the SAC and described above in regard to plaintiff’s requests for a reasonable accommodation; plaintiff disclosing her belief that Defendants were acting in violation of FEHA by failing to provide any reasonable accommodation, which plaintiff also alleges constitutes protected activity; and plaintiff’s discharge, which the complaint and SAC each allege was based on pretextual reasons. (Compl., ¶¶ 16-18 & 69-71; cf. SAC, ¶¶ 109-112.)
Though the court acknowledges that the complaint, in some respects, is pleaded in a conclusory manner, the SAC rests, in part, on the same general set of facts described in the complaint and described above; involves the same injury (i.e., Defendants’ termination of plaintiff’s employment in retaliation for plaintiff disclosing their belief that Defendants were acting in violation of FEHA by refusing an accommodation); and refers to the same instrumentality (i.e., plaintiff’s discharge). Though the SAC may plead facts with greater particularity in regard t to these matters, that pleading does not seek recovery upon a set of facts which are entirely unrelated to those alleged in the original complaint.
“[I]n applying the relation-back analysis, courts should consider the ‘strong policy in this state that cases should be decided on their merits.’ [Citations.]” (Pointe, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at pp. 276–277.) For these and all further reasons discussed above, the fifth cause of action alleged in the SAC arises from facts which are sufficiently similar, if not identical, to those alleged in the original complaint. Defendants also offer no reasoned argument sufficient to show why they had no adequate notice of that claim in time to prepare a defense on the merits.
Upon further consideration of the matter notwithstanding the court’s prior ruling sustaining the demurrer of Defendants to the FAC, and for all reasons discussed above, the court finds that the fifth cause of action alleged in the SAC relates back to plaintiff’s original complaint. For these reasons, the court will overrule the demurrer to that cause of action on the grounds stated.
Demurrer to the second cause of action:
Though the opening memorandum in support of the demurrer argues that the second cause of action for harassment in violation of FEHA is time-barred, that ground is not stated in the notice or demurrer. (See Notice & Demurrer at p. 2.) “A basic tenet of motion practice is that the notice of motion must state the grounds for the order being sought [citations], and courts generally may consider only the grounds stated in the notice of motion.” (Kinda v. Carpenter (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1277.) As the notice fails to state as grounds for the demurrer, that the second cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations, the court declines to consider that ground.
Even if the court were to consider the contention advanced in the demurrer that the second cause of action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, the same reasoning and analysis apply. (See also Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 798, 823–824 [general discussion of running of statute of limitations].)
Defendants also contend in the demurrer, that the only allegations in the SAC that identify harassment appear in paragraph 45 of that pleading. Defendants contend that those events or actions constitute investigations of plaintiff’s conduct and performance, and personnel decisions. For these reasons, the Defendants contend, the SAC fails to allege facts sufficient to constitute harassment.
“It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to ‘harass’ an employee based on membership in a protected class.... [Citation.]” (Bailey v. San Francisco Dist. Attorney’s Office (2024) 16 Cal.5th 611, 626 (Bailey).) “Harassment includes ‘[v]erbal harassment’ such as ‘epithets, derogatory comments or slurs on a basis enumerated in the Act’ [citation] ....” (Id. at p. 627.)
The acts constituting harassment alleged in the SAC include the allegations described above, including with respect to repeating purportedly false stories to staff regarding plaintiff making a “scene”; manufacturing a complaint that accused plaintiff of directing nurses to falsify documentation; and broadcasting a mischaracterized discussion to others. (See, e.g., SAC, ¶¶ 40-45 & 71.) The court, for present purposes, accepts the truth of these allegations without regard to plaintiff’s ability to prove them. (Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Boyle (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1034.)
The allegations of the SAC described above, if proven, are sufficient to show unwelcome or derogatory conduct imputable to Defendants, that, according to plaintiff, created an abusive or intolerable work environment which detracted from plaintiff’s job performance. (Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, 707 [general discussion]; Bailey, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 627-628 [same].) Moreover, as the purportedly harassing conduct is alleged to be the consequence of plaintiff expressing a need for disability accommodations (SAC, ¶ 45), the SAC is sufficient to show that the alleged harassment was based on plaintiff’s membership in a protected class. (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (j)(1) [prohibiting an employer from harassing an employee “because of ... physical disability....”].)
In addition, to the extent the SAC is in some respects uncertain as to the frequency of the conduct which the SAC alleges constitutes harassment, “ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616; see also Miller v. Department of Corrections (2005) 36 Cal.4th 446, 462 [noting that the trier of fact should evaluate the work environment “in light of the totality of the circumstances....”’].) The court further notes that “although viable hostile work environment claims often involve repeated conduct, it is not required.” (Bailey, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 629.) For these and all further reasons discussed above, the court will overrule the demurrer on the grounds stated.
Demurrer to the third cause of action:
The demurrer contends that the third cause of action for retaliation in violation of FEHA is time barred for the same reasons discussed above. The same analysis applies.
Defendants further contend that the SAC fails to allege facts showing that, prior to plaintiff’s termination, plaintiff engaged in any protected activity, or that there exists a causal nexus between an adverse employment action and protected conduct. For these reasons, Defendants argue, the SAC fails to allege facts sufficient to constitute a claim for retaliation in violation of FEHA.
“To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under FEHA, ‘a plaintiff must show “(1) he or she engaged in a ‘protected activity,’ (2) the employer subjected the employee to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link existed between the protected activity and the employer’s action.” ’ [Citation.]” (Nealy v. City of Santa Monica (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 359, 380 (Nealy).)
Protected activity includes where a “person has opposed any practices forbidden under” FEHA. (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (h).) “Opposing practices forbidden by FEHA includes ... opposing employment practices the employee reasonably believes to exist and believes to be a violation of FEHA.... [¶] But protected activity does not include a mere request for reasonable accommodation. [Citation.] Without more, exercising one’s rights under FEHA to request reasonable accommodation or engage in the interactive process does not demonstrate some degree of opposition to or protest of unlawful conduct by the employer.” (Nealy, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 380–381.)
The SAC describes conduct or incidents which were purportedly deployed by Defendants as a means to retaliate against plaintiff for, among other things, requesting a disability accommodation. (SAC, ¶ 45(a)-(k).) The SAC further alleges that plaintiff “contemporaneously or promptly opposed and objected to the adverse, retaliatory and discriminatory actions, statements and conduct by Defendants....” (SAC, ¶ 47.) Though sparse and not a model of pleading clarity, these allegations are, for pleading purposes, sufficient to show that plaintiff engaged in a protected activity for purposes of plaintiff’s retaliation claim. For these and all further reasons discussed above, the court will overrule the demurrer to the third cause of action alleged in the SAC on the grounds stated.
Motion to strike:
Noted above, the motion to strike requests an order striking from the SAC, various paragraphs, terms, and other matters which are the subject of the demurrer. (Notice at ¶¶ 1-14.) As the court will overrule the demurrer for all reasons further discussed above, the court will also deny the motion to strike.
Request for Judicial Notice
In support of the demurrer and motion to strike, Defendants request that the court take judicial notice of the complaint filed in this action on November 17, 2023; the FAC; the court’s October 6, 2025, minute order; and the SAC. (RJN at p. 2 & Exs. 1-4.) The court will grant Defendants’ request for judicial notice of those court records. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).) Judicial notice of those records does not extend to their truthfulness or proper interpretation. (Apple Inc. v. Superior Court (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 222, 241.)