Mariette Wingard et al vs Jordan Walker et al

Case Number

23CV05001

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 12/12/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

CMC; Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP)

Tentative Ruling

For the reasons set forth below, the motion of defendant J. Blair Pence II to strike plaintiffs’ complaint Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.16, is granted. Plaintiffs’ complaint, as to J. Blair Pence II, is dismissed with prejudice.

Any issues regarding statutory fees are to be addressed by separate noticed motion.

Background:

This action commenced on November 9, 2023, by the filing of the complaint by plaintiffs Mariette Wingard (Wingard), Herbal Angels Inc. (Herbal), and Mary Fritz (Fritz) (collectively “plaintiffs”), against defendants J. Blair Pence II (Pence), Jordan Walker (Walker), Santa Barbara County Sheriff’s Office (Sheriff), County of Santa Barbara (County), Santa Barbara County District Attorney’s Office (DA), Santa Barbara County Building and Planning (Planning Dept.), Frank Vasquez (Vasquez), James Furber (Furber), John Savrnoch (Savrnoch), Joyce Dudley (Dudley), Anthony Davis (Davis), Morgan Lucas (Lucas), Lee Carter (Carter), and Christina Perkins (Perkins) (collectively “defendants”) for: (1) Violations of due process rights; (2) Abuse of process; (3) Illegal search and seizure; (4) Takings in violation of the prohibitions within the Federal and California Constitutions; (5) Conversion; (6) Trespass to chattel; (7) Conspiracy to deprive and violate Constitutional rights; (8) Monell violation of Civil Rights Policy Claim; (9) Malicious prosecution; (10) Malicious prosecution – resulting from civil litigation; (11) Violation of the right to privacy; (12) Defamation; (13) Intentional interference with economic prospective; (14) Civil conspiracy; and (15) Respondeat Superior. All of the individual defendants were, at all relevant times, employees of either Sheriff or DA.

As alleged in the complaint:

In March 2020, DA and Deputy DA Davis filed criminal charges against Wingard for cannabis cultivation without a license and possession of cannabis for sale without a license, on the basis that she was cultivating without a State cannabis cultivation license (Case No. 20CV02691). (Compl., ¶ 46.) Prior to filing the criminal charges against Wingard, “the County Actors” knew there was no basis to charge her. (Ibid.) Prior to filing the criminal charges against Wingard, “the County Actors” knew Herbal had active State cannabis cultivation licenses. (Ibid.) Prior to filing the criminal charges against Wingard, Sheriff and DA knew that cannabis cultivation took place at 2761 Cebada Canyon Road, Lompoc (the “property”) prior to January 19, 2016. (Ibid.)

Prior to November 9, 2022, two superior court judges disregarded the State cannabis cultivation licenses issued to Herbal, by authorizing search warrants and summarily denying Wingard’s demurrer to counts 3 and 4 of the criminal complaint. (Compl., ¶ 47.)

On November 9, 2022, following three years of litigation, Judge Adams ruled that Wingard was immune from arrest, prosecution, and asset forfeiture. (Compl., ¶ 48.) The court specifically ruled that Wingard was connected to Herbal, that Herbal possessed active State licenses at the time of the criminal investigation and raid, and that only the State has authority to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke State licenses. (Id. at ¶ 49.) The criminal charges were dismissed. (Id at ¶ 50.) Despite the findings and dismissal of the criminal charges, the court continues to deny Wingard’s factual innocence. (Id. at ¶ 51.)

In September 2019, Sheriff began an “illegal” investigation of Herbal’s cultivation site without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. (Compl., ¶ 70.) Prior to investigating Herbal and Wingard, County, DA, and Sheriff had actual knowledge that Wingard was connected to Herbal, and that Herbal had the licenses needed to cultivate cannabis in Santa Barbara County. (Id. at ¶ 71.)

The investigation commenced when Walker was serving a search warrant at the property on September 14, 2019, and noticed “hoop houses” at the property. (Compl., ¶ 72.) Every fact uncovered by Walker after September 14, 2019, showed that Herbal was the cannabis operator at the property and that Herbal was a licensed cannabis cultivator with 12 active licenses issued by the State of California, and that Herbal and Avo Vista Farms, LLC were seeking zoning permits from Planning Dept. in accordance with the County’s cannabis ordinances. (Ibid.)

On December 13, 2019, and December 16, 2019, Walker filed an affidavit in support of a requested search warrant for the property, Wingard’s residence, the residence of a previous owner of Avo Vista Farms, and the office location for Avo Vista Farms, “for evidence of illegal cannabis cultivation, paraphernalia, records, proceeds and other evidence . . . which will . . . show that persons associated with this property are cultivating cannabis as a public offense, in violation of H.S. 11358(c).” (Compl., ¶ 73.) Walker stated in the warrant affidavit that Herbal, at the time, had 12 active State cannabis cultivation licenses that would remain active until May 2020. (Id. at ¶ 74.) A superior court judge signed the search warrants knowing that Herbal had 12 active State cultivation licenses that would remain active until May 2020. (Id. at ¶ 75.)

Sheriff, DA, and Davis fabricated evidence against Wingard and Herbal by failing to inform the court that the 12 active State cannabis cultivation licenses conferred absolute immunity from charges of cultivation without a license on Wingard and Herbal by informing the court that the State cannabis licenses were invalid despite knowing the State never investigated, disciplined, conditioned, suspended, or revoked the licenses, by concealing from the court and from Wingard prior cultivation at the property. (Compl., ¶ 76.) Planning and Sheriff colluded to “destroy” Herbal via the investigation. (Id. at ¶ 77.) Davis colluded with Sheriff to “destroy” Herbal via the investigation, and Davis colluded with Sheriff to fabricate evidence during the investigation, search, and seizure of Wingard and Herbal. (Id. at ¶ 78.)

On December 16, 2019, Wingard, her infant daughter, her toddler daughter, and Wingard’s mother Fritz left Wingard’s residence in Wingard’s family van. (Compl., ¶ 79.) Approximately one mile from her home, Wingard was pulled over and two law enforcement officers approached the vehicle, took Wingard’s phone, and asked if there were any guns in the vehicle. (Ibid.) Shortly thereafter, two more officers arrived. (Ibid.) Fritz asked if she could leave and was told that she was being detained but was not told why. (Id. at ¶ 80.) An officer threatened Fritz and Wingard that Wingard’s infant would likely be taken away from the family by children’s services. (Id. at ¶ 81.) Wingard and Fritz informed the officers that the infant needed to nurse and could not be separated from Wingard, but the officer reiterated that the infant might be taken. (Ibid.)

Fritz, the infant, and the toddler were not the subject of the investigation or persons of interest. (Compl., ¶ 82.) Fritz asked to leave with Wingard’s infant and toddler, but the officers refused to let her leave with the children. (Ibid.)

The officers searched and seized Fritz’s belongings, including the money from her wallet, despite there being no evidence to indicate Fritz was in any way connected to the criminal investigation. (Compl., ¶ 83.) Sherriff still has Wingard’s and Fritz’s belongings and refuses to release them on the basis that they still must be retained as evidence of a crime. (Ibid.)

Eventually, Wingard was allowed to permit a friend to pick up the toddler. (Compl., ¶ 84.) After the toddler was picked up, the officers ordered Wingard to return to her residence with Fritz and the infant. (Ibid.) Fritz was still not allowed to leave. (Ibid.)

At Wingard’s residence, Wingard, Fritz, and the infant were detained in the living room while officers searched the residence for several hours. (Compl., ¶ 85.) Fritz was not permitted to leave until the search was complete, and she was not told why she was being detained or allowed to see the search warrant. (Ibid.)

Sheriff found no evidence of cannabis cultivation without a license but, despite this fact, Sheriff seized $206,418.72 from Herbal, Wingard, and Eli Sheiman (Sheiman), destroyed legally cultivated cannabis worth millions of dollars, and terrorized Wingard, Fritz, and Sheiman, as well as their two young children over the years. (Compl., ¶ 96.) Because County seized all of Wingard’s funds, Fritz loaned Wingard $130,000.00 for rent, food, clothing, medical bills, taxes, transportation, insurance, therapy, and preschool tuition. (Id. at ¶ 97.) Fritz was retried prior to the incident but went back to working full-time in 2020 to help support Wingard and Wingard’s children. (Ibid.)

During its investigation and search and seizure of Wingard and Herbal, Sheriff destroyed over $3,500,000.00 in lawfully cultivated cannabis, trade secrets, business property, and seized over $200,000.00 from Herbal, as well as all of Herbal’s business records. (Compl., ¶ 98.) The seizure and destruction of Herbal’s assets destroyed the business, destroyed the business’s goodwill and reputation within the community, and made any attempts to revive the business and its conditional use permit futile. (Id. at ¶ 99.)

Despite the criminal case against Wingard being dismissed on November 9, 2022, it took nearly a year for DA and Sheriff to return the funds seized from Wingard and Herbal. (Compl., ¶ 100.)

Davis and Sheriff colluded to destroy Herbal’s conditional use permit. (Compl., ¶ 101.)

Wingard was charged with the misdemeanor crimes of cultivating more than six cannabis plaints and possessing marijuana for sale. (Compl., ¶ 103.) Prior to the filing of the criminal complaint, DA and Sheriff were aware that Wingard was connected to Herbal, and that Herbal held active State cannabis cultivation licenses issued by the California Department of Agriculture Cannabis for the cultivation of marijuana at the property. (Ibid.)

What was presented as evidence in the criminal trial was the “false, manufactured, and fabricated” evidence by Davis, Walker, Vasquez, Perkins, Furber, Lucas, Carter, and the prosecutorial team. (Compl., ¶ 104.) Throughout the criminal action, and continuing to the present, defendants have joined and participated in Davis’s efforts to withhold and conceal exculpatory evidence that “would have unraveled the illegal case against Wingard.” (Ibid.) Defendants’ actions were part of defendants’ long-standing conspiracy to frame Wingard and Herbal for crimes they did not commit. (Id. at ¶ 105.)

On August 12, 2020, Wingard demurred to the criminal complaint on the grounds that she was immune from arrest, prosecution, and asset forfeiture for cultivation and possession of cannabis without a license because she was connected to Herbal and Herbal held an active State license for cannabis cultivation. (Compl., ¶ 106.) On August 31, 2021, the court denied the demurrer. (Ibid.)

As the sole basis for the criminal charges against Wingard, DA “ruled” that the State licenses issued to Herbal were invalid. (Compl., ¶ 111.) County has no authority to suspend, issue, or revoke State cannabis licenses. (Ibid.)

DA and Sheriff engaged in interviews with the press and misstated facts in an effort to pressure Wingard and Herbal to waive their rights and to destroy their reputations with other businesses and the public. (Compl., ¶ 115.)

Other than the caption and a paragraph identifying Pence as a resident of Los Angeles County, the complaint mentions Pence in just two other paragraphs which will be discussed below.

On November 21, 2025, a Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP) was granted in favor of County of Santa Barbara, Jordan Walker, Frank Vasquez, James Furber, John Savrnoch, Joyce Dudley, Anthony Davis, Morgan Lucas, Lee Carter, and Kristina Perkins.

Arguing that the complaint against him is based on protected activity, and that plaintiffs cannot show a probability of prevailing on the merits, Pence now moves to strike plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to the Anti-SLAPP statute as well.

Plaintiffs oppose the motion, arguing that the action against Pence is not based on his communications with law enforcement but, rather, on “Pence’s powerful lobby against cannabis and his drive to obstruct any cannabis operation seeking licensing, and to effectively eliminate cannabis operations from Santa Barbara County. (Opp., p. 15, ll. 11-13.) (Note: As was the opposition to the County defendants’ motion, here the opposition was late filed, improperly formatted, and exceeds the allowable number of pages. While the court will again exercise its discretion and consider the opposition, counsel is again reminded of the importance of complying with the California Rules of Court, as well as the potential consequences of ignoring the Rules.)

Analysis:

Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 provides, in relevant part:

“(a) The Legislature finds and declares that there has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances. The Legislature finds and declares that it is in the public interest to encourage continued participation in matters of public significance, and that this participation should not be chilled through abuse of the judicial process. To this end, this section shall be construed broadly.

“(b)(1) A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.

“(2) In making its determination, the court shall consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.

“(3) If the court determines that the plaintiff has established a probability that he or she will prevail on the claim, neither that determination nor the fact of that determination shall be admissible in evidence at any later stage of the case, or in any subsequent action, and no burden of proof or degree of proof otherwise applicable shall be affected by that determination in any later stage of the case or in any subsequent proceeding.

* * *

“(e) As used in this section, “act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue” includes: (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.”

“Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion involves two steps. First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected by [Code of Civil Procedure] section 425.16. [Citation.] If the defendant makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success. We have described this second step as a ‘summary-judgment-like procedure.’ [Citation, fn.] The court does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims. Its inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. It accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as true, and evaluates the defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law. [Citation.] ‘[C]laims with the requisite minimal merit may proceed.’ [Citation.]” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384–385.)

1. Public Interest Exception

As they did in their opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion of the County defendants, plaintiffs argue that the public interest exception bars the anti-SLAPP motion in its entirety, because “the general public has a fundamental right and interest in private citizens being estopped from interfering with a business’ licensing and operations where that authority rests with the County.” (Opp., p. 20, ll. 10-11.)

“The Legislature “ ‘designed subdivision (b) of section 425.17 to prevent the use of the anti-SLAPP device against ‘ “specified public interest actions,” ’ among others. [Citation.]’ ” [Citation.] More specifically, the intent of the Legislature was to “ ‘ “make the SLAPP motion inapplicable to public interest and class action lawsuits “ ‘brought solely in the public interest or on behalf of the general public’ ” when three specified conditions are met.” ’ ” [Citation.] Those three conditions are as follows: “ ‘(1) The plaintiff does not seek any relief greater than or different from the relief sought for the general public . . .. [¶] (2) The action, if successful, would enforce an important right affecting the public interest, and would confer a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, on the general public or a large class of persons. [¶] (3) Private enforcement is necessary and places a disproportionate financial burden on the plaintiff in relation to the plaintiff’s stake in the matter.’ ” (§ 425.17, subd. (b).) “ ‘If a plaintiff's lawsuit comes within section 425.17, subdivision (b), it is exempt from the anti-SLAPP statute, and thus, a trial court may deny the defendants’ special motion to strike without determining whether the plaintiff's causes of action arise from protected activity, and if so, whether the plaintiff has established a probability of prevailing on those causes of action under section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1).’ ” [Citation.]” (The Inland Oversight Committee v. County of San Bernardino (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 671, 676.)

This is not a public interest or class action lawsuit “brought solely in the public interest or on behalf of the general public.” It is a private lawsuit that seeks significant damages, including over $100,000,000.00 to go to plaintiffs. Nothing in plaintiffs’ prayer for relief confers anything on any member of the public other than plaintiffs.

The public interest exception simply does not apply to this case.

2. First Prong – Arising From Protected Activity

Pence argues that his communications with law enforcement are protected activity. Plaintiffs acknowledge that communications with law enforcement are protected activity under the Anti-SLAPP statutes, arguing:

“The fact that Mr. Pence engages in a protected activity to carry out his mission (i.e., protected speech to law enforcement), does not make Plaintiffs’ complaint about Mr. Pence’s mission subject to the Anti-SLAPP statutes. In other words, Mr. Pence’s false communication to the Sheriff’s Department during the investigation of Mariette Wingard and Herbal Angels, is not itself the complained of conduct. Rather, it was a step leading to Mr. Pence’s obstruction of and interference with licensed cannabis operations or cannabis operations seeking licensing. It is the mission to obstruct and interfere with cannabis businesses which is the act for which liability is asserted by the Plaintiffs.” (Opp., p. 15, ll. 15-21.)

Pence is sued under the following causes of action:

First Cause of Action for Violation of Due Process Rights – All Defendants

Second Cause of Action for Abuse of Process – All Defendants

Seventh Cause of Action for Conspiracy to Deprive Constitutional Rights – All Defendants

Ninth Cause of Action for Malicious Prosecution – All Defendants

Tenth Cause of Action for Malicious Prosecution – All Defendants

Twelfth Cause of Action for Defamation – Pence and Davis

As noted in the order granting the County defendants’ special motion to strike: The first, second, and seventh causes of action all involve allegations of actions taken by law enforcement and prosecutors during the investigation and prosecution of a criminal case and associated civil forfeiture proceedings. As such, and explained in the prior ruling, they are all protected activities under the anti-SLAPP statutes. Further, there are no allegations in the first, second, or seventh causes of action alleging any acts or omissions on the part of Pence.

Also as noted in the order granting the County defendants’ special motion to strike: The ninth and tenth causes of action are based on allegations that consist of the County defendants conducting the investigation, seeking warrants, and individuals carrying out duties as required by their positions. And despite plaintiffs’ continuing insistence to the contrary, and as has been previously explained to plaintiffs’ counsel:

“[B]y its terms, section 425.16 potentially may apply to every malicious prosecution action, because every such action arises from an underlying lawsuit, or petition to the judicial branch. By definition, a malicious prosecution suit alleges that the defendant committed a tort by filing a lawsuit. [Citation.] Accordingly, every Court of Appeal that has addressed the question has concluded that malicious prosecution causes of action fall within the purview of the anti-SLAPP statute. [Citations.] Courts in our sister states construing similar statues are in accord.” (Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 734-735.)

“The Legislature clearly knows how to create an exemption from the anti-SLAPP statute when it wishes to do so. It has not done so for malicious prosecution claims.” (Id. at p. 735.)

Additionally, the ninth and tenth causes of action do not contain any allegations or acts or omissions on the part of Pence.

Finally, the twelfth cause of action, as noted in the order granting the County defendants’ special motion to strike, consists of statements that were made in connection with official investigations, prosecutions, or judicial proceedings and are protected activities because they consist of reports or statements to law enforcement, public comments by prosecutors or government officials, and media communications that relate to ongoing public controversies or governmental investigations.

The only two paragraphs referencing Pence are under the twelfth cause of action for Defamation. Those paragraphs are:

“J. Blair Pence conspired with Walker and others to make false statements for the purpose of causing harm to Plaintiffs. Specifically, Pence stated that marijuana had never been grown at 2761 Cebada Canyon Road and that Eli Sheiman lied when executing the Affidavit. Pence defamed Sheiman and Wingard to law enforcement for the express purpose of initiating an illegal investigation and prosecution against Wingard and Sheiman.” (Compl., ¶ 288, italics added.)

“Pence made a false statement to law enforcement, knowing it was false at the time he made the statement. Pence made the statement in an effort to fabricate evidence to cause the illegal investigation, arrest and prosecution of Plaintiffs. Pence made the statements to further his ongoing, very public effort to thwart and block cannabis businesses in Santa Barbara County Pence sold Avo Vista Farms, LLC the land and knew that he was frustrating the purpose of the sale and interfering with the economic success of the sale by making false statements to the Santa Barbara Sherriff’s department against Herbal Angles, plaintiff Wingard and her associates.” (Compl., ¶ 289, italics added.)

“A privileged publication or broadcast is one made: . . .

“(b) In any (1) legislative proceeding, (2) judicial proceeding, (3) in any other official proceeding authorized by law, or (4) in the initiation or course of any other proceeding authorized by law and reviewable pursuant to Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 1084) of Title 1 of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure . . ..” (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b).)

“This privilege applies even if the statement was false and made with malice. (Jacob B. v. County of Shasta (2007) 40 Cal.4th 948, 955-956 [privilege applies even to civil actions based on perjury].)” (Cox v. Griffin (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 440, 448.)

“A claim arises from protected activity when that activity underlies or forms the basis for the claim. [Citations.] Critically, “ ‘the defendant’s act underlying the plaintiff’s cause of action must itself have been an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.’ ” [Citations.]” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1062-1063.)

“When moving to strike a cause of action under the anti-SLAPP statute, a defendant that satisfies its initial burden of demonstrating the targeted action is one arising from protected activity faces no additional requirement of proving the plaintiff’s subjective intent. [Citation.] Nor need a moving defendant demonstrate that the action actually has had a chilling effect on the exercise of such rights. [Citation.]” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 88.)

“[T]he mere fact that an action was filed after protected activity took place does not mean the action arose from that activity for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute. [Citation.] Moreover, that a cause of action arguably may have been “ ‘triggered’ ” by protected activity does not entail that it is one arising from such. [Citation.] In the anti-SLAPP context, the critical consideration is whether the cause of action is based on the defendant’s protected free speech or petitioning activity. [Citations.]” (Navellier v. Sletten, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 89.)

“In deciding whether the initial “ ‘arising from’ ” requirement is met, a court considers “ ‘the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.’ ” (§ 425.16, subd. (b).)” (Navellier v. Sletten, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 89.)

Here, a review of the complaint makes clear that the causes of action asserted against Pence all arise from his statements to the police. Plaintiffs’ opposition is inconsistent with the allegations contained in the complaint and constitute an attempt to amend the complaint to assert an entirely different theory of liability. “But a plaintiff cannot avoid an anti-SLAPP motion by amending the complaint. (Hansen v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2008) 171 Cal.App.4th 1537, 1547.) Thus, we must view the complaint as it existed at the time of the motion.” (Santa Clara Waste Water Co. v. County of Ventura Environmental Health Division (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 1082, 1090.)

Even if plaintiffs’ characterization of the complaint were correct, which it is not, claiming that Pence is engaged in the “obstruction of and interference with licensed cannabis operations or cannabis operations seeking licensing,” that characterization does not prevent Pence from prevailing on the first prong. As Pence points out in his reply brief: Lobbying activities seeking to influence the decisions of regulatory and legislative bodies are protected activities under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivisions (b)(1) and (e). (see DuPont Merck Pharmaceutical Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 562, 565-566.)

Pence has met his burden under the first prong by showing that the complaint, and each cause of action alleged against him, is based on statutorily protected activity.

3. Second Prong – Probability of Prevailing on the Merits

“If the defendant carries its burden, the plaintiff must then demonstrate its claims have at least “ ‘minimal merit.’ ” [Citations.]” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1061.)

“At this second stage, “ ‘a plaintiff seeking to demonstrate the merit of the claim “ ‘may not rely solely on its complaint, even if verified; instead, its proof must be made upon competent admissible evidence.” ’ ” (Citation.)” (Young v. Midland Funding LLC (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 63, 79.)

“Argument of an attorney whether it be statements made at a hearing or statements contained in points and authorities is not proof legal or evidentiary.” (City of Fresno v. Superior Court (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 25, 31 fn. 2.)

Here, plaintiffs base their prong two argument on allegations that do not exist in the complaint, and they have not provided any admissible evidence of any wrongdoing on the part of Pence. There are no declarations, other than that of plaintiffs’ counsel, and the documents attached to that declaration consist of several hearsay documents that are not properly authenticated. There is no request for judicial notice of any of the documents. Even if the court were to take judicial notice of some of the documents, the court could not take judicial notice of the truth of the matters contained therein. Because plaintiffs have produced no admissible evidence, or even reasoned argument, they have not met their burden of showing that their claims have even minimal merit.

The anti-SLAPP motion will be granted and the claims against Pence will be dismissed with prejudice.

Any issues regarding statutory fees are to be addressed by separate noticed motion.