Henry Aguila v. First American Title Insurance Co., et al.

Case Number

23CV00204

Case Type

Civil Law & Motion

Hearing Date / Time

Mon, 01/26/2026 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion Summary Judgment; Motion to File Confidential Settlement Under Seal; and, Motion to Sever

Tentative Ruling

Henry Aguila v. First American Title Insurance Co., et al.

Case No. 23CV00204

Hearing Date: January 26, 2026

HEARING: (1) Defendant First American Title Insurance Company’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(2) Defendant First American Title Insurance Company’s Motion to File Confidential Settlement Under Seal

(3) Defendant Pico Rivera First Mortgage Investors, LP and Mortgage Co. of Santa Barbara, Inc.’s Motion to Sever

ATTORNEYS: For Plaintiff Henry Aguila: Ronald D. Tym, The Tym Firm

For Defendant First American Title Insurance Company: Sean R. Burnett, Ashley Dorris Egerer, Daniel P. Park, Snyder Burnett Egerer, LLP

For Defendants Pico Rivera First Mortgage Investors, LP,

and Mortgage Co. of Santa Barbara, Inc.: Robert Forouzandeh, Riviera Law Group, PC

TENTATIVE RULING:

(1) First American Title Insurance Company’s motion for summary judgment is denied.

(2) , First American Title Insurance Company’s motion to file confidential settlement under seal is denied. The clerk of the court is directed to file in the public record the documents conditionally lodged under seal by First American on August 1, 2025, in their entirety.

(3) Pico Rivera First Mortgage Investors, LP and Mortgage Co. of Santa Barbara, Inc.’s motion to sever is denied but the court will address in the context of trial any issues of law raised by the moving parties’ first, third, and fourth affirmative defenses prior to any jury trial in this action.

Background:

On January 18, 2023, plaintiff Henry Aguila (Aguila) filed a complaint against defendants First American Title Insurance Company (First American), Pico Rivera First Mortgage Investors, LP (PRFMI), Mortgage Co. of Santa Barbara, Inc. (MCSB), and Andrew Fuller, alleging six causes of action for (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of contract/third party beneficiary, (3) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (4) inducing breach of contract, (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (6) negligence.

On September 9, 2024, Aguila filed his operative Third Amended Complaint (TAC) alleging two causes of action for (1) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing against PRFMI and MCSB, and (2) intentional interference with contractual relations against First American.

The following material facts are undisputed for purposes of First American’s motion for summary judgment:

Aguila was the sole shareholder of Thee Aguila, Inc. (TAI). (Aguila’s Sep. Stat. ISO Opp. (SSUF), Undisputed No. 2.)

On July 16, 2015, TAI borrowed $5.7 million from PRFMI (Loan) which was secured by the property located at 8825 Washington Blvd., Pico Rivera, California (Property) pursuant to a deed of trust from TAI (Deed of Trust). (SSUF, Undisputed No. 1.)

Aguila personally guaranteed TAI’s obligations to PRFMI under the Loan (Guarantee Agreement). (SSUF, Undisputed No. 2.)

First American issued a lender’s policy of title insurance insuring the Property’s title (Lender’s Title Insurance Policy). (SSUF, Undisputed No. 3.)

On October 18, 2018, PRFMI filed suit against Aguila for breach of the Guaranty Agreement in Santa Barbara Superior Court Case No. 18CV04958 (the Guarantee Lawsuit). (SSUF, Undisputed No. 4.)

In 2019, PRFMI filed suit against First American for breach of the Lender’s Title Insurance Policy in Santa Barbara Superior Court Case No. 19CV02285, alleging an undisclosed title defect (the Title Lawsuit). (SSUF, Undisputed Nos. 9-10.)

On December 4, 2020, a stipulated judgment was entered in the Guarantee Lawsuit against Aguila in amount of $3,867,113.84 (Stipulated Judgment). (SSUF, Undisputed No. 5.)

First American and PRFMI settled the Title Lawsuit and agreed on a confidential settlement under which First American paid PRFMI $1.1 million (Confidential Settlement Agreement). (SSUF, Undisputed No. 12.)

As alleged in the TAC:

The $1.1 million settlement payment by First American to PRFMI was conditioned on (a) PRFMI not disclosing such payment to Aguila, (b) PRFMI not crediting such payment towards Aguila’s liability under the Guaranty Agreement, and (c) PRFMI continuing to seek the $1.1 million from Aguila under the Guarantee Agreement. (TAC, ¶ 30.)

This failure by PRFMI to credit the $1.1 million towards Aguila’s liability under the Guarantee Agreement and the continuing efforts by PRFMI to collect the $1.1 million from Aguila breached PFRMI’s obligations under the Guarantee Agreement. (TAC, ¶ 32.)

First American’s actions in settling the Title Lawsuit via the Confidential Settlement Agreement constituted interference with the Guarantee Agreement between Aguila and PRFMI. (TAC, ¶¶ 31-33.)

As argued in opposition by Aguila, “[t]he payment by First American should have reduced Aguila’s obligations under the Guarantee Agreement. Instead, First American interfered with this obligation of PRFMI by requiring that PRFMI not disclose First American’s payment to Aguila and by not permitting PRFMI to credit the $1.1 million paid towards Aguila’s obligations.” (Opp., p. 4, ll. 23-28.)

On July 31, 2025, First American filed this motion for summary judgment on the basis that Aguila’s only cause of action against First American for intentional interference with contractual relations fails because the element of intent cannot be established. (Motion, p. 6, ll. 1 - p. 8, ll. 5.) First American argues “[t]here is no evidence that First American acted with the specific intent to induce any alleged breach of the Guaranty [A]greement. The undisputed facts show that First American merely settled a separate title insurance claim brought by its insured, PRFMI—a lawful act called for by its legal duties under the [Lender’s Title Insurance Policy].” (Id. at p. 8, ll. 2-5.) First American does not challenge any other elements of this cause of action. (Id. at p. 6, ll. 1 - p. 8, ll. 5.)

Aguila opposes the motion for summary judgment.

On August 1, 2025, First American filed a motion to file under seal the Confidential Settlement Agreement between First American and PRFMI. This motion is unopposed.

On October 27, 2025, the court continued the motion for summary judgment, motion to seal, and a previously filed motion to sever by PRFMI and MCSB to this hearing of January 26, 2026. PRFMI and MCSB’s motion seeks to sever three of their affirmative defenses because they raised questions of law and severance would ostensibly promote judicial efficiency and convenience of the parties and witnesses. This motion is unopposed.

Analysis:

(1) Legal Standard for First American’s Motion for Summary Judgment

A defendant’s motion for summary judgment asks the court to determine that the entire action has no merit and to terminate the action without the necessity of a trial. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a).) The procedure enables the court to look behind the pleadings to determine whether the party against whom the motion is directed has evidence to support their claims. (Little v. Community Bank (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 355, 358.) To grant summary judgment the court must determine from the evidence presented that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)

“[F]rom commencement to conclusion, the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar).) There is no obligation on the opposing party to establish anything by affidavit unless and until the moving party has by affidavit stated facts establishing every element necessary to sustain an adjudication in his favor. (Consumer Cause, Inc. v. Smilecare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.) “[W]e liberally construe plaintiff’s evidentiary submissions and strictly scrutinize defendant’s own evidence, in order to resolve any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in plaintiff’s favor.” (Johnson v. American Standard, Inc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 56, 64.)

“A defendant … has met that party’s burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action … cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. Once the defendant … has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff … to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) In resolving the motion, the court may not weigh the evidence. (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.) A triable issue of material fact exists only if the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.)

“The pleadings determine the issues to be addressed by a summary judgment motion.” (Arce v. The Ensign Group, Inc. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 622, 628.) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues: the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleading. {Citation.] The complaint measures the materiality of the facts tendered in a defendant’s challenge to the plaintiff’s cause of action.” (FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381.) “Accordingly, the burden of a defendant moving for summary judgment only requires that he or she negate plaintiff’s theories of liability as alleged in the complaint; that is, a moving party need not refute liability on some theoretical possibility not included in the pleadings.” (Hutton v. Fidelity National Title Co. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 486, 493.)

(2) Element of Intent for First American’s Second Cause of Action

The TAC alleges one cause of action for intentional interference with contractual relations against First American (Second COA). (TAC, ¶¶ 29-33.) “The elements which a plaintiff must plead to state the cause of action for intentional interference with contractual relations are (1) a valid contract between plaintiff and a third party; (2) defendant’s knowledge of this contract; (3) defendant’s intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; (4) actual breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; and (5) resulting damage.” (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 55 (Quelimane).)

First American bears the burden of persuasion that the element of intent cannot be established as to the Second COA. (See Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (o)(1) & (p)(2).) “[A] plaintiff need not establish that the primary purpose of the defendant’s actions was to disrupt the contract. The tort is shown even where ‘the actor does not act for the purpose of interfering with the contract or desire it but knows that the interference is certain or substantially certain to occur as a result of his [or her] action.’ ” (Jenni Rivera Enterprises, LLC v. Latin World Entertainment Holdings, Inc. (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 766, 782 (Jenni Rivera).)

“The fact that this interference with the other’s contract was not desired and was purely incidental in character is, however, a factor to be considered in determining whether the interference is improper. If the actor is not acting criminally nor with fraud or violence or other means wrongful in themselves but is endeavoring to advance some interest of his own, the fact that he is aware that he will cause interference with the plaintiff’s contract may be regarded as such a minor and incidental consequence and so far removed from the defendant’s objective that as against the plaintiff the interference may be found to be not improper.” (Quelimane, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 56.)

“Whether the interference was justified as merely incidental to the defendant’s legitimate pursuit of his own interests is a question of fact.” (Tuchscher Development Enterprises, Inc. v. San Diego Unified Port Dist. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1239.) “It is only where reasonable minds can draw but one conclusion from the evidence that the question [of fact] becomes a matter of law.” (Wozniak v. Peninsula Hospital (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 716, 725.)

According to First American, intent to interfere with the Guarantee Agreement cannot be established from the Confidential Settlement Agreement because “[t]he Confidential Settlement Agreement contains a general confidentiality provision that does not identify Henry Aguila by name,” “[t]he Confidential Settlement Agreement does not prohibit PRFMI from crediting the settlement payment against any obligation owed by Henry Aguila under the Guaranty Agreement,” and “[t]he Confidential Settlement Agreement does not require PRFMI to continue seeking the $1.1 million from Aguila under the Guaranty Agreement.” (SSUF, Undisputed Nos. 14, 16, Disputed No. 15.)

First American is correct that the $1.1 million settlement payment was not expressly conditioned on no credit being given towards Aguila’s liability under the Guarantee Agreement. (Burnett Decl., Ex. J, § 1.3.) First American argues that it therefore did not “intend to cause the result” or act “with the specific intent to induce any alleged breach of the Guaranty agreement.” (Motion, p. 6, ll. 20-22, p. 8, ll. 2-3.)

First American cites Ramona Manor Convalescent Hospital v. Care Enterprises (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 1120, 1131, which concluded that intent to interfere requires “that the defendant act with culpable intent” and “it is essential that plaintiff … prove that the defendant intended to induce a breach ….” However, subsequent case law from the California Supreme Court establishes that intent under this cause of action includes circumstances “in which the actor does not act for the purpose of interfering with the contract or desire it but knows that the interference is certain or substantially certain to occur as a result of his action….” (Quelimane, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 56.)

First American has not carried its burden of persuasion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) The element of intent focuses on what was substantially certain to occur, not what was expressly stated in writing. (Jenni Rivera, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 782.) Whether PRFMI was required to continue to seek the $1.1 million settlement payment from Aguila is different from whether, as a matter of substantial certainty, PRFMI would do so. First American does not establish what was, or what not, substantially certain to occur after the Confidential Settlement Agreement was executed. First American has not shown that the Second COA’s element of intent fails as a matter of law.

Alternatively, Aguila raises a triable issue of fact on the element of intent. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) A reasonable trier of fact could infer from the circumstances and the language in section 1.3 of the Confidential Settlement Agreement that (a) First American would not grant written authorization for PRFMI to reduce the $1.1 million portion of Aguila’s outstanding obligations assigned to First American, (b) part of First American’s motivation to include terms in section 1.3 pertaining to collection priority was to make Aguila ultimately bear the expense of the $1.1 million settlement payment through collection proceedings, and (c) it was substantially certain that PRFMI would seek to collect the entire amount from Aguila rather than giving him credit for the $1.1 million settlement payment. (First American’s Sep. Stat. Re Aguila’s Add. Facts (SS Add. Facts), Add. Undisputed Nos. 1-4, 8-11, Add. Disputed Nos. 5-7.)

“Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law.” (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839.) “[S]ummary judgment shall not be granted by the court based on inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence if contradicted by other inferences.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)

For all the foregoing reasons, the court will deny First American’s motion.

(3) First American’s Evidentiary Objections

“In granting or denying a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, the court need rule only on those objections to evidence that it deems material to its disposition of the motion….” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (q).) First American objects on the basis of the litigation privilege as to the Confidential Settlement Agreement and related communications supporting Aguila’s additional fact numbers four through eight. The litigation privilege under Civil Code section 47 is not an evidentiary privilege. (Oren Royal Oaks Venture v. Greenberg, Bernhard, Weiss & Karma, Inc. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1157, 1168.) These objections are also overruled given that First American cited to the Confidential Settlement Agreement in support of its motion. (See SSUF, Undisputed Nos. 12, 14, 16, Disputed No. 15.) A privilege “may not be used both as a sword and a shield.” (People ex rel. Herrera v. Stender (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 614, 647.)

(4) First American’s Request for Judicial Notice

First American requests that the court take judicial notice of (a) the complaint in the Guarantee Lawsuit, (b) Aguila’s second amended cross-complaint in the Guarantee Lawsuit, (c) the Stipulated Judgment entered in the Guarantee Lawsuit, (d) Aguila’s motion to vacate in the Guarantee Lawsuit, (e) the court’s order denying Aguila’s motion to vacate in the Guarantee Lawsuit, (f) the appeal court’s order affirming the denial of Aguila’s motion to vacate in the Guarantee Lawsuit, (g) the complaint in Title Lawsuit (h) notice of settlement in the Title Lawsuit, and (i) Aguila’s TAC in this action.

The court will take judicial notice of exhibits A through H attached to the request for judicial notice (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)(1).) The court does not need to take judicial notice of the operative TAC in this action—a citation is sufficient. The court therefore denies the request as to exhibit I.

To the extent granted, judicial notice of the documents described above extends to the existence of court records but does not extend to the truth of facts contained in the documents that are subject to dispute or to any hearsay or irrelevant matter. (See Johnson & Johnson v Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 768 (Johnson & Johnson.)

(5) First American’s Motion to File Under Seal

“The public has a First Amendment right of access to civil litigation documents filed in court and used at trial or submitted as a basis for adjudication.” (Savaglio v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 588, 596.) “Substantive courtroom proceedings in ordinary civil cases, and the transcripts and records pertaining to these proceedings, are ‘presumptively open.’ ” (Id. at p. 597.)

These standards are embodied in the California Rules of Court:

“The court may order that a record be filed under seal only if it expressly finds facts that establish:

“(1) There exists an overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to the record;

“(2) The overriding interest supports sealing the record;

“(3) A substantial probability exists that the overriding interest will be prejudiced if the record is not sealed;

“(4) The proposed sealing is narrowly tailored; and

“(5) No less restrictive means exist to achieve the overriding interest.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.550(d).)

“A party requesting that a record be filed under seal must file a motion or an application for an order sealing the record. The motion or application must be accompanied by a memorandum and a declaration containing facts sufficient to justify the sealing.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.551(b)(1).)

Here, First American justifies its request to seal substantial portions of the Confidential Settlement Agreement because “[p]ublic disclosure of those confidential terms would prejudice First American’s ability to negotiate future settlements on fair and individualized terms. Disclosure of the financial consideration and other material terms would give third parties insight into First American’s settlement strategy and impair its position in unrelated matters.” (Burnett Decl., ¶ 8.) “In accordance with the parties’ confidentiality agreement, First American is submitting a redacted version of the Settlement Agreement for the public file.” (Id. at ¶ 7.)

The Confidential Settlement Agreement was one of the primary bases for the court’s ruling on First American’s motion for summary judgment. The public’s interest in viewing this document is significant. The parties’ dispute in this motion for summary judgment focuses on section 1.3 of the Confidential Settlement Agreement. This section is critical to the parties’ arguments and the court’s reasoning.

Some of the material terms of the Confidential Settlement Agreement have been discussed openly by the parties. (SSUF, Undisputed Nos. 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16; SS Add. Facts, Add. Undisputed Nos. 3 & 8, Add. Disputed Nos. 5 & 7.) Aside from section 1.3, most of the terms which have not yet been made public appear to be standard settlement terms. None of the undisclosed terms appear to be the type of sensitive information that should be filed under seal.

First American has not demonstrated an overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to this record. “The court must not permit a record to be filed under seal based solely on the agreement or stipulation of the parties.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.551(a).

For all these reasons, First American’s motion to file under seal is denied.

(6) First American’s Answer to the TAC

On January 6, 2025, First American was “directed to file and serve its answer to the TAC no later than January 16, 2025.” (Minute Order, January 6, 2025.) The court notes that its files do not reflect an answer to the TAC by First American.

(7) PRFMI and MCSB’s Motion to Sever

PRFMI and MCSB move to sever three of its affirmative defenses including the first defense that Aguila has failed to state a cause of action, the third defense that Aguila has released the claims at issue in this action, and the fourth defense that the contractual rights under the Guarantee Agreement have been merged into the Stipulated Judgment. (Answer to TAC.)

PRFMI and MCSB argue that these affirmative defenses raise legal issues that must be resolved by the court before any trial on the factual disputes. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 592.) Moreover, they argue that the court should exercise its discretion to sever these defenses in the name of judicial efficiency and convenience of the parties and witnesses. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 597, 598 & 1048.) The court agrees in part with PRFMI and MCSB.

“In actions for … money claimed as due upon contract, or as damages for breach of contract … an issue of fact must be tried by a jury, unless a jury trial is waived … Where in these cases there are issues both of law and fact, the issue of law must be first disposed of….” (Code Civ. Proc., § 592.) Aguila is requesting a trial by jury in this matter. (Aguila Case Mgt. Stmts., filed June 7, 2023 & Oct. 23, 2025.) PRFMI, MCSB and First American are requesting a court trial.

“When the right to jury trial exists, it provides the right to have a jury try and determine issues of fact. (Code Civ. Proc., § 592; Evid. Code, § 312.) Even in such cases, issues of law are to be determined by the court, rather than a jury.” (Shaw v. Superior Court (2017) 2 Cal.5th 983, 993.) “An issue of law must be tried by the court, unless it is referred upon consent ….” (Code Civ. Proc., § 591.)

As to PRFMI and MCSB’s first affirmative defense, according to PRFMI and MCSB the remedy of setoff must be sought by Aguila pursuant to the judgment satisfaction procedures under Code of Civil Procedure sections 724.010 through 724.100. “Interpretation of a statute is a question of law.” (Harbor Fumigation, Inc. v. County of San Diego Air Pollution Control Dist. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 854, 859.) “All questions of law (including but not limited to questions concerning the construction of statutes and other writings, the admissibility of evidence, and other rules of evidence) are to be decided by the court.” (Evid. Code, § 310.)

PRFMI and MCSB’s third affirmative defense for release states in part that “plaintiff has released and fully discharged these answering defendants from any liability, responsibility, or claim of damage of whatever nature, whether as alleged in the Second [sic] Amended Complaint, or otherwise, or at all.” (Answer to TAC, p. 2, ll. 10-14.) PRFMI and MCSB argue that Aguila unambiguously released the contractual rights he asserts in the TAC by executing the written settlement of the Guarantee Lawsuit. (See Woosley Decl., Ex. B.)

“The interpretation of a contract is a question of law when the contract terms are unambiguous. However, when extrinsic evidence is required to determine the intent of the parties to the contract, the interpretation becomes a question of fact for the trier of fact.” (Abifadel v. Cigna Ins. Co. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 145, 159.) “Interpretation of a written instrument becomes solely a judicial function only when it is based on the words of the instrument alone, when there is no conflict in the extrinsic evidence, or when a determination was made based on incompetent evidence.” (City of Hope National Medical Center v. Genentech, Inc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 375, 395.)

PRFMI and MCSB’s fourth affirmative defense of merger states in part that “plaintiff’s claims, to the extent they ever existed, were merged into the Stipulated Judgment entered into by, and against, the plaintiff.” (Answer to TAC, p. 2, ll. 15-18.) “The interpretation of the effect of a judgment is a question of law … In case of doubt regarding the meaning or consequence of a judgment, or any part of it, the whole record may be examined to ascertain the meaning.” (John Siebel Associates v. Keele (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 560, 565.)

PRFMI and MCSB have demonstrated that issues of law may exist as to their first, third, and fourth affirmative defenses. The court will, therefore, address any questions of law pertaining to these issues before any jury trial in this action. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 592.) This ruling makes no finding on the scope or merits of any legal issues asserted by PRFMI and MCSB or whether Aguila has a right to jury trial in this action.

Severance of these affirmative defenses as to factual disputes is not warranted based on judicial efficiency or convenience of the parties or witnesses. The factual issues raised by PRFMI and MCSB’s affirmative defenses overlap substantially with the factual issues raised by Aguila’s cause of action for breach of the implied covenant. (See CACI No. 325.)

(8) PRFMI and MCSB’s Request for Judicial Notice

The court will take judicial notice of exhibit 1 (the complaint in the Guarantee Lawsuit) and exhibit 2 (Stipulated Judgment) attached to PRFMI and MCSB’s request for judicial notice. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)(1).) These documents provided useful background information pertaining to this motion.

Courts may decline to take judicial notice of matters that are not material to the resolution of the issues before the court. (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 544, fn. 4.) “[J]judicial notice, since it is a substitute for proof [citation], is always confined to those matters which are relevant to the issue at hand.” (Mangini v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063.) PRFMI and MCSB’s request is denied as to exhibits 3 (order denying Aguila’s motion to vacate in the Guarantee Lawsuit), exhibit 4 (appellate order affirming denial of order denying motion to vacate) and exhibit 5 (order on demurrer to Aguila’s first amended complaint in this action).

Judicial Branch of California

Notice: