Brian A Goldsworthy vs General Motors LLC

Case Number

22CV03371

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 12/20/2024 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion: Attorneys Fees

Tentative Ruling

For all reasons discussed herein, the motion of plaintiff for attorney’s fees and costs is granted, in part. The Court awards plaintiff attorney’s fees in the amount of $55,427. Except as granted herein, the motion is otherwise denied.

Background:

On August 31, 2022, plaintiff Brian A. Goldsworthy filed a complaint against defendant General Motors LLC (GM), alleging five causes of action: (1) violation of subdivision (d) of Civil Code section 1793.2; (2) violation of subdivision (b) of Civil Code section 1793.2; (3) violation of subdivision (a)(3) of Civil Code section 1793.2; (4) breach of express warranty (Civ. Code sections 1791.2, subd. (a), and 1794); and (5) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability (Civ. Code sections 1791.1 and 1794). As alleged in the complaint:

On December 1, 2020, plaintiff purchased a 2020 GMC Sierra 1500 (the vehicle) which was manufactured and distributed by GM. (Complaint, ¶ 6.) In connection with the purchase of the vehicle, plaintiff received an express written warranty which provided that in the event a defect developed during the warranty period, plaintiff could deliver the vehicle for repair services to GM’s representative and the vehicle would be repaired. (Id. at ¶ 10.)

After plaintiff took possession of the vehicle and during the warranty period, the vehicle developed defects which impaired the use, safety, and value of the vehicle and which violated express and implied warranties. (Complaint, ¶¶ 11-13, 17.) Plaintiff presented the vehicle for repair to GM and its representatives and gave GM sufficient opportunity to repair the vehicle, but GM was unable or failed to service or repair the vehicle within a reasonable number of attempts. (Id. at ¶¶ 14, 15, 20, 21)

On October 31, 2022, GM filed its answer to plaintiff’s complaint generally denying its allegations and asserting twenty-five affirmative defenses.

On March 14, 2024, plaintiff filed a notice of conditional settlement of the entire case.

On July 16, 2024, the parties filed a joint stipulation for dismissal of the action with jurisdiction to enforce the parties’ settlement terms under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6. On the same date, the Court entered an order dismissing the action without prejudice and retaining jurisdiction under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 to enforce the terms of the parties’ settlement agreement.

Also on July 16, 2024, plaintiff filed a memorandum of costs claiming costs in the amount of $1,598.59.

On October 1, 2024, plaintiff filed a motion for an order awarding to plaintiff attorney’s fees and costs in the total amount of $57,561.09, on the grounds that plaintiff is the prevailing party in this action under Civil Code section 1791 et seq. (the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act or Song-Beverly)

In support of the motion, plaintiff submits the declaration of his counsel, Jordan G. Cohen (Cohen), who is a partner at Consumer Law Experts, P.C. (CLE), counsel of record for plaintiff, and the primary attorney for this matter. (Cohen Decl., ¶¶ 1 & 9.) Cohen states that plaintiff retained CLE in May 2022 with respect to a breach of warranty claim against GM pursuant to Song-Beverly. (Id. at ¶ 5.) CLE took plaintiff’s case on a contingency basis and advanced all costs and fees incurred to litigate this action. (Id. at ¶ 6.)

Cohen provides a brief summary of what Cohen describes as key litigation events relating to appearances at case management conferences and a March 15, 2024, trial confirmation conference, and discovery proceedings. (Cohen Decl., ¶ 8.)

Cohen further states that in March 2024, GM agreed to repurchase the vehicle and pay to plaintiff the amount of $111,000 plus attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to a noticed motion. (Cohen Decl., ¶ 8(c).) In the parties’ final settlement agreement (the settlement agreement), GM agreed that plaintiff is the prevailing party for purposes of a fee motion brought under subdivision (d) of Civil Code section 1794. (Ibid. & Exh. A [settlement agreement].)

Cohen also provides a description of his background and experience, and the background and experience of Jessica Anvar, the founder and managing attorney of CLE who performed prelitigation services in this action. (Cohen Decl., ¶¶ 9-10.) Cohen asserts that it is the regular practice of CLE to bill time expended in one-tenth of an hour increments together with the date and description of work performed, to complete all time billing entries contemporaneously with each dated entry, and to accurately set forth the actual time expended for matter reflected in each entry. (Id. at ¶ 14.) Cohen submits as exhibit I to the Cohen declaration a summary of the contemporaneous computerized billing records of CLE identifying the number of attorney hours expended to litigate this case which Cohen has reviewed and audited for unnecessary, duplicative, or excessive entries. (Ibid.)

Cohen also anticipates that plaintiff will incur additional attorney’s fees in the amount of $3,150 for time spent to review, analyze, and reply to the anticipated opposition of GM to the motion, and to appear at the hearing on the motion. (Cohen Decl., ¶ 15.)

The motion is opposed by GM.

Analysis:

If authorized by contract, statute, or law, reasonable attorney’s fees are allowable costs, and may be awarded upon a noticed motion. (Code Civ. Proc § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10), (c)(5)(A).) Attorney’s fees which are allowable as costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(10), shall be fixed by the Court. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1033.5(c)(5)(A).) Under subdivision (d) of Civil Code section 1794, a buyer who prevails in an action under Song-Beverly “shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).)

The undisputed record before the Court shows that under the terms of the settlement agreement, GM agreed to pay plaintiff’s attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses reasonably incurred in the action, in an amount to be determined by the Court by way of a noticed motion, and that that plaintiff is the prevailing party for purposes of such noticed motion. (Cohen Decl., Exh. A at ¶ 3(a)(iii).) In its opposition to the present motion, GM does not dispute plaintiff’s entitlement to an award of attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses, and instead directs its opposition solely to whether or not the attorney’s fees requested by plaintiff in the motion were reasonably incurred, excessive, or compensable.

“It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion.” (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623.) To determine the amount of a reasonable attorney’s fee, the court first calculates the “lodestar” by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1134-1135; Meister v. Regents of University of California (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 437, 448-449.) The lodestar method “anchors the trial court’s analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney’s services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary.” (Lealao v. Beneficial California, Inc. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 19, 41; PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) 

The court generally begins its lodestar analysis by reviewing the attorney’s time records which, if verified, are “entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous[.]” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396 (Horsford); see also Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 562-563 [if a fee request is supported by sufficient declarations and documentation, a challenge to the request requires similar proof].) Though “the predicate of any attorney fee award … is the necessity and usefulness of the conduct for which compensation is sought”, the court must exercise its discretion so as to fully compensate the attorney for the services provided to the client, which may also include fees incurred to pursue a claim for attorney’s fees. (Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819, 846, italics omitted; Horsford, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at pp. 395-396; Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 580.)

Plaintiff has provided a copy of the billing records of CLE for this litigation which includes a breakdown of the hours expended by attorneys Cohen and Anvar and by paralegals Elaine Astorga, Kathy Carreno, David Gomez, and Clarence Serrano. (Cohen Decl., Exh. I.) The hourly rates for Cohen and Anvar are, respectively, $525 and $500. (Ibid.) The hourly rates for the paralegals identified above and in exhibit I are $200. (Ibid.) As noted above, Cohen attests to the educational and professional background, training, and experience of Cohen and Anvar and to the accuracy of the information appearing in the billing records as to each attorney and law clerk who expended and recorded time in this litigation.

GM contends in a conclusory manner that the hourly rates charged by Cohen and Anvar are not reasonable for attorneys in Santa Barbara County with experience litigating Song-Beverly claims, that there is no evidence to show that a court in Santa Barbara County has approved counsel’s hourly rates, and that the orders and rulings attached to the Cohen declaration as exhibits B through G, each of which were entered in unrelated actions filed in other California courts, show that other courts have approved a lower hourly rate for Cohen’s time.

The isolated written trial court rulings attached to the Cohen declaration have “no precedential value” and “cannot properly be cited in support of a legal argument, absent exceptions not applicable here.” (Santa Ana Hospital Medical Center v. Belshe (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 819, 831; San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. v. County of San Diego (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1163, 1184.) Furthermore, court orders issued in other actions which are not in any way related to the present action have no relevance to the question of whether the attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses incurred and sought in this case are compensable. (Evid. Code, § 350; Mangini v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063, overruled on other grounds in In re Tobacco Cases II (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1257, 1276.)

Moreover, based on its own familiarity with the relevant legal market and information provided by Cohen regarding the skill and relevant experience of counsel for plaintiff, the Court finds the hourly rates charged by CLE attorneys to be reasonable for both the Santa Barbara and Los Angeles areas. (In re Tobacco Cases I (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 570, 587-588 (In re Tobacco Cases I) [the trial court may also rely on its own experience and knowledge to determine the reasonable value of the attorney’s services].)

The hours expended by CLE in connection with this litigation at the hourly rates further described above total 110.5. (Cohen Decl., Exh. I.) Available information and evidence indicates that the billing records submitted by plaintiff reflect the actual time billed by each attorney and paralegal identified above and recorded contemporaneously with the described services, and have been audited to remove fees which may be unnecessary, duplicative, or excessive. (Id. at ¶ 14.) Because there is no information appearing on the face of the billing records submitted by plaintiff which would suggest that the records are erroneous or inaccurate, they are entitled to credence. (Horsford, supra, 132 Cal. App. 4th at p. 396.)

In its opposition to the motion, GM advances several arguments to challenge the reasonableness of the hours expended by CLE attorneys and paralegals in this litigation. First, GM asserts that CLE has relied on what GM describes as “templated” motions, discovery drafts, and meet and confer letters which, according to GM, CLE regularly utilizes to litigate Song-Beverly actions against GM, and for which CLE has requested and been granted attorney’s fees in the other Song-Beverly actions. To support this argument, GM submits the declaration of its counsel, Sandra Habib (Habib), who identifies purportedly standard, “template-based” or “stock” discovery requests, deposition notices, meet and confer letters, objections to discovery requests, as well as motions to compel further responses to discovery, compliance with court orders, and for sanctions which GM contends were used by CLE in this action. (Habib Decl., ¶¶ 4-7, 9-12, & Exhs. A-V.) GM also submits a list of fee motions filed by CLE against GM from November 2023 to November 2024 in other courts. (Id. at ¶ 16 & Exh. X.)

GM argues that the use of these “templates” for which CLE has already recovered attorney’s fees in other actions demonstrates the existence of multiple inefficiencies and “padded” billing entries. For this reason, GM argues, the attorney’s fees requested in the fee motion are excessive and unreasonable, and should be reduced by the hours set forth in pages 9 through 10 of the opposition.

Even if the Court were to credit GM’s arguments and assume their truth, the use of templates or forms which have been previously prepared or used by CLE in similar litigation would suggest to the Court that the time expended by CLE in this action was efficient, as opposed to circumstances under which CLE created entirely new documents or forms for each new case. Further, the Court would expect counsel to expend time to review and modify any previously prepared forms or templates to conform each document to the specific facts and theories alleged in each different case. For these reasons, the Court does not find that the entries identified by GM necessarily reflect that CLE expended excessive or unreasonable time to prepare documents, or that the fees incurred for these entries warrant the significant and, in some cases, wholesale reductions proposed by GM.

The Court is also not persuaded by the remaining arguments offered by GM with respect to the manner in which CLE staffed this case, whether tasks could or should have been completed by clerical staff rather than paralegals, whether any delay by CLE increased the time expended in this litigation, whether any “block billed” time is improper, and whether time expended on various tasks is accurate. To the extent there exists block billing in the records submitted by plaintiff, these entries are sufficiently itemized and not so vague so as to prevent the Court from determining whether the described tasks are compensable or whether the hours expended were unreasonable or excessive. (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1010; Mountjoy v. Bank of America, N.A. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 279.) There is also no information to show that other staff apart from paralegals could have completed tasks in a more efficient manner, or that the time spent by paralegals was not reasonable. (See Sundance v. Municipal Court (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 268, 274-275 [general discussion of compensable paralegal time].)

The same analysis applies with respect to plaintiff’s request for additional fees for time to review, analyze, and draft a reply to the opposition of GM to the motion and to appear at the hearing. The declaration of attorney Jasmine Song (Song) submitted in reply shows that Song expended 6.3 hours to analyze the opposition of GM to the motion and to draft the reply. (Song Decl., ¶ 7.) The Court finds that 6.3 hours for these tasks at Song’s hourly rate of $415 is reasonable.

For all reasons further discussed above, the Court finds that an award of attorney’s fees in the total amount of $55,427 is reasonable based on the hours spent by plaintiff’s counsel on this matter, counsel’s hourly rates, the nature of this litigation, plaintiff’s success, and counsel’s experience in the type of work demanded. (See In re Tobacco Cases I, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at pp. 581-582, 587.) Therefore, the Court will grant the motion, in part, and award to plaintiff attorney’s fees in the amount of $55,427.

Plaintiff’s claim for costs:

In the motion, plaintiff also requests an award of costs in the amount of $1,598.59. As further detailed above, the Court’s records reflect that plaintiff filed a memorandum of costs on July 16, 2024. Although GM references a motion to strike costs in its opposition to the motion (see opp. at p. 4, fn. 1), there is no such motion on file with the Court or appearing in the Court’s docket for this action. The Court also has no record of the filing of a notice of entry of dismissal by any party to this action. Therefore, the Court will address any claim for costs made by plaintiff pursuant to the procedures set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 3.1700.