Maria Azari vs Covenant Living West Inc

Case Number

22CV01556

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 02/13/2026 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motions to Quash

Tentative Ruling

For the reasons set forth herein, plaintiff’s motions to quash subpoenas are granted in part and denied in part. The subpoenas will each be modified to seek:

“1. Employment records and files relating to Maria Azari that include, but are limited to, job description, performance evaluations, disciplinary actions, and payroll records from May 1, 2021 to present.”

Any records obtained by defendant, as a result of the subpoenas, shall be subject to a protective order and shall not be used or disseminated for any purpose other than the present action.

This order is without prejudice should further discovery reveal that additional employment records are relevant to plaintiff’s claims or prayer for damages.

No monetary sanctions shall be issued in favor of or against any party.

Background:

This action was commenced on April 22, 2022, by plaintiff Maria Azari (“plaintiff” or “Azari”) against her former employer Covenant Living West, Inc. (“defendant” or “Covenant Living”), by the filing of her original complaint.

The complaint asserted seven causes of action as follows: (1) Failure to provide meal and rest periods. (2) Failure to pay overtime wages. (3) Failure to pay final wages. (4) Failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements. (5) Failure to pay wages when due. (6) Unfair Business Practices. (7) Unlawful retaliation.

On April 19, 2024, the court granted defendants motion for judgment on the pleadings, with leave to amend as to those claims which are alleged under or based on Labor Code section 1102.5.

On April 23, 2024, Azari filed a first amended complaint alleging one cause of action against Covenant Living for retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5 et seq.

On June 24, 2024, with leave of court, Azari filed a second amended complaint (“SAC”), also alleging one cause of action against Covenant Living for retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5 et seq. As alleged in the operative SAC:

Azari was hired by Covenant Living as a Certified Nursing Assistant (CNA) in April 2017. (SAC, ¶ 8.) Covenant Living set the daily tasks, work duties, and rate of pay of Azari who was to be compensated at the rate of $17.12 per hour. (Id. at ¶¶ 9-10.) For six to eight months, Azari, who worked in excess of 8 hours per day and 40 hours per week, was not paid overtime wages and was not permitted to take meal or rest breaks because Covenant Living was understaffed. (Id. at ¶¶ 12-15.) In addition, Covenant Living failed to keep accurate records of Azari’s hours of work and meal breaks, to maintain such records for three years, and to provide accurate, itemized wage statements showing the number of hours worked. (Id. at ¶¶ 17-18.)

On May 16, 2021, Azari and four of her co-workers told the administrator of Covenant Living that it was unfair to assign 120 patients to only five CNAs because it did not enable them to provide the necessary standard of care to the patients without foregoing meal and rest breaks and requiring them to work overtime for which they were not being paid. (SAC, ¶ 16.) The administrator of Covenant Living “brushed them off laughingly telling them they would have a ‘pizza party’ and ordered them to get back to work.” (Ibid.) Azari also informed Covenant Living’s then supervising nurse, Michelle, that due to being short staffed, CNAs and nurses had developed a routine of “splitting” the checking of residents’ vital signs and that disregarding this routine would result in missed meal and rest breaks and unpaid overtime hours. (Id. at ¶¶ 19-20.)

Michelle told Azari that she had to listen to her nurse and brought up a grudge that Michelle evidently held against Azari from a previous conversation during which Azari had tried to persuade Michelle to find nurses to cover for those who called off work when they were short-staffed. (SAC, ¶¶ 20.) After becoming visibly annoyed during the conversation with Azari, Michelle ordered Azari to take a five-minute break, and a couple of minutes later, told Azari to leave, stating that Azari would be called to come into work the next day. (Id. at ¶ 22.)

Azari was not called back into work the next day. (SAC, ¶ 23.) Azari called the Human Resource Director of Covenant Living asking if she could come into work, but the Human Resource Director alleged that Azari had abandoned her job without permission or notice and accused Azari of refusing to care for the residents. (Ibid.) Azari explained what happened the day prior. (Id. at ¶ 24.) Though the Human Resource Director said she would call Azari back after an investigation, Azari received a letter 10 days later stating that Azari had been terminated on as of four days prior to the day Michelle demanded that Azari leave the work location. (Id. at ¶ 25.) (Note: Paragraphs 25 and 26 of the SAC appear to include typographical errors with respect to the date Azari was terminated.)

On July 24, 2024, Covenant Living filed a demurrer to the SAC on the grounds that the sole cause of action alleged in the SAC was barred by the res judicata impact of the Lopez settlement and that Azari had failed to allege facts sufficient to state a claim for retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5. Covenant Living also filed a motion to strike the prayer for punitive damages in the SAC.

On October 25, 2024, the demurrer was overruled and the motion to strike was denied.

On November 7, 2024, Covenant Living filed its answer to the SAC asserting a general denial and 24 affirmative defenses.

In September 2025, Covenant Living served subpoenas on Covenant Care California, LLC (“CCC”), Comfort Senior Care, LLC (“CSC”), and Doctor’s Medical Center of Modesto, Inc. (“DMC”). Following unsuccessful meet and confer efforts, plaintiff now moves to quash the subpoenas, arguing that the subpoenas are overbroad and violate her privacy rights.

Covenant Living opposes the motions.

Analysis:

As an initial matter, with respect to the motion to quash subpoena directed at the records of CCC, defendant argues that the motion is untimely and moot. However, the timing language included in Code of Civil Procedure section 1985.3, subdivision (g) is permissive. The word “may” is used rather than “shall.” “A motion to quash is typically filed before the time for production (see, e.g., Code Civ. Proc., § 1985.3, subd. (g)), but the court has authority to consider the motion even if brought after the date for production. [Citation.]” (In re R.R. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1278.) The court will consider the motion along with the other two.

“Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with this title, any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the action. Discovery may be obtained of the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter, as well as of the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any document, electronically stored information, tangible thing, or land or other property.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.)

“A trial court must be mindful of the Legislature’s preference for discovery over trial by surprise, [and] must construe the facts before it liberally in favor of discovery. . .” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 540.)

“If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, electronically stored information, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the court’s own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1, subd. (a).)

“The state has two substantial interests in regulating pretrial discovery. The first is to facilitate the search for truth and promote justice. The second is to protect the legitimate privacy interests of the litigants and third parties. [Citation.] “ ‘The interest in truth and justice is promoted by allowing liberal discovery of information in the possession of the opposing party. [Citation.] The interest in privacy is promoted by restricting the procurement or dissemination of information from the opposing party upon a showing of ‘ “good cause.” ’ [Citations.]” The trial court is in the best position to weigh fairly the competing needs and interests of parties affected by discovery. [Citation.]” (Stadish v. Superior Court (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1130, 1145.)

The subpoenas issued to CCC, CSC, and DMC all seek the same categories of records. Those records are:

“1) All employment records and files relating to Maria Azari (including their job description, personnel file, job performance evaluations, disciplinary actions, leave file, workers’ compensation files, payroll records, separation and/or severance agreements) from May 1, 2021 to Present.

2) All communications (including but not limited to emails and text messages) between Maria Azari and [Entity Name] (including but not limited to officers, executive management, and staff) regarding all complaints, grievances, petitions, or charges made by Maria Azari relating to claims of retaliation and wage-related violations in their employment from May 1, 2021 to Present.”

“The state Constitution expressly grants Californians a right of privacy. [Citation.] Protection of informational privacy is the provision’s central concern. [Citation.] In [Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1], we established a framework for evaluating potential invasions of privacy. The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious. [Citation.] The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. A court must then balance these competing considerations.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th 531at p. 552.)

Defendant makes repeated arguments that plaintiff has waived her privacy rights. As plaintiff accurately points out, she has not waived all her privacy rights.

“In determining whether one has waived the right of privacy by bringing suit, our Supreme Court has noted that although there may be an implicit partial waiver, the scope of such waiver must be narrowly, rather than expansively construed, so that plaintiffs will not be unduly deterred from instituting lawsuits by fear of exposure of private activities. (Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 842, 239 Cal.Rptr. 292, 740 P.2d 404, quoting Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 859, 143 Cal.Rptr. 695, 574 P.2d 766.) An implicit waiver of a party’s constitutional rights encompasses only discovery directly relevant to the plaintiff’s claim and essential to the fair resolution of the lawsuit. (Vinson v. Superior Court, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 842, 239 Cal.Rptr. 292, 740 P.2d 404.) There must be a compelling and opposing state interest justifying the discovery. (Britt v. Superior Court, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 855, 143 Cal.Rptr. 695, 574 P.2d 766.) Even when discovery of private information is found directly relevant to the issues of ongoing litigation, it will not be automatically allowed; there must then be a careful balancing of the compelling public need for discovery against the fundamental right of privacy. [Citation.] The scope of any disclosure must be narrowly circumscribed, drawn with narrow specificity, and must proceed by the least intrusive manner. [Citation.]” (Davis v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1014.)

The critical inquiry here is what categories of documents are directly relevant. Certainly, as defendant argues, mitigation of damages is directly relevant to plaintiff’s claims.

Misconduct resulting in the loss of a subsequent comparable, or substantially similar, job may constitute a failure to mitigate damages. (see Alexander v. Community Hospital of Long Beach (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 238, 266-267.) As such, plaintiff’s job performance evaluations and disciplinary records are relevant and discoverable.

Plaintiff does not appear to dispute that dates of employment and wages earned are relevant, as she agreed to the limitation of the subpoenas to “plaintiff’s payroll records, which would reflect Plaintiff’s dates of employment and wage earnings.” (Yellin Decl., ¶ 6 & Exh. B, p. 4.)

Defendant has demonstrated that relevant, and discoverable, documents from plaintiff’s subsequent employers include plaintiff’s job description, performance evaluations, disciplinary actions, and payroll records from May 1, 2021 to present. Defendant has not provided any cogent argument or authority for the production of documents responsive to any of the other categories included in the subpoenas. As such, the subpoenas will be modified to only seek documents seeking plaintiff’s job descriptions, performance evaluations, disciplinary actions, and payroll records from May 1, 2021 to present.

Both plaintiff and defendant seek sanctions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.2. As the motion will be partially granted and partially denied, the imposition of sanctions, at this time, would be unjust.