Austin Buist et al vs The State of California, Department of Transportation et al

Case Number

20CV03089

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 12/19/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Pro Hac Vice; Motion for Summary Judgment

Tentative Ruling

For the reasons discussed herein:

1. Defendant Robin Harlan’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
2. Defendants’ Applications for Orders Permitting Travis S. Gamble and Wayne B. Mason, of the law firm of Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, to appear in this action pro hac vice, are  granted.

Background:

This action arises out of a vehicle collision that occurred on U.S. Highway 101 (the highway) at the intersection (the intersection) of Las Varas Ranch Access Road (Las Varas) in an unincorporated area of Santa Barbara County north of the City of Goleta. The operative pleading is the Second Amended Complaint (SAC) filed on December 16, 2020, by plaintiffs Austin Buist and Maverick Buist, who is a minor, individually and as heirs at law and successors in interest to Allyson Jean Buist, who is deceased, and the Estate of Allyson Jean Buist. (Note: For ease of reference, the court will refer to plaintiffs and decedent by their first names. No disrespect is intended.) The SAC alleges eight causes of action: (1) negligence/negligence per se (against defendants Garrett Staab (Staab) and Spirit Flow, Inc. (Spirit Flow)); (2) dangerous condition of property (against defendant the State of California, Department of Transportation (Caltrans)); (3) negligent infliction of emotional distress-bystander (against Staab, Spirit Flow, and defendants Toyota Motor Corporation, Toyota Motor Engineering & Manufacturing North America, Inc., Toyota Motor North America Inc., Toyota Motor Manufacturing, California, Inc., and Toyota Motor Sales USA, Inc.); (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress-direct victim (against Staab, Spirit Flow, and the Toyota defendants identified above); (5) negligence-product liability (against the Toyota defendants identified above); (6) strict product liability (against the Toyota defendants identified above); (7) breach of express warranty (against the Toyota defendants identified above); and, (8) breach of implied warranty (against the Toyota defendants identified above). Pursuant to the court’s order dated January 4, 2022, this matter is related to Santa Barbara Superior Court case number 21CV03400 entitled Anthony M. Koehl vs. Garrett Staab.

As alleged in the SAC, on September 10, 2019, Austin, Maverick, and Allyson were in a Toyota vehicle traveling southbound on the highway approaching the intersection. At the same time, Staab was travelling northbound on the highway. At the intersection, which is owned or controlled by Caltrans, the highway has a speed limit of 65 miles per hour and consists of two southbound lanes and two northbound lanes with designated left turn lanes onto Las Varas for both northbound and southbound traffic. Staab, who was employed by and running business errands for Spirit Flow, was travelling northbound on the highway. After missing his exit, Staab made a left U-turn at Las Varas, turning in front of Austin who, despite taking evasive maneuvers, was unable to avoid colliding with Staab’s vehicle. Austin, Maverick, Allyson were each injured in the collision. Allyson later died as a result of her injuries.

Staab, Spirit Flow, Caltrans, Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (Toyota Sales), Toyota Motor Engineering & Manufacturing North America, Inc. (Toyota Engineering), and Toyota Motor Corporation (Toyota Corp.) each filed their answers to the SAC generally denying its allegations and asserting affirmative defenses. Spirit Flow, Staab, Caltrans, Toyota Sales, and Toyota Engineering each filed cross-complaints.

Plaintiffs filed an amendment to the SAC on February 10, 2022, substituting David Alan Zaboski (Zaboski) for Doe 1. Zaboski filed an answer to the SAC on September 13, 2022.

On February 13, 2024, plaintiffs filed and amendment to the SAC substituting Robin Harlan (Harlan) for Doe 2. The causes of action asserted against Harlan are the first cause of action for negligence, the third cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress – bystander, and the fourth cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress – direct victim.

On February 16, 2024, the court granted an application of the Toyota defendants for determination of good faith settlement of the claims of Maverick.

On April 4, 2024, Harlan answered the SAC with a general denial and 11 affirmative defenses.

On April 10, 2023, the court granted an application of Caltrans for determination of good faith settlement. On October 14, 2024, plaintiffs dismissed Caltrans.

On May 10, 2024, the court denied a motion for summary judgment filed by Zaboski.

Harlan now moves for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication, arguing that plaintiffs’ claims rest on a theory of vicarious liability, but that Harlan had no personal involvement, was not present, did not employ or supervise Staab, and had no knowledge of the events leading to the incident.

Plaintiffs oppose Harlan’s motion for summary judgment, arguing that Harlan is the alter ego of Spirit Flow.

Defendants Spirit Flow, Zaboski, and Harlan have also filed applications for orders permitting Travis S. Gamble and Wayne B. Mason, of the law firm of Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, to appear on their behalf in this action as counsel pro hac vice.

 

Analysis:

Summary Judgment Standard

A defendant’s motion for summary judgment asks the court to determine that the entire action has no merit, and to terminate the action without the necessity of a trial. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(a).) The procedure enables the court to look behind the pleadings to determine whether the party against whom the motion is directed has evidence to back up the claims. The court must determine from the evidence presented that there is no triable issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(c).)

The moving party bears the burden of persuasion that that there is no triable issue of material fact, and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) Consequently, a defendant moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that one or more elements of the cause of action in question cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense thereto. (Ibid.) The motion must be supported by evidentiary facts, not merely the ultimate facts. Further, conclusions of fact or law are not sufficient to support a motion for summary judgment. (Snider v. Snider (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 741, 751.) 

Once a moving defendant meets its initial burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to produce evidence to prove the existence of a triable issue of fact regarding that element of its cause of action or the defense at issue in the motion, and if plaintiff is unable to do so, defendant will be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 35 Cal.4th 763, 780-781.)

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must consider all of the evidence and all of the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c)), and must view the evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the opposing party. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at 843.) In examining the sufficiency of the affidavits filed in connection with a summary judgment motion, those filed by the moving party are strictly construed, and those of the opposing party are liberally construed. (D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 20-21.)

In resolving the motion, the court may not weigh the evidence. (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.) Rather, the role of the trial court in resolving a summary judgment motion is to determine whether issues of fact exist, not to decide the merits of the issues. (Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1107; see also Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group) § 10:270.) A triable issue of material fact exists only if the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 850.)

            Role of Pleadings

“The pleadings play a key role in a summary judgment motion.” (Hutton v. Fidelity National Title Co. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 486, 493 (Hutton).) “The materiality of a disputed fact is measured by the pleadings [citations], which ‘set the boundaries of the issues to be resolved at summary judgment.’ [Citations.]” (Conroy v. Regents of University of California (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1244, 1250.) “Accordingly, the burden of a defendant moving for summary judgment only requires that he or she negate plaintiff’s theories of liability as alleged in the complaint; that is, a moving party need not refute liability on some theoretical possibility not included in the pleadings. [Citations.]” (Hutton, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 493.)

Here, as noted above, there are three causes of action asserted against Harlan (as Doe 2), which are all based on negligence.

Plaintiffs readily admit: “Defendant Harlan’s liability is only predicated on her capacity as owner and alter ego of Spirit Flow, Inc.” (Opp., p. 1., ll. 14-15, italics omitted.)

Importantly, although plaintiffs’ argument in opposition to the present motion is based on a theory of alter ego liability, there are no alter ego allegations contained in the SAC.

“ ‘Ordinarily, a corporation is regarded as a legal entity, separate and distinct from its stockholders, officers and directors, with separate and distinct liabilities and obligations. [Citations.]’ ” [Citation.] “ ‘[T]he corporate form will be disregarded only in narrowly defined circumstances and only when the ends of justice so require.’ ” [Citation.] Before a corporation’s obligations can be recognized as those of a particular person, the requisite unity of interest and inequitable result must be shown. [Citation.] These factors comprise the elements that must be present for liability as an alter ego.” (Leek v. Cooper (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 399, 411 (Leek).)

“ ‘ “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues. . . .” ’ [Citations.]’ ” [Citations.] The pleadings are the “ ‘outer measure of materiality in a summary judgment proceeding.’ ” [Citation.] The summary judgment procedure “ ‘presupposes that the pleadings are adequate to put in issue a cause of action or defense thereto. [Citation.] However a pleading may be defective in failing to allege an element of a cause of action or in failing to intelligibly identify a defense thereto. In such a case, the moving party need not address a missing element or, obviously, respond to assertions which are unintelligible or make out no recognizable legal claim. The summary judgment proceeding is thereby necessarily transmuted into a test of the pleadings and the summary judgment motion into a motion for judgment on the pleadings. In these circumstances it has been said that a defendant’s ‘ “motion for summary judgment necessarily includes a test of the sufficiency of the complaint and as such is in legal effect a motion for judgment on the pleadings.” ’ [Citation.]’ ” [Citation.]” (Leek, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 412.)

Leek is on point. In Leek, ruling on a summary judgment motion, the court noted that the complaint did not contain sufficient factual allegations to inform defendant that plaintiffs were seeking relief on the basis of defendant’s liability as an alter ego. The same is true here.

The complaint only alleges that Staab was in the course and scope of his employment for Spirit Flow. (SAC, ¶¶ 4, 5, 15, 21.)

“A complaint must set forth the facts with sufficient precision to put the defendant on notice about what the plaintiff is complaining and what remedies are being sought. [Citation.] To recover on an alter ego theory, a plaintiff need not use the words “ ‘alter ego,’ ” but must allege sufficient facts to show a unity of interest and ownership, and an unjust result if the corporation is treated as the sole actor. [Citation.] An allegation that a person owns all of the corporate stock and makes all of the management decisions is insufficient to cause the court to disregard the corporate entity. [Citation.]” (Leek, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 415.)

As there are no facts alleged in the SAC that would have any tendency to put Harlan on notice that plaintiffs were asserting an alter ego theory of liability, plaintiffs’ alter ego arguments in opposition to the present motion for summary judgment fails. By this finding, the court makes no determination of whether alter ego liability exists. As it was not pled in the complaint, and not substantively ruled upon, issue preclusion would not apply to prevent plaintiffs from later seeking to pursue that theory of liability should it be appropriate to do so.

Also, plaintiffs’ argument that Harlan has waived her defense, that Staab was an employee because she failed to plead it as an affirmative defense, is without merit. Plaintiffs do not allege, in the SAC, that Staab was employed, directed, or controlled by Harlan. As noted above, the allegations are that Staab was in the course and scope of his employment with Spirit Flow. Plaintiffs’ own arguments demonstrate that they are not making any direct employment arguments as between Harlan and Staab. As such, there was no need to assert an affirmative defense regarding Staab not being an employee of Harlan directly.

            Undisputed Material Facts

“Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (b)(1), requires each motion for summary judgment to be accompanied by a separate statement “ ‘setting forth plainly and concisely all material facts that the moving party contends are undisputed. Each of the material facts stated shall be followed by a reference to the supporting evidence.’ ” California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(d)(2)4 states: “ ‘The separate statement should include only material facts and not any facts that are not pertinent to the disposition of the motion.’ ” Under the Rules of Court, “ ‘ “Material facts’ “ are facts that relate to the cause of action, claim for damages, issue of duty, or affirmative defense that is the subject of the motion and that could make a difference in the disposition of the motion.’ ” (Rule 3.1350(a)(2).)” (Beltran v. Hard Rock Hotel Licensing, Inc. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 865, 874-875.)

Here, all of the material facts set forth by Harlan are either admitted or are not reasonably disputed. Those material facts are:

1. “On September 10, 2019, Mrs. Harlan was not operating any of the vehicles involved in the accident.”
2. “Mrs. Harlan was not present at the scene of the accident and was nowhere near the location when it occurred.”
3. “Mrs. Harlan did not own the vehicle driven by Garrett Staab, nor did she own or possess any of the vehicles involved in the collision.”
4. “Mrs. Harlan did not ask Mr. Staab to run any type of personal errands or perform any tasks on her behalf on the date of the accident.” (Not reasonably disputed. Plaintiffs do not directly address the fact as stated and, instead, rely on an alter ego argument.)
5. “Plaintiffs do not allege that Mr. Staab was driving for Mrs. Harlan individually at the time of the incident; instead, they contend he was “ ‘running errands’ ” for Spirit Flow, Inc.”
6. “The statements made by Mr. Staab in the traffic collision report do not indicate that he was picking up any materials for Mrs. Harlan.” (Not reasonably disputed. Plaintiffs do not directly address the fact as stated and, instead, rely on an alter ego argument.)
7. “Mrs. Harlan did not compensate Mr. Staab personally for any work related to the Planet Home event.” (Not reasonably disputed. Plaintiffs do not directly address the fact as stated and, instead, rely on an alter ego argument.)
8. “After the event, Spirit Flow, Inc. issued a $1,500 payment to Mr. Staab’s LLC, Heart Gallery, LLC.” (Not reasonably disputed. Plaintiffs do not directly address the fact as stated and provide no evidence that contradicts the fact as stated.)
9. “The only involvement Mrs. Harlan has at all in this case is at the time of the incident, she was an officer of Spirit Flow.” (Not reasonably disputed. Plaintiffs do not directly address the fact as stated and, instead, rely on an alter ego argument.)
10.  “Mrs. Harlan has no direct and/or indirect involvement in the traffic accident other than simply being a corporate officer of the company Mr. Staab contends he was working for.” (Not reasonably disputed. Plaintiffs do not directly address the fact as stated and, instead, rely on an alter ego argument.)

Plaintiffs also claim that there is an undisputed material fact No. 11 that is disputed. However, there is no undisputed material fact No. 11 set forth by Harlan.

Plaintiffs then add 57 additional facts that they claim are material to the present motion. The court has reviewed all the additional facts and, even if they are all true, they do not create any triable issues. They are primarily based on plaintiffs’ argument of alter ego liability, or simply random “facts” regarding various parties that are irrelevant to the present motion.

What the undisputed material facts show is that there is no negligence liability on Harlan directly. It is established that Harlan was not present at the scene of the incident, did not own any of the vehicles involved in the incident, that Staab was not acting under Harlan’s direction, and that Harlan did not personally compensate Staab for any activities that he was performing at the time of the incident. Under these circumstances, there is no duty to breach and direct negligence liability cannot attach to Harlan.

Finally, plaintiffs’ reliance on the denial of Zaboski’s motion for summary judgment is misplaced. The ruling on that motion was based on different material facts, different evidence before the court, and different legal theories. Relative to Zaboski’s motion, based on the evidence provided, the court determined that some of Zaboski’s claimed undisputed material facts were in fact disputed. The court specifically emphasized that the ruling was based “on the UMFs presented by Zaboski, and the evidence submitted in support of opposition . . ..” (Italics in original.) Nothing in that ruling precludes the granting of the present motion.

Harlan’s motion for summary judgment will be granted in its entirety. As noted above, because it was not pled in the SAC and therefore not before the court, the court makes no determination regarding the applicability of alter ego liability.

Plaintiffs’ objections to evidence submitted in support of the motion for summary judgment are without merit and are overruled.

            Motions to Appear Pro Hac Vice

“A person who is not a licensee of the State Bar but who is an attorney in good standing of and eligible to practice before the bar of any United States court or the highest court in any state, territory, or insular possession of the United States, and who has been retained to appear in a particular cause pending in a court of this state, may in the discretion of such court be permitted upon written application to appear as counsel pro hac vice, provided that an active licensee of the State Bar is associated as attorney of record. No person is eligible to appear as counsel pro hac vice under this rule if the person is:

“(1) A resident of the State of California;

“(2) Regularly employed in the State of California; or

“(3) Regularly engaged in substantial business, professional, or other activities in the State of California.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.40(a).)

“The application must state:

“(1) The applicant’s residence and office address;

“(2) The courts to which the applicant has been admitted to practice and the dates of admission;

“(3) That the applicant is a licensee in good standing in those courts;

“(4) That the applicant is not currently suspended or disbarred in any court;

“(5) The title of each court and cause in which the applicant has filed an application to appear as counsel pro hac vice in this state in the preceding two years, the date of each application, and whether or not it was granted; and

“(6) The name, address, and telephone number of the active licensee of the State Bar who is attorney of record.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.40(d).)

The court has reviewed the declarations of Gamble and Mason, as well as the declaration submitted by attorney Bryan L. Saalfeld on their behalf and finds that each of them is eligible to be admitted to appear as counsel pro hac vice on behalf of defendants. The applications will be granted.