Tentative Ruling: Rancho Las Cruces LLC et al vs Robert Ramirez et al

Case Number

19CV00717

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Mon, 03/16/2026 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion: Strike Sham Pleadings and for Judgment on the Pleadings

Tentative Ruling

Rancho Las Cruces, LLC, et al., v. Robert Ramirez, et al.

Case No. 19CV00717

           

Hearing Date: March 16, 2026                                   

HEARING:              Motions of Defendant and Cross-Complainant John Mogens Henning to Strike Sham Pleadings and for Judgment on the Pleadings

ATTORNEYS:        For Plaintiffs and Cross-Defendants Rancho Las Cruces, LLC, Walter J. Henning, individually, as trustee of the Walter C. Henning Trust, and as trustee of the Caroline Henning Trust, and James E. Henning: Diana Alcala-Hernandez, Timothy Nguyen, Kirk & Simas

                                    For Defendant and Cross-Complainant John Mogens Henning, individually and as personal representative of the Estate of Carolyn Jane Winther: James F. Scafide, Tyler J. Sprague, Figueroa Law Group LLP

TENTATIVE RULING:

The motions of defendant and cross-complainant John Mogens Henning to strike sham pleadings and for judgment on the pleadings are denied.

Background:

On February 6, 2019, plaintiffs Rancho Las Cruces, LLC (RLC), Walter J. Henning, individually, as trustee of the Walter C. Henning Trust, and as trustee of the Caroline Henning Trust, and James E. Henning filed their complaint in this action against defendants Robert Ramirez and John Mogens Henning (JMH), the latter both individually and as personal representative of the Estate of Carolyn Jane Winther. The complaint asserts four causes of action: (1) declaratory and injunctive relief; (2) ejectment; (3) trespass; and (4) waste. With respect to the declaratory relief claim, plaintiffs seek declarations that (1) plaintiffs own real properties described in the complaint as Parcels 3, 7, 8, 9, 11, 21, 25, and 26 free and clear of any ownership or possessory interest of the defendants, (2) plaintiff RLC owns real properties described in the complaint as Parcels 4, 5, 10, 43, 52, 54, 56, 57, and 58, and that upon dissolution shall be distributed back to the parties in the percentage interests to which they were entitled at the time of the deaths of settlors Walter C. Henning and Caroline Henning, and (3) that defendant Ramirez’s continued occupancy of Parcel 21 is unlawful.

On April 9, 2019, defendant JMH filed his demurrer and motion to strike portions of the complaint. On May 13, 2019, the court sustained the demurrer as to the second, third and fourth causes of action as to plaintiffs Walter J. Henning, individually, as trustee of the Walter C. Henning Trust, and as trustee of the Caroline Henning Trust, and as to plaintiff James E. Henning without leave to amend, and otherwise overruled the demurrer. The court denied the motion to strike.

On May 15, 2019, defendant Ramirez filed his answer to the complaint generally denying the allegations of the complaint and asserting 25 affirmative defenses.

On June 12, 2019, defendant JMH filed his answer to the complaint admitting and denying allegations thereof and asserting 10 affirmative defenses. Concurrently with the filing of the answer, JMH filed a cross-complaint against Walter J. Henning, individually and as a member and manager of RLC, and James E. Henning, individually and as a member and manager of RLC, asserting 16 causes of action.

On June 14, 2019, defendant Ramirez filed his amended answer to the complaint admitting and denying allegations thereof and asserting 25 affirmative defenses.

On July 19, 2019, plaintiffs and cross-defendants filed their answer to the cross-complaint admitting and denying the allegations thereof and asserting 24 affirmative defenses.

On December 23, 2025, JMH filed his amended verified derivative cross complaint, setting forth 19 causes of action.

On January 30, 2026, plaintiffs and cross-defendants filed their answer to the amended cross-complaint admitting and denying the allegations thereof and asserting the same 24 affirmative defenses.

On December 20, 2019, defendant JMH filed his first motion for summary judgment or alternatively for summary adjudication. The motion was opposed. On March 13, 2020, the court entered an order on the stipulation of the parties continuing the hearing on the motion for summary judgment to April 13, 2020, and trial to June 1, 2020. On May 21, the court continued the hearing on the motion for summary judgment and trial to June 29, 2020.

On June 29, 2020, the court denied the first motion for summary judgment without prejudice based upon JMH’s failure to comply with court rules and procedures. (Minute Order, filed June 29, 2020, p. 1.)

On June 28, 2021, defendant JMH filed a motion for summary adjudication that was originally set for hearing on September 27, 2021.

Following continuances of the hearing, on January 10, 2022, the court denied the motion for summary adjudication.

JMH now moves to strike sham pleadings and moves for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that plaintiffs and cross-defendants Walter and James Henning “are attempting to maintain a legal fiction that the Court has already resolved.” (Motion, p. 3, ll. 3-4.)

Walter and James Henning oppose the motions.

Analysis:

It is unclear exactly what JMH is seeking by way of his motion. JMH’s points and authorities consist of only three pages of authorities and argument. By way of the points and authorities, JMH vacillates between referencing Walter and James’ answer to the cross-complaint and the original complaint. The only thing that is clear about the motion, or motions, is that JMH is asking the court to strike “sham denials and grant judgment on the pleadings” that are “legally incompatible with the Court’s 2024 Order and the LLC’s Operating Agreement.” (Motion, p. 3, ll. 8-12),

The most that can be ascertained from the motions is that the motion to strike is directed at plaintiff and cross-defendants’ answer to the cross-complaint, and that the motion for judgment on the pleadings is directed at the original complaint. However, the issues are not separated, which make it unclear what argument pertains to each motion. Because it is unclear what relief is being sought by way of the motion to strike, as opposed to the motion for judgment on the pleadings, the motions will be addressed concurrently. The motions should have been filed separately for clarity.

“Like a demurrer, a motion for judgment on the pleadings attacks defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that may be judicially noticed.” (Alameda County Waste Management Authority v. Waste Connections US, Inc. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 1162, 1174.)

“The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.)

“The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).)

“In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.)

“[J]udges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)

“Notices must be in writing, and the notice of a motion, other than for a new trial, must state when, and the grounds upon which it will be made, and the papers, if any, upon which it is to be based.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1010.)

“Section 1010’s requirement “ ‘is for the benefit of the party upon whom the notice is served,’ ” to make him or her aware of the issues to be raised in the motion. (Hecq v. Conner (1928) 203 Cal. 504, 506, 265 P. 180; see also Kinda v. Carpenter (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1277, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 183 (Kinda).) As stated in Kinda: “ ‘The purpose of the notice requirements ‘ “is to cause the moving party to “ ‘sufficiently define the issues for the information and attention of the adverse party and the court.” ’ ” [Citations.]” (Golf & Tennis Pro Shop, Inc. v. Superior Court (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 127, 137-138.)

“A notice of motion to strike a portion of a pleading must quote in full the portions sought to be stricken except where the motion is to strike an entire paragraph, cause of action, count, or defense. Specifications in a notice must be numbered consecutively.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1322(a).)

JMH’ notice of motion states, in its entirety:

“PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on March 16, 2026, at 10:00 a.m., or as soon as the matter may be heard, in Department 5 of the Santa Barbara Superior Court, located at 1100 Anacapa Street, Santa Barbara, CA 93101, Defendant and Cross-Complainant JOHN MOGENS HENNING (“ ‘Defendant’ ”) will, and hereby does, move for a Motion to Strike Sham Pleadings [CCP § 436] and Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [CCP § 438].”

The notice of motion is severely lacking. It does not identify any portions of the complaint, or answer to cross-complaint, that JMH seeks to have stricken. And, even trying to piece together what is being requested, by referring to the motion itself, it is not possible to determine what JMH seeks. The only place in the body of the motion that even refers to specific items being stricken is at page 4, lines 12-13, where JMH argues: “Their denials of Paragraphs 41-46 of the Cross-Complaint are “ ‘sham’ ” responses and must be stricken under CCP § 436.” The argument makes no sense. By way of the answer to the amended cross-complaint, the cross-defendants admit paragraphs including 42, 44, and 45. (Answer to amended cross-complaint, ¶ 1.) JMH’s motion to strike fails because the notice is defective and the motion itself is so convoluted as to make granting any type of relief impossible. For example:

JMH advances seemingly random arguments that the LLC lacks the legal capacity to sue, that judicial estoppel bars Walter and James from disputing LLC ownership, that the claims for trespass and ejectment fail as a matter of law, the claim for waste is procedurally improper, and that a 2019 ruling bars Walter and James’ individual claims. None of these arguments are supported by any cogent argument or persuasive authorities. JMH fails to state the legal basis for bringing the motion for judgment on the pleadings, other than to include, in the notice of motion: “[CCP § 438]”. Code of Civil Procedure section 438, subdivision (c) allows a motion for judgment on the pleadings to be brought only on very specific grounds. JMH fails to identify any specific grounds that would entitle him to judgment on the pleadings.

Further, to the extent that JMH bases any part of either his motion to strike or the motion for judgment on the pleadings on the LLC lacking the legal capacity to sue, he does not plead that as an affirmative defense in his answer to the complaint. “ ‘[W]here the lack of capacity to sue does not appear on the face of the complaint, lack of capacity to sue must be raised in the answer or that objection is waived.’ ” [Citation.]” (Wanke, Industrial, Commercial, Residential, Inc. v. AV Builder Corp. (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 466, 476, fn. 5.) Lack of capacity to sue does not appear on the face of the complaint.

As a final observation, there is no declaration by counsel for JMH that he complied with the required meet and confer, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 435.5, prior to filing the motion to strike, nor is there a declaration that he complied with the required meet and confer, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 439, prior to filing the motion for judgment on the pleadings.

The motions will be denied.