Tentative Ruling: Mark Signa v. The Regents of the University of California, et al

Case Number

18CV05728

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 10/02/2026 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motions to Strike (2)

Tentative Ruling

1.  For the reasons stated herein, the motion of plaintiff Mark Signa to strike or tax costs claimed in the memorandum of costs of defendant The Regents of the University of California is granted, in part. The court disallows costs claimed in item 5 of defendant’s memorandum of costs in the amount of $492.50 apportioned to plaintiff Mark Signa. The court awards costs in favor of defendant The Regents of the University of California and against plaintiff Mark Signa in the amount of $8,784.76.
2.  For the reasons stated herein, the motion of plaintiff Matthew Stern to strike or tax costs claimed in the memorandum of costs of defendant The Regents of the University of California is granted, in part. The court disallows costs claimed in item 5 of defendant’s memorandum of costs in the amount of $492.50 apportioned to plaintiff Matthew Stern. The court awards costs in favor of defendant The Regents of the University of California and against plaintiff Matthew Stern in the amount of $8,784.76.

Background:

This matter concerns six actions that were consolidated for pre-trial purposes on September 17, 2021. Those actions are:

1. Mark Signa v. The Regents of the University of California, et al. (18CV05728) (the Signa Action);
2. Michael Little and Tiffany Little v. The Regents of the University of California, et al. (19CV01431) (the Little Action);
3. Matthew Stern v. The Regents of the University of California, et al. (19CV04418) (the Stern Action);
4. Jonathan Lee Reyes v. The Regents of the University of California, et al. (19CV02586) (the Reyes Action);
5. Ryan Smith v. The Regents of the University of California, et al. (19CV01625) (the Smith Action); and
6. Ryan Hashimoto v. The Regents of the University of California, et al. (21CV01256) (the Hashimoto Action).

On February 26, 2025, the court entered judgment in favor of The Regents of the University of California (the Regents), the University of California Santa Barbara Police Department (the UCSB-PD), and the University of California Santa Barbara, and against plaintiff Ryan Hashimoto as to the complaint filed in the Hashimoto Action.

At a trial confirmation conference held on August 8, 2025, the court set the Smith Action for a jury trial to commence on June 8, 2026, and the Signa Action for a 15 day jury trial to commence on June 18, 2026, based on the parties’ agreement. (See Aug. 8, 2025, Minute Order.)

On May 29, 2026, the court granted a motion to consolidate by plaintiffs Mark Signa (Signa), Michael Little (M Little), Tiffany Little (T Little), Matthew Stern (Stern), and Jonathan Reyes (Reyes), and ordered the Signa Action consolidated for trial with the Little Action, the Stern Action, and the Reyes Action. (May 29, 2026, Minute Order.)

The procedural history relevant to this proceeding shows that the jury trial of the Signa Action, the Little Action, the Stern Action, and the Reyes Action (collectively, the Consolidated Cases) commenced on June 18, 2026, and concluded on July 14 when the jury returned special verdicts. On July 29, 2026, the court signed and entered a judgment on the special verdicts (the judgment) in favor of T Little and against the Regents the total amount of $1,320,690; in favor of M Little and against the Regents in the total amount of $200,000; in favor of Reyes and against the Regents in the amount of $180,000; in favor of the Regents and against Signa as to the complaint filed in the Signa Action; and in favor of the Regents and against Stern as to the complaint filed in the Stern Action.

On August 27, the Regents filed a memorandum of costs claiming costs incurred in the Signa Action (the Regents Signa Cost Memorandum) in the total amount of $9,277.26; and later that day, filed a memorandum of costs claiming costs incurred in the Stern Action (the Regents Stern Cost Memorandum) in the same total amount.

On August 28, M Little, T Little (collectively, the Littles), and Reyes filed a memorandum of costs (the Plaintiffs’ Cost Memorandum), claiming costs in the total amount of $68,729.63.

On September 11, Signa filed a motion for an order striking or, in the alternative, taxing costs claimed in the Regents Signa Cost Memorandum (the Signa Motion); and Stern separately filed a motion for an order striking or, in the alternative, taxing costs claimed in the Regents Stern Cost Memorandum (the Stern Motion). The Signa Motion and the Stern Motion are calendared for hearing on October 2, 2026.

On September 18, the Regents filed a consolidated opposition to the Signa Motion and the Stern Motion.

Analysis:

As a threshold matter, in its combined opposition to the Signa Motion and the Stern Motion, the Regents asserts that those motions are procedurally defective because Signa and Stern did not provide the statutory notice required under Code of Civil Procedure section 1005. The Regents argues that the court “must deny the motions on that basis alone.” (Combined Opp. at p. 8, ll. 6-7.)

“ ‘It is well settled that the appearance of a party at the hearing of a motion and his or her opposition to the motion on its merits is a waiver of any defects or irregularities in the notice of motion. (Citations.) This rule applies even when no notice was given at all. (Citations.) ....’ [Citations.]” (Carlton v. Quint (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 690, 697 (Carlton).)

Court records described above show that the Regents filed its combined opposition to the Signa Motion and the Stern Motion nine court days before the hearing on those motions. Though the combined opposition raises the adequacy of notice of the Signa Motion and Stern Motion, the Regents contests each of those motions on their merits.

Furthermore, though the Regents asserts, among other things, that it was required to evaluate two motions and prepare its consolidated opposition while simultaneously preparing other time-sensitive motions, the court is not persuaded that the Regents was prejudiced in preparing its combined opposition to the Signa Motion and the Stern Motion. For example, notwithstanding the claim of inadequate notice, the combined opposition of the Regents does not include any request for a continuance of the hearing on the Signa Motion and the Stern Motion.

Under the circumstances present here and for all reasons discussed above, the court finds that the Regents has “waived any claim of inadequate service or notice assuming, without deciding, that claim had any merit.” (Carlton, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 697.)

“[Civil Code section] 1032 is the fundamental authority for awarding costs in civil actions. It establishes the general rule that ‘[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by statute, a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding.’ [Citation.]” (Scott Co. of California v. Blount, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1103, 1108.) “ ‘Prevailing party’ includes the party with a net monetary recovery, a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered, a defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant obtains any relief, and a defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that defendant.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (a)(4).) Unless otherwise provided by statute, “the court has no discretion to deny costs to the prevailing party.” (Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 111, 128-129 (Nelson).)

Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5 sets forth “items” which “are allowable as costs under Section 1032” and which “are not allowable as costs, except when expressly authorized by law[.]” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a) & (b).) “Costs are allowable if incurred, whether or not paid.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (c)(1).) “Items not mentioned in [section 1033.5] and items assessed upon application may be allowed or denied in the court’s discretion.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (c)(4).)

“[A]ny award of costs — whether categorically recoverable under section 1033.5, subdivision (a) or allowable in the court’s discretion under section 1033.5(c)(4) — must meet the requirements of subdivision (c)(2) and (3).” (Segal v. ASICS America Corp. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 651, 667 (Segal).) Those subdivisions provide that “[a]llowable costs shall be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation” and “reasonable in amount.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (c)(2) & (3).)

“A prevailing party who claims costs must serve and file a memorandum of costs within 15 days after the date of service of the notice of entry of judgment or dismissal by the clerk under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.5 or the date of service of written notice of entry of judgment or dismissal, or within 180 days after entry of judgment, whichever is first. The memorandum of costs must be verified by a statement of the party, attorney, or agent that to the best of his or her knowledge the items of cost are correct and were necessarily incurred in the case.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1700(a)(1).) “If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that were not reasonable or necessary. On the other hand, if the items are properly objected to, they are put in issue and the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs.” (Ladas v. California State Auto. Assn. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 774.)

“The court’s first determination, therefore, is whether the statute expressly allows the particular item, and whether it appears proper on its face.” (Nelson, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 131.)

The Regents Signa Cost Memorandum and the Regents Stern Cost Memorandum claim the same items of costs in the same amounts, and show that the Regents has apportioned costs as between the Signa Action and the Stern Action. For these reasons, the court will, at times and for convenience of writing, refer to the Regents Signa Cost Memorandum and the Regents Stern Cost Memorandum, collectively, as the Regents Cost Memorandum.

The Regents Cost Memorandum is verified. The Signa Motion and Stern Motion present no reasoned factual or legal argument to show why the Regents Cost Memorandum was not timely filed.

In the Regents Cost Memorandum, the Regents claim (item 2) jury fees in the amount of $645.79; (item 4) deposition costs in the amount of $3,388.19; (item 5) service of process in the amount of $492.50; (item 11) court reporter fees as established by statute in the amount of $3,793.31; (item 13) models, enlargements, and photocopies of exhibits in the amount of $286.25; (item 14) fees for electronic filing or service in the amount of $371.22; and (item 15) “other” costs in the amount of $300. (Regents Cost Memorandum at p. 1.) Noted above, those items of costs total $9,277.26. (Ibid.)

The Signa Motion and the Stern Motion each contend that the Signa Action and the Stern Action involved causes of action for violations of the California Whistleblower Protection Act, codified as Government Code section 8547 et seq. (the Act), and Labor Code section 1102.5 only, and that the Act and Labor Code section 1102.5 include “one-way, plaintiff-only” fee provisions which authorize an award of attorney’s fees only to a prevailing plaintiff with no corresponding provision permitting a defendant to recover fees or costs from an unsuccessful whistleblower plaintiff. For these reasons, Signa Motion and Stern Motion argue, the Regents may not recover any costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032 unless it shows that the Signa Action and the Stern Action were frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, or that Signa and Stern continued to litigate after the actions clearly became so.

The Signa Motion and Stern Motion also appear to concede that the Regents Cost Memorandum claim proportional or allocated expenses shared between Signa and Stern whose cases were tried or otherwise proceeded together; and contend that the Regents has failed to document or substantiate those costs, to disclose the allocation methodology, or to show why the claimed allocation is reasonable. For these additional reasons, Signa and Stern argue, the court should strike the Regents Cost Memorandum.

In its combined opposition, the Regents explains that, because discovery in the Smith Action and the Consolidated Cases proceeded jointly, deposition costs incurred by the Regents were divided five ways; and because the Consolidated Cases were tried together, trial expenses incurred by the Regents were divided four ways. The Regents further explains that the Regents Signa Cost Memorandum and the Regents Stern Cost Memorandum apportion the claimed costs as between the Signa Action and Stern Action as follows: 20 percent to each plaintiff for deposition costs incurred in all five actions and 25 percent to each plaintiff for jury, service, reporter, and exhibit costs incurred by the Regents in the Consolidated Actions. The Regents argues that an equal apportionment of costs as between the Signa Action and Stern Action is reasonable because common witnesses and trial proceedings served the Consolidated Cases, and because consolidation reduced the total costs incurred by the Regents.

The Signa Motion and the Stern Motion do not effectively dispute that, pursuant to the judgment, the Regents is the prevailing party as to the claims asserted against it in the Signa Action and the Stern Action. There is no information or evidence which shows or suggests that any costs claimed in the Regents Cost Memorandum were incurred by a nonprevailing party. (See Charton v. Harkey (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 730, 745 [generally discussing allocation of costs].)

The present record also shows or suggests that each item of costs claimed in the Regents Cost Memorandum reflects a reduction in the total costs incurred by the Regents in each of the actions described above; that the reduced amount of costs was apportioned equally as between the Signa Action and the Stern Action; and that the Regents Cost Memorandum does not include or claim costs incurred in the Smith Action, the Little Action, or the Reyes Action. (See, e.g., Regents Cost Memorandum [Worksheet] at ¶ 2 (b) [describing apportionment] & ¶¶ 13, 15, & attachments 4(e), 5(d), & 11(c) [same].)

Considering that Signa and Stern are represented by the same law firm and pursued identical causes of action in a consolidated trial, the available evidence and information does not show that the Regents “bears the burden of apportioning costs” as between Signa and Stern. (Acosta v. SI Corp. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1376.) Furthermore, as the Regents Cost Memorandum describes the manner in which the reduced costs were apportioned as between the Signa Action and the Stern Action, the information and evidence also does not show that “some costs are ... specific to a particular plaintiff” or that it would not be “fair” to include the costs claimed in that memorandum in any award of costs. (Ibid.)

For all reasons discussed above, the court finds that the apportionment of costs as between the Signa Action and Stern Action reflected in the Regents Cost Memorandum is reasonable and appropriate.

The Signa Motion and Stern Motion also fail to show why California Fair Employment and Housing Act (the FEHA) jurisprudence applies here.

The FEHA, codified as Government Code section 12900 et seq., “expressly directs the use of a different standard than the general costs statute[.]” (Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist. (2015) 61 Cal.4th 97, 105 (Williams).) Government Code section 12965 provides: “In civil actions brought under this section, the court, in its discretion, may award to the prevailing party, including the department, reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, including expert witness fees, except that, notwithstanding Section 998 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a prevailing defendant shall not be awarded fees and costs unless the court finds the action was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless when brought, or the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.” (Gov. Code, § 12965, subd. (c)(6).) Under the FEHA, “[c]osts that would be awarded as a matter of right to the prevailing party under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032(b) are instead awarded in the discretion of the trial court ....” (Williams, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 105.)

“Government Code section 12965, subdivision (c)(6), codifies the Williams rule[.] [¶] Thus, when the defense prevails in a FEHA action, it has no automatic right to recover costs under section 1032; instead, it must move the court to make a discretionary award of such costs, based in part on a specific finding that the action was frivolous.” (Neeble-Diamond v. Hotel California By the Sea, LLC (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 551, 557.)

Government Code section 8547.10 does not include the same standards or express language found in the FEHA as further discussed above. Instead, though that section authorizes the recovery of reasonable attorney’s fees by the injured party where liability has been established, the statute is silent as to the recovery of costs. (Gov. Code, § 8547.10, subd. (c); see also Williams, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 105 [noting that “rather than being silent as to either party’s recovery of costs,” FEHA “expressly states that both parties are allowed costs in the trial court’s discretion”].)

The same reasoning and analysis apply as to the causes of action asserted in the Signa Action and Stern Action for violations of Labor Code section 1102.5, which is also silent as to the recovery of costs and provides: “The court is authorized to award reasonable attorney’s fees to a plaintiff who brings a successful action for a violation of these provisions.” (Lab. Code, § 1102.5, subd. (j).) For these and all further reasons discussed above, the Signa Motion and the Stern Motion fail to show why Government Code section 8547.10 or Labor Code section 1102.5 govern the recovery of costs in the Signa Action or the Stern Action, or why those statutes state “a standard expressly differing from the entitlement to costs provided under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032[,] [subdivision] (b).” (Williams, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 105.)

For all reasons discussed above, the court declines to strike the Regents Cost Memorandum on the grounds stated.

(a)       Items allowable as costs

Jury fees; the “[t]aking, video recording, and transcribing necessary depositions, including an original and one copy of those taken by the claimant and one copy of depositions taken by the party against whom costs are allowed”; “[t]ravel expenses to attend depositions”; “[s]ervice of process by a public officer, registered process server, or other means”; “[c]ourt reporter fees as established by statute”; “[m]odels, the enlargements of exhibits and photocopies of exhibits, and the electronic presentation of exhibits, including costs of rental equipment and electronic formatting ... if they were reasonably helpful to aid the trier of fact”; and “[f]ees for the electronic filing or service of documents through an electronic filing service provider if a court requires or orders electronic filing or service of documents” are expressly allowable as costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(1), (a)(3)(A) & (C), (a)(4)(A)-(D), (a)(11), (a)(13) & (a)(14).)

For all reasons discussed above, the costs claimed under items 2, 4, 5, 11, 13, and 14 of the Regents Cost Memorandum appear proper on their face. Therefore, Signa and Stern bear the burden to show why those items are not reasonably necessary to the conduct of this litigation or reasonable in amount.

Jury fees (Regents Cost Memorandum item 2):

As to the jury fees claimed in item 2 of the Regents Signa Cost Memorandum, the Signa Motion asserts that those fees are stated as a fractional share of an unsupported total cost figure; that Signa does not concede that this item is recoverable in any amount; and that Signa identifies them in the Signa Motion “so that, to the extent the [c]ourt reaches ordinary Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5 analysis, [the Regents] is put to its burden of production and proof on every challenged item[.]” (Signa Motion at pp. 10-11.)

The Signa Motion appears to conflate the burden of proof where costs are allowable and appear, on their face, to be proper. For example, the Signa Motion fails to explain why jury fees are not expressly allowable, or why those fees are not, on the face of the Regents Signa Cost Memorandum, proper or reasonable charges.

Further, the court’s review of the worksheet attached to the Regents Signa Cost Memorandum shows that the Regents incurred a jury fee deposit on March 22, 2019, in the amount of $150, and jury fees on June 17, 2026, of which Signa’s one-quarter share totals $495.79, for a total of $645.79 in apportioned jury fees as to the Signa Action. Neither the amount of jury fees claimed by the Regents, nor the amount apportioned as between the Signa Action and the Stern Action, appear unreasonable.

Though “the mere filing of a motion to tax costs may be a ‘proper objection’ to an item, the necessity of which appears doubtful, or which does not appear to be proper on its face ... [citation]” (Nelson, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 131), “[i]f the items appear to be proper charges the verified memorandum is prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses and services therein listed were necessarily incurred by the defendant [citations], and the burden of showing that an item is not properly chargeable or is unreasonable is upon the plaintiff[]” (Oak Grove School Dist. of Santa Clara County v. City Title Ins. Co. (1963) 217 Cal.App.2d 678, 698–699). Absent any reasoned factual or legal argument showing why the jury fees claimed under item 2 of the Regents Signa Cost Memorandum are not allowable, unnecessary, or unreasonable, the court will, for all reasons discussed above, deny the Signa Motion as to that item, and allow jury fees in the amount of $645.79 apportioned to the Signa Action.

As the Stern Motion advances the same general and conclusory points described above as to the same apportioned jury fees claimed in item 2 of the Regents Stern Cost Memorandum, the same reasoning and analysis apply. For all reasons discussed above, the court will deny the Stern Motion as to item 2 of the Regents Stern Cost Memorandum, and will allow jury fees in the amount of $645.79 apportioned to the Stern Action.

Deposition costs (Regents Cost Memorandum item 4):

As to the deposition costs claimed in item 4 of the Regents Signa Cost Memorandum, the Signa Motion challenges the allocation of 20 percent of the costs of deposing Reyes and T Little to Signa, on the grounds that there exists no basis to find that those costs were reasonably necessary to the conduct of this litigation or to require Signa to bear any share of the cost to depose different, prevailing co-plaintiffs who are independently entitled, pursuant to the judgment, to recover their costs of suit from the Regents. The Signa Motion advances the same reasoning as to the apportioned costs to depose Stern, which the Signa Motion contends were not reasonably necessary to the Signa Action.

The Signa Motion further contends that, because the operative first amended complaint of Signa did not name David Millard as an individual defendant, Signa should not be charged 20 percent of the costs to depose that individual who was named only in the Stern Action and who was noticed for a deposition in the Smith Action.

The Signa Motion also challenges the apportionment of 20 percent of the cost of deposing witnesses Garry MacPherson and Karen Kramer to the Signa Action, on the grounds that the testimony or conclusions of those witnesses concerned the Regents’ post-complaint investigation which the court ruled inadmissible at trial. (Declaration of Jamie L. Keeton, ¶ 7.) The Signa Motion argues that the Regents has not shown that the deposition of those two witnesses, the anticipated subject matter of which was later ruled inadmissible and precluded at trial, was reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation.

For the reasons stated above, the Signa Motion argues, of the fifteen depositions listed in the Regents Signa Cost Memorandum, only Signa’s deposition testimony is attributable to the Signa Action.

The Regents Signa Cost Memorandum includes an attachment which shows that, subject to exception for Signa’s economic expert, the Regents have apportioned to the Signa Action, 20 percent of the total cost to take and transcribe fifteen depositions on the basis that discovery proceeded jointly in the Smith Action, the Signa Action, the Stern Action, the Reyes Action, and the Little Action which, as noted above, were consolidated for pre-trial purposes on September 17, 2021. (Regents Signa Cost Memorandum, attachment 4(e).)

“The recovery of deposition costs does not depend on whether the deponent ultimately testifies at trial.” (Chaaban v. Wet Seal, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 49, 57 (Chaaban).) Furthermore, it can be inferred from the available evidence and information that the deponents listed in the Regents Signa Cost Memorandum were potential witnesses in the Consolidated Cases. For these and all further reasons discussed above, “[t]he court [is] well within its discretion to allow [the Regents] to recover the amounts expended in deposing” the individuals listed in attachment 4(e) to the Regents Signa Cost Memorandum. (Ibid.)

In addition, “[t]he need for a deposition must be viewed from the pretrial vantage point of a litigant ….” (Brake v. Beech Aircraft Corp. (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 930, 940.) The Regents Signa Cost Memorandum shows that each of the depositions at issue occurred after the Signa Action was consolidated for pre-trial purposes with the Little Action, the Stern Action, the Reyes Action, and the Smith Action. (Regents Signa Cost Memorandum, attachment 4(e), ¶ 4(a)-(o) [listing dates of depositions].) Considering that those actions were consolidated before the depositions at issue concluded, and that the Signa Action was also consolidated with the Little Action, the Stern Action, and the Reyes Action for trial, the Signa Motion fails to show why those depositions were unnecessary at the time they were taken. (Silver v. Gold (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 17, 25-26 [discussing burden of proof].) 

For all reasons discussed above, the costs to depose the individuals identified in the Regents Signa Cost Memorandum appear, on their face, to include allowable and reasonable charges. The apportionment of those costs to the Signa Action also appears appropriate. Therefore, the court will deny the Signa Motion as to item 4 and allow deposition costs in the amount of $3,388.19 apportioned to the Signa Action.

As the deposition costs claimed under item 4 of the Regents Stern Cost Memorandum are identical to those claimed in the Regents Signa Cost Memorandum, and  the points advanced in the Stern Motion are the same or effectively the same as those advanced in the Signa Motion described above, the same reasoning and analysis apply. For all reasons discussed above, the court will deny the Stern Motion as to item 4 and allow deposition costs in the amount of $3,388.19 apportioned to the Stern Action.

Service of process (Regents Cost Memorandum item 5):

As to the costs for service of process claimed under item 5 of the Regents Signa Cost Memorandum, the Signa Motion advances the same or similar arguments as those described above, including that the Regents has failed to support the service of process costs with appropriate documentation.

The Regents Signa Cost Memorandum shows that item 5 includes fees ostensibly charged by Array and Omni-Invictus LLC to serve subpoenas on Hollister Optometric Center, Pueblo Radiology Medical Group, Pacific Pain Physicians, Neurology Associates of Santa Barbara, MedCenter, Inc., Santa Barbara VA Clinic Subpoena, and D.K. Kapadia; the ostensible dates of service of each subpoena; and the total cost for each subpoena. (Regents Signa Cost Memorandum, attachment 5(d), ¶ 5(a)-(h).) The Regents Signa Cost Memorandum includes an apportionment of 25 percent of the total cost to serve the subpoenas described above to the Signa Action, which the Regents asserts reflects a reduction related to the consolidation of the Signa Action for trial. (Ibid.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5 specifies the circumstances where costs for service of process “by a public officer, registered process server, or other means” are allowable. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(4)(A)-(D).) “Whether and in what amount the expenses for service of process are allowed depends upon who served the process and what amount is allowed to a public officer in this state for such a service. [Citation.] Since [the Regents Signa Cost Memorandum] does not state how the subpoenas were served, it cannot be determined from the face of the cost bill whether the items are proper. The verified cost bill [is] therefore insufficient, the Regents ha[ve] the burden to establish the necessity and reasonableness of the service costs, but did not do so.” (Nelson, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 132.) For these and all further reasons discussed above, the court will grant the Signa Motion as to the costs claimed in item 5 of the Regents Signa Cost Memorandum, and disallow costs for service of process in the amount of $492.50 apportioned to the Signa Action.

The same reasoning and analysis apply as to the costs for service of process claimed under item 5 of the Regents Stern Cost Memorandum. For the same reasons further discussed above, the court will grant the Stern Motion as to that item, and disallow costs for service of process in the amount of $492.50 apportioned to the Stern Action.

Court reporter fees as established by statute (Regents Cost Memorandum item 11):

Item 11 of the Regents Signa Cost Memorandum claims court reporter fees charged by Denise Daunch during the trial, of which the Regents seek to apportion 25 percent as between the Signa Action and the Stern Action to reflect the consolidation for trial. “The parties have to pay the court reporter regardless of whether anyone orders transcripts.” (Chaaban, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 58.) “As [the] prevailing party, the [Regents] [is] statutorily entitled to recover court reporter fees.” (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 858 (Benach).)

As to the costs claimed under item 11, the Signa Motion advances the same general and conclusory arguments described above in regard to the jury fees claimed in the Regents Cost Memorandum. Because the Regents Signa Cost Memorandum “is prima facie evidence the expenses were necessarily incurred by the [Regents]”, those general and conclusory arguments are, for the same reasons discussed above, insufficient to show why the court reporter fees included under item 11 are “not properly chargeable” or “unreasonable ....” (Benach, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 858.) Therefore, and for these reasons, the court will deny the Signa Motion as to the costs claimed under item 11 of the Regents Signa Cost Memorandum, and allow court reporter fees in the amount of $3,793.31 apportioned to the Signa Action.

The same reasoning and analysis apply as to the costs claimed under item 11 of the Regents Stern Cost Memorandum. For the same reasons discussed above, the court will deny the Stern Motion as to that item, and allow court reporter fees in the amount of $3,793.31 apportioned to the Stern Action.

Costs for models, enlargements, and photocopies of exhibits (Regents Cost Memorandum item 12):

The Regents Signa Cost Memorandum claims costs for trial exhibits in the amount of $266.25, which reflects an apportionment to the Signa Action of one-quarter of the total costs for trial exhibits ostensibly incurred by the Regents in the Consolidated Cases. Section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(13) expressly provides that costs incurred for “the electronic presentation of exhibits, including costs of rental equipment and electronic formatting, may be allowed if they were reasonably helpful to aid the trier of fact.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(13).) The Signa Motion presents the same general and conclusory arguments described above in regard to the costs for trial exhibits claimed in the Regents Signa Cost Memorandum, which appear proper on their face.

Provided they are reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation and reasonable in amount, the court may “award costs incurred in preparing demonstratives and photocopies of trial exhibits, even though they were not ultimately used at trial ....” (Segal, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 667.) Under the circumstances present here and based on the court’s experience with and observations of the trial of the Consolidated Cases, the court finds that the exhibits used at trial, and the trial technology implemented by the Regents, “enhanced counsel’s advocacy during trial and was reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation.” (Bender v. County of Los Angeles (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 968, 990.) Moreover, the overly general and conclusory assertions advanced in the Signa Motion fail to show why any models, blowups, or exhibits were not necessary or why the costs claimed by the Regents for trial exhibits are not reasonable.

For all reasons discussed above, the costs claimed under item 12 of the Regents Signa Cost Memorandum appear proper on their face and reasonable in amount. The available evidence and information also shows that these costs were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the consolidated trial. Therefore, and for these reasons, the court will deny the Signa Motion as to item 12, and allow costs for “models, enlargements, and photocopies of exhibits” in the amount of $286.25 apportioned to the Signa Action.

The same reasoning and analysis apply to the apportioned costs for models, enlargements, and photocopies of exhibits claimed under item 13 of the Regents Stern Cost Memorandum. For the same reasons discussed above, the court will deny the Stern Motion as to that item, and allow costs for “models, enlargements, and photocopies of exhibits” in the amount of $286.25 apportioned to the Stern Action.

Fees for electronic filing or service (Regents Cost Memorandum item 14):

Noted above, fees for the electronic filing or service of documents through the court’s electronic filing service provider are allowable as costs. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(14).) The arguments advanced in the Signa Motion and Stern Motion in regard to the electronic filing or service fees claimed as costs under item 14 of the Regents Cost Memorandum are, for the same reasons discussed above, overly general and conclusory, and fail to show why those costs are improper on their face, unnecessary, or unreasonable. Therefore, and for the same or similar reasons discussed above, the court will deny the Signa Motion and the Stern Motion as to item 14, and allow fees for electronic filing or service in the amount of $371.22 apportioned as between the Signa Action and the Stern Action.

(b)       Items not allowable as costs or which may be allowed or denied in the court’s discretion

Information appearing in the Regents Cost Memorandum shows or suggests that the “other” costs claimed under item 15 include “mediation fees” ostensibly incurred by the Regents on October 17, 2019. (Regents Cost Memorandum at p. 3, ¶ 15.) Mediation fees are not mentioned in Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5. The Signa Motion and the Stern Motion each contend that, because the court did not order or require the parties to attend a mediation in this case, those mediation fees are not allowed.

As further discussed above, the fees of a mediator are not expressly allowable or expressly disallowed under subdivisions (a) and (b) of Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5. “Thus, these costs fall within the ‘discretionary category,’ subdivision (c)—that is, they are allowable if in the court’s discretion they were ‘reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation.’” (Sanford v. Rasnick (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1132.) “Where costs are not expressly allowed by the statute, the burden is on the party claiming the costs to show that the charges were reasonable and necessary.” (Foothill-De Anza Community College Dist. v. Emerich (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 11, 29.)

In their combined opposition to the Signa Motion and Stern Motion, the Regents asserts that the mediation held in October 2019 was a reasonable attempt to resolve multiple actions before years of discovery and trial; and that the Regents seeks the amount of $300 from each unsuccessful plaintiff, which represents one-fifth of the Regents’ one-third share of the $9,000 total charge to the parties, of which one-third was allocated to the Regents, one-third to the plaintiffs in the Consolidated Cases, and one-third to plaintiff Ryan Smith. The Regents also asserts that the Littles and Reyes each seek to recover the full payment made by those plaintiffs for a total requested recovery of $6,000.

In the Plaintiffs’ Cost Memorandum, the Littles and Reyes, who are represented by the same counsel as Signa and Stern, claim under item 15, mediation costs in the total amount of $6,000. (Aug. 28, 2026, Pl. Cost Memorandum, item 15; Worksheet ¶ 15, & p. 4 of 6 [“Additional Information”].) Attached to the Plaintiffs’ Cost Memorandum are two invoices from Bongiovi Mediation to Darren M. Richie of the firm Richie Litigation. (Pl. Cost Memorandum at pdf pp. 102-103.) One invoice states a total due of $3,000 for a mediation on October 17, 2019, and the other invoice states a total due of $3,000 for a mediation on October 18, 2019. (Ibid.) Noted above, the mediation fees claimed in the Regents Cost Memorandum also arise from a mediation on October 17, 2019, for which the Regents was charged $3,000. (See, e.g., Regents Cost Memorandum [Worksheet], ¶ 15.)

The information and evidence described above shows, expressly and by inference, that the mediation described in the Regents Cost Memorandum occurred at or near the time of the mediations for which the Littles and Reyes claim costs in the Plaintiffs’ Cost Memorandum. The inclusion of those costs in the Plaintiffs’ Cost Memorandum suggests to the court that the mediation was reasonably necessary to the conduct of this litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation, and that the costs incurred by the parties for that mediation are reasonable.

For the same reasons discussed above, the court also questions the representations made in the Signa Motion and the Stern Motion that mediation fees may be allowed as costs only where the mediation was ordered by the court.

“Encouraging the parties to resolve lawsuits at the earliest time and before a costly and time-consuming trial, is a necessary part of litigation as conducted in this state. The award of mediation fees is no less reasonably necessary to the conduct of litigation ....” (Gibson v. Bobroff (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1209.) Under the totality of the circumstances present here, and for all reasons discussed above, the court will allow the mediation costs claimed under item 15 of the Regents Cost Memorandum in the amount of $300 apportioned to the Signa Action and the amount of $300 apportioned to the Stern Action, and will deny the Signa Motion and the Stern Motion as to that item.