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Carlos, et al. v. Canfield

Case Number

25CV04228

Case Type

Civil Law & Motion

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 11/05/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Defendant’s Motion to Strike

Tentative Ruling

For Plaintiffs Enzo Carlos, Susana Perez: Monica M. Robles, Robles-Muzinisch, APC

                                   

For Defendant Angela Catherine Canfield: Jennifer T. Tseng, H. Daniel Burrows, E. Richard McGuire, Tseng & Associates

                                  

RULING

Defendant Angela Catherine Canfield’s motion to strike Plaintiffs Enzo Carlos and Susana Perez’s prayer for exemplary/punitive damages is granted. The allegations seeking punitive or exemplary damages, including on pages 3 and 6 of the operative complaint, are hereby stricken. This motion is granted without leave to amend, but without prejudice to Plaintiffs filing a subsequent noticed motion seeking leave to amend, if appropriate.

The CMC matter and L&M matter will both be called at the 10 am calendar. No need to appear at 8:30am.

CMCS filed by Plaintiff: Reports that Plaintiff has served the first round of written discovery on Defendant. Defendant has not yet filed an Answer but has filed a Motion to Strike the punitive damages allegations from the Complaint. The parties have stipulated to strike the punitive damages claim, and the hearing on Defendant's Motion to Strike is currently set for November 5, 2025. It is anticipated that the hearing will be taken off calendar once the stipulation is filed. [No stipulation has been filed to take this matter off calendar when this ruling was drafted.] Plaintiff requests a 60-90 day continuance.

The request for a continuance is denied. This is routine litigation, and the Court sets the calendar dates as follows:

Trial date 11/4/26 at 11:30 am for Pretrial Conference [jury panel comes over 11/5/25; all pretrial documents due one week in advance.]

MSC 10/9/26 at 8:30 am in Depart #5 via Zoom

Final CMC 9/2/26 at 8:30 am for a report on the status of the expert witness depositions.

Next CMC 41/26 at 8:30 am for a report on the status of the discovery.

Do not file a stipulation to continue the trial date. 

Background

This case involves a motor vehicle accident allegedly causing injury and damages to the two named Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs Carlos and Perez allege that Defendant Canfield, “negligently, carelessly, recklessly and unlawfully drove, operated, maintained, owned, leased, rented, controlled and entrusted her vehicle so as to cause it to collide with Plaintiffs, thereby causing personal injur[i]es and damages to Plaintiffs.” (Complaint, p. 5.) Defendant filed a motion to strike Plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages on the grounds that the allegations are insufficient to support a claim for punitive damages under Civil Code section 3294. Defendant’s motion is unopposed.

Plaintiffs Carlos and Perez allege the following facts in support of their prayer for punitive damages:

“1. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate the allegations of the Complaint, Motor Vehicle Attachment, and General Negligence Attachment.

“2. Rather than stopping to exchange information as required by law, Defendant Angela Catherine Canfield fled the scene violating California Vehicle Code Section 20002(a).

“3. It has come to our attention that Canfield, has a history of multiple DUIs, including convictions in 2003, 2015, and most recently in 2024. Given that she fled the scene of this crash, there is a serious concern that she was under the influence at the time of this collision and left to avoid criminal liability.” (Complaint, p. 5.)

Analysis

Any party may file a motion to strike as a responsive pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.) “The Court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper [¶] [s]trike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).)

The standards for punitive damages in the context of alleged intoxicated driving are well established. “In order to justify an award of punitive damages on this basis, the Plaintiff must establish that the Defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and that he wilfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.” (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 895-896 (“Taylor”).) “[T]he act of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated may constitute an act of ‘malice’ under section 3294 if performed under circumstances which disclose a conscious disregard of the probable dangerous consequences.” (Id. at p. 892.) Conclusory characterization of Defendant’s conduct is insufficient to support a prayer for punitive damages. (Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872). “Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim.” (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166.)

Taylor, supra, 24 Cal.3d at pp. 892-897, is instructive. In Taylor, the complaint alleged that the Defendant (a) had previously caused a serious automobile accident while driving under the influence of alcohol, (b) had been arrested and convicted for drunken driving on numerous prior occasions, (c) had recently completed a period of probation which followed a drunk driving conviction, (d) was required by probation to refrain from driving for at least six hours after consuming any alcoholic beverage, (e) was facing an additional pending criminal drunk driving charge, (f) had nonetheless accepted employment which required him to call on various commercial establishments where alcoholic beverages were sold, (g) engaged in the delivery or transport of such beverages in his car, and (h) at the time the accident was transporting alcoholic beverages and simultaneously driving while consuming an alcoholic beverage and under the influence. (Id. at p. 893.) The Court in Taylor found these allegations sufficient to support an allegation for punitive damages.

The Taylor Court reasoned the allegation for punitive damages was warranted because, “[d]efendant became intoxicated and thereafter drove a car while in that condition, despite his knowledge of the safety hazard he created thereby.” (Taylor, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 896.) The Court explained, “while a history of prior arrests, convictions and mishaps may heighten the probability and foreseeability of an accident, we do not deem these aggravating factors essential prerequisites to the assessment of punitive damages in drunk driving cases.” (Ibid.) Rather, the critical factor in Taylor was Defendant’s alleged conscious knowledge of his intoxicated driving and the inherent risks associated therewith: “One who wilfully consumes alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing that he thereafter must operate a motor vehicle, thereby combining sharply impaired physical and mental faculties with a vehicle capable of great force and speed, reasonably may be held to exhibit a conscious disregard of the safety of others.” (Id. at p. 897.)

Defendant Canfield argues that Plaintiffs Carlos and Perez’s complaint fails to state facts sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages. The complaint alleges that Defendant fled the scene of the accident and had three previous convictions for driving under the influence. (Complaint, p. 6.) Plaintiffs further allege, based on these circumstances, “there is serious concern that [Defendant] was under the influence.” (Ibid.) These alleged facts are insufficient to support a claim for punitive damages under Taylor, supra, 24 Cal.3d at pp. 892-897. Unlike in Taylor, Plaintiffs’ allegations, assuming the truth thereof, do not establish that Defendant willfully consumed alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing that she thereafter would operate a motor vehicle.

Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Defendant Canfield’s motion to strike. Plaintiffs Carlos and Perez did not allege facts sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages. Based on the allegations describing Plaintiffs’ investigation into these issues, it appears that Plaintiffs do not currently possess sufficient knowledge to properly allege punitive damages in this action. Therefore, the Court grants Defendant’s motion without leave to amend. However, Plaintiffs may file a noticed motion seeking leave to assert additional facts supporting punitive damages if Plaintiffs later become aware of such facts.

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