PoloDonkey, LLC vs. Tyler N. Quiel, et al

Case Number

24CV05259

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 10/29/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment Or, In the Alternative, Summary Adjudication

Tentative Ruling

For Plaintiff PoloDonkey, LLC: Todd A. Amspoker, Jeff F. Tchakarov, Price, Postel & Parma LLP

For Defendants Tyler N. Quiel and Diana Sandoval: Stephen M. Sanders, Jeff G. Coyner, Nathanael P. Cade, Sanders Coyner Cade, PC

Co-Counsel: Joseph A. LeVota

                    

RULING

For all reasons discussed herein, the motion of plaintiff for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication is denied.

Background

On September 23, 2024, plaintiff PoloDonkey, LLC, (PoloDonkey) filed a verified complaint against defendants Tyler N. Quiel (Quiel) and Diana Sandoval (Sandoval) (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging six causes of action: (1) interference with easement; (2) private nuisance; (3) quiet title; (4) declaratory relief; (5) temporary restraining order and preliminary and permanent injunctions; and (6) quiet title to prescriptive easement. As alleged in the complaint:

PoloDonkey owns real property located at 3215 Foothill Road/3200 Serena Avenue, in Carpinteria, California (the PoloDonkey Property). (Compl., ¶ 8.) Defendants are the owners of property located at 3196 Serena Avenue, in Carpinteria, California (the Serena Property). (Compl., ¶ 9.) The PoloDonkey Property is benefitted by an express easement located on a portion of the Serena Property. (Compl., ¶¶ 11-13.) Contrary to the express language of the easement, Defendants have maintained a fence on and across the easement, blocking PoloDonkey’s access and denying PoloDonkey a safe and unobstructed easement area. (Compl., ¶¶ 15-16.)

On November 26, 2024, Defendants filed a verified answer to the complaint, responding to its allegations and asserting forty-three affirmative defenses.

On July 24, 2025, PoloDonkey filed a motion for summary judgment which is made on the grounds that there exist no triable issues of material fact as to any of the elements of PoloDonkey’s causes of action, and that there is no evidence to support any defense to the causes of action.

Alternatively, PoloDonkey requests an order adjudicating the following “issues”, on the grounds that that there is no evidence to support any of Defendants’ defenses, including the defense that PoloDonkey’s access easement has been abandoned or extinguished, and: (1) as to the first cause of action for interference with easement, that Defendants have admitted to installing an immobile fence across the entire width of the easement; (2) as to the second cause of action for private nuisance, that Defendants have substantially and unreasonably interfered with the easement; (3) as to the third cause of action for quiet title, that Defendants have no right, title, estate, lien, or interest superseding PoloDonkey’s rights; (4) as to the fourth cause of action for declaratory relief, that PoloDonkey has a valid unabandoned access easement over Defendants’ property with which Defendants lack any right to interfere; (5) as to the fifth cause of action for permanent injunction, that Defendants’ unreasonable interference with the easement and nuisance are causing irreparable injuries to PoloDonkey which cannot be adequately compensated in damages, requiring Defendants to remove their fence and not install any immobile fencing on the easement area in the future; and (6) as to the sixth cause of action for quiet title, that PoloDonkey is entitled to a prescriptive easement over an area where a bridge located on the easement extends slightly outside of the access easement area.

On September 12, 2025, the court entered an order on the parties’ stipulation to continue the hearing on the present motion to October 29, 2025.

Defendants oppose the motion.

Analysis

“A party may move for summary judgment in an action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a)(1).) “A plaintiff ... has met that party’s burden of showing that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) All that the plaintiff need do is to ‘prove[ ] each element of the cause of action.’ [Citation.]” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 853 (Aguilar).)

In addition, “[a] party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.

“... A motion for summary adjudication may be made by itself or as an alternative to a motion for summary judgment and shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment. “ (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1)-(2).)

“The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.) The party moving for summary judgment “bears the burden of persuasion that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Id. at p. 845.) “Initially, the moving party bears a burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any genuine issue of material fact. If he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift: the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.” (Ibid.)

The separate statement of PoloDonkey, and Defendants’ response to that separate statement, indicate that the parties do not, for present purposes, dispute or reasonably dispute the following facts:

The PoloDonkey Property and the Serena Property are adjacent to each other and share a common lot boundary, with the PoloDonkey Property located to the north or north-east of the Serena Property. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 11 & evidence cited therein [not reasonably disputed on this point].)

On December 10, 1915, by a “Deed of Gift” (the Easement Deed), an access easement (the Easement) for road purposes was created which burdens the Serena Property for the benefit of the PoloDonkey Property. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 12 & evidence cited therein.) The Easement consists of a 16 foot wide strip of land which runs along a private roadway (the Easement Roadway) from the PoloDonkey Property through several neighboring properties including the Serena Property. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 14 & evidence cited therein [not reasonably disputed on this point].)

The part of the Easement that includes the Serena Property runs adjacent to and along the south-eastern lot boundary of that property. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 15 & evidence cited therein [not reasonably disputed on this point].) Because of the Easement and the Easement Roadway, the PoloDonkey Property can be accessed from both Foothill Road to the north and Serena Avenue to the south. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 16 & evidence cited therein.)

The PoloDonkey Property was previously owned by Michael Rothbard (Rothbard), who acquired the property on May 27, 2005. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 4 & evidence cited therein.) On June 25, 2013, Rothbard quitclaimed the PoloDonkey Property to the Michael Rothbard Revocable Trust dated January 11, 2013, which, on the same date, quitclaimed the PoloDonkey Property to Rothbard’s limited liability company 3215 Foothill Road, LLC (the Rothbard LLC). (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF nos. 5-6 & evidence cited therein.)

PoloDonkey acquired the PoloDonkey Property from the Rothbard LLC on July 31, 2014, and presently owns that property. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF nos. 1, 7 & evidence cited therein [not reasonably disputed on these points].) The Easement is described as “Parcel Two” in the legal description of the PoloDonkey Property included in the deed transferring ownership of the PoloDonkey Property from the Rothbard LLC to Plaintiff. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 13 & evidence cited therein.) Title to the PoloDonkey Property is held under PoloDonkey’s name for the benefit of its principal and managing member, Robert Seidler (Seidler), and Seidler’s family. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF nos. 2, 3 & evidence cited therein.)

Defendants, as Trustees of the Sandoval Quiel Revocable Living Trust dated July 15, 2022 (the Sandoval Quiel Trust), purchased the Serena Property on February 12, 2021, and own that property. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF nos. 8, 9 & evidence cited therein.) Defendants transferred the title to the Serena Property to the Sandoval Quiel Trust on October 4, 2022. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 10 & evidence cited therein.)

In 2019, during a visit to the PoloDonkey Property, Seidler discovered that a bamboo fence (the Fence) had been installed on the Serena Property, in close proximity to a bridge (the Bridge) which spans a waterway or creek bed between the two properties. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF nos. 17, 53 & evidence cited therein.) The Fence was erected by the prior owner of the Serena Property to restrict access from the Serena Property to the Bridge following a lawsuit involving an incident where a neighbor’s foot fell through a hole in one of the wooden floor planks of the Bridge. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF nos. 33, 34, 54 & evidence cited therein.)

The Fence stretches across the entire width of the Easement area; is approximately 6 feet tall; does not move, open, or close; is securely and permanently attached to metal and plastic poles or pipes with metal wiring and zip ties; and is impossible to jump or climb over. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF nos. 55, 56 & evidence cited therein.) After purchasing the Serena Property, Defendants left the Fence in place, installed “Keep Out” and “No Trespassing” signs on it as well as caution tape and a motion-censor video camera overlooking the Bridge, to ensure that no one could freely or safely circumvent the Fence. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 59 & evidence cited therein [not reasonably disputed on these points].)

In their opposition to the motion, Defendants expressly state: “[PoloDonkey’s] moving papers describe the Serena Property, the PoloDonkey Property, the Bridge, and the ... Fence, such that Defendants will not repeat these descriptions and accept these defined terms. Further, Defendants do not dispute that an easement was created in 1915 and that it appears to have been used during ... Rothbard’s ownership of the PoloDonkey Property, though ... there are some disputes regarding the use of the Bridge to access Serena Avenue in the latter years of his ownership. Moreover, [PoloDonkey] does not discuss how the 1915 instrument [which] created the [E]asement provides that the owners in possession of the Serena Property can require the PoloDonkey Property discontinue any use of the Serena Property. Regardless, it is what occurs after [PoloDonkey] acquires the PoloDonkey Property in July 2014 that is most relevant to Defendants’ opposition.”

To the extent the motion seeks summary judgment as to the causes of action alleged in the complaint, and considering the information, evidence, and points advanced by the parties in their respective moving and opposing papers, the court will, for present purposes, assume without deciding that PoloDonkey has met its initial burden to produce admissible evidence sufficient to prove each element of the causes of action at issue. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 853 [“summary judgment law in this state no longer requires a plaintiff moving for summary judgment to disprove any defense asserted by the defendant”].)

Assuming without deciding that PoloDonkey has met its initial burden for summary judgment purposes, the burden shifts to Defendants “to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) For all reasons discussed below, Defendants have met their burden to “set forth ... specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists” as to a defense to the causes of action alleged in the complaint. (Ibid.; see also Santa Ana Unified School Dist. v. Orange County Development Agency (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 404, 411 [general discussion].)

The opposition of Defendants is effectively directed to whether there exists sufficient evidence showing that PoloDonkey has abandoned any rights to the Easement, which the parties appear to concede constitutes a defense to the causes of action alleged in the complaint and raised by Defendants in this action.

“Abandonment of an easement created by grant, as here, requires proof of (1) the cessation of use of the easement by the owner of the dominant tenement and (2) ‘ “ ‘unequivocal and decisive acts on the part of the [dominant tenant], clearly showing an intention to abandon.’ ” ’ [Citations.] An easement that is found to be abandoned ‘does not “revert” to the grantor[;] it is simply extinguished.’ [Citation.]

“Abandonment, and in particular the intent to abandon, are issues of fact. [Citations.] With respect to this inquiry, California has adopted the view of the original Restatement of Property that ‘ “[t]he intention required in the abandonment of an easement is the intention not to make in the future the uses authorized by it. The benefit of an easement lies in the privilege of use of the land subject to it. There is no abandonment unless there is a giving up of that use.” ’ [Citations.] Although mere nonuse is insufficient to demonstrate an intent to abandon, a long period of nonuse may be considered as evidence of the necessary intent.” (Visitacion Investment, LLC v. 424 Jessie Historic Properties, LLC (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1081, 1090, fn. 6.)

The moving separate statement of PoloDonkey includes the following facts which PoloDonkey contends are material to the disposition of the motion, including as to a defense raised by Defendants based on a purported abandonment of the Easement by PoloDonkey: “During the time period between 1985 and 2021, the Easement and Bridge were regularly used for ingress and egress to and from the PoloDonkey Property by neighbors, Cottage tenants, guests of the PoloDonkey Property’s owners and tenants, and employees and contractors of the PoloDonkey Property’s owners. During this period, the Bridge and Easement regularly accommodated both vehicular and pedestrian traffic.” (Sep. Stmt. at pp. 30 [summary judgment UMF no. 82], 67 [same re issue no. 1], 103 [same re issue no. 2] 139 [same re issue no. 3] 175 [same re issue no. 4] 211 [same re issue no. 5], 247 [same re issue no. 6].)

In support of their opposition to the motion, Defendants’ submit additional facts supported by evidence appearing in Defendants’ compendium (the COE), which includes a declaration of Defendants’ neighbor, Susan Flannery (Flannery). In that declaration, Flannery asserts that, since at least March 2019, the area of the Easement and Bridge has been continuously fenced off and physically obstructed. (Def. COE, Exh. O, ¶ 3.) Flannery further states that they have never observed a pedestrian or any vehicular traffic through the disputed area, which Flannery asserts has remained inaccessible due to what Flannery describes as the “collapsed” Bridge and the Fence. (Id. at ¶ 4.)

Additional evidence submitted by Defendants in support of their opposition also suggests that Seidler accessed, or ostensibly intended to access, an employee dwelling on the PoloDonkey Property from Serena Avenue through the main entrance to the PoloDonkey Property, and not by using the Easement. (Def. COE, Exh. A [Seidler Deposition Transcript] at p. 43, ll. 8-22; see also Exh. C [email from Eva Turenchalk stating that access to the employee dwelling would be “from Foothill Road”].)

PoloDonkey’s separate statement “ ‘effectively concedes the materiality of whatever facts are included. Thus, if a triable issue is raised as to any of the facts in [that] separate statement, the motion must be denied!’ [Citation.]” (Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 252, original italics.) To the extent PoloDonkey contends that the material facts stated in its moving separate statement show, expressly or by inference, that the Easement was regularly used to access the PoloDonkey Property, the evidence presented by Defendants and described above gives rise to a competing inference that the Easement was not regularly used for each of the purposes and during the whole of the time frame stated in the separate statement.

“[S]ummary judgment shall not be granted by the court based on inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence if contradicted by other inferences or evidence that raise a triable issue as to any material fact.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) Furthermore, “[t]he court has no power in a summary proceeding to weigh one inference against another or against other evidence....” (Sanchez v. Swinerton & Walberg Co. (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1461, 1465-1466.) For all reasons discussed above, the court is unable to find, based on the present record, that PoloDonkey is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850, fn. omitted.)

As to the motion for summary adjudication of any defense raised by Defendants which is based on a purported abandonment of the Easement by PoloDonkey, the same reasoning and analysis apply. Moreover, to the extent the motion seeks adjudication of a defense raised by Defendants, the motion is, for all reasons discussed below, procedurally deficient.

“If summary adjudication is sought, whether separately or as an alternative to the motion for summary judgment, the specific cause of action, affirmative defense, claims for damages, or issues of duty must be stated specifically in the notice of motion and be repeated, verbatim, in the separate statement of undisputed material facts.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(b).) The court has discretion to deny summary judgment “on the basis of failure to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350....” (Truong v. Glasser (2009) 181 Cal.App.4th 102, 118.)

Though PoloDonkey contends that there exists no evidence to support “any” of the defenses raised by Defendants, PoloDonkey has failed to specifically state each affirmative defense in the notice of the motion and the separate statement submitted in support of the motion. (See Notice at pp. 3-4; Sep. Stmt. at pp. 38, 74, 110, 146, 182, & 218.) The failure to specifically state each affirmative defense at issue, as required by court rules, also forces the court to search the record to determine the specific defenses to which the motion is directed, among other things, justifying a denial of the motion on procedural grounds.

For all reasons discussed above, as Defendants have met their burden to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact based on competing inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence presented by the parties, and based on the procedural deficiencies described herein, the court will deny the motion.

The parties’ evidentiary objections:

In their opposition to the motion, Defendants raise objections to material and matters appearing in the declarations of Seidler, Peter Haslund, Ronald MacLeod, Amanda Maluf, Barry J. Waters, and John Hebda, submitted by PoloDonkey in support of the motion.

In support of its reply, PoloDonkey submits objections to the declarations of Sandoval, Quiel, and Flannery.

“In granting or denying a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, the court need rule only on those objections to evidence that it deems material to its disposition of the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (q).) Based on the court’s review of the parties’ respective objections, the purportedly objectionable evidence is not material to the court’s disposition of the motion as further discussed herein. For these and all further reasons discussed above, the court need not rule on these objections.

PoloDonkey’s requests for judicial notice:

In support of the motion, PoloDonkey requests judicial notice of: (1) the Easement Deed, which was recorded on December 10, 1915, in Book 151, pages 286-87 of Deeds, in the official records of the County of Santa Barbara; (2) the Grant Deed (the Rothbard Grant Deed) to Michael Rothbard, recorded on May 27, 2005, as instrument no. 2005-0049649 in the official records of the County of Santa Barbara; (3) a “Quitclaim Deed” (the Rothbard Quitclaim) to Michael Rothbard, Trustee u.d.t. dated January 11, 2013 (The Michael Rothbard Revocable Trust), recorded on June 25, 2013, as instrument no. 2013-0042708 in the official records of the County of Santa Barbara County; (4) a “Quitclaim Deed” (the Foothill Quitclaim) to 3215 Foothill Road, LLC, recorded on June 25, 2013, as instrument no. 2013-0042709 in the official records of the County of Santa Barbara; (5) Articles of Organization of 3215 Foothill Road, LLC, filed with the California Secretary of State on January 17, 2013; (6) a Grant Deed (the PoloDonkey Grant Deed) to PoloDonkey recorded on July 31, 2014, as instrument no. 2014-0034710 in the official records of the County of Santa Barbara County; (7) a Statement of Information for PoloDonkey filed with the California Secretary of State on November 7, 2024; (8) a Grant Deed (Defendants Deed) to Defendants recorded on February 12, 2021, as instrument no. 2021-0011341 in the official records of the County of Santa Barbara; (9) a Trust Transfer Deed (the Trust Transfer) to Defendants as Trustees of the Sandoval Quiel Revocable Living Trust dated July 15, 2022, recorded on October 4, 2022, as instrument no. 2022-0042523 in the official records of the County of Santa Barbara; (10) a complaint and cross-complaint filed in Superior Court of Los Angeles County case number BC698675; (11) the verified answer filed by Defendants in this action; and (12) a verified second amended petition for writ of mandamus/mandate and complaint for damages filed in Superior Court of Santa Barbara County case number 24CV04379. (PoloDonkey RJN, ¶¶ 1-12 & Exhs. 3-14.)

In support of its reply to Defendants’ opposition, PoloDonkey requests that the court take juridical notice of site plans and maps submitted to the County of Santa Barbara. (PoloDonkey Reply RJN, ¶ 1; Exh. E to Reply Tcharkarov Decl.)

The court will grant PoloDonkey’s request for judicial notice of the Easement Deed, the Rothbard Grant Deed, the Rothbard Quitclaim, the Foothill Quitclaim, the PoloDonkey Grant Deed, Defendants Deed, and the Trust Transfer. (Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (c), (h).) Judicial notice of these records does not extend to the truth of their contents or any particular interpretation of their meaning, which remain disputable. (Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375.)

The remaining records and other materials described above are unnecessary or irrelevant to the court’s determination of the issues presented in the motion. (Evid. Code, § 350; Mangini v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063, overruled on other grounds in In re Tobacco Cases II (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1257, 1276.) For these reasons, the court will deny the request of PoloDonkey for judicial notice of the additional records and other materials described above.