James Knapp vs City of Santa Barbara et al

Case Number

24CV03988

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 01/31/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

CMC; Demurrer

Tentative Ruling

For the reasons set forth herein, the court will stay this action pending disposition of the criminal action, People v. Knapp, Santa Barbara Superior Court case No. 24CR03332, or further order of this court. The court will set a case management conference to monitor the status of the criminal action. The defendants’ demurrer to the first amended complaint is ordered off calendar, to be reset for hearing after the stay is lifted.

Background:

As alleged in plaintiff’s first amended complaint (FAC):

Plaintiff James Knapp is the manager of a limited liability company (LLC) that owns an apartment building within the city limits of defendant City of Santa Barbara (City). (FAC, ¶¶ 1, 7, 13.)

On January 31, 2024, in his capacity as the manager of the LLC, Knapp caused to be served a 60-day written notice to terminate tenancy on a tenant so that the LLC could substantially remodel the apartment building’s electrical, wiring, and plumbing systems pursuant to lawfully issued building permits issued by the City. (FAC, ¶ 13.) The repairs authorized under the permits would require the tenant to be displaced from the unit for more than 30 days in order to be completed. (Ibid.) In serving the notice, Knapp contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration the filing of an unlawful detainer action in the event the tenant did not abide by the requirements of the notice. (Ibid.) In fact, thereafter, Knapp caused to be filed an unlawful detainer complaint in this Court based upon the eviction notice on April 5, 2024. (Ibid.)

On May 1, 2024, after Knapp had already caused to be filed the unlawful detainer action based upon the eviction notice at issue, the City Attorney filed a misdemeanor complaint against Knapp (Criminal Complaint) in People v. Knapp, Santa Barbara Superior Court case No. 24CR03332 (Criminal Action). (FAC, ¶ 15 & exhibit 2.) The Criminal Complaint contains three counts: (1) unlawfully terminating the tenancy of a qualified tenant without just cause stated in full in the termination notice in violation of Santa Barbara Municipal Code section 26.50.010; (2) unlawfully failing to comply with the just cause eviction notice requirements in violation of Santa Barbara Municipal Code section 26.50.040; and (3) unlawfully failing to serve tenants with a copy of the permits along with the written notice stating the reason for the termination, the type and scope of work to be performed, why the work cannot be reasonably accomplished in a safe manner with the tenant in place, and why the work requires the tenant to vacate the residential real property for at least 30 days when seeking to recover possession of a property to totally demolish or to substantially remodel in violation of Santa Barbara Municipal Code section 26.50.070, definition of “Just Cause,” subdivision (2)(d). (FAC, ¶ 16 & exhibit B.)

The Criminal Action remains pending. (FAC, ¶ 18.)

On July 18, 2024, Knapp filed his original complaint against City and against the Office of the City Attorney. Defendants filed a demurrer to the original complaint. Shortly thereafter, and before that demurrer was heard, Knapp filed his FAC. The FAC asserts two causes of action: (1) for declaratory relief (facial violation of Civil Code, § 47); and (2) for declaratory relief (as-applied violation of Civil Code, § 47). In both causes of action Knapp asserts that Civil Code section 47 preempts the provisions of Santa Barbara Municipal Code chapter 26.50 that allow the City Attorney to bring an “administrative, civil, or criminal action” for penalties, damages, or imprisonment against a rental housing owner who files a court action to recover possession of a rental unit. (FAC, ¶¶ 24, 33.)

The City withdrew its demurrer to the original complaint as superseded by the FAC. On October 18, 2024, the City filed its demurrer to the FAC. The City argues that Civil Code section 47 does not preempt chapter 26.50 of the City’s Municipal Code (Chapter 26.50). Knapp opposes the demurrer, arguing in favor of preemption.

When this demurrer was originally set for hearing, the court identified a jurisdictional issue, discussed below, that potentially affects the court’s ability to resolve this matter at this time. The court requested that the parties provide supplemental briefing on this issue. The parties have provided supplemental briefing in response to the court’s request.

Analysis:

As the court noted in its order seeking further briefing:

Knapp does not argue that Chapter 26.50 is entirely invalid. Knapp argues that Chapter 26.50 is invalid as preempted by Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) (also known as the “litigation privilege”) only to the extent that (i) it purports to go beyond allowing the City Attorney to obtain an injunction and authorizes the City Attorney to bring an “administrative, civil, or criminal action,” (ii) purports to require the City Attorney to seek attorney fees and costs, and specifically (iii) authorizes the Criminal Action against Knapp. (FAC, ¶¶ 24-26, 32-34.) Knapp seeks declarations to that effect and permanent injunctions enjoining all enforcement and criminal prosecutions. (FAC, prayer ¶¶ 1-6.)

The only causes of action asserted in the FAC are for declaratory relief, for which injunctive relief is an addition remedy. “It is well established that parties may seek declaratory relief with respect to the interpretation and application of local ordinances. [Citations.] It is also well established that preemption, like other affirmative defenses, may be raised in a complaint seeking declaratory or other prospective relief.” (Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1250, fn. 5.) “Declaratory relief is not foreclosed simply because the subject matter of the action is a penal statute or ordinance. [Citations] But this does not mean that declaratory relief is always appropriate to challenge the validity of a penal statute or to obtain a construction of it for a plaintiff’s benefit. Declaratory relief is properly denied, for example, if the factual matrix is insufficiently set to permit a useful and intelligent adjudication to be made [citation], or if the issues can be better decided in a criminal proceeding [citations].” (California Water & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles County (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 16, 24.) Where there is an adequate remedy at law, declaratory relief is generally unavailable. (Ellis v. County of Calaveras (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 64, 73.) The particular remedy at law available under the allegations of the FAC is the pending criminal action. (See Miller v. State of California (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 202, 204–205.)

A corresponding equitable limitation exists to preclude injunctions as to pending criminal actions. “Courts of equity will, in proper cases, enjoin the attempt to enforce a law or ordinance making certain acts a criminal offense and imposing a punishment therefor, where the law or ordinance is invalid and its enforcement will injure or destroy the plaintiff’s property or property rights.” (Sullivan v. San Francisco Gas & Elec. Co. (1905) 148 Cal. 368, 371.)

“We know of no principle of jurisprudence which authorizes a court of equity, on the ground that it will prevent a multiplicity of actions, or that it will prevent an injurious interference with plaintiff’s business, to proceed to investigate as to the truth of criminal charges that have been or may be preferred against him, to hear the evidence in regard to his guilt or innocence, to determine, in advance of the decision of the lawfully constituted criminal courts, the question of his guilt or innocence of pending charges and his probable guilt or innocence of future charges, and, if found in his favor, to forestall the action of the law courts and enjoin the enforcement of a constitutional and valid law against him, on the sole ground that there is not, and never will be, sufficient evidence of his guilt. This, in substance, is the relief which the plaintiffs demand. The answer to the application is that the plaintiffs’ remedy in the courts of law is complete and adequate. Every person is subject to the chance that he may be prosecuted for some offense of which he is not only not guilty, but as to which there is no reasonable or probable cause to believe him guilty. The prosecution must of course be in some court having jurisdiction of the offense. In that court he has an opportunity to make his defense to the charge, to rebut the evidence against him, and introduce evidence in his favor. The presumption that such court will give him a fair trial and decide justly in his case is as strong as the presumption that a court of equity will fairly try and justly decide his application for an injunction involving the same facts. There is no rule which permits a person to substitute a court of equity for the courts of law in the decision of such matters of fact, and, by anticipatory action therein, take from the regularly constituted criminal courts their jurisdiction of the particular offense in question. All persons must submit to the due process of law in the courts vested with lawful jurisdiction of legal offenses charged against them, and the fact that such courts may give an erroneous decision is no ground for relief in a court of equity by way of injunction to prevent them from acting at all, or to interfere with their judgments when made.” (Sullivan v. San Francisco Gas & Elec. Co., supra, 148 Cal. at pp. 372–373.)

“The object apparently sought by the suit is a judicial determination of these questions in a court of equity, to be used as a precedent in the criminal courts upon the trial of prosecutions …, or which would have the effect of deterring the defendants from beginning such prosecutions. The superior court is as competent to decide such questions when sitting as a criminal court in the trial of a criminal cause as it would be upon the trial of a suit in equity, and there is no reason why the plaintiffs should not be restricted to the criminal courts for the preservation of their rights and the maintenance of their defenses. However desirable and beneficial such a predetermination by a court of equity would be, it gives no right to invoke equity jurisdiction.” (Sullivan v. San Francisco Gas & Elec. Co., supra, 148 Cal. at p. 373; see Civ. Code, § 3423, subd. (a); Code Civ. Proc., § 526, subd. (b)(1).)

“As a general rule an injunction will not be granted to protect a person from prosecution for the alleged commission of a criminal offense on a showing that he is not guilty of such offense or that the law does not apply to him. The court having jurisdiction over criminal offenses is the forum in which such questions of fact must be determined. [Citations.] [¶] An exception has been made to this general rule in both federal and state courts where constitutional statutes are being unconstitutionally applied to suppress constitutional rights guaranteed to all citizens by either the federal or state constitutions [citations]. [¶] In determining whether these exceptional circumstances exist, a trial court must proceed with great caution. In [City of Santa Monica v. Superior Court (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 223, 226], this standard of care is set forth as follows: ‘[W]e regard it as beyond question that trial courts should be extremely cautious, and even hesitant and reluctant, when asked to enjoin law enforcement officials from enforcing an ordinance obviously approved and adopted by duly elected representatives of the people for the purposes of promoting and protecting public morality prior to a trial on the merits.’ ” (Pitchess v. Superior Court (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 644, 648–649.)

These equitable considerations come into play at this stage of the proceeding with respect to the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction. “The doctrine of ‘ “exclusive concurrent jurisdiction” ’ provides that when two or more courts have subject matter jurisdiction over a dispute, the court that first asserts jurisdiction assumes it to the exclusion of the others. [Citations.] The rule is ‘a judicial rule of priority or preference and is not jurisdictional in the traditional sense of the word,’ in that it ‘does not divest a court, which otherwise has jurisdiction of an action, of jurisdiction.’ [Citation.] The purpose of this rule ‘is to avoid unseemly conflict between courts that might arise if they were free to make contradictory decisions or awards at the same time or relating to the same controversy’ and ‘to protect litigants from the expense and harassment of multiple litigation.’ [Citation.] Because it is a policy rule, the application of the rule in a given case depends upon the balancing of countervailing policies.” (BBBB Bonding Corp. v. Caldwell (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 349, 374.)

As the traditional rules of equity, discussed above, generally, preclude a court of equity from interfering with the disposition of pending (and not merely threatened or potential) criminal action, those policies strongly imply the application of the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction in this case. The parties here seek a legal declaration as to the enforceability, or not, of Chapter 26.50 as it applies to criminal proceedings generally, and as it applies in the Criminal Action specifically. Such a declaration would have the effect of supplanting the jurisdiction of the criminal court on this issue.

In the requested supplemental briefing, the parties address the issue, as framed by this court, of whether, while the Criminal Action remains pending, the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction, an abstention doctrine, or other limitation on the court’s jurisdiction or discretion preclude further litigation in this matter. Perhaps not surprisingly, the City argues that this court does not have jurisdiction to proceed; Knapp argues to the contrary, that this court has jurisdiction to proceed and should do so.

In supplemental briefing, Knapp argues that countervailing policies argue against staying this case pending the outcome of the Criminal Action, citing, among other cases, Childs v. Eltinge (1973) 29 Cal.App.3d 843 (Childs) and People ex rel. Garamendi v. American Autoplan, Inc. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 760 (Garamendi). In Childs, the plaintiffs were lessors of a ground lease of property located in Riverside County upon which the defendant lessees constructed a shopping center. (Childs, supra, at p. 845.) Under the lease, the annual rent was adjusted every five years based upon an appraised value of the real property exclusive of improvements. (Ibid.) Each purporting to follow the lease’s appraisal procedures, the defendant lessees disputed the appraisal, and the resulting calculated rent increase, made by the plaintiff lessors. (Id. at p. 846.) Consequently, the defendant lessees filed an action in Los Angeles County for declaratory relief against plaintiff lessors. (Ibid.) The defendant lessees continued to pay the base rent, but did not pay the disputed rent increase. (Ibid.) A couple of months after having answered the Los Angeles complaint, the plaintiff lessors served on defendant lessees a 3-day notice to quit or pay rent based upon the failure to pay the disputed rent increase. (Ibid.) The plaintiff lessors thereafter filed an unlawful detainer action in Riverside County. (Id. at p. 847.)

The defendant lessees (as plaintiffs in the Los Angeles action) obtained a preliminary injunction restraining the prosecution of the unlawful detainer action in Childs, subject to certain conditions. (Childs, supra, 29 Cal.App.3d at p. 847.) The injunction was dissolved when the defendant lessees failed to comply with those conditions. (Ibid.) The defendant lessees then moved to quash service of summons, to dismiss, and to sustain their demurrer to the unlawful detainer action. (Ibid.) The trial court granted the motions and sustained the demurrer on the basis of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Los Angeles court. (Id. at pp. 847-848.)

On appeal in Childs, the court noted the particular policies underlying the statutorily prioritized unlawful detainer action: “The unlawful detainer statutes were, as previously noted, enacted to provide an adequate, expeditious and summary procedure for regaining possession of real property wrongfully withheld by a tenant. … The enactment of such statutory procedures is supported by the strong public policy of preserving the peace [citation] as well as the recognition of the unique factual and legal characteristics of the landlord-tenant relationship [citation]. Where the amount of rent due is in dispute, we think it unquestionable that a lessee may pay the disputed rent under protest and institute an action for declaratory relief in which, if he prevailed, it could be declared that he was entitled to reimbursement or credit against rent due thereafter during the term of the lease. Just as unquestionably, under such circumstances, we think the lessee ought not to have the right to refuse to pay the disputed rent, file and serve an action for declaratory relief and thereby prevent the lessor from employing the summary remedies to which he is entitled under the unlawful detainer statutes [citation]. If such were the rule, it would be within the power of the lessee to render nugatory the statutorily prescribed unlawful detainer procedures.” (Childs, supra, 29 Cal.App.3d at pp. 853–854, fns. omitted.)

The Childs court concluded: “The rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction is as previously noted itself a policy rule [citation]. In view of the countervailing policies mentioned above, we have concluded that the rule should not be applied to forestall lessors proceeding with their unlawful detainer action in the Riverside Superior Court.” (Childs, supra, 29 Cal.App.3d at p. 854.) Moreover, “in the case at bench where venue in the second action was properly laid in Riverside County and where because of the summary nature of the second action it could not be joined for trial with the first action in the Los Angeles Superior Court without mutual consent of the parties and where the relief sought in the second action could not be afforded in the first action it would be improvident to order the outright dismissal of the second action pending termination of the first even if the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction applied.” (Id. at pp. 855–856.)

In Garamendi, certain of the defendants (and another entity) sold automobile repair contracts that the plaintiff California Department of Insurance opined constituted contracts of insurance. (Garamendi, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 765.) On May 18, 1988, the plaintiff filed suit in Los Angeles Superior court against defendants, requesting an injunction prohibiting the sale of such contracts without first being licensed. (Ibid.) The same day, a preliminary injunction was granted (which was later affirmed on appeal). (Ibid.) In December 1991, the parties stipulated for judgment of a permanent injunction. (Ibid.).

In January 1989, the defendants in Garamendi began selling automobile repair contracts similar to those previously sold and subject to the earlier action but now sold through insurance agents. (Garamendi, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 766.) On May 7, 1992, after receiving consumer complaints, the plaintiff issued a cease and desist order directing the defendants to stop violations of the Insurance Code and from violating the preliminary injunction in the earlier action. (Id. at p. 767.) Two of the defendants in Garamendi filed an action for declaratory relief against the plaintiff in Riverside Superior Court on June 4, 1992, arguing that the plaintiff acted in excess of its jurisdiction to issue the cease and desist order, that defendants did not violate the Insurance Code or the injunction in the other action. (Id. at pp. 768-769.)

On June 15, 1992, the plaintiff filed the Garamendi action in Los Angeles Superior Court seeking an injunction based upon the new business of the defendants. (Garamendi, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 768.) The plaintiff sought and obtained a temporary restraining order and order to show cause re preliminary injunction. (Ibid.) In opposition to the temporary restraining order, the defendants argued, among other things, that under the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction, the Los Angeles Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to issue the order because the Riverside Superior Court involved the same matter. (Ibid.) The defendants suggested that the Los Angeles action should be stayed or transferred to Riverside, but did not bring a separate motion or file a pleading containing a request for affirmative relief. (Ibid.) The temporary restraining order was denied, but the preliminary injunction was ultimately granted. (Id. at p. 769.) After the preliminary injunction was granted, the court granted defendants’ motion to transfer the action to Riverside. (Ibid.)

On appeal in Garamendi, the Garamendi court concluded that “the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction is a judicial rule of priority or preference and does not divest a court, which otherwise has jurisdiction of an action, of jurisdiction. The rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction is similar to an affirmative defense and the remedy for its applicability is a stay of the second action. Prior to an appropriate pleading requesting such a stay, the trial court in the second action properly exercises its jurisdiction.” (Garamendi, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 769.)

“ ‘Under the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction, “when two [California] superior courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the subject matter and all parties involved in litigation, the first to assume jurisdiction has exclusive and continuing jurisdiction over the subject matter and all parties involved until such time as all necessarily related matters have been resolved.” [Citations.] The rule is based upon the public policies of avoiding conflicts that might arise between courts if they were free to make contradictory decisions or awards relating to the same controversy, and preventing vexatious litigation and multiplicity of suits.’ [Citation.] Ordinarily, ‘[p]riority of jurisdiction resides in the tribunal where process is first served.’ [Citation.] However, the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction is a rule of policy and countervailing policies may make the rule inapplicable. [(Childs, supra, 29 Cal.App.3d at p. 854.)]” (Garamendi, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at pp. 769-770.)

“The rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction, as mentioned previously, is mandatory. Thus, if the conditions are met, the issuance of a stay order is a matter of right. [Citation.] Frequently, the term, ‘jurisdictional’ has been used to describe the mandatory nature of the rule. [Citations.] However, ‘the term “jurisdiction” is used in many senses. [Citation.] The term is not synonymous with “mandatory.” ’ [Citations.] The failure to comply with a mandatory procedural rule does not render a ruling void. [Citations.] The rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction is not ‘jurisdictional’ in the sense that failure to comply renders subsequent proceedings void.” (Garamendi, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 772.)

From Garamendi it is clear that the doctrine of concurrent exclusive jurisdiction, at least in the present context, is instructive but neither jurisdictional nor mandatory. The two actions here at issue are the Criminal Action and this civil declaratory relief action. This action completely overlaps with the Criminal Action as to the issue of whether Chapter 26.50 is invalid as preempted by Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) as to the Criminal Complaint against Knapp. This is a core issue of the Criminal Action because if Knapp succeeds on his legal theory that the prosecution is preempted, the Criminal Action completely fails. Similarly, if this court were to rule favorably to Knapp and provide the remedies Knapp seeks, that ruling would preclude the existing prosecution against Knapp.

The exact doctrine being applied is a bit more complicated. As Garamendi notes, the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction applies when there are two courts having concurrent jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties to the litigation. Here, there is technically two departments of one court exercising jurisdiction. (See Williams v. Superior Court (1939) 14 Cal.2d 656, 662 (Williams).) But there is a similar doctrine applying within one court: “[W]here a proceeding has been duly assigned for hearing and determination to one department of the superior court by the presiding judge of said court in conformity with the rules thereof, and the proceeding so assigned has not been finally disposed of therein or legally removed therefrom, it is beyond the jurisdictional authority of another department of the same court to interfere with the exercise of the power of the department to which the proceeding has been so assigned.” (Ibid.) But this policy-based rule, too, has similar exceptions and limitations. (E.g., Asuncion v. Superior Court (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 141, 146–147 [preliminary injunction to stay unlawful detainer proceedings until civil trial of fraud action].)

Regardless of the application of other, more specific technical legal doctrines, this court has authority to control its own docket. “Every court shall have the power to do all of the following: [¶] … [¶] (3) To provide for the orderly conduct of proceedings before it, or its officers.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 128, subd. (a)(3).) This authority includes the authority and discretion to stay an action when warranted. (E.g., People ex rel. Burns v. Wood (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 700, 712.)

The circumstances in this matter strongly counsels for a stay of this action pending disposition of the Criminal Action. As discussed above, the disposition of either this action or the Criminal Action will resolve a core issue between the parties that could potentially be dispositive of the other action. The Criminal Action was filed first; this action was filed in response to the Criminal Action with the specific goal of preempting the Criminal Action. The policies underlying the exclusive concurrent jurisdiction doctrine are based upon the interests of comity between the courts to provide respect and to avoid potentially conflicting decisions in favor of the first court to assume jurisdiction. Those same policies support proceeding with the Criminal Action and staying this action.

Moreover, as discussed above, traditional rules of equity preclude interfering with a pending criminal action. The core issues raised in both proceedings may be asserted as a defense in the Criminal Action. This is an adequate remedy at law. As the Supreme Court emphasized in Sullivan v. San Francisco Gas & Elec. Co., supra, the criminal court is fully competent and capable of resolve such issues before it. Furthermore, criminal actions have statutory priority over civil actions. (Pen. Code, § 1050, subd. (a).) As discussed in the context of the priority of unlawful detainer actions in Childs, supra, this factor also counsels in favor of proceeding with the first-filed Criminal Action. (See also Mobil Oil Corp. v. Superior Court (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 486, 494–495 [“Essentially, the matter centers upon the statutory precedence for trial accorded the respective actions.”].)

After considering the supplemental briefing of the parties, the court concludes that a stay of these proceedings is in the interests of justice, judicial economy, and comity. After the conclusion of the Criminal Action, the court and the parties will be in a good position to determine what, if anything, remains to be litigated in this action.