Erika Rios Zarate, et al. v. Our Lady of Guadalupe Church, et al

Case Number

24CV01672

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 01/29/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

1) Demurrer To Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint; 2) Motion To Strike Portions Of Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint; and, 3) City Of Santa Barbara’s Demurrer To Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint

Tentative Ruling

For Plaintiffs Erika Rios Zarate and Guadalupe Rios Zarate: Russell Brown, RBX Law, PC

                                   

For Defendants Our Lady of Guadalupe Church and The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles: Alison K. Beanum, Veena A. Mitchell, Natalie Portone, Clyde & Co US LLP

                                   

For Defendant the City of Santa Barbara: Sarah J. Knecht, Tom R. Shapiro, Delaney Satz, Office of the City Attorney

RULING

[Both CMC and L&M will be called at 10am.]

Law and Motion

(1) The demurrer of Defendants Our Lady of Guadalupe Church and The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles to Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint is overruled as to the first and second causes of action, and sustained as to the third cause of action, with leave to amend.

(2) The motion of Defendants Our Lady of Guadalupe Church and The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles to strike portions of Plaintiffs second amended complaint is granted, with leave to amend. To the extent Plaintiffs fail to file a third amended complaint as authorized herein, the following matters shall be stricken from Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint: prayer for relief paragraph 4.

(3) The demurrer of Defendant the City of Santa Barbara is sustained, with leave to amend.

(4) Plaintiffs shall file and serve any third amended complaint on or before February 10, 2025.

Case Management Conference

CMCS filed by Defendant Eureka 1/16/2025; jury trial requested, 7-8 day estimate; no trial date set; The Plaintiffs allege that they were assaulted and battered while attending a Fiesta at Our La of Guadalupe Church.

CMCS filed by Plaintiff; Req for Entry of Default filed by Plaintiffs Zarate 1/14/2025; Parties served, but not appeared – Party Eureka has had Default entered; jury trial requested, 4-5 day estimate; TCC 10/1/2025.

CMCS filed by Defendant Our Lady of Guadalupe 1/14/2025; 5-7 day estimate; TCC 10/1/2025; Plaintiffs' alleged personal injuries arise from an alleged altercation between Plaintiffs and the individual Defendants while attending the Church’s 2022 Fiesta event on August 7, 2022. While the Church had no role in the alleged altercation, Plaintiffs have defectively pled negligence, premises liability, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against the Church. The Church’s demurrer and motion to strike are set to be heard on January 29, 2025.

CMCS filed by Defendants City of SB 1/14/2025; acknowledges trial date.

Confirm

Trial date – 10/1/25

MSC 9/5/25

Next CMC 7/23/25

Background

On October 21, 2024, with leave of court, Plaintiffs Erika Rios Zarate (Erika) and Guadalupe Rios Zarate (Guadalupe) (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed their operative second amended complaint (the SAC) against Defendants Our Lady of Guadalupe Church (the Church), the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles (the Archbishop), Eureka Private Security Patrol, Inc. (Eureka), the Santa Barbara Police Department (the SBPD), Mayda Hurtado (Mayda), Jorge Hurtado (Jorge), and Claudia Real (Real) (collectively, Defendants), alleging four causes of action: (1) negligence (against the Church, the Archbishop, Eureka, and SBPD only); (2) premises liability (against the Church and Archbishop only); (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress (against all Defendants); and (4) battery (against Mayda, Jorge, and Real only). (Note: To avoid confusion due to common surnames, the Court will refer to individual Defendants by their first names. No disrespect is intended.)

The theories of liability alleged in the SAC arise out of what Plaintiffs allege was a “mob attack” which occurred during an annual “Fiesta” event (the Event) on August 7, 2022, at property owned, controlled, and in the possession of the Church, and located at 227 N. Nopal Street in Santa Barbara, California (the property). (SAC, at p. 2, ll. 2-4 & ¶ 3.) As further alleged in the SAC:

The Event, which is held annually over the course of 3 days during the City of Santa Barbara’s “Fiesta” celebration, is organized and planned by the Church and Archbishop (collectively, the Church Defendants), and attracts thousands of patrons who pay money for food, beverages, games, and other items. (SAC, ¶¶ 3 & 16-18.) The purpose of the Event is to generate income for the Church Defendants to fund the Church’s activities, which the Church Defendants maximize by admitting as many persons and selling as much food, beverages (including alcohol), and other goods and services as possible. (SAC, ¶¶ 3 & 16-17.)

The Church promoted the Event online and through the media. (SAC, ¶ 15.) The Church, who is responsible for selecting and hiring security personnel for the Event, contracted with Eureka to provide security services for the Event, which includes restricting entry and exit to the Event, monitoring alcohol consumption at the Event, and ensuring the safety of persons attending the Event. (SAC, ¶¶ 3, 7 & Exh. 1 [contract for Eureka security services].) The Church also hired and paid the SBPD to provide security services for the Event. (SAC, ¶ 8.)

The Church Defendants, Eureka, and the SBPD knew that from 2015 through 2022, fights occurred at other “Fiesta” events, that these fights resulted in serious injuries to patrons of the events, that unmonitored alcohol consumption at these events increased the risk of fights occurring, that the Event takes place in a location within Santa Barbara where violence and violent persons are known to be present, and that the security at prior events was insufficient to prevent, control, or disperse these fights once they occurred. (SAC, ¶¶ 20-26.)

The Church Defendants, Eureka, and the SBPD failed to monitor or limit the number of attendees at the Event, failed to place security at the entrance to the Event, did not provide patrons with the location of security officers at the Event, and did not secure common areas where fights had occurred in the past. (SAC, ¶¶ 27-28.) The Church Defendants also did not monitor, control, or limit the amount of alcohol consumed by attendees of the Event, and did not take steps to ensure that alcohol was not served to minors at the Event. (SAC, ¶ 19.) As a result, attendees of the Event became increasing intoxicated and violent throughout the day of the Event, making the Event more dangerous. (Ibid.)

Erika and Guadalupe attended the Event with their respective husbands and children. (SAC, ¶ 31.) Following an encounter where a group of young women led by Erika’s former neighbor approached and insulted Erika in the bathroom area, Erika and Guadalupe were heading back from the bathroom area to reunite with their families when they were confronted by a group of 13 or 14 people, including Jorge, that was led by Mayda and another individual. (SAC, ¶¶ 31-33.) Because the Event was overcrowded, Erika and Guadalupe could not escape or locate security personnel. (SAC, ¶ 34.)

A subsequent fight occurred in an open common area in the center of the property, during which Mayda attacked Erika and yelled that Mayda was going to kill Erika. (SAC, ¶ 34.) After Erika was forced to the ground by a member of the group, the group kicked and punched Erika’s face and abdomen while Erika was on the ground. (SAC, ¶¶ 35 & 37.) When Guadalupe tried to remove the attackers off of Erika, she was also attacked. (SAC, ¶ 36.)

The attack lasted for 15 minutes until Eureka’s security personnel arrived and separated Erika and Guadalupe from the group. (SAC, ¶ 38-39.) Erika was transported to the hospital where she was diagnosed with a facial fracture and acute trauma to her abdomen and pelvis. (SAC, ¶¶ 42-45.) Guadalupe, whose 4 year old daughter witnessed the attack, was also injured. (SAC, ¶¶ 51-52.)

On December 13, 2024, the default of Eureka was entered as requested by Plaintiffs.

On January 14, 2025, the defaults of Mayda and Jorge were entered as requested by Plaintiffs.

The demurrers and motion to strike:

On November 19, 2024, the Church Defendants filed a demurrer (the Church demurrer) to the first, second, and third causes of action alleged in the SAC on the grounds that Plaintiffs have failed to state facts sufficient to state causes of action against them, and a motion (the Church motion to strike) for an order striking the request of Plaintiffs for attorney’s fees.

On November 25, 2024, the City filed a demurrer (the City demurrer) to the first and third causes of action on the grounds that Plaintiffs have failed to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action and have failed to comply with Government Code section 810 et seq.

Plaintiffs oppose the Church demurrer, the Church motion to strike, and the City demurrer.

Analysis

(1) The Church Demurrer and the City Demurrer

In ruling on a demurrer, the court determines whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Moore v. Regents of University of California (1990) 51 Cal.3d 120, 125.) The pleading subject to demurrer is given a reasonable interpretation and read as a whole, with all its parts in their context. (Ibid.) A demurrer assumes the truth of properly pleaded material allegations including facts which may be inferred from those expressly alleged, but not of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Ibid.; McMahon v. Craig (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1509.) “If the complaint states a cause of action under any theory, regardless of the title under which the factual basis for relief is stated, that aspect of the complaint is good against a demurrer.” (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38.)

The Church demurrer to the first and second causes of action:

As grounds for the Church demurrer to the first cause of action for negligence, the Church Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts sufficient to show a pattern of dangerous conditions at the Event, to show that the Church Defendants were aware of any alleged danger or that any alleged danger was foreseeable, or to show that the Church Defendants created any alleged peril. For these reasons, the Church Defendants argue, Plaintiffs have failed to adequately allege the existence of a duty owed by the Church Defendants to protect Plaintiffs from what the Church Defendants contend constitute unlawful acts of independent third parties.

In response, Plaintiffs contend that they have alleged facts sufficient to show that the Church Defendants held the property open to the public for the purpose of generating income, that numerous incidents involving the same type of violence or crimes have occurred at the prior “Fiesta” events, that the Church Defendants were aware of these prior incidents and that security for the Event was inadequate, that the Church Defendants’ conduct or failures to act increased the likelihood of a fight, and that Plaintiffs and the Church Defendants were in a special relationship. For these reasons, Plaintiffs argue, they have alleged facts sufficient to show that the attack alleged in the SAC was foreseeable, and that the Church Defendants owed a duty protect Plaintiffs from the type of attack that occurred at the Event as further described above.

“A Plaintiff in a negligence suit must demonstrate ‘ “a legal duty to use due care, a breach of such legal duty, and the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.” ’ [Citation.]” (Vasilenko v. Grace Family Church (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1077, 1083.) “ ‘The proper test to be applied to the liability of the possessor of land ... is whether in the management of his property he has acted as a reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to others....’ [Citation.] This requires persons ‘to maintain land in their possession and control in a reasonably safe condition. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Alcaraz v. Vece (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1149, 1156.)

Generally, there exists no “no duty to act to protect others from the conduct of third parties” unless a Defendant has a “special relationship” with the other party. (Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill (2005) 36 Cal.4th 224, 235 (Delgado).) The Church Defendants appear to concede for present purposes that Plaintiffs have alleged facts sufficient to show that the Church Defendants own, control, or possess the property where the Event and attack occurred, and that Plaintiffs patronized the Event at the invitation of the Church Defendants. These allegations are, for present purposes, sufficient to show the existence of a special relationship between Plaintiffs and the Church Defendants with respect to the Event. (Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 799, 806 (Peterson) [a “special relationship” exists “between a possessor of land and members of the public who enter in response to the landowner’s invitation”].)
 

With respect to the question of whether or not Plaintiffs have alleged facts showing that the Church Defendants owed a duty to act to protect Plaintiffs from the group attack by third parties as alleged in the SAC, “legal duties are not discoverable facts of nature, but merely conclusory expressions that, in cases of a particular type, liability should be imposed for damage done.” (Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 434.) “There are a number of situations in the law of negligence where a Defendant, including a landowner, may be liable for providing or not removing the opportunity for another to do harm. [Citation.] If the place or character of the landowner’s business, or his past experience, is such that he should reasonably anticipate careless or criminal conduct on the part of third persons, either generally or at some particular time, he may be under a duty to take precautions against it and to use such means of protection as are available to afford reasonable protection.” (Nola M. v. University of Southern California (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 421, 426; see also Peterson, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 807 [“[l]iability will normally be imposed in circumstances where the possessor has reasonable cause to anticipate the misconduct of third persons”].)

In the SAC, Plaintiffs allege facts describing, with specificity, previous physical assaults or fights which took place on the property during prior “Fiesta” events such as the Event at issue, including those which allegedly involved intoxicated individuals. (See, e.g., SAC, ¶¶ 21-26 [also alleging that “[i]n total, SBPD officers were called to [t]he Church’s fiesta event 6 times in 2015, two times in 2016, 12 times in 2017, 5 times in 2018, 7 times in 2019, 7 times in 2021, and 10 times in 2022”].) Assuming the truth of these allegations, a reasonable trier of fact could infer or conclude that the occurrence of a fight or assault at the Event was reasonably foreseeable “ ‘in light of all the circumstances.’ [Citation.]”. (Delgado, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 240 [ “heightened foreseeability” may exist based on prior similar incidents]; Dix v. Live Nation Entertainment, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 590, 611-612 (Dix) [general discussion, noting that “[p]rior similar incidents are relevant in analyzing foreseeability”].)

Moreover, the Church Defendants do not cite, and the Court is unaware of, any legal authority which would require that the prior incidents alleged in the SAC be identical or nearly identical to the attack at issue. In addition, giving the allegations of the SAC a reasonable interpretation, the prior incidents described by Plaintiffs are sufficiently similar to the assault which caused harm to Plaintiffs such that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude, based on these allegations, that there existed a reasonably foreseeable risk of the assault occurring at the Event. (Delgado, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 240.) In addition, a trier of fact could conclude based on the allegations of the SAC that the burden of preventing future harm of the type alleged in the SAC would not be unfair considering that Plaintiffs also allege, expressly and by inference, that the Church Defendants regularly undertook security measures for past “Fiesta” events. (Id. at p. 238.)

For reasons discussed above, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged, expressly and by inference, facts sufficient to show for present purposes that the Church Defendants knew or should have recognized that physical assaults or fights such as the attack alleged in the SAC were a risk to attendees of the Event. The allegations are also sufficient for present purposes to show a sufficiently close connection between the conduct at issue and the injuries alleged in the SAC. (Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 628-629.) Therefore, and notwithstanding whether there exists “relevant intervening conduct”, Plaintiffs have at this stage of the proceedings adequately alleged facts which give rise to a duty owed by the Church Defendants. (Dix, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at pp. 612-613.) The Court does not, for present purposes, consider whether Plaintiffs can prove their allegations. (Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Boyle (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1034.) Accordingly, the Court will overrule the demurrer of the Church Defendants to the first cause of action for negligence alleged in the SAC.

As to the Church demurrer to the second cause of action for premises liability, the Church Defendants offer the same or substantively similar arguments to show that Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts sufficient to give rise to a duty or to show that the assault on Plaintiffs was foreseeable. “The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages.” (Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.) Accordingly, the same analysis and reasoning apply. For all reasons discussed above, the Court will also overrule the demurrer of the Church Defendants to the second cause of action alleged in the SAC.

The Church demurrer to the third cause of action:

As grounds for their demurrer to the third cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the Church Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have failed to plead any intentional, extreme, or outrageous conduct, or that such conduct was directed to Plaintiffs.

“A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists when there is ‘(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the Defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the Plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the Defendant's outrageous conduct.’ [Citations.] A Defendant’s conduct is ‘outrageous’ when it is so ‘extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.’ [Citation.] And the Defendant’s conduct must be ‘intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.’ [Citation.]” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-1051, internal quotation marks omitted.)

A reasonable interpretation of the SAC shows that Plaintiffs tie the following allegations to the element of extreme and outrageous conduct by the Church Defendants: soliciting and failing to screen attendees that the Church Defendants knew would be raucous and likely to engage in violent behavior; failing to implement security protocols sufficient to prevent attendees from being subjected to violence; admitting an excessive number of people to the Event preventing security personnel from moving freely through the property and Plaintiffs from reaching a place of safety or contacting security personnel; failing to control or monitor alcohol consumption resulting in the excessive intoxication of patrons; failing to intervene during the “mob attack” at issue; failing to provide medical personnel to administer aid to individuals that had been harmed on the property; and, failing to protect Plaintiffs from further assault after the fight ended. (SAC, ¶ 73(1)-(8).)

Even if the Court were to assume without deciding that the allegations of the SAC are sufficient to show a lack of sound judgment by the Church Defendants with respect to the Event, “conduct uninformed by sound judgment is not necessarily synonymous with extreme and outrageous conduct.” (KOVR-TV, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1030.) Wholly absent from the SAC are any allegations showing that the purported conduct of the Church Defendants was directed at Plaintiffs, or that the Church Defendants knew Plaintiffs were “peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress, by reason of some physical or mental condition or peculiarity” and proceeded to direct their conduct at Plaintiff in the face of such knowledge. (McDaniel v. Gile (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 363, 372.) The allegations of the SAC are also insufficient to show any intentional act by the Church Defendants undertaken for the purpose of causing distress to Plaintiffs. (Berry v. Frazier (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1258, 1273; Ochoa v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 159, 165, fn. 5 [conduct must be of a nature which is calculated to and actually does cause serious mental distress].)

For all reasons discussed above, Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts sufficient to show extreme or outrageous conduct by the Church Defendants which exceeds or is beyond all bounds of decency or which was calculated to cause severe emotional distress to Plaintiffs. Therefore, the Court will sustain the demurrer of the Church Defendants to the third cause of action alleged in the SAC.

The City Demurrer:

The City demurrer is directed to the first and third causes of action alleged in the SAC. The City, which contends that it and not the SBPD is the proper Defendant in this action, contends that Plaintiffs have failed to allege that they timely filed a claim under Government Code section 911.2. The City further contends that the SBPD is immune from liability under Government Code section 845, and that it is not liable for the injuries alleged in the SAC under Government Code section 815.

In support of its demurrer, the City submits a request for judicial notice of what the City contends are “facts” regarding Plaintiffs’ failure to either timely file a government claim or seek leave to file a late claim. (RJN, ¶¶ 1-2.) The City’s request for judicial notice is ostensibly supported by assertions appearing in the declaration of its counsel, Delaney R. Satz. (See Satz Decl., ¶ 2.)

Plaintiffs do not contend, and appear to concede, that the causes of action alleged against the SBPD are subject to the requirements of Government Code section 810 et seq. (the Government Claims Act or Act.) Subject to exceptions, all claims for money or damages against a public entity must be presented in accordance with Government Code section 910 et seq. prior to filing a lawsuit. (Gov. Code, §§ 905, 900.4 [defining “local public entity” to include a city and a “public authority”]; see also City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 737 (Stockton).) “[F]ailure to timely present a claim for money or damages to a public entity bars a Plaintiff from filing a lawsuit against that entity.” (State of California v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239.) Relevant here and undisputed by the City, the causes of action alleged in the SAC “shall be presented as provided in Article 2 (commencing with Section 915) not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action.” (Gov. Code, § 911.2, subd. (a).)

For purposes of Government Code section 911.2, “[t]he date of accrual is the date ‘that would pertain under the statute of limitations applicable to a dispute between private litigants.’ [Citation.]” (The Kind & Compassionate v. City of Long Beach (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 116, 125, fn. 1.) The limitations period for the causes of action for negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress alleged against the City is two years. (So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 662; Wassmann v. South Orange County Community College District (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 825, 852-853; see also Code Civ. Proc., §§ 335 & 335.1.)

As further detailed above, Plaintiffs allege that they were injured or harmed by the “mob attack” which occurred at the Event on August 7, 2022. Plaintiffs further allege that that they were not aware that the SBPD was hired by the Church to provide security at the Event until July 9, 2024, when they received discovery responses from the Church, and that on August 13, 2024, they mailed a claim for damages (the government claim) to the City. (SAC, ¶ 54.) Though the allegations of the SAC, on their face, show that Plaintiffs did not file the government claim within the limitations period applicable to the causes of action alleged against the City as further described above, the date of accrual of these causes of action “may be postponed under the delayed discovery doctrine” under which “a cause of action does not accrue until the Plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action.” (S.M. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 712, 717.)

Though it is unclear from the allegations of the SAC when Plaintiffs suffered emotional distress as a result of any purportedly outrageous conduct by the SBPD (see Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 889,) Plaintiffs may rely on the discovery rule to delay accrual of the causes of action alleged against the City provided that the SAC shows “ ‘(1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence.’ [Citation.]” (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 808 (Fox), original italics.) “Under the discovery rule, suspicion of one or more of the elements of a cause of action, coupled with knowledge of any remaining elements, will generally trigger the statute of limitations period.” (Id. at p. 807.)

Though Plaintiffs allege that they did not know the SBPD had been hired to provide security at the Event, the SAC also includes allegations that “at all relevant times … SBPD’s officers were wearing SBPD uniforms and acting within the scope of their official duties” to provide law enforcement services, that the SBPD knew of prior fights or assaults at the Event as described in the SAC, and that the SBPD is liable for the “reckless acts and omissions” of its officers during the Event which are further described above in the SAC. (SAC, ¶¶ 8, 20.) Though Plaintiffs allege that they do not claim that the SBPD failed to provide adequate police protection, absent from the SAC are any allegations to show or suggest that Plaintiffs did not know SBPD was providing law enforcement services, whether under a contract with the Church or otherwise, on the day of the Event.

The allegations of the SAC, on their face, indicate that Plaintiffs had or should have had notice or “information of circumstances to put a reasonable person on inquiry” of the SBPD’s presence and conduct at the Event, or had “the opportunity to obtain knowledge from sources open to [Plaintiffs’] investigation” regarding the circumstances under which officers of the SBPD were present at the Event. (Sanchez v. South Hoover Hospital (1976) 18 Cal.3d 93, 101; Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 807-808.) Plaintiffs do not address these allegations, which at a minimum show that Plaintiffs were aware of the presence and allegedly negligent conduct of SBPD officers with respect to the alleged assault. Plaintiffs also fail to offer reasoned argument sufficient to show why the allegations of the SAC do not show that the statute of limitations further discussed above commenced on the day of the alleged assault, or when the SBPD officers engaged in the purportedly negligent conduct alleged in the SAC.

For all reasons discussed above, the SAC on its face indicates that Plaintiffs were or should have been aware of the presence and conduct of SBPD officers on the day of the Event, and that Plaintiffs were on inquiry notice of any alleged negligence of the SBPD on the day of the Event. As the allegations of the SAC indicate that the statute of limitations period was triggered on the day of the Event with respect to any purportedly negligent or outrageous conduct of the SBPD officers, the SAC shows on its face that the government claim was not filed within the limitations period. Therefore, the Court will sustain the City demurrer on this ground.

As the Court will sustain the City demurrer on the grounds further discussed above, it is not necessary for the Court to address the remaining grounds for demurrer asserted by the City. Further, the Court will deny the City’s request for judicial notice of the facts described above, as these matters are not proper subjects of judicial notice. (Evid. Code, § 452.)

(2) The Church Motion to Strike

“Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof[.]” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).) Upon a motion to strike made under Code of Civil Procedure section 435, the court may “strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading” or “strike  all or part of any pleading not filed in conformity with applicable law, court rules, or an order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436(a) & (b).) The grounds for a motion to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or from matters which the court may take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).)

In the Church motion to strike, the Church Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have failed to plead any contractual, statutory, or other legal basis for the attorney’s fees sought in paragraphs 4 of the prayer for relief. (See SAC, p. 21, ¶ 4.) For this reason, the Church Defendants argue, the claim for attorney’s fees should be stricken from the SAC.

California follows the “American rule” regarding the recovery of attorney’s fees in litigation, “which provides that each party to a lawsuit must ordinarily pay his own attorney fees.” (Trope v. Katz (1995) 11 Cal.4th 274, 278 (Trope).) Code of Civil Procedure section 1021, codifies this rule and states that “[e]xcept as attorney's fees are specifically provided for by statute, the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties[.]” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021; see also Trope, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 279 [parties may expressly or impliedly agree to an allocation of attorney’s fees]; Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (a).)

On its face, the SAC does not allege a statutory or contractual basis upon which attorney’s fees may be recovered by Plaintiffs in this litigation. Plaintiffs allege in the SAC, and contend in their opposition to the Church motion to strike, that they may recover attorney’s fees under the “substantial benefit” doctrine because Plaintiffs seek in this action injunctive relief prohibiting the Church from conducting “Fiesta” activities until they provide adequate security, the purpose of which is to “serve the public good by preventing future patrons from being injured” at the Church’s “Fiesta” event. (SAC, ¶ 13.)

There exist exceptions to the general rule reflected in Code of Civil Procedure section 1021 which are “based on the inherent equitable powers of the court.” (Coalition for L. County Planning etc. Interest v. Board of Supervisors (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 241, 247 (Coalition).) One exception is the “common fund” principle under which a court may award attorney’s fees in circumstances where “a litigant has been responsible for the creation or preservation of a special fund to which other nonlitigants are entitled in common”, in order to prevent “other claimants from being unjustly enriched at the expense of the party responsible for the common benefit.” (Ibid.) In addition, under the “substantial benefit theory”, which is derived from the “common fund” principle, a court may award attorney’s fees to a litigant “whose action has been responsible for conferring on a group substantial nonpecuniary benefits ….” (Ibid.)

Though a Plaintiff is not required to bring a class action to claim attorneys’ fees under the substantial benefit theory, to qualify for use of this theory, the litigation “must: (1) be one in which the court’s equitable powers come into play, (2) be commenced and maintained as a representative action [citation], and (3) result in a disposition that confers substantial benefits either pecuniary or nonpecuniary upon the persons represented.” (Coalition, supra, 76 Cal.App.3d at p. 248, fn. omitted.)

The present litigation is not maintained by Plaintiffs as a representative action. Further, apart from alleging in a conclusory manner that an injunction may confer a generally described public good upon patrons of future “Fiesta” events sponsored by the Church Defendants, the allegations of the SAC do not show on their face that the primary objective of this litigation is injunctive relief, and do not sufficiently describe an ascertainable class of persons who attend the “Fiesta” event or actual and concrete benefits which will be conferred on such persons. (See, e.g., California Public Records Research, Inc. v. County of Yolo (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 150, 191-192; Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 41, fn. 10.) For these reasons, the attorney’s fees demanded in the SAC are not supported by its allegations. Therefore, the Court will grant the Church motion to strike.

 

(3) Leave To Amend

Plaintiffs assert a general request for leave to amend in each of their separately filed oppositions to the Church demurrer, the City demurrer, and the Church motion to strike. Plaintiffs offer no reasoned factual or legal argument showing how they can amend the SAC to cure the deficiencies discussed herein, or how any amendment will change its legal effect. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.)

Though there exist sufficient grounds to deny Plaintiffs leave to amend, as the SAC does not necessarily show on its face that it is incapable of amendment, and is, in effect, an original pleading, the Court will at this stage of the proceedings grant Plaintiffs leave to amend. (See Eghtesad v. State Farm General Insurance Company (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 406, 411-412; Stockton, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 747.) To the extent there exist additional deficiencies in the SAC with respect to any remaining grounds asserted in the City demurrer which are not addressed herein, the Court expects that any such deficiencies will be cured in any amended pleading that may be filed by Plaintiffs.