Center Point Development Group, Inc., etc. v. Gwendolyn Campbell

Case Number

24CV00306

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 10/29/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

1) Motion of Plaintiff for Summary Judgment or Alternatively for Summary Adjudication; 2) Motion of Cross-Defendant and Gavbin Moores for Summary Judgment or Alternatively for Summary Adjudication; 3) Motion of Hudson Insurance Company to Dismiss

Tentative Ruling

For Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant Center Point Development Group, Inc., dba CP

Builders and Cross-Defendant Anthony Gavin Moores: Paul W. Smigliani, Intelink

Law Group, PC; Jason W. Wansor, R. Scott Mullen, Rogers, Sheffield & Campbell,

LLP  

                                   

For Defendant and Cross-Complainant Gwendolyn Campbell: Self-represented (but

see below)

                                   

For Cross-Defendant SureTec Insurance Company: Christian J. Gascou, Ronald W.

Hopkins, Gascou Hopkins LLP

                                   

For Cross-Defendant Hudson Insurance Company: Clark H. Cameron, Neil H. Berger, Kenneth S. Humphrey, Humphrey, Berger & Associates LLP

Last on the 10/22/25 CMC Calendar; the Court set a Case Management

Conference for 3/11/26 for Status Report; the Court and counsel discussed steps to be taken arising from the reported death of Gwendolyn Campbell; the Motion Dates on calendar were confirmed.   

RULING

For the reasons set forth herein:

(1) The motion of Plaintiff Center Point Development Group, Inc., for summary judgment or alternatively for summary adjudication is ordered off calendar as moot.

(2) The motion of cross-Defendant Center Point Development Group, Inc., and Anthony Gavin Moores for summary judgment or alternatively for summary adjudication is ordered off calendar.

(3) The motion of Hudson Insurance Company to dismiss is denied without prejudice.

Background

On January 22, 2024, Plaintiff Center Point Development Group, Inc., dba CP Builders (CP) filed its complaint in this action against Defendant Gwendolyn Campbell asserting six causes of action: (1) breach of contract; (2) open book account; (3) foreclosure on mechanic’s lien; (4) labor, services, and materials; (5) quantum meruit; and (6) unjust enrichment.

On June 26, 2024, Defendant Gwendolyn Campbell, then represented by attorney Bruce Rudman, filed her answer to the complaint, generally denying the allegations thereof and asserting 32 affirmative defenses. Also on June 26, Campbell filed a cross-complaint (Campbell Cross-Complaint) asserting five causes of action: (1) breach of contract; (2) rescission; (3) fraud; (4) disgorgement; and (5) claim on license bond. The first, second, third, and fourth causes of action are asserted against CP and cross-Defendant Anthony Gavin Moores. The fifth cause of action is asserted against cross-Defendants Hudson Insurance Company (Hudson) and SureTec Insurance Company (SureTec).

On July 26, 2024, CP and Moores filed their answer to the Campbell Cross-Complaint, generally denying the allegations thereof and asserting 26 affirmative defenses.

On August 23, 2024, SureTec filed its answer to the Campbell Cross-Complaint, generally denying the allegations thereof and asserting 16 affirmative defenses.

On August 26, 2024, Hudson filed its answer to the Campbell Cross-Complaint, generally denying the allegations thereof and asserting 20 affirmative defenses. Also on August 26, Hudson filed a cross-complaint (Hudson Cross-Complaint) against Campbell and CP asserting claims for declaratory relief and interpleader.

On September 5, 2024, Campbell filed her answer to the Hudson Cross-Complaint, admitting and denying allegations thereof and asserting six affirmative defenses.

On October 10, 2024, CP filed its answer to the Hudson Cross-Complaint, admitting and denying allegations thereof and asserting six affirmative defenses.

On November 13, 2024, CP filed three motions to compel responses to form interrogatories, special interrogatories, and requests for production of documents. These motions were noticed for hearing on January 15, 2025. Campbell filed a limited opposition stating that medical issues prevented her from assisting counsel to provide verified responses and requested more time to respond.

On January 9, 2025, CP filed a motion to deem matters admitted. This motion was noticed for hearing on March 5.

On January 15, 2025, the Court continued the hearing of all four discovery motions to March 26, 2025.

On March 7, 2025, pursuant to stipulation of the parties and order of the Court, CP filed a cross-complaint (CP Cross-Complaint) against cross-Defendants Mark W. Garcia dba M W Garcia Company, Del Campo Plastering Inc., and Coastline Construction and Concrete Inc., C J Warme Inc. dba Totally Wired Electric, asserting causes of action for equitable indemnity, express indemnity, breach of express and implied warranties, breach of written contract, negligence, contribution, declaratory relief re duty to defend, declaratory relief re duty to indemnify, and breach of written contract—additional insurance.

On March 14, 2025, attorney Rudman filed a response in advance of the March 26 hearing stating that Campbell remained medically unable to assist in her defense.

On March 26, 2025, the Court continued the hearing on the four discovery motions to June 25.

On June 25, 2025, the Court held a hearing on the four discovery motions. Campbell appeared in person with attorney Rudman. Campbell informed the Court that she terminated her attorney. The Court granted the motions to compel and to deem matters admitted.

On July 9, 2025, attorney Rudman filed a motion to be relieved as counsel.

On July 25, 2025 (at 3:15 p.m.), CP filed its first motion for summary judgment or alternatively for summary adjudication. This first motion is addressed to CP’s complaint against Campbell. This motion is noticed for this hearing date of October 29.

Also on July 25, 2025, a second motion for summary judgment or alternatively for summary adjudication was filed. This second motion is apparently addressed to the Campbell Cross-Complaint against CP and Moores. However, this motion was never filed. Instead, the notice and motion filed with the supporting papers (all at 3:27 p.m.) is identical to the first motion and thus only addresses CP’s complaint. At the same time, the papers supporting this second motion, i.e., the separate statement, request for judicial notice, declaration of Moores, and proof of service, all refer to a motion addressed to the Campbell Cross-Complaint. This second motion is also noticed for this hearing date of October 29.

On July 29, 2025, CP filed a motion for issue, evidentiary, and terminating sanctions against Campbell.

On September 10, 2025, the Court granted attorney Rudman’s motion to be relieved as counsel. The Court made further orders granting terminating sanctions to strike Campbell’s answer to the complaint and entering Campbell’s default, and to strike the Campbell Cross-Complaint as to CP only. The Court vacated the November 19, 2025, trial date, and MSC set for October 10, 2025, but confirmed the summary judgment motion set for October 29, 2025 (without identifying which motion was confirmed).

On September 19, 2025, Hudson filed a motion to dismiss Hudson from the Campbell Cross-Complaint. This motion is noticed for this hearing date of October 29 (but for unexplained reasons is not identified as a hearing in the Court’s docketing system).

On September 22, 2025, the Court filed its order granting attorney Rudman’s motion to be relieved as counsel for Campbell. Also on September 22, SureTec filed a motion to dismiss SureTec from the Campbell Cross-Complaint that is noticed for hearing on November 19.

On October 9, 2025, attorney Rudman filed proof of service of the order relieving him as counsel for Campbell.

On October 16, 2025, CP and Moores filed a case management statement which identifies that after the striking of the answer and Campbell Cross-Complaint as to CP, only the Campbell Cross-Complaint against Moores remained as to them, and that Moores’s motion for summary judgment was set for hearing on October 29. CP and Moores also reported that counsel for CP was informed on September 15, 2025, by the brother of Campbell that Campbell had passed away.

Analysis

(1) Summary Judgment Motions

Separate and apart from the procedural issues with the status of the case because of Campbell’s reported death, discussed below, there are impediments to the Court addressing the summary judgment motions.

The granting of CP’s motion for terminating sanctions, striking Campbell’s answer and entering Campbell’s default moots CP’s motion for summary judgment. This is essentially confirmed both by the Court’s September 10 order confirming one summary judgment motion as set for this hearing rather than two and by CP and Moores’s case management statement of October 16 stating that Moores’s motion for summary judgment is set for this hearing without mention of CP’s motion for summary judgment. The Court therefore finds that, under the present procedural posture, CP’s motion for summary judgment is moot and will be ordered off calendar.

The motion of Moores for summary judgment is not now before the Court. Although Moores filed a proof of service that states that the motion was served on Campbell and the other parties, this motion was never filed with the Court. The Court cannot rule on a motion not filed with the Court. This motion will therefore also be ordered off calendar without prejudice.

(2) Hudson Motion to Dismiss

As noted above, for unexplained reasons, Hudson’s motion to dismiss was filed on September 19, 2025, but does not appear as set for hearing on the Court’s docket. Nonetheless, the Court will address the motion.

The motion is styled as a motion to dismiss made pursuant to Civil Code section 2809 and Code of Civil Procedure section 996.430.

“The obligation of a surety must be neither larger in amount nor in other respects more burdensome than that of the principal; and if in its terms it exceeds it, it is reducible in proportion to the principal obligation.” (Civ. Code, § 2809.)

“The liability on a bond may be enforced by civil action. Both the principal and the sureties shall be joined as parties to the action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 996.430, subd. (a).)

“If the bond was given in an action or proceeding, the action shall be commenced in the Court in which the action or proceeding was pending. If the bond was given other than in an action or proceeding, the action shall be commenced in any Court of competent jurisdiction, and the amount of damage claimed in the action, not the amount of the bond, determines the jurisdictional classification of the case.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 996.430, subd. (b).)

“A cause of action on a bond may be transferred and assigned as other causes of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 996.430, subd. (c).)

Code of Civil Procedure section 996.430 authorizes a civil action to establish liability on a bond. Section 996.430 does not provide a separate procedure for dismissal of a civil action.

Civil Code section 2809 provides substantive law as to the extent of liability of a surety, i.e., liability on a bond. Section 2809 does not authorize dismissal of a civil action where there may, under the substantive law, be no liability.

In general, involuntary dismissals are limited to specific situations not present here. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 581.) “The procedure of moving to dismiss an action based on extrinsic evidence is disapproved in California and the motion is permitted only where it complies with the requirements for a motion for summary judgment.” (Saltarelli & Steponovich v. Douglas (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1, 5.) Alternatively, a dismissal may follow the sustaining of a demurrer or granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings based upon judicially noticed materials. However, “[a] basic tenet of motion practice is that the notice of motion must state the grounds for the order being sought (Code Civ. Proc., § 1010; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1110(a)), and Courts generally may consider only the grounds stated in the notice of motion.” (Kinda v. Carpenter (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1277.) The notice of motion provides no grounds for a dismissal. The motion to dismiss will therefore be denied on the grounds stated without prejudice to the making a different, procedurally appropriate motion.

The Court further notes that this motion was made after it was reported the Campbell had died. This creates a further issue generally discussed below.

(3) Death of Campbell

On September 15, 2025, it was reported to counsel for CP that Campbell had died sometime previous to that report. This was reported to the Court by counsel on October 16. The Court assumes for purposes of this discussion that this report is true. It is unknown whether there has been any formal administration of Campbell’s estate commenced.

“A pending action or proceeding does not abate by the death of a party if the cause of action survives.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 377.21.) “Except as otherwise provided by statute, a cause of action for or against a person is not lost by reason of the person’s death, but survives subject to the applicable limitations period.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 377.20, subd. (a).)

“Where a Defendant dies and no personal representative is substituted, any judgment rendered is in excess of the Court’s jurisdiction to try the case.” (Herring v. Peterson (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 608, 611–612; accord In re Parsell’s Estate (1923) 190 Cal. 454, 456 [“A judgment rendered for or against a dead person is void ….”].) In affirming a trial Court order vacating a default judgment entered against a Defendant who died while the action was pending, the Court in Grappo v. McMills (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 996, 1007–1008 (Grappo), quoting 2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Jurisdiction, § 317, p. 929, stated:

“Witkin describes this state of affairs this way: ‘Death During Action. If the Defendant was alive when the action was begun and personal jurisdiction over him or her was obtained, the Defendant was originally a party. Death occurring thereafter, before judgment, makes it improper to render judgment for or against the Defendant without first taking the procedural step of substituting the executor or administrator. The failure to take this step is a departure from the mandatory requirements of the statute, and does result in a judgment for or against a person not a party. Hence, it seems clearly in excess of jurisdiction and subject to prevention or annulment by some form of direct attack. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]”

Notwithstanding this broad observation, the Grappo Court affirmed the order vacating the default judgment on the narrower ground of prejudice rather than the judgment being void. (Grappo, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at pp.1009-1010.)

The apparent indisposition of Campbell leading to her failure to make discovery, the dismissal and subsequent relief of her attorney as counsel, the granting of the motion for terminating sanctions, and the timing of these events all raise questions as to what needs to be done to put this matter in a proper procedural posture to move forward. Until Campbell’s successor (either individually, as in the complaint, or as a successor trustee, as in the cross-complaint) is resolved, it appears problematic for the Court to proceed.