Steven Gummo v. Jon Lasser, et al

Case Number

21CV03644

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 10/22/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion Of Defendant Douglas L. Meyer to Quash Service of Summons

Tentative Ruling

For Plaintiff Steven Gummo: William B. DeClercq, DeClercq Law PC

For Defendant Douglas L. Meyer: Robert S. McWhorter, Buchalter, A Professional Corporation

Additional Defendants: See List

                       

RULING

For all reasons discussed herein, the motion of Defendant Douglas L. Meyer to quash service of summons is granted. Plaintiff’s service of the summons on Defendant is quashed, and Plaintiff’s complaint as to Defendant Douglas L. Meyer, only, is dismissed.

Background

On September 13, 2021, Plaintiff Steven Gummo filed a complaint against Defendants Pura Industries, LLC (Pura), Jon Lasser (Lasser), Douglas Meyer (Meyer), Pura Cali Management Corp. (PCM), Pura Holdings America Inc. (Pura Holdings), Humboldt J&G Group, LLC, G&J Enterprises, LLC, Forward International GW, Inc., Rogue Valley Land Management LLC, Emerald Farm Management, LLC, PNW Wholesalers, LLC, Pura Vineyards LLC, Pura Wyoming, LLC, Diamond J Farms LLC, Pura Cana LLC, Bottle Rock West LLC, Bottle Rock East LLC, Pura Valley LLC, Pura Extractions LLC, and KJ Formulations LLC (collectively, Defendants), alleging ten causes of action: (1) breach of employment contract; (2) breach of settlement agreement; (3) fraud – false promise; (4) wage theft; (5) retaliation against whistleblower; (6) solicitation of employee by misrepresentation (Lab. Code, § 970); (7) failure to issue accurate wage statements (Lab. Code, § 970); (8) unjust enrichment; (9) breach of fiduciary duty (against Lasser and Meyer only); and (10) unfair business practices (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200).

In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, through Lasser and Meyer, made oral and written representations in an offer letter dated September 30, 2020, and on various dates in October and November 2020, promising that Plaintiff would, among other things, receive an annual salary of $250,000 and an immediate grant of 150,000 vested Class C shares in Pura if Plaintiff would leave their job, move to California, and join Defendants’ business as an employee. (Compl., ¶¶ 2-4.) After Plaintiff quit their job and moved to California, Defendants failed to provide the promised Class C shares, to pay wages to Plaintiff, to provide wage statements, and to make appropriate withholdings. (Compl., ¶ 6.)

Plaintiff further alleges that when Defendants failed to correct their purported violations of law, Plaintiff commenced a claim for wage theft. (Compl., ¶ 7.) Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff by cutting Plaintiff off from corporate communications, failing to provide any meaningful work assignments, and ignoring Plaintiff. (Ibid.) Plaintiff’s wage claim was resolved in a written settlement agreement which Defendants have failed to perform. (Compl., ¶ 8.) Defendants also failed to pay Plaintiff’s salary after June 30, 2021. (Ibid.)

The above is not an exhaustive summary of the allegations of the complaint.

On August 20, 2025, the Court entered a minute order (the Order) granting the motion of Meyer to set aside and vacate the default entered on March 27, 2023, and the Court judgment by default entered on May 24, 2023, as amended on March 13, 2024, as to Meyer only. Further, the Court vacated its Order For Publication Of Summons Or Citation entered in this case on December 27, 2022.

On September 17, 2025, Meyer filed a motion for an order quashing service of the summons on Meyer, which is made pursuant to subdivision (a)(1) of Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10. (Notice at p. 2, ll. 17-18.) The motion also requests an order dismissing the complaint as against Meyer. (Notice at p. 2, ll. 12-14.)

In support of the motion, Meyer submits a declaration of his counsel, Robert S. McWhorter (McWhorter), who states that in a Notice and Acknowledgment of Receipt (the Acknowledgment), a copy of which is attached to the compendium of exhibits (the COE) submitted with the motion, Meyer reserved his right to object to the Court’s lack of jurisdiction. (McWhorter Decl., ¶ 3 & COE, Exh. 5.) McWhorter asserts that, before executing the Acknowledgment, McWhorter suggested to Plaintiff’s counsel, William B. DeClercq (DeClercq), that the complaint be amended to allege specific facts establishing the Court’s personal jurisdiction over Meyer, but that DeClercq declined. (McWhorter Decl., ¶ 3.)

The motion is also supported by Meyer’s declaration as further discussed herein.

On September 30, the parties submitted a stipulation to waive the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10, subdivision (b), as to the date set for the hearing on the motion.

On October 8, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion.

On October 17, 2025, Plaintiff filed a request for judicial notice and application to amend the complaint to reflect a change in Plaintiff’s name to Rachel Gummo. Attached to that request is a copy of a “Decree Changing Name and Order Recognizing Change of Gender and for Issuance of New Birth Certificate” filed on April 18, 2022, in Santa Barbara Superior Court case no. 22CV00274 entitled Matter of Steven Emery Gummo. (Oct. 17, 2025, Request & Application, Exh. A.) In that decree, the Court ordered that the name of Steven Emery Gummo is changed to Rachel Emery Gummo, and that the gender of Rachel Emery Gummo is changed to female. (Id. at ¶¶ 3-4.)

Court records reflect that on October 20, 2025, the Court in this case signed an order approving and filing an amendment to the complaint to substitute the name Rachel Gummo for Steven Gummo wherever it appears in the complaint.

Analysis

The present motion is made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10, which provides that “[a] Defendant, on or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any further time that the Court may for good cause allow, may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes: [¶] (1) To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Court over him or her.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subd. (a)(1).)

The grounds for the motion are that this Court lacks general or specific personal jurisdiction over Meyer because Meyer has resided and been domiciled in New York at all relevant times, and that Meyer was not physically present in, and lacks the requisite “minimum contacts” with, California. (Notice at p. 2, ll. 17-24.)

“A Court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10.) “A state Court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident Defendant who has not been served with process within the state comports with the requirements of the due process clause of the federal Constitution if the Defendant has such minimum contacts with the state that the assertion of jurisdiction does not violate ‘ “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” ’ [Citations.]” (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444 (Vons).)

“Under the minimum contacts test, ‘an essential criterion in all cases is whether the “quality and nature” of the Defendant’s activity is such that it is “reasonable” and “fair” to require him to conduct his defense in that State.’ [Citations.]” (Pavlovich v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 262, 268 (Pavlovich).) The minimum contacts test requires the Court to weigh “ ‘the facts of each case ... to determine whether the requisite “affiliating circumstances” are present.’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.)

“Personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific. A nonresident Defendant may be subject to the general jurisdiction of the forum if his or her contacts in the forum state are ‘substantial ... continuous and systematic.’ [Citations.] In such a case, ‘it is not necessary that the specific cause of action alleged be connected with the Defendant’s business relationship to the forum.’ [Citations.] Such a Defendant’s contacts with the forum are so wide-ranging that they take the place of physical presence in the forum as a basis for jurisdiction....

“If the nonresident Defendant does not have substantial and systematic contacts in the forum sufficient to establish general jurisdiction, he or she still may be subject to the specific jurisdiction of the forum, if the Defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits [citation], and the ‘controversy is related to or “arises out of” a Defendant’s contacts with the forum.’ [Citations.]” (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 445-446, original italics.)

“[W]hen jurisdiction is challenged by a nonresident Defendant, the burden of proof is upon the Plaintiff to demonstrate that ‘minimum contacts’ exist between Defendant and the forum state to justify imposition of personal jurisdiction.” (Mihlon v. Superior Court (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 703, 710 (Mihlon).)

In the opposition to the motion, Plaintiff, who the Court will refer to as “Gummo”, expressly states “Gummo does not contend that general jurisdiction exists. This Court therefore need only consider whether specific jurisdiction exists.” (Opp. at p. 3, ll. 1-3.) Based on this statement by Gummo, it is the Court’s understanding that Gummo, who bears the burden of proof in this proceeding, does not dispute, and appears to concede, that Meyer is not subject to the general jurisdiction of this Court. Therefore, the Court limits its analysis and determination of the present motion to whether Gummo has met her burden of proof to demonstrate that Meyer is subject to the specific jurisdiction of this forum.

For all reasons discussed below, Gummo has failed to meet her burden to demonstrate, with competent, probative, and sufficiently weighty evidence showing, expressly or by inference, the existence of minimum contacts between Meyer and California sufficient to subject Meyer to the specific jurisdiction of this Court. Therefore, the Court will grant the motion of Meyer.

“The United States Supreme Court has described the forum contacts necessary to establish specific jurisdiction as involving variously a nonresident who has ‘purposefully directed’ his or her activities at forum residents [citation], or who has ‘purposefully derived benefit’ from forum activities [citation], or ‘ “purposefully avail[ed himself or herself] of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” ’ [Citation.]. The Court also has referred to the requisite forum contact as involving a nonresident Defendant who ‘ “deliberately” has engaged in significant activities with a State [citation] or has created ‘continuing obligations’ between himself and residents of the forum [citation]’ [citation], concluding that in such cases the Defendant ‘manifestly has availed himself of the privilege of conducting business [in the forum], and because his activities are shielded by “the benefits and protections” of the forum’s laws it is presumptively not unreasonable to require him to submit to the burdens of litigation in that forum as well.’ [Citation.]” (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 446.)

To determine whether a Defendant “purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of California law to make it reasonably foreseeable to be ‘haled into the Court in the forum State’ to defend itself in an action...”, the “Court must focus on the nature and quality of the activity in the forum state, not the quantity.” (As You Sow v. Crawford Laboratories, Inc. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1859, 1869-1870, citation omitted.) Further, “the nonresident Defendant’s acts must have caused the forum-related injury of which the Plaintiff complains.” (Boaz v. Boyle & Co. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 700, 718.)

In addition, “ ‘the suit’ must ‘aris[e] out of or relat[e] to the Defendant’s contacts with the forum.’ [Citations.] In other words, there must be ‘an affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State’s regulation.’ [Citation.] For this reason, ‘specific jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.’ [Citation.]” (Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court (2017) 582 U.S. 255, 262 [137 S.Ct. 1773, 198 L.Ed.2d 395] original italics.)

Gummo may meet her burden “to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that all necessary jurisdictional criteria are met ... by competent evidence in affidavits and authenticated documentary evidence. An unverified complaint may not be considered as an affidavit supplying necessary facts.” (Ziller Electronics Lab GmbH v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1222, 1232-1233 (Ziller).)

The complaint filed by Gummo in this action is not verified. For this reason, Gummo may not rely on nor may the Court consider the complaint to supply any facts necessary to show that the jurisdictional criteria have been met.

To meet her present burden, Gummo submits a declaration stating that she was employed by a collection of companies called “Pura Cali”, with the word “Cali” referring to California. (Gummo Decl., ¶ 2.) Attached to that declaration is a copy of what Gummo describes as “the Pura Cali website (www.puracali.com) [the Website] captured as it appeared during [Gummo’s] employment” on the following dates: August 6, September 19, October 31, November 5, and December 2, 2020; and January 23, March 3, April 14, May 8, July 29, and September 16, 2021. (Ibid. & Exh. A.)

Gummo asserts that the Website represented that “’Pura Cali is firmly rooted in the untamed and elemental nature of Northern California...’”, and contains a graphic of the state of California and a bear, which Gummo states is the State animal of California, with rotating text stating “PROUDLY MADE IN CALIFORNIA”. (Gummo Decl., ¶ 3, italics and emphasis omitted.) Gummo further asserts that the Website shows that Meyer was the Chief Executive Officer or “CEO”, and a director, of Pura Cali. (Gummo Decl., ¶ 4.)

It is Gummo’s understanding that Pura Cali and its affiliated companies are organized under California law, that cannabis is illegal under federal law, and that California state law permits certain cannabis businesses to operate within its borders. (Gummo Decl., ¶ 6.) To Gummo’s knowledge, Pura Cali was not licensed to operate a cannabis business in any state other than California, and financial transactions involving proceeds from cannabis related activities which cross state lines may constitute money laundering under federal law. (Ibid.) It is for these reasons that Gummo presumed her dealings with Pura Cali were based in California. (Ibid.)

The Court finds it useful to note here that the Website constitutes a “[w]riting” as that term is defined in Evidence Code section 250. “Authentication of a writing is required before it may be received in evidence [or] before secondary evidence of its content may be received in evidence.” (Evid. Code, § 1401, subds. (a)-(b).)

Apart from generally asserting that the Website was “captured by the non-profit Internet Archive” on the dates described above, Gummo offers no information or evidence regarding the “Internet Archive”; the manner in which this archive “captured” the Website on the dates identified in the Gummo declaration; or how, when or by what means Gummo retrieved from the “Internet Archive” the pages of the Website described in and attached to the Gummo declaration, among other things. (See, e.g., People v. Goldsmith (2014) 59 Cal.4th 258, 267 [discussing proof necessary to authenticate a writing, and stating that “what is necessary is a prima facie case”].) In addition, to the extent conflicting inferences may be drawn regarding the Website’s authenticity, this fact “goes to the document’s weight as evidence....” (Jazayeri v. Mao (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 301, 321.)

The Court also has no record showing that Gummo has submitted with the opposition an appropriate request for judicial notice of the Website “as a [s]ubstitute for proof....” (Gravert v. Deluse (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 576, 580.) Even if the Court were to assume that Gummo effectively requests that the Court take judicial notice of the Website, Gummo has made no showing that the Website or its contents “cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute” or are “capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (g)-(h).) Moreover, to the extent the Website is a proper subject of judicial notice, the Court “may not accept [its] contents as true.” (Ragland v. U.S. Bank National Assn. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 182, 193.)

To the extent the Court, absent a dispute by Meyer, may consider the Website which indicates that Meyer was the CEO of Pura Cali on the dates set forth in the Gummo declaration, wholly absent from that declaration is any information or evidence showing that Gummo worked for Pura Cali on these dates. As further discussed above, Gummo’s “unverified complaint has no evidentiary value in determination of personal jurisdiction....” (Mihlon, supra, 169 Cal.App.3d at p. 710.)

Notwithstanding that Gummo may not rely on, and the Court may not consider, the allegations of the unverified complaint to supply any necessary facts, the Court notes that the complaint alleges that Gummo began her employment with Defendants on November 10, 2020. (Compl., ¶ 36.) A reasonable interpretation of the complaint also indicates that Gummo continued working for Defendants until at least September 2021. (See, e.g., Compl., ¶¶ 57-60 [alleging a reduction in Gummo’s salary and settlement agreement during this time].) These dates appear to coincide with the dates on which the Website was “captured” as further discussed above. Meyer also does not dispute that Gummo worked for Pura Cali on the dates stated in the Gummo declaration.

Relevant under the circumstances present here, “it is well established by California case law that for jurisdictional purposes the acts of corporate officers and directors, in their official capacities, are acts exclusively of (qua ) the corporation, and are thus not material for purposes of establishing minimum contacts as to individuals. [Citations.] Implicit in this principle is the consideration that corporations are separate legal entities that cannot speak or act without their designated officers and directors. Accordingly, acts performed by individuals in such official capacities may not reasonably be attributed to them as individual acts creating personal jurisdiction.” (Mihlon, supra, 169 Cal.App.3d at p. 713.) Instead, “[e]ach Defendant’s contacts with the forum State must be assessed individually.” (Calder v. Jones (1984) 465 U.S. 783, 790 [104 S.Ct. 1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804].)

To ostensibly show that Meyer engaged in forum-related contacts or activities, Gummo states that she “understood [Meyer] to be ... my supervisor at all relevant times I was working for Pura Cali; that Meyer “dictated my job title”; that when Gummo was “living and working in California, [Gummo] reported to” Meyer; that Meyer “was an active member of the executive team for Pura Cali...” with whom Gummo “regularly spoke to ... about the financial status of Pura Cali”; and that Meyer “regularly participated in finance conference calls, which were initiated in California, including [Gummo] and other employees and executives, concerning the financial state of Pura Cali.” (Gummo Decl., ¶¶ 5 & 7-8.)

Gummo further states that she complained to Meyer about purported violations of law by Pura Cali, and that Meyer directly communicated to Gummo by email and phone on July 15, 2021, stating that Pura would not honor its commitments to Gummo. (Gummo Decl., ¶¶ 9-10 & Exh. B [Jul. 15, 2021, email correspondence from Meyer to Gummo re “Notice of Pay Change”].) Gummo also asserts that in the July 15, 2021, email correspondence attached to the Gummo declaration, Meyer stated that Gummo was to report to Meyer while Gummo continued to live and work in California. (Gummo Decl., ¶¶ 9-10.)

Gummo’s declaration consists “primarily of vague assertions of ultimate facts rather than specific evidentiary facts permitting [the] Court to form an independent conclusion on the issue.” (Ziller, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at p. 1233.) For example, Gummo offers no evidentiary facts or other probative evidence showing the precise status of or relationship between Meyer and Gummo during Gummo’s employment with Pura Cali. Gummo also offers no evidentiary facts showing precisely “when, where, [or] how” Meyer dictated Gummo’s job title, regularly spoke to Gummo about the matters described above, or participated in conference calls with Gummo. (Ibid.)

In addition, the sole written communication between Meyer and Gummo provided by Gummo is a July 15, 2021, email correspondence (the email) from Meyer to Gummo. (Gummo Decl., Exh. B.) Though Meyer references in that email, an offer letter, there is no information or evidence showing that Meyer authored that letter, or was engaged in the process of hiring Gummo or determining Gummo’s salary as reflected in the offer letter.

Information appearing in the email also suggests that the purpose of that communication with Gummo was to notify Gummo of a reduction in Gummo’s salary, among other things. (See Gummo Decl., Exh. B.) The email further indicates or suggests that the reduction in Gummo’s salary, which is the subject of the email, was part of “[Pura’s] across-the-board compensation reductions in recent weeks and months.” (Gummo Decl., Exh. B [first paragraph].) Gummo submits no copies of any further written communications between Meyer and Gummo apart from the email.

While Gummo asserts that the email directs Gummo to report to Meyer, the Court’s review of that document does not show that Meyer made this statement. For example, the though the email includes a statement that Meyer “will be reaching out in the coming days in an effort to ensure that you have sufficient work on your plate, and to discuss your ongoing duties...”, which Gummo has ostensibly underlined (see Gummo Decl., Exh. B [underlined sentence]), Gummo fails to sufficiently explain the basis for her assertion that this sentence constitutes an “explicit” statement by Meyer that Gummo was to “report” to Meyer. Gummo also fails to explain why this single communication by Meyer shows, expressly or by inference, a pattern or practice of communications between Meyer and Gummo during the time Gummo was employed by Pura Cali in California.

In addition, the Meyer declaration submitted in support of the motion states, among other things, that Pura engaged Meyer as a consultant in 2016 to assist in developing Pura’s business operations and to add to the company’s credibility, and that Meyer’s role in this regard was limited to raising investment capital which Meyer performed from his residence in New York. (Meyer Decl., ¶ 5.) Meyer further states that in October 2018, Meyer became the CEO of PCM for the purposes of assisting with efforts to raise capital, which Meyer also performed outside of California. (Ibid.)

Meyer asserts that Lasser exclusively managed the communications and “HR”, and the compensation of, Gummo, that Meyer resigned as the CEO of PCM in October 2021, and that Meyer had no authority over, or involvement in, PCM’s or Pura’s day-to-day operations or management, which Meyer states were also under the exclusive control of Lasser. (Meyer Decl., ¶¶ 7-8.) Though Lasser asked Meyer to prepare an “Offer Memo” and an initial offer letter for Gummo, Meyer returned those documents to Lasser who dictated their terms and conditions. (Meyer Decl., ¶ 7.)

Meyer also states that he was effectively excluded from and had no managerial role in Pura or PCM’s decision-making or operations, did not have an employment relationship with Gummo, did not supervise Gummo’s work, and did not direct Gummo’s day-to-day activities or the manner in which Gummo performed her job, among other things. (Meyer Decl., ¶ 8.) According to Meyer, all aspects of Gummo’s roles, responsibilities, and compensation were managed by Lasser and the entities Lasser controlled, and many of the purported events that Gummo alleges in the complaint happened after Meyer resigned. (Ibid.) Meyer also had no direct involvement in, participation with, or knowledge of the wage claim that Gummo filed against Pura, and was not a signatory or a party to any settlement agreement that may have resulted from that proceeding. (Meyer Decl., ¶ 9.)

Meyer contends that he never promised Gummo any compensation, equity interest, bonus or raise, and did not authorize any other individual to make such promises on Meyer’s behalf. (Meyer Decl., ¶ 14.) In addition, Meyer asserts that Meyer had no authority to bind Pura or PCM to any financial or contractual obligation and was not involved in any discussions regarding Gummo’s alleged move to California, which was the responsibility of Lasser. (Ibid.)

Meyer also never told Gummo that Gummo would receive a salary or equity in Pura or PCM, or a guaranteed raise by any date, and states that Lasser exclusively communicated, negotiated, and executed all agreements with Gummo. (Meyer Decl., ¶ 15.) Meyer further contends that he did not direct the work of Gummo, supervise Gummo’s hours, assign Gummo tasks, and had no role in managing Gummo’s employment. (Meyer Decl., ¶ 16.) According to Meyer, because Lasser lived in California, and Meyer resided in New York and was tasked only with raising capital, Lasser was responsible for these matters. (Ibid.) Meyer also did not reduce Gummo’s pay, exclude Gummo from meetings or assignments, or participate in any decisions affecting Gummo’s role or responsibilities. (Meyer Decl., ¶ 17.)

The information and evidence presented in the Meyer declaration and described above is sufficient to show, expressly and by inference, that, apart from the email in which Meyer notified Gummo of an across-the-board reduction in salaries including the salary of Gummo as further discussed above, Meyer did not otherwise purposefully direct any other communications or activities to Gummo during Gummo’s employment with Pura Cali, did not derive any benefit from Gummo’s employment with Pura Cali, did not purposefully avail himself of any privilege of conducting activities relating to Gummo’s employment in California, did not deliberately engage in any significant activities in regard to Gummo’s employment in California, and did not create any continuing obligations between himself and Gummo. For all reasons discussed above, the general, speculative, and conclusory information presented in the Gummo declaration “contributes nothing to cast doubt upon” the statements of Meyer. (Shearer v. Superior Court (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 424, 430 (Shearer).)

Even if the information and evidence presented by Gummo was sufficiently probative and weighty for jurisdictional purposes, these show, at most, that Meyer was dealing with Gummo “solely in his capacity as a corporate officer” of Pura Cali, that Meyer was acting in an official capacity “as the disclosed agent[] of [Pura Cali]...”, and that Meyer’s conduct or activities may not reasonably be attributed to Meyer as individual acts sufficient to subject Meyer to personal jurisdiction under the circumstances present here. (Shearer, supra, 70 Cal.App.3d at pp. 429-430; Mihlon, supra, 169 Cal.App.3d at p. 713.)

Gummo also contends that she was recruited by Meyer to work for Pura Cali, and that based on Meyer’s representations about the job, Gummo moved to California. (Gummo Decl., ¶ 7.) Apart from these general and conclusory statements, Gummo offers no evidentiary facts showing when, where, or the manner in which Meyer recruited Gummo to work in California.

In the motion, Meyer states that he met Gummo’s father, Peter Gummo (Peter), a couple of times in Rhode Island to discuss a possible investment in PCM or Pura. (Meyer Decl., ¶ 6.) (Note: Due to common familial surnames, the Court refers to Peter by his first name to avoid confusion. No disrespect is intended.) Peter referred Gummo to Pura for potential employment. (Ibid.)

Meyer also states that he met Gummo during a second meeting with Peter in Rhode Island, and believes that Gummo resided in Connecticut or Rhode Island at that time. (Meyer Decl., ¶ 7.) Before Gummo joined Pura, Meyer contacted Gummo, who at the time resided in Connecticut or Rhode Island, a few times by telephone or email when Meyer was located in New York. (Ibid.)

“ ‘[F]oreseeability of causing injury in another State ... is not a “sufficient benchmark” for exercising personal jurisdiction.’ [Citation]. Rather, ‘the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis ... is that the Defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into Court there.’ [Citation.] The knowledge that harm will likely be suffered in the forum state, ‘when unaccompanied by other contacts,’ is therefore ‘too unfocused to justify personal jurisdiction.’ [Citation.]” (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 272-273, fn. 3; see also Sibley v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 442, 446 (Sibley) [“[t]he mere causing of an ‘effect’ in California ... is not necessarily sufficient to afford a constitutional basis for jurisdiction...”].)

Gummo offers no evidence or information to dispute the Meyer declaration, or to show that Meyer or Gummo resided or were otherwise located in California when Gummo met Meyer, or when Meyer purportedly recruited Gummo to work for Pura Cali. Gummo also offers no probative information or evidence showing what, if any, representations Meyer made about Gummo’s future employment with Pura Cali when recruiting Gummo to work in California, or showing that when Meyer recruited Gummo, Meyer was aware Gummo would suffer harm if Gummo agreed to move to California to work for Pura Cali. For these and all reasons further discussed above, to the extent it can be inferred from the information offered by Gummo any injury that Gummo may suffer in California was foreseeable to Meyer, this information is, under the circumstances present here, insufficiently weighty to justify personal jurisdiction over Meyer.

In addition, the available evidence and information does not show, expressly or by inference, that Meyer engaged or personally participated in, or directed, any tortious conduct when recruiting Gummo, or other conduct sufficient to subject Meyer to vicarious liability for any conduct by Pura Cali after Gummo began her employment. (Seagate Technology v. A. J. Kogyo Co. (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 696, 701-702 [general discussion]; Shearer, supra, 70 Cal.App.3d at p. 430.) Absent specific or probative evidentiary facts sufficient to permit the Court to conclude why Meyer’s recruitment of Gummo subjects Meyer to the Court’s specific jurisdiction, Gummo has failed to meet her burden in this regard.

Even if the present record was sufficient to show that Meyer “purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in this state, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of California’s laws[,]” Gummo also bears the burden under the circumstances present here, to show that “the claim or controversy ... relate[s] to or arise[s] out of [Meyer’s] forum-related contacts.” (Rivelli v. Hemm (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 380, 392 (Rivelli).)

Though “an unverified complaint has no evidentiary value in determination of personal jurisdiction [citation], ... such pleading has limited cognizable significance as ‘a material fact, in that it defines the cause of action, the nature of which has some bearing upon the decision whether it is fair and reasonable to require the nonresident parties to appear and defend in this state. But the pleader has no burden of proving the truth of the allegations constituting the causes of action in order to justify the exercise of jurisdiction over nonresident parties.’ [Citation.] The Plaintiff need only present facts demonstrating that the conduct of Defendants related to the pleaded causes is such as to constitute constitutionally cognizable ‘minimum contacts.’ [Citation.]” (Mihlon, supra, 169 Cal.App.3d at p. 710.)

The causes of action alleged in the complaint are described above. The only cause of action which is specifically directed to Meyer is the ninth cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty. (See Compl. at p. 19.) Gummo fails to present probative or weighty evidence showing, expressly or by inference, “(1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship, (2) its breach, and (3) damage proximately caused by that breach.” (Mendoza v. Continental Sales Co. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1405; see also City of Hope National Medical Center v. Genentech, Inc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 375, 390 [discussing circumstances under which contractual relationship may impose fiduciary obligations]; Barbara A. v. John G. (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 369, 382-383 [same re confidential relationships giving rise to fiduciary duties]; Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. Glen (1966) 64 Cal.2d 327, 345-347 [general discussion of corporate officer duties].)

As to the first and second causes of action which arise from purported breaches by Meyer of, respectively, an employment contract and a settlement agreement, Gummo also fails to present evidence or information showing, expressly or by inference, that Meyer negotiated or executed a contract or settlement agreement with Gummo, or the terms of these purported contracts, among other things. (Checker Motors Corp. v. Superior Court (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1007, 1017-1019 [discussing circumstances under which the solicitation and negotiation of a partnership interest were sufficient to show minimum contacts with California]; see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 478-480 [general discussion].)

As to the third cause of action for fraud-false promise, the information and evidence presented by Gummo also fails to show, expressly or by inference, why Meyer made a misrepresentation to Gummo with knowledge of its falsity and with the intent to defraud Gummo, or that Meyer made a false promise or fraudulently induced Gummo to enter into a contract, among other things. (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.)

As to the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, and tenth causes of action for, respectively, wage theft by Meyer, retaliation by Meyer, Meyer’s solicitation of Gummo by misrepresentation, Meyer’s failure to issue accurate wage statements to Gummo, unjust enrichment by Meyer based on a purported failure by Meyer to pay all wages due to Gummo, and unfair business practices by Meyer in violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq., the same reasoning and analysis apply. (See also Miklosy v. Regents of University of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 900-901 [discussion of individual liability for retaliatory conduct].)

“The case-linked jurisdictional analysis is intensely fact-specific. [Citation.] Indeed, the test for personal jurisdiction ‘ “is not susceptible of mechanical application; rather, the facts of each case must be weighed to determine whether the requisite ‘affiliating circumstances’ are present.” ’ [Citations.]” (Rivelli, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at pp. 392-393.) For all reasons discussed above, Gummo has failed to present probative or weighty evidence showing, expressly or by inference, that Meyer had the requisite minimum contacts with California, or that the present controversy is related to or arises out those minimum contacts, sufficient to show that specific jurisdiction over Meyer in this case is justified. Therefore, the Court will grant the motion and order service of the summons on Meyer quashed.

“Because [Meyer’s] contacts with California are insufficient to justify jurisdiction, it is not necessary to undertake the additional process of balancing the inconvenience of defending the action in this state against the interests of [Gummo] in suing locally and of the state in assuming jurisdiction. [Citations.]” (Sibley, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 448.)

Noted above, the motion also requests an order dismissing the complaint as to Meyer. “The Court may dismiss without prejudice the complaint in whole, or as to that Defendant, when dismissal is made pursuant to [Code of Civil Procedure] [s]ection 418.10.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 581, subd. (h).) As the motion is made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10, and will be granted, the Court will also order the complaint dismissed as to Meyer, only.

The Court’s Conclusions

The Court has reviewed the proposed order submitted by Meyer and intends to sign it.