Peter Hacker v. Four Jays Music Company

Case Number

19CV04052

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 10/29/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion of Plaintiff Peter Hacker for Post-Judgment Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Tentative Ruling

For Plaintiff Peter Hacker: Roger N. Behle, Jr., Jordan A. Liebman, Foley Bezek Behle & Curtis, LLP

For Defendant Four Jays Music Company: Timothy M. Kowal, Teddy T. Davis, Ryan Merker, Kowal Law Group APC

RULING

For all reasons discussed herein, Plaintiff’s motion for post-judgment attorneys’ fees and costs is denied. Hacker is ordered to execute and file an acknowledgment of full satisfaction of judgment no later than November 5, 2025.

Background

Plaintiff Peter Hacker (Hacker) filed the present action on August 1, 2019, alleging eight causes of action against Defendants Four Jays Music Company (the Company) and Julia Riva (Riva): (1) misappropriation of royalties/conversion; (2) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage; (3) negligent interference with prospective economic advantage; (4) slander of title; (5) breach of fiduciary duty; (6) breach of written contract; (7) financial elder abuse; and (8) accounting.

As alleged in the complaint:

Hacker is one of three surviving grandchildren of musical composer Harry Warren (Warren) and a recipient to numerous rights and revenues derived from the musical compositions of Warren. Riva is also one of the three living grandchildren of Warren and a director, shareholder, President, and Chief Financial Officer of the Company. The Company’s principal business is music publishing primarily having to do with the musical compositions of Warren. The Company and Riva (collectively, Defendants) have collected revenue from Warren’s compositions including from the British Reversionary Territories, and money for Hacker’s share to which he is entitled, but have failed to fulfill their obligation to forward Hacker’s share to him and have wrongfully disputed Hacker’s claims to his rights in the compositions of Warren.

On September 19, 2019, Defendants filed a motion for an order compelling the arbitration of all claims brought by Hacker and staying the action pending arbitration. Alternatively, Defendants requested that this action be transferred to the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. The motion of Defendants to compel arbitration was opposed by Hacker.

On October 15, 2019, the Court entered a Minute Order granting the motion to compel arbitration and stayed the present action pending the completion of arbitration.

On April 16, 2024, following the completion of the arbitration, Hacker filed a petition to confirm the contractual arbitration award against the Company. As stated in the petition, arbitration hearings were conducted on November 29, November 30, and December 1, 2022. (Petition, ¶ 7(a).) The arbitration award was made on March 4, 2024, which requires the Company to pay to Hacker the aggregate sum of $200,000 consisting of $32,416.40 in damages, $127,989.69 in recoverable costs, $39,593.91 in attorney’s fees, and $0 in pre-judgment interest.

On May 22, 2024, the Court confirmed the arbitration award.

On September 2, 2025, Hacker filed the present motion for post-judgment attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedures sections 685.040 and 685.080, subdivision (a).

The Company opposes the motion.

Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 685.040 provides:

“The judgment creditor is entitled to the reasonable and necessary costs of enforcing a judgment. Attorney’s fees incurred in enforcing a judgment are not included in costs collectible under this title unless otherwise provided by law. Attorney’s fees incurred in enforcing a judgment are included as costs collectible under this title if the underlying judgment includes an award of attorney’s fees to the judgment creditor pursuant to subparagraph (A) of paragraph (10) of subdivision (a) of Section 1033.5.”

“The judgment creditor may claim costs authorized by Section 685.040 by noticed motion. The motion shall be made before the judgment is satisfied in full, but not later than two years after the costs have been incurred.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 685.080, subd. (a).)

“ ‘ “[T]he statutory purpose of requiring that the motion for enforcement costs be brought “ ‘before the judgment is satisfied in full’ ” (§ 685.080, subd. (a)) is to avoid a situation where a judgment debtor has paid off the entirety of what he [justifiably] believes to be his obligation in the entire case, only to be confronted later with a motion for yet more fees.’ “ [Citation.]’ ” [Citation.]” (Gray1 CPB, LLC v. SCC Acquisitions, Inc. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 882, 891 (Gray1).)

There is no dispute that the Company partially satisfied the judgment through three bank levies in September and November 2024, and thereafter, on August 11, 2025, wired the remainder of the judgment to Hacker’s attorney’s client trust account. Thus, the current motion was brought after the judgment was satisfied in full and is untimely.

Hacker argues that the Company is equitably estopped from opposing the motion based on the untimeliness of the motion.

The statutory deadlines for a motion to recover reasonable and necessary costs of enforcing a judgment are not subject to equitable estoppel. (see Gray1, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 897; Wertheim, LLC v. Currency Corp. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 327, 338-339.) Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that equitable estoppel is applicable as an excuse for failing to meet the statutory deadline to file the motion, Hackler’s motion would not be granted.

“ ‘The required elements for an equitable estoppel are: “ ‘ “ ‘(1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel had a right to believe it was so intended; (3) the other party must be ignorant of the true state of facts; and (4) he must rely upon the conduct to his injury.” ’ ” ’ ” [Citation.]” (A.S. v. Palmdale School Dist. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1091, 1100–1101.)

Hackler argues, primarily by way of his reply brief, that the company “continuously misled Mr. Hacker into believing full payment of the judgment and attorneys’ fees and costs would be made,” and that the Company “never challenged that the judgment payoff offers by Mr. Hacker mistakenly omitted funds collected by the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department.”

The Court has reviewed the evidence provided in support of Hacker’s arguments, and the Company never agreed to pay the claimed post-judgment attorneys’ fees or costs. On March 7, 2025, an attorney named Andrew Nutbrown wrote to Hacker’s attorney and asked for a current payoff amount for the judgment. (Behle Decl., ¶ 13 & Exhs. 2, 3.) Hacker’s attorney responded the same day indicating that he would send a payoff amount “early next week.” (Behle Decl., Exh. 3.) On March 19, 2025, Hacker’s attorney sent a payoff amount that included attorneys’ fees and costs. (Behle Decl., ¶ 15 & Exh. 4.) Mr. Nutbrown responded the same day with: “Thank you Roger, I will pass this along to Jean-Paul.” (Ibid.) Following some discussions regarding a confidentiality agreement and timing of a payoff, on August 6, 2025, Hacker’s attorney sent another payoff amount email that included attorneys’ fees and costs. (Behle Decl., ¶ 18 & Exh. 8.).

Again, there is no evidence that the Company ever agreed to pay the claimed post-judgment attorneys’ fees or costs. Hacker’s representations, included in his reply brief, that the Company’s counsel represented that they would “pay the principal, interest, and fees and costs” (Reply, p. 3, ll. 11-16), is simply untrue. At most, Mr. Nutbrown indicated that he would pass the information along to his client. Further, any indication that the Company would “pay the entirety of the amount owed under the judgment” in no way implies that the Company would pay the claimed fees and costs. Those amounts are not part of the judgment until ordered by the Court. The Court finds nothing misleading in Mr. Nutbrown’s response to Hackler’s payoff amount. Settlement offers are made all the time, and the typical response is that the offer will be passed along to the client. Representing that the client will inform the client of an offer in no way implies that the offer is going to be accepted.

Regarding Hacker’s second argument, that the Company never brought up that the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department had collected funds that Hacker had included in his payoff calculations, Hacker provides no authority that the Company would have any duty to inform Hacker that his calculations were incorrect. The money was collected by way of a writ of execution issued by Hacker. It is not the Company’s duty or responsibility to keep track of Hacker’s own writ and inform Hacker that it had been collected upon.

Because it is both untimely, and fails on its merits, the motion will be denied.