Linda Cobb vs. Superior Court Of California For The County Of Ventura
Linda Cobb vs. Superior Court Of California For The County Of Ventura
Case Number
VENCI00568898
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Wed, 09/20/2023 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings
Defendant’s Motion For Summary Judgment Or, In The Alternative, Summary Adjudication
Tentative Ruling
For Plaintiff Linda Cobb: Lanny M. Tron, Terry L. Tron, Tron & Tron
For Defendant the Superior Court of California, County of Ventura: Corrie J. Klewkowski, Tory S. Polin, Quarles & Brady LLP
For Defendant the County of Ventura: Tiffany N. North, Brett B. McMurdo, Christine Renshaw, Office of County Counsel
RULING
For all reasons discussed herein, the motion of Defendant the County of Ventura for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication is GRANTED. Defendant shall submit a corrected proposed order in accordance with this ruling.
Background
Plaintiff Linda Cobb filed her complaint in this matter on August 8, 2022, alleging three causes of action against Defendants the Superior Court of California for the County of Ventura (the Superior Court) and the County of Ventura (the County) (collectively, Defendants): (1) unlawful disability discrimination in violation of Government Code section 12900 et seq. (the California Fair Employment and Housing Act or FEHA); (2) unlawful retaliation in violation of FEHA; and (3) failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation in violation of FEHA. As alleged in the complaint, Plaintiff commenced her employment with Defendants in Defendants’ records department in November 1993. In 2005, Plaintiff became a judicial assistant and received pay raises, laudable job evaluations, and compliments from her superiors and co-workers.
In December 2017, Plaintiff developed a left arm condition for which she sought medical treatment. Plaintiff made Defendants aware of her arm condition and provided Defendants with work restrictions prescribed by Plaintiff’s doctor. Defendants advised Plaintiff that the work restrictions could not be accommodated. Defendants granted Plaintiff medical leave. Plaintiff returned to work in January 2018 without being provided any workplace modifications.
In September 2018, Plaintiff developed a right arm condition for which she sought medical treatment. Plaintiff provided Defendants with a doctor’s note and work restrictions prescribed by her doctor. Defendants granted Plaintiff a series of medical leaves advising Plaintiff that the restrictions could not be accommodated.
In March 2019, following surgery to repair Plaintiff’s right arm, Defendants accommodated Plaintiff by making modifications to her workplace. Thus, Plaintiff returned to work in May 2019. Plaintiff performed her job duties for the next several months of 2019.
In June 2019, Plaintiff filed a claim against Defendants for harassment by Plaintiff’s supervisors which resulted in injuries to Plaintiff’s cardiovascular and muscular system. In July 2019, Plaintiff provided Defendants with a doctor’s note and work restrictions. Plaintiff continued to work through 2019.
In November 2019, Plaintiff was further medically evaluated as to her disabilities. Defendants were provided with the doctor’s report and work restrictions which were nearly identical to those provided in March 2019. Defendants would only accommodate Plaintiff with medical leave contending that the work restrictions could not be accommodated. Defendants refused to allow Plaintiff to return to work with the same workplace modifications she had earlier in 2019.
In March 2020, when the Covid pandemic forced the closure of the Superior Court, Defendants placed Plaintiff on further medical leave through June 2020. On July 9, 2020, Plaintiff was advised she would be terminated because she was limited in her ability to perform essential functions of her job and that Defendants would not grant a one-year medical leave for surgery or therapy as requested by Plaintiff despite Defendants having previously accommodated Plaintiff through workplace modifications in 2019. Plaintiff requested to be returned to work over the next few months with the same modifications she had in 2019 or to be granted leave of a year for surgery and therapy but Defendants rejected Plaintiffs’ proposals.
Defendants served Plaintiff with a notice of intent to terminate on September 29, 2020 (the termination notice). In response to the termination notice, Plaintiff offered a written list of suggestions and accommodations on October 20, 2020. After receiving no response, Plaintiff objected to the notice of intended termination.
Eventually, Defendants hired an ergonomic expert who found that Plaintiff’s disabilities could be accommodated. The expert offered workplace modifications so that Plaintiff could work. In January 2021, Plaintiff returned to work with the ergonomic expert’s prescribed accommodations. Almost immediately, Plaintiff was subjected to unfavorable work assignments, increased scrutiny, micromanagement, unwarranted criticism, limited breaks, and threatened termination.
In mid-January 2021, Defendants sought to terminate Plaintiff by claiming that Plaintiff had been overpaid vacation/leave benefits. Defendants demanded repayment. Plaintiff opposed these efforts. Defendants then deducted the overpayment from Plaintiff’s wages and conducted a disciplinary hearing as to Plaintiff’s termination. Defendants failed to appoint an impartial hearing officer and did not advise Plaintiff that she had a right to call witnesses and present evidence at the disciplinary hearing. Defendants terminated Plaintiff on July 1, 2021.
On October 5, 2022, the Superior Court filed its answer to Plaintiff’s complaint generally denying its allegations and asserting eleven affirmative defenses. The County filed its answer to the complaint on October 10, 2022, generally denying its allegations and asserting twenty-two affirmative defenses including that Plaintiff did not have an employment relationship with the County.
The County has filed a motion for summary judgment of each cause of action alleged in the complaint on the grounds that the County was not Plaintiff’s employer between 2016 and 2021. Alternatively, the County seeks summary adjudication of its defense that the County was not Plaintiff’s employer between 2016 and 2021 when Plaintiff alleges that the discrimination, retaliation, and failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation occurred. The motion is opposed by Plaintiff.
Analysis
A motion for summary judgment “shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (c).) “From commencement to conclusion, the moving party bears the burden of persuasion that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 845, 850 (Aguilar).)
A Defendant moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that “one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar, supra, 235 Cal.4th at p. 850, 853 [Defendant is not required to conclusively negate the element that Defendant contends the Plaintiff cannot establish].) A moving Defendant also bears an initial burden of production to make a sufficient prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 845, 850-851.)
If a moving Defendant carries its burden of production, this “causes a shift, and the [Plaintiff] is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) The Plaintiff must set forth specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (o).) If the Plaintiff cannot meet its burden of proof regarding an essential element of Plaintiff’s case, Defendant will be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 35 Cal.4th 763, 780-781.)
A triable issue of fact exists “if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) “In ruling on the motion, the Court must ‘consider all of the evidence’ and ‘all’ of the ‘inferences’ reasonably drawn therefrom [citation], and must view such evidence [citations] and such inferences [citations], in the light most favorable to the opposing party.” (Id. at p. 843.) Furthermore, the Court “may not weigh the evidence or conflicting inferences and must deny the motion if there is a single issue of material fact in dispute.” (Cates v. California Gambling Control Com. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1308.)
Motions for summary adjudication “proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(2); Oroville Hospital v. Superior Court (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 382, 399.) “A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty….A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).)
(1) The County’s Motion for Summary Judgment
The pleadings frame the issues to be considered on a motion for summary judgment. (Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1253.) In the complaint, Plaintiff contends that the County was Plaintiff’s joint employer. The present motion is brought by the County on the sole ground that, as a matter of law based on the undisputed material facts offered by the County, the County was not Plaintiff’s employer between 2016 and 2021, when the conduct which Plaintiff alleges constitutes discrimination, retaliation, and a failure to prevent the alleged discrimination and retaliation occurred. Accordingly, the County bears the burden to establish that it was not Plaintiff’s joint employer for purposes of FEHA liability. (Melchior v. New Line Productions, Inc. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 779, 791, fn. 6; see also Hedayati v. Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 833, 846.)
FEHA makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to: “bar or to discharge” an employee or “discriminate against [an employee] in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” based on the employee’s “physical disability”; “discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against any person because the person has opposed any practices forbidden under this part or because the person has filed a complaint, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under this part”; and “fail to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination and harassment from occurring.” (Gov. Code, § 12940, subds. (a), (h) & (k).) “[A] Plaintiff employee who seeks relief under the FEHA [must] shoulder the burden of producing evidence and persuading the trier of fact that the Defendant employer engaged in impermissible disability discrimination against him or her as a qualified individual, as defined by the FEHA….” (Green v. State of California (2007) 42 Cal.4th 254, 263; Evid. Code, § 500.)
“[T]he structure of the statute itself …predicates potential FEHA liability on the status of the Defendant as an ‘employer.’ [Citation.]” (Kelly v. Methodist Hospital of Southern Cal. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1108; see also Reno v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th 640, 644 [“FEHA … prohibits only ‘an employer’ from engaging in improper discrimination”].) Accordingly, a Plaintiff asserting claims under FEHA must make a “a threshold showing” that the Defendant was the Plaintiff’s employer. (Jimenez v. U.S. Continental Marketing, Inc. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 189, 192 (Jimenez.)
“The FEHA provides limited definitions of the terms ‘employee’ and ‘employer.’ [Citation.]” (Shephard v. Loyola Marymount Univ. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 837, 842.) Subject to exceptions which are not present here, FEHA defines an “employer as “any person regularly employing five or more persons, or any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly, the state or any political or civil subdivision of the state, and cities….” (Gov. Code, § 12926, subd. (d).) “FEHA does not define ‘employee,’ but the administrative agency charged with interpreting FEHA—the Fair Employment and Housing Council (FEHC)—does define the term. [Citations.] … [Citations.] The FEHC defines ‘employee’ as ‘[a]ny individual under the direction and control of an employer under any appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written.’ [Citation.] FEHA thus requires an employment relationship, but that relationship need not be direct. [Citation.]” (Jimenez, supra,41 Cal.App.5th at pp. 196-197; see also (Cal. Code of Regs., tit. 2, § 11008, subd. (c).)
The County’s separate statement relies on the following facts, which are not disputed or reasonably disputed by Plaintiff, to establish that the County is not Plaintiff’s joint employer with the Superior Court. The County and the Superior Court are separate legal entities. (Plaintiff’s Opposing Separate Statement (Opp. Sep. Stmt.), UMF No. 4 & evidence cited therein [not reasonably disputed on this point].) Plaintiff was hired by the County in 1993. (Id. at UMF No. 1 & evidence cited therein.) The Superior Court became Plaintiff’s employer in the year 2000. (Id. at UMF No. 2 & evidence cited therein [not reasonably disputed on this point].) Plaintiff was hired as a judicial assistant with the Superior Court in 2005. (Id. at UMF No. 6 & evidence cited therein.) The Superior Court employed Plaintiff as a judicial assistant between January 1, 2016, and July 1, 2021. (Id. at UMF No. 7 & evidence cited therein [not reasonably disputed on this point].)
The County also submits the declaration of Kelly Akers (“Akers”) in support of the motion. Akers has been employed with the County’s Human Resources Department since May 2007 and is currently a Personnel Management Analyst responsible for administering the human resources section of the County’s payroll system. (Akers Decl., ¶ 1.) Akers’ duties include reviewing transactions to ensure compliance with the County’s administrative policy, personnel rules and regulations, and memorandums of agreement. (Ibid.) Akers’ duties also include data entry, reporting, auditing, maintenance, and updates to the County's Human Resources Information System. (Ibid.)
Akers declares that the County’s human resources department has been separate from the Superior Court’s human resources department since 2001. (Sep. Stmt., UMF No. 10 [Akers Decl., ¶ 9.) Since the year 2000, the County's Human Resources Department has not made any employment decisions pertaining to the Superior Court’s employees and has not participated in the Superior Court’s interactive or accommodations process for the Superior Court’s employees. (Id. at UMF Nos. 11, 12, 27 [Akers Decl., ¶ 10, 11].) The County has “had had no say in determining [p]laintiff’s compensation from 2001 to 2021.” (Id. at UMF No. 30 [Akers Decl., ¶ 18].) Based on Aker’s review of Plaintiff’s discovery responses, the individuals that Plaintiff claims were involved with or responsible for the alleged discrimination, retaliation, and failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation are not employed with the County or were not employed with the County between January 1, 2016, and July 1, 2021. (Id. at UMF No. 17 [Akers Decl., ¶ 19].)
The County did not participate in any interactive process or accommodations meetings with Plaintiff or in any interactive process or accommodations decisions pertaining to Plaintiff in 2016 or 2017. (Sep. Stmt., UMF Nos. 19-23 [Akers Decl., ¶¶ 14-17].) The County did not terminate and did not participate in the decision to terminate Plaintiff’s employment with the Superior Court. (Sep. Stmt., UMF No. 26 [Akers Decl., ¶¶ 12, 13.)
The Akers declaration includes the following additional information which is not specifically included in the County’s separate statement. (See San Diego Watercrafts, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 308, 315 (San Diego Watercrafts) [“the Court may ignore evidence not disclosed in moving party's separate statement of undisputed facts”.) The County has not maintained a personnel file for Plaintiff, and Plaintiff has not appeared in the County’s human resources or personnel records as a County employee, since 2000. (Akers Decl., ¶¶ 5, 8.) The Superior Court’s employees work in the County’s Hall of Justice where all Courtrooms, chambers, staff, and equipment are located. (Id. at ¶ 21.) The County provides these facilities to the Superior Court for judges and Superior Court staff. (Ibid.) Because the Hall of Justice is a secure County building, Superior Court staff require and are provided access badges by the County's General Services Agency so that the Superior Court’s staff can access their workstations and relevant Courtrooms and chambers. (Ibid.)
In support of the motion, the County also submits the declaration of Patti Dowdy (“Dowdy”), who has been employed with the County’s Human Resources Department since 2005 and who is currently employed as the County’s Employee Benefits Manager. (Dowdy Decl., ¶ 1.) Dowdy is responsible for supervising the County’s Human Resources Benefits section, and her duties including administration of the County’s existing employee insurance and benefits programs, medical reimbursement, employee assistance, the leave of absence program, and County’s wellness programs. (Ibid.)
Dowdy declares that the County helps facilitate employee and retirement benefits for the Superior Court pursuant to two memorandums of agreement dated in 2006. (Sep. Stmt., UMF Nos. 36, 37 [Dowdy Decl., ¶ 4-7.) These benefits include a 401(k)/457 plan, pension access, medical and dental insurance, wellness and financial seminars, and access to the County’s Human Resources Payroll System (VCHRP). (Ibid.) Plaintiff does not dispute that she was allowed to and did access and participate in the County’s 401(k) and Section 457 plan. (Opp. Sep. Stmt., UMF Nos. 36-38, 41.)
Dowdy states that the first Memorandum of Agreement (the first MOA) became effective on January 1, 2006, and provides for “ ‘the participation of [Superior] Court employees in the [County’s] 401(k) Shared Savings Plan and Section 457 Plan (collectively, “Plans’’).’ ” (Sep. Stmt., UMF Nos. 36-38 [Dowdy Decl., ¶ 5 & County Exh. 8 at p. 1].) The first MOA states that “ ‘[p]ursuant to Government Code section 71628 and subject to Part III of this Agreement, [Superior] Court employees shall be permitted to participate in the Plans, subject to the same eligibility rules as County employees and in accordance with all other Plan requirements.’ ” (Sep. Stmt., UMF No. 38 [County Exh. 8 at Section I.) The first MOA also states that “ ‘[t]he [Superior] Court will offer the Plans to its employees as a successor employer to the County and shall be considered a participating employer in such plans . . . for purposes of [the first MOA], and that a “[Superior] Court employee” is any employee of the Superior Court who is a “trial Court employee” within the meaning of Government Code section 71601(1).’ ” (Sep. Stmt., UMF No. 39 [Exh. 8 at Section I].) The County has helped facilitate access to the benefits since at least January 1, 2006, and the Superior Court has accepted the County’s assistance since that date. (Sep. Stmt., UMF No. 40 [Dowdy Decl., ¶ 7].)
Dowdy further declares that a second Memorandum of Agreement (the second MOA), which also became effective January 1, 2006, provides for the participation of Superior Court employees in the following County benefits: medical, dental, vision, life, and disability plans; wellness programs; employee assistance and “Work/Family” programs; and employee health services. (Sep. Stmt., UMF No. 41 [Dowdy Decl., ¶ 8; County Exhibit 9 at p. 1, first paragraph].) The second MOA includes the same definition of a Superior Court employee and the same language that is included in the first MOA regarding the Superior Court offering the Plans as a successor employer and that the Superior Court is considered a participating employer. (Sep. Stmt., UMF Nos. 42 & 43 [County Exh. 9 at Section I].) The benefits subject to the first MOA and second MOA are funded by the Superior Court. (Sep. Stmt., UMF No. 44 [Dowdy Decl., ¶ 11].)
The Dowdy declaration also includes the following information not specifically included in the County’s separate statement. Retirement accounts, including Superior Court employee pensions, are accessible to the Superior Court’s employees through VCHRP. (Dowdy Decl., ¶ 12.) Notices pertaining to the benefits are provided from the County to the Superior Court’s employees, often at the same time that notices are mailed to County employees and in the same envelopes for efficiency purposes. (Id. at ¶ 13.) The notices are often mailed to the Superior Court’s employees in envelopes from “County of Ventura Human Resources Department” with titles like “Important Employee Notices.” (Ibid.) These notices are provided by the County pursuant to the first MOA and the second MOA because facilitating access to benefits for the Superior Court’s staff requires occasional communications regarding those benefits. (Ibid.)
In addition, the County submits the declaration of Michelle Yamaguchi (“Yamaguchi”) who is the County’s Assistant Auditor-Controller. (Yamaguchi Decl., ¶ 1.) Yamaguchi’s responsibilities include planning, administering, and directing the accounting, and systems analysis work performed by the County’s Auditor-Controller’s Office. (Ibid.)
Yamaguchi declares that the Superior Court and the County are parties to an agreement dated July 1, 2005 (the services agreement), pursuant to which the County agrees to perform certain services for the Superior Court in exchange for compensation. (Sep. Stmt., UMF No. 31 [Yamaguchi Decl., ¶ 4 & County Exh. 10].) The services agreement is still in effect. (Sep. Stmt., UMF No. 33 [Yamaguchi Decl., ¶ 4].)
Pursuant to the services agreement, the compensated services which the County’s Auditor-Controller’s Office provides to the Superior Court include processing properly authorized employee timecards, calculating payroll, issuing paychecks, handling deduction processing, calculating and withholding taxes, producing W-2 reports, and forwarding retirement contributions to the Ventura County Retirement System. (Sep. Stmt., UMF No. 33 [Yamaguchi Decl., ¶ 5].) The services agreement further provides that the Superior Court is responsible to maintain sufficient cash to fund payroll expenditures, to provide time-card information, to verify payroll reports, to distribute payroll, and to provide to the County copies of all union agreements, side letter agreements, and resolutions covering management and unrepresented Superior Court employees. (Ibid.)
Pursuant to the services agreement, the County’s Auditor-Controller’s Office invoices the Superior Court on a monthly basis for all of the services rendered as well as the cost of debt incurred for the County’s Integrated Justice Information System (VCIJIS) and the VCHRP. (Sep. Stmt., UMF No. 34 [Yamaguchi Decl., ¶ 6 & Exh. 11 [memorandum re invoices for payroll billing submitted to the Superior Court by the County].) The Superior Court’s employee’s paychecks and salaries are not funded by or paid with County funds. (Sep. Stmt., UMF Nos. 28, 29, 38 [Yamaguchi Decl., ¶ 5, 9].) Paychecks issued to Plaintiff from 2001 through 2021 by the County’s Auditor-Controller were funded by the Superior Court. (Sep. Stmt., UMF No. 35 [Yamaguchi Decl., ¶ 10].)
The Yamaguchi declaration also includes the following information. The County’s Auditor-Controller does not determine the amount of compensation for the Superior Court’s employees and the County and County Auditor-Controller have not done so for Plaintiff since the year 2000. (Yamaguchi Decl., ¶ 7.) The County and County Auditor-Controller “have no say in” compensation decisions pertaining to the Superior Court’s employees, including Plaintiff’s compensation, since the year 2000. (Id. at ¶ 8.)
In paragraphs 2, 3, 5, 9, 16, 32, and 47 through 52 of its separate statement, the County offers legal and factual conclusions which are “insufficient to satisfy the evidentiary requirements for a summary judgment statute….” (Perkins v. Howard (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 708, 713.) The Court disregards these conclusions offered by the County in its separate statement.
Plaintiff asserts evidentiary objections to the facts disclosed in the County’s separate statement at paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 17, 19-23, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 3536, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, and 44. Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections are addressed below.
In addition to asserting evidentiary objections, Plaintiff disputes the facts offered in paragraphs 11, 28, 30, 35, 40, and 44 of the County’s separate statement, asserting that the County controls the benefits program which provided benefits that were part of Plaintiff’s compensation, that the County was responsible for determining the best benefit plans for employees such as Plaintiff, that the County distributed a “Benefit Plan Handbook” (the benefits handbook) to Plaintiff which states that it was created by the County and written to address the County’s employees, that references to the County in the benefits handbook also apply to the Superior Court, that the benefits handbook does not state that the County is facilitating the Superior Court’s provision of benefits, that Plaintiff had to contribute (i.e., make premium payments) towards the various benefits such that they were not funded solely by the Superior Court, that the County sent Plaintiff two letters regarding non-payment of premiums while on leave of absence which communicated to Plaintiff that the County was the provider of her benefits and which, according to Plaintiff, demonstrate that the benefits were not solely funded by the Superior Court, that the paychecks issued to Plaintiff were issued by the County thus the County had to use its funds in its bank accounts to honor these paychecks, and that the paystubs and paychecks identified the County as the payor of Plaintiff’s wages. (Opp. Sep. Stmt., UMF Nos. 11, 28, 30, 35, 40, 44, & evidence cited therein).
In addition to the above, Plaintiff also offers additional facts in her opposing separate statement. The additional facts offered by Plaintiff include that Plaintiff’s “W-2” forms were issued by the County and identified the County as her employer until Plaintiff was terminated in 2021, that the federal and state identification numbers on Plaintiff’s W-2 statement are the County’s identification numbers, that Plaintiff’s paystubs and paychecks identified the County Auditor-Controller as the payor of Plaintiff’s wages, that the County distributed the benefits handbook every year to Plaintiff, that the benefits handbook was created by the County to address the County’s employees and included employee notices and benefits information, that Plaintiff received correspondence from the County including during her final year of employment that address Plaintiff as an employee or communicated to Plaintiff that she was a County employee, that throughout her employment as a judicial assistant Plaintiff had to contribute to various benefits, and that Plaintiff had to obtain an ID badge from the County to get into the Superior Court’s facility to do her job. (Plaintiff’s Additional Facts (AF) Nos. 1-14 & evidence cited therein.)
The County does not dispute or effectively dispute that it issued Plaintiff’s W-2 statements which identify the County and include the County’s state and federal tax identification numbers, that Plaintiff’s paystubs and paychecks reference the name of the County’s Auditor-Controller, and that the benefits handbook included language regarding County employees. (County’s Resp. to AF Nos. 1-7 & evidence cited therein.) The County contends that the terms of the services agreement required the County to assist the Superior Court with processing employee W-2 forms and payroll which in turn required the County to list its employer ID and name and to transmit related communications to Plaintiff. (County’s Resp. To AF Nos. 1-4, 8-12 & evidence cited therein.) The County further contends that the benefits handbook includes language differentiating between County and Superior Court employees, and language stating it has been modified by the Superior Court to remove or change information not applicable to employees of the Superior Court and stating that references to County employees may also pertain to Superior Court employees. (County’s Resp. to AF Nos. 5, 6, 7 & evidence cited therein.)
The County submits a reply to Plaintiff’s opposition to the County’s separate statement. The County’s reply to Plaintiff’s opposition to the moving separate statement is improper and will be disregarded by the Court. (Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 249.)
The Court has considered all relevant and admissible evidence offered by the parties. The Court further notes that the policy underlying motions for summary judgment and adjudication of issues is to “dispose of cases … which are unmeritorious in substance and fact which, by considering the pleadings only, might remain in Court to the harm or harassment of parties and to the disadvantage and expense of the public, and in particular of other litigants.” (Wells Fargo Bank v. Kincaid (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 120, 123; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(1) [the Court has discretion to deny the motion for failure to comply with the separate statement requirement]; San Diego Watercrafts, supra, 102 Cal.App.4th at p. 316 [“[w]hether to consider evidence not referenced in the moving party’s separate statement rests with the sound discretion of the trial Court”].) The evidence presented by the County that is specifically included in the separate statement gives rise to inferences that are also supported by the information offered by the County but not specifically disclosed in the County’s separate statement. Therefore, the Court will exercise its discretion to consider but not necessarily rely on information that is offered by the County but not specifically or clearly stated in the separate statement as further discussed above
“ ‘[A] superior Court is not a subagency of [a] county. Rather, it is a separate branch of government. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Jones v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1045 (Jones).) “The presiding judge of each superior Court is a state officer [citation], who controls the hiring, firing, and supervision of superior Court employees, or delegates those duties to the Court's executive officer. [Citations.] The superior Court is part of the state judicial branch [citations], administered by the state Judicial Council [citation], and funded through the state budget process. [Citation.]” (Obbard v. State Bar of California (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 345, 349-350 (Obbard).) For example, Government Code section 77200 provides that “[o]n and after July 1, 1997, the state shall assume sole responsibility for the funding of Court operations, as defined in Section 77003 and Rule 10.810 of the California Rules of Court as it read on January 1, 2007.” (Gov. Code, § 77200.) “Court operations” includes “salary, benefits, and public agency retirement contributions for other Court staff [who are not Court judges or subordinate judicial officers].” (Gov. Code, § 77003, subd. (a)(2).)
Pursuant to Government Code section 77003, subdivision (a)(2), Plaintiff’s pay, benefits, and retirement contributions are part of the Superior Court’s operation costs. It can be reasonably inferred from the evidence offered by the County that as of the date of the services agreement, Plaintiff’s pay was funded by the Superior Court and not by the County. In addition, it can be reasonably inferred from the evidence offered by the County that Plaintiffs’ benefits were funded by the Superior Court since the effective dates of the first MOA and second MOA. Therefore, the County has met its burden to demonstrate that Plaintiff was not an employee of the County since at least 2005, and well before the dates of the purportedly unlawful conduct alleged in the complaint. Based on the evidence presented by the County and all inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, the County has established that it was not Plaintiff’s joint employer for purposes of the FEHA causes of action alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint. (Obbard, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 350.)
In opposition to the motion, Plaintiff offers evidence to demonstrate that the County was identified on Plaintiff’s paystubs and wage and tax statements as Plaintiff’s employer, and that Plaintiff also contributed to her benefits through her employment as a judicial assistant. The indicia of a joint employment relationship offered by Plaintiff are similar to those considered by the Court in Jones, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1046-1047. Jones involved an action brought against the County of Los Angeles by a secretary of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County alleging harassment and retaliation for complaining about discrimination in Plaintiff’s employment. (Jones, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1040-1041.) In Jones, the evidenced cited by Plaintiff to support the argument that Plaintiff in that case was jointly employed by Los Angeles County included that “Plaintiff’s paychecks are drawn by the County, that statutorily she had many of the same benefits as County employees, and that Plaintiff may have believed the County was at least in part her employer.” (Id. at pp. 1046-1047, fn. omitted.)
Affirming the trial Court’s summary judgment in favor of the county in that case, the Court noted that “those in Plaintiff's position ‘are appointed by the Court and serve at the pleasure of the Court. The Court has the exclusive right to control the duties of these employees. It is only in the payment of salary and benefits that the county is involved.’ ” (Jones, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1047, citation omitted.) Despite the presence of the same evidence offered by Plaintiff, the Court in Jones found that the Plaintiff was an employee of the Court and not of the county in that case. (Ibid.)
The same analysis applies. While Plaintiff here may have believed that the County was her employer based on the content of correspondence Plaintiff received from the County and the inclusion of the County’s identifying information on paystubs and wage and tax statements, among other things, the totality of the evidence offered by the parties including all inferences that may be drawn therefrom demonstrates that the County did not fund Plaintiff’s pay or benefits notwithstanding that the County facilitated accounting services such as payroll for the Superior Court’s employees on behalf of the Superior Court pursuant to the services agreement and permitted the Superior Court employees to access participate in the County’s benefit plans pursuant to the first MOA and the second MOA. Though Plaintiff’s paychecks were drawn by the County and Plaintiff had the same benefits as County employees, Plaintiff has offered no evidence to demonstrate that Plaintiff’s pay or benefits were funded by the County. For all reasons discussed above, the County has established that it was not Plaintiff’s joint employer during the relevant time frames alleged in the complaint.
Moreover, “[t]o evaluate whether an entity is an employer for FEHA purposes, Courts consider the totality of circumstances and analyze several factors ….” (Jimenez, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 193.) “Factors to be taken into account in assessing the relationship of the parties include payment of salary or other employment benefits and Social Security taxes, the ownership of the equipment necessary to performance of the job, the location where the work is performed, the obligation of the Defendant to train the employee, the authority of the Defendant to hire, transfer, promote, discipline or discharge the employee, the authority to establish work schedules and assignments, the Defendant's discretion to determine the amount of compensation earned by the employee, the skill required of the work performed and the extent to which it is done under the direction of a supervisor, whether the work is part of the Defendant's regular business operations, the skill required in the particular occupation, the duration of the relationship of the parties, and the duration of the Plaintiff's employment. [Citations.] ‘ “Generally, ... the individual factors cannot be applied mechanically as separate tests; they are intertwined and their weight depends often on particular combinations.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Vernon v. State of California (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 114, 125.) “ ‘Of these factors, the extent of the Defendant’s right to control the means and manner of the workers’ performance is the most important.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 126; see also Service Employees Internat. Union v. Superior Court (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 320, 326.).)
For all reasons discussed above, the County has established that it did not compensate Plaintiff for her services as a judicial assistant, or determine Plaintiff’s compensation, as of at least 2005 and in no event any later than 2006 based on the effective dates of the services agreement, the first MOA, and the second MOA. In addition, it can be reasonably inferred from the evidence offered by the County and further discussed above that, during the time frames alleged in the complaint, the County was not involved in employment decisions relating to any of the Superior Court’s employees including Plaintiff nor was the County Plaintiff’s employer with regard to the events alleged in the complaint. Therefore, the County has met its burden to demonstrate that it was not Plaintiff’s joint employer for purposes of FEHA.
Plaintiff’s opposing evidence is further discussed above. Plaintiff also asserts that she was required to obtain an ID badge from the County to get into the Superior Court to do her job. Presumably, Plaintiff offers this evidence to establish that the County owns or controls the location where Plaintiff’s work as a judicial assistant was performed during the timeframes alleged in the complaint. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the location where Plaintiff performed her work as a judicial assistant is not, standing alone, dispositive of whether the County was, for purposes of FEHA, Plaintiff’s joint employer.
Plaintiff has offered no evidence in opposition to the motion to establish that the presiding judge of the Superior Court or the Superior Court’s executive officer did not control Plaintiff’s hiring, firing, or supervision or that the Superior Court did not have the authority to establish Plaintiff’s work schedule notwithstanding the location where Plaintiff performed her duties. Moreover, though the County is not responsible to provide funding for Court operations as further discussed above, “[e]xcept as provided in Section 70312, commencing as of July 1, 1996, and each year thereafter, [the County] shall be responsible for providing necessary and suitable facilities for judicial and Court support positions created prior to July 1, 1996. In determining whether facilities are necessary and suitable, the reasonable needs of the Court and the fiscal condition of [the County] shall be taken into consideration.” (Gov. Code, § 70311, subd. (b).) It can be inferred from the evidence offered by Plaintiff that the County provided facilities utilized by the Superior Court pursuant to its statutory obligations. For this additional reason, Plaintiff’s use of the County’s facilities to perform her job duties does not, by itself, establish that the County was Plaintiff’s employer during the time frames alleged in the complaint.
Considering the totality of the evidence presented by the parties, including reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence, and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that the County has met its burden of persuasion to show that Plaintiff cannot establish that the County was Plaintiff’s joint employer for purposes of each of the FEHA causes of action alleged in the complaint. Plaintiff has not met her burden to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact. For these reasons, the County is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, the Court will grant the County’s motion.
The Court has reviewed the proposed order submitted by the County. The Court will require the County to submit a corrected proposed order that removes the words “and because Plaintiff cannot establish that Defendant caused Plaintiff’s alleged harms” which appear at page 2, lines 9-10 of the proposed order.
(2) The Parties’ Evidentiary Objections
The Court rules only on those objections to evidence that the Court deems material to its disposition of the motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (q).)
a. Plaintiff’s Objections:
The Court overrules Plaintiff’s evidentiary objection nos. 5 through 9 and 12 through 22.
b. The County’s Objections:
The Court overrules the County’s evidentiary objection nos. 1 through 21.
(3) The County’s Request for Judicial Notice
The County requests judicial notice of Government Code sections 68073.1, 70311, 71600 through 71675, 77003, 77212, California Rules of Court, rule 10.810, and California Code of Regulations, title 2, section 11008. (RFJN, ¶¶ 1-5, 7-8; McMurdo Decl., ¶¶ 3-7, 9, 10; County’s Exhs. 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19.) Evidence Code section 451, subdivisions (a) and (c), require the Court to take judicial notice of the public statutory law of this state and the rules of practice and procedure for the Courts of this state adopted by the Judicial Council. For this reason, the County’s request for judicial notice of these matters is not required. Though the County’s request for judicial notice of statutory law and rules of Court is not necessary, the Court will grant the County’s request for judicial notice of Government Code sections 68073.1, 70311, 71600 through 71675, 77003, 77212, California Rules of Court, rule 10.810, and California Code of Regulations, title 2, section 11008. (Evid. Code, § 451, subds. (a) & (c).)
The County also requests judicial notice of the complaint filed by Plaintiff in this action. (RFJN, ¶ 6; McMurdo Decl., ¶ 8; County Exh. 17.) Though also not necessary, the Court will grant the County’s request for judicial notice of Plaintiff’s complaint. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)(1).)