OPV vs Fox Canyon Groundwater

Case Number

VENCI00555357

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 08/01/2025 - 15:00

Nature of Proceedings

CMC

Tentative Ruling

(See below)

On calendar for August 1, 2025, as of this posting, are: (1) the Special Master’s Report No. 4 (notice filed May 20); (2) the Special Master’s Report No. 6 (notice filed June 23); (3) the Special Master’s Report No. 7 (notice filed July 2); (4) the Special Master’s Report No. 8 (notice filed July 24); and (5) United Water Conservation District’s objection to plaintiffs’ dismissals.

(1)       Special Master’s Report No. 4 re Motions for Protective Orders

On May 19, 2025, the Special Master conducted a hearing by Zoom videoconference to consider his recommendation to the court concerning three discovery motions brought by United Water Conservation District (United): (a) Motion for Protective Order Re: Amended Deposition Notice of Mauricio Guardado, (b) Motion for Protective Order Re: Amended Notice of Deposition of Jason Sun, and (c) Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoena for Dr. Sorab Panday. The following summarizes the recommendations of the Special Master:

(a)       As to the Motion for Protective Order Re: Amended Deposition Notice of Mauricio Guardado, the Special Master recommends that the court grant United’s motion. (Report No. 4, at p. 3.)

(b)       As to the Motion for Protective Order Re: Amended Notice of Deposition of Jason Sun, the Special Master recommends that the court grant United’s motion in part: “While Plaintiffs may depose Sun, they are limited to deposing him about facts known or opinions held by him before he was specially employed by United for this litigation on October 29, 2020 [Citation.] United’s request limiting Plaintiff to the documentary evidence United has previously produced in lieu of Sun’s deposition should be denied.” (Report No. 4, at p. 5.) “The Special Master recommends the court grant United’s motion in part as to the document production. Communications or analysis between January 1, 2020 and October 28, 2020 would be outside the period of Sun’s special employment as an expert witness and would therefore be subject to discovery today. To the extent Sun withholds documents, United should produce a privilege log. The limited temporal scope of the production eliminates claims of harassment, burden and oppression on this record.” (Report No. 4, at p. 6.)

(c)        As to the Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoena for Dr. Sorab Panday, the Special Master recommends the court grant United’s motion in part: “Dr. Panday’s deposition shall take place by videoconference (Zoom) and last for no more than two hours. The scope of the deposition shall be limited to historical facts.” (Report No. 4, at p. 8.)

On May 20, 2025, Plaintiffs filed an objection to the notice of Report No. 4, with “no objection to the Special Master’s Report No. 4.” (Objection, at p. 2.)

The text of the notice of the Special Master’s Report No. 4, filed on May 20, 2025, by United is not relevant to the adoption of the Special Master’s recommendations; the court does not consider whether the text of the notice is or is not objectionable. The court will adopt Special Master’s Report No. 4 itself and its recommendations as stated therein as orders of the court.

(2)       Special Master’s Report No. 6 re Matters Deemed Admitted

United brought a motion against plaintiffs to deem matters admitted. The Special Master recommended the court make the following orders:

1.         “Plaintiffs’ objections to Requests for Admission, Set One (Phase One) are waived.”

2.         “United’s request that the truth of any matters specified be deemed admitted as to Plaintiffs is denied.”

3.         “Plaintiffs shall pay $5,000 to United as and for mandatory sanctions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280, subdivision (d).”

4.         “United’s request that Plaintiffs incur the entirety of the special master’s fees associated with this motion is denied.” (Report No. 6, at p. 2.)

No objection to Report No. 6 has been filed. The court will adopt Special Master’s Report No. 6 and its recommendations as stated therein as orders of the court.

(3)       Special Master’s Report Nos. 7 and 8 re Settlement Procedures

As the court reported at the special July 18, 2025, case management conference, the Special Master’s recommendation in Report No. 7 that a judge of the Santa Barbara County Superior Court serve as the settlement officer for Phase 1 issues will not work and must therefore be rejected. The court ordered the parties back to the Special Master for an alternative.

On July 23, 2025, the Special Master conducted a hearing and, with no apparent objection, recommends that the court adopt the following orders:

            1.         Appoint Justice Luis A. Lavin (Ret.) of JAMS to serve as settlement master for Phase 1 of this groundwater adjudication.

            2.         “JAMS fees for the services of Justice Luis A. Lavin be paid in the same manner as the parties pay for the special master.”

            3.         “[A]ppropriate reimbursements to any party or parties who advance the funds for Justice Lavin’s services.”

            4.         “[T]he mediation privilege (Evidence Code sections 703.5 and 1115 through 1128) apply to any settlement discussions with Justice Lavin.” (Report No. 8, at p. 2.)

In the absence of objections, the court will adopt Special Master’s Report No. 8 and its recommendations as stated therein as orders of the court. The court encourages the parties to commence settlement discussions at the earliest practical opportunity.

(4)       Plaintiffs’ Dismissals

 

Plaintiffs have requested, and the court has entered, dismissal as to particular named parties.

 

On July 3, 2025, United filed objections as to 18 identified parties dismissed by plaintiffs. United states three grounds for objection: (a) United has not consented to these parties’ dismissals, which are thereby not effective to release them from United’s complaint-in-intervention; (b) dismissals have been without prejudice as to some, but not all, of the dismissed defendants leaving an open issue as to whether these dismissed parties may come back into the case at a later phase; and (c) it is unclear what consideration was given to plaintiffs in exchange for these dismissals.

 

United concludes:

 

“Accordingly, United is willing to agree to consent to the requested dismissals of the parties identified hereinabove provided the Court orders that (1) those parties are dismissed with prejudice and (2) any consideration provided to Plaintiffs, or any other person or entity whatsoever, in exchange for these dismissals, including in the form of monetary considerations, water rights or rights in this adjudication to any other party, is nullified. For these purposes, consideration does not include any waiver of the right to collect costs or attorneys’ fees that arose out of this adjudication. To the extent that Plaintiffs don’t agree to either of the foregoing, United respectfully requests the Court issue an order (a) denying any pending requests for dismissals filed by Plaintiffs and (b) reversing any previously entered dismissals requested by Plaintiffs and reviving those improperly dismissed parties.” (United Objection, at p. 4.)

 

Plaintiffs respond: (a) United’s response is improper and untimely as to the first 16 dismissed parties on United’s list; (b) the court granted plaintiffs’ unopposed motion on April 11, 2025, as to the first 16 dismissed parties; and (c) objections about potential parties’ rejoining the case is speculative. Plaintiffs declare that no dismissed party has received consideration relating to dismissal. (Smith decl., ¶ 3.)

 

On July 18, 2025, United filed a reply responding: (a) while the court granted the motion on April 11, 2025, it did not order dismissal until May 9; (b) United was not at the meet-and-confer which discussed dismissals, and did not give its consent; (c) United still has not consented and the parties are not dismissed as to United merely by plaintiffs’ request.

 

United objects to the dismissal of 18 specific plaintiffs. In the context of this comprehensive groundwater adjudication, the effect of the dismissal is more nuanced than in a typical case.

 

As first principles, the provisions for a comprehensive groundwater adjudication “shall be applied and interpreted consistently with all of the following: [¶] … [¶]

“(2)      Conducting a comprehensive adjudication in a manner that promotes efficiency, reduces unnecessary delays, and provides due process.

“(3)      Encouraging the compromise and settlement of comprehensive adjudications. [¶] … [¶]

“(5)      Establishing procedures by which courts may conduct comprehensive determinations of all rights and priorities to groundwater in a basin. [¶] … [¶]

“(7)      Providing notice and due process sufficient to enable a court in a comprehensive adjudication conducted pursuant to this chapter to determine and establish the priority for unexercised water rights.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 830, subd. (b)(2), (3), (5), (7).)

 

As the purpose of this action is a comprehensive adjudication, dismissal of a party makes sense only where either the court cannot obtain jurisdiction over a party (not raised as an issue here) or where the party’s participation in the action is not necessary for a comprehensive adjudication. A party’s participation is not necessary where the party does not have a claim to water rights, for example, where a party has transferred the claim to water rights to another person who becomes a party to the action or where a party disclaims any claim to water rights being adjudicated.

 

The dismissal of a party who has transferred its interest in a claim to water rights to another person provides no prejudice to any remaining party. The interest of the original party in this litigation became moot; the same interest is then asserted by the transferee party, who becomes a party in their own right. Similarly, a party who, through error or otherwise, previously asserted a claim in water rights or other interest in this litigation but no longer makes such assertion may be dismissed without prejudicing the claims of any remaining party. There should be no substantial dispute that the efficiency goals of a comprehensive adjudication are best met by dismissing parties who serve no adjudicatory purpose in participating in the action.

 

The matter is more analytically complex when the party to be dismissed is a plaintiff who continues in some sense to maintain a claim to water rights under adjudication. The purpose of the dismissal ostensibly is to remove the plaintiff from the action. However,

 

“Whenever proceedings are instituted under this chapter, it shall be the duty of all claimants interested in the proceedings and having notice of the proceedings pursuant to this chapter to appear in the proceedings and to submit proof of their claims at the time, and in the manner, required by this chapter.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 836, subd. (k).)

 

Section 836, subdivision (k), resonates with United’s position that although a plaintiff may dismiss that plaintiff’s claim for affirmative relief (see Code Civ. Proc., § 581, subd. (c)), a plaintiff may not be dismissed as a defendant to United’s complaint-in-intervention by that plaintiff’s own voluntary dismissal without United’s consent (id., § 581, subds. (b)(1), (i)).

 

Harmonizing these sections, the actions of the parties, and the orders of the court, the court construes the dismissal of a party-plaintiff at that party’s request as a concession by that party that (i) the party does not intend to assert any claim in this action on its own behalf adverse to any other party in this action (with any transferred claim of interest to be asserted exclusively by the transferee), (ii) the party does not intend to participate further in this action, and (iii) the party nonetheless agrees to be bound to the final judgment in this action. Similarly, in view of section 836, subdivision (k), the dismissal of a party-defendant by unopposed motion is deemed to make the same concession.

 

By this construction, the dismissed parties are, and remain, dismissed from the action, but all such parties, having received notice and an opportunity to participate in this action and voluntarily chosen not to participate, will not be permitted to participate further as a party and will be bound by the court’s ultimate judgment herein. Also, by this construction, it is irrelevant whether any consideration was exchanged for the dismissal (which is denied factually by plaintiffs in any case). Further, the court does not now make any orders as to the speculative assertion that a dismissed party will seek to return to the action at some later stage of the proceedings; any such issues are reserved and will be addressed, if at all, in a procedurally appropriate manner under the facts and circumstances existing at such a time.

 

To the extent this construction does not fully resolve United’s objections, the plaintiffs’ responses, and the current status of the dismissals, any party may make a noticed motion to seek specific, necessary relief.