OPV Coalition et al vs Fox Canyon Groundwater Management Agency

Case Number

VENCI00555357

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 10/06/2023 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Case Management Conference; Motion to Compel

Tentative Ruling

TENTATIVE RULING:

(1)       For the reasons set forth herein, the motion of plaintiffs OPV Coalition, et al. (OPV Coalition) to compel further responses to its request for production of documents from defendant United Water Conservation District (UWCD) is granted in part and denied in part. On or before October 23, 2023, UWCD shall serve further responses to requests for production Nos. 1 and 2 without objection and consistent with this ruling. UWCD shall concurrently produce all documents responsive to such requests as set forth herein. Documents produced in response to this order shall be used and disclosed only in connection with this action. In all other respects, the motion is denied without prejudice.

(2)       Until further order of the court, and except for initial disclosures and the discovery required by the rulings herein, all discovery in this action is stayed.

(3)       As set forth herein, in advance of the case management conference to be set at this hearing, the parties are ordered to meet and confer regarding a case management order. Counsel for plaintiffs shall serve and lodge with the court a proposed case management order with the court at least 10 court days prior to that case management conference, which shall, to the extent practicable, include any disputed matters with the position of each party (or group of parties) identified. To the extent disputes or objections cannot be included in the proposed order, objections and responses may be filed and served by any party five court days prior to that case management conference.

Background:

On June 15, 2021, plaintiffs OPV Coalition, et al. (OPV Coalition), filed their complaint for comprehensive groundwater adjudication of the Oxnard Groundwater Subbasin and the Pleasant Valley Groundwater Subbasin (collectively, Basins) in Ventura County Superior Court.

On September 29, 2021, the Ventura County Superior Court entered its order, pursuant to the Order of the Chief Justice of California as Chair of the Judicial Council, transferring this action to the Santa Barbara County Superior Court.

On March 3, 2022, OPV Coalition filed a case management conference statement (CMC statement) in anticipation of a case management conference (CMC) to have been held on March 18, 2022. (See also Wheeler decl., ¶ 4 & exhibit A.) That CMC statement included the following:

“Given that it may take almost a year just to notice and join potential parties, Plaintiffs request that the Court stay discovery until notice of the case is given to all prospective parties and they are permitted a reasonable time to answer. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 840(b)(7) (at the initial case management conference, the Court may ‘limit discovery to correspond to phases’). Plaintiffs intend to further meet and confer with the other parties with the goal of streamlining discovery as much as possible. Plaintiffs believe that discovery should be phased along with trial.” (OPV CMC statement, filed Mar. 3, 2022, at p. 4.) Before the March 18 CMC was to take place, that CMC was vacated.

On August 2, 2022, the court set a new CMC for September 2. OPV Coalition filed a new CMC statement on August 18. This CMC statement includes the following:

“Given that it may take almost a year just to notice and join potential parties, Plaintiffs request that the Court stay discovery, except for initial disclosures, until notice of the case is given to all prospective parties and they are permitted a reasonable time to answer, and that discovery be phased thereafter. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 840(b)(7) (at the initial case management conference, the Court may ‘limit discovery to correspond to phases’). Plaintiffs intend to meet and confer with the other parties with the goal of streamlining discovery as much as possible.” (OPV CMC statement, filed Aug. 18, 2022, at p. 5.)

At the September 2, 2022, CMC, the following colloquy occurred between counsel for OPV Coalition and the court:

“MR. YOST: In the meantime, your Honor, discovery should be stayed, we believe. Is that acceptable to the Court?

“THE COURT: I think that’s – that’s correct. Let’s get these preliminary matters sorted out first.

“MR. YOST: Great. And then we've also requested that a party seek leave of Court before filing a motion for summary judgment so that we don’t get piecemeal motions so that this fact intensive case we’re sure that these motions should be heard, that they not be filed seriatim at the parties’ inspiration.

“THE COURT: All right. I think in a case of this size, I think that’s probably appropriate.” (Wheeler decl., ¶ 11 & exhibit E [Reporter’s Transcript of Sept. 2, 2022, CMC hearing, at pp. 8-9.)

This was immediately followed by a comment from counsel for defendant Fox Canyon Groundwater Management Agency and the court’s response:

“MS. EWENS: And your Honor, if I might. Apologize. I do respect that that may be the Court’s ruling but I would note that CCP 836(a)(1)(A) provides that the initial CMC -- or CMC conference is not to take place until after parties are served with notice. I do have some procedural concerns about decisions being made, however benign they may seem, before notice is served on all parties and they have an opportunity to be heard.

“THE COURT: Okay. I respect that. So have counsel even met and conferred about any of this?

“MS. EWENS: We had initial discussions but not on this in particular.

“THE COURT: Why don’t do you that and we’ll address it later.

“MS. EWENS: Thank you.” (Reporter’s Transcript of Sept. 2, 2022, CMC hearing, at p. 9.)

The court’s minute order from the September 2, 2022, hearing provided: “The Court ordered that discovery is stayed while the preliminary matters are sorted out.”

On October 13, 2022, OPV Coalition filed a further CMC statement in anticipation of the CMC to be held on October 28. This CMC statement includes the following:

“Given that it may take nine months or more to notice and join potential parties, Plaintiffs renew their request for a stay of discovery, except for initial disclosures, until notice of the case is given to all prospective parties and they are permitted a reasonable time to answer. Plaintiffs request that discovery be phased once all parties are noticed and joined. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 840(b)(7) (at the initial case management conference, the Court may ‘limit discovery to correspond to phases’). Plaintiffs met and conferred with the other parties regarding this request. Ventura and Marathon refused to make any agreements and the other parties did not state their position. Plaintiffs submit that no party that appears later will object to an existing stay of discovery, and that staying discovery until the noticing and appearance procedures are complete is both fair to new parties and more efficient than beginning piecemeal discovery now.” (OPV CMC statement, filed Oct. 13, 2022, at pp. 2-3.)

At the CMC held on October 28, 2022, the following colloquy occurred between counsel for OPV Coalition and the court:

“MR. YOST: We’d also renew our request from the last case management conference to stay discovery and to require any parties seeking to move for summary adjudication to first obtain leave.

“THE COURT: I think you need to do it by noticed motion.

“MR. YOST: Okay.

“THE COURT: Okay?

“MR. YOST: Our thought was protect the parties that are still incoming and not –

“THE COURT: Understood, but still I think you need to do it by noticed motion, please.

“MR. YOST: Thank you, your Honor. And then I think that’s it for us.” (Wheeler decl., ¶ 16 & exhibit G [Reporter’s Transcript of Oct. 28, 2022, CMC hearing, at p. 10.)

The court’s minute order from the October 28, 2022, hearing does not mention the status of a discovery stay.

Between January and April 2023, OPV Coalition sought information from defendant United Water Conservation District (UWCD) regarding the identity of persons reporting extractions from the Basins, which requests were, and remain, the subject of dispute between the parties. (Sinclair decl., ¶¶ 4-16 & exhibits A-G.)

On May 12, 2023, OPV Coalition served its requests for production of documents (RFP) on UWCD that are at issue in this motion. (Sinclair decl., ¶ 17 & exhibit H.)

On June 12, 2023, UWCD served its objections to the RFP, including an objection that the discovery is improper because of a stay of discovery. (Sinclair decl., ¶ 18 & exhibit I.)

On July 27, 2023, OPV Coalition filed this motion to compel. The motion is opposed by UWCD.

Analysis:

(1)       Stay of Discovery

There is ambiguity as to whether a stay of discovery is or was in effect. The colloquy at the September 2, 2022, CMC first suggested that a stay was ordered, then backtracked a bit. The minute order clearly states that there is a discovery stay, but OPV Coalition came to the October 28 hearing with the expectation that no stay was in effect, noting that its request for a discovery stay was “renewed” in its CMC statement and in its counsel’s request at the CMC. The court’s response, contrary to the September 2 minute order, both suggested that no discovery stay was in effect and that a noticed motion was required for such a stay. This confusion is regrettable, but here we are.

Apart from this discovery dispute, which is discussed specifically below, the court will clarify that, until further order of the court and except for initial disclosures, all discovery is stayed. The purpose of the stay is to address discovery in an orderly manner and particularly to give the court and the parties time to work out scheduling and other case management issues. These issues are also discussed below.

Accordingly, the procedure for discovery going forward will be either by opening discovery generally by case management order or by noticed motion for leave for specific discovery.

(2)       Discovery Dispute

Given the ambiguity in the court’s orders, the respective positions of the parties regarding the existence or nonexistence of the stay are not unreasonable. With the issues fully briefed here, the court will address OPV Coalition’s motion to compel as including a request for leave for the discovery at issue.

There are two RFP requests at issue. RFP No. 1 is: “DOCUMENTS sufficient to show the names, mailing addresses, and email addresses, if available, of ALL PERSONS reporting extractions of GROUNDWATER within the BASINS under the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act, or Part 5 (commencing with Section 4999) or Part 5.2 (commencing with Section 5200) of Division 2 of the Water Code.”

RFP No. 2 is: “ALL DOCUMENTS containing the names, mailings addresses, and email addresses of PERSONS reporting extractions of GROUNDWATER within the BASINS under the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act, or Part 5 (commencing with Section 4999) or Part 5.2 (commencing with Section 5200) of Division 2 of the Water Code provided by YOU to JND Legal Administration on or around February 24, 2023.”

The response to RFP No. 1 is: “Responding Party objects to this Request on the grounds that a court-ordered discovery stay is in effect and prohibits all discovery in this matter. Responding Party further objects to this Request on the grounds that it seeks documents and information already in the possession, custody, or control Propounding Party or its agents. Responding Party further objects to this Request because the burden and expense of producing the requested information outweighs its likely benefit, is not proportional to the needs of the case, and is unduly burdensome, oppressive and harassing. Responding Party further objects to this Request to the extent because it seeks private, personal, and confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California Constitution and other applicable laws.” The response to RFP No. 2 is identical to the response to RFP No. 1.

As to the first objection, the court will permit the discovery notwithstanding the discovery stay to the extent that the discovery is useful to the purposes of this stage of litigation and is otherwise appropriate.

“(1)      Following a court order approving the notice and form answer and authorizing service of landowners pursuant to this section, the plaintiff shall do all of the following:

            (A)       Identify the assessor parcel numbers and physical addresses of all real property in the basin and the names and addresses of all holders of fee title to real property in the basin using the records of the assessor or assessors of the county or counties in which the basin to be adjudicated lies. The plaintiff shall provide the court and all parties with notice of its acquisition of, or sufficient access to, this information.

            “(B)     Mail, by registered mail or certified mail, return receipt requested, the notice, complaint, and form answer to all holders of fee title to real property in the basin. If the physical address of the real property differs from the address of the holder of fee title, the notice, complaint, and form answer shall be mailed by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, to the physical address of the real property and the address of the holder of fee title.

            “(C)     If return receipt is not received for a parcel of real property, the plaintiff shall post a copy of the notice, complaint, and form answer in a conspicuous place on the real property.

            “(D)     Within 20 days of the court order, publish the notice at least once per week for four consecutive weeks in one or more newspapers of general circulation in each county overlying the basin in whole or in part.

“(2)      Service pursuant to this subdivision is not required if the real property is owned by a person in a class of water users that are otherwise noticed in accordance with this chapter. If the owner is part of a class of water users proposed for certification, service is not required until the court acts on the proposal for certification.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 836, subd. (d).)

“Within 15 days of the court order approving the notice and form answer under Section 836, the plaintiff shall request from the following entities the names and addresses of persons reporting extractions within the basin under the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act, or Part 5 (commencing with Section 4999) or Part 5.2 (commencing with Section 5200) of Division 2 of the Water Code:

            “(1)      The State Water Resources Control Board.

            “(2)      A local agency designated under Section 5009 of the Water Code as the local agency for a board-designated local area that includes the basin or a portion of the basin.

            “(3)      A groundwater sustainability agency for the basin or a portion of the basin.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 836.5, subd. (a).)

“The entities described in paragraphs (1) to (3), inclusive, of subdivision (a) shall provide the plaintiff with the names, mailing addresses, and email addresses, if available, within 45 days of the plaintiff’s request. The State Water Resources Control Board shall also provide the mailing address and email addresses, if available, of any person known to the board who holds a permit or license authorizing underground storage in the basin or who claims a right to divert water for underground storage in the basin.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 836.5, subd. (b).)

“Upon request, the plaintiff shall reimburse the reasonable costs incurred under this section by an entity described in paragraphs (1) to (3), inclusive, of subdivision (a).” (Code Civ. Proc., § 836.5, subd. (c).) “An entity shall not be held civilly liable for complying with this section.” (Id., subd. (d).)

Under section 836.5, plaintiff is obligated to request, and certain entities are obligated to respond to plaintiff with, address information for persons reporting extractions within the Basin. There is no apparent dispute that UWCD is an entity to which section 836.5 applies. Indeed, there appears to be no dispute that UWCD appears to have provided the information required by section 836.5 to JND Legal Administration (JND), OPV Coalition’s third party administrator for service. (Wheeler decl., ¶ 25 & exhibits L, M.) The issue between the parties is whether providing the information to JND subject to a confidentiality agreement precluding communication of that information to OVP Coalition itself is sufficient.

UWCD argues that providing the information only to JND is sufficient because JND is OVP Coalition’s agent and because this information is confidential information protected by the right of privacy, citing Belaire-West Landscape, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 554 (Belaire-West) and Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531 (Williams).

In Williams, the California Supreme Court explained: “The state Constitution expressly grants Californians a right of privacy. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1.) Protection of informational privacy is the provision’s central concern. [Citation.] In [Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1 (Hill)], we established a framework for evaluating potential invasions of privacy. The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious. [Citation.] The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. A court must then balance these competing considerations. [Citation.]” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 552.)

Addressing Belaire-West, the Williams court summarized this analysis in the class action context: “The Hill test, conceived in the context of a pleaded cause of action for invasion of privacy, has been applied more broadly, including to circumstances where litigation requires a court to reconcile asserted privacy interests with competing claims for access to third party contact information. [Citations.] In [Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 40 Cal.4th 360 (Pioneer Electronics)], we used the Hill framework to resolve the same question the trial court faced here—the extent to which a litigant should have access to nonparty contact information. In the context of a consumer class action, we concluded fellow consumers who had already complained about a product defect had little or no expectation their contact information would be withheld from a plaintiff seeking relief from the manufacturer on behalf of consumers [citation], that disclosure would involve ‘no serious invasion of privacy’ [citation], and in any event that conditioning disclosure on an opt-in notice might significantly limit the ability of named plaintiffs ‘to redress a variety of social ills’ through collective action [citation].

“In turn, Pioneer Electronics was extended to wage and hour class actions by [Belaire-West]. Before class certification, the named plaintiff sought statewide employee contact information for the preceding five years. While fellow employees generally had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their contact information, the court doubted they would have ‘wish[ed] it to be withheld from a class action plaintiff who seeks relief for violations of employment laws.’ [Citation.] Nor was any prospective invasion of privacy serious: ‘the information, while personal, was not particularly sensitive, as it was contact information, not medical or financial details.’ [Citation.] Moreover, the balance of competing interests favored disclosure even more clearly than in Pioneer Electronics; ‘at stake [was] the fundamental public policy underlying California’s employment laws.’ [Citation.] The Belaire-West trial court was correct to order disclosure, subject to employees being given notice of the action, assurance they were under no obligation to talk to the plaintiffs’ counsel, and an opportunity to opt out of disclosure by returning an enclosed postcard.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 552–553.)

In Williams, the plaintiff brought a wage and hour claim as an aggrieved employee under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 538–539.) The plaintiff sought discovery of the contact information of fellow employees. (Id. at p. 539.) The trial court partially granted the plaintiff’s motion to compel and the plaintiff sought writ review. (Ibid.) On review in the Supreme Court, the Williams court explained its analysis applying the principles of Hill:

“[A]bsent employees have a bona fide interest in the confidentiality of their contact information. While less sensitive than one’s medical history or financial data, ‘home contact information is generally considered private.’ [Citations.] However, the second Hill requirement, a reasonable expectation of privacy in the particular circumstances, is not met. Like other courts, we doubt [the plaintiff’s] fellow employees would expect that information to be withheld from a plaintiff seeking to prove labor law violations committed against them and to recover civil penalties on their behalf. [Citations.] Rather, fellow employees ‘might reasonably expect, and even hope, that their names and addresses would be given to’ a plaintiff seeking to vindicate their rights. [Citation.] At a minimum, fellow employees would have no reason to expect their information would be categorically withheld, without even an opportunity to opt in to or opt out of disclosure. [Citation.]

“The third requirement, a serious invasion of privacy, is also absent. [The plaintiff] was willing to accept as a condition of disclosure, and share the costs of, a Belaire-West notice to employees affording them an opportunity to opt out of having their information shared. The trial court recognized the Costa Mesa store employees’ privacy interests and any potential desire to avoid disclosure or contact could be protected by conditioning disclosure on issuance of such a notice. Employees at other stores have no different privacy interests and expectations than those for whom disclosure was ordered; there is no reason to think their interests could not have been accommodated in a like manner. [Citation.] As in Pioneer Electronics, there is no justification for concluding disclosure of contact information, after affording affected individuals the opportunity to opt out, would entail a serious invasion of privacy. [Citation.]

“Because two of the three threshold Hill requirements are absent here, we need not move on to a balancing of interests. [Citations.] We observe in passing, however, that complete bans on disclosure to vindicate privacy interests, or disclosure subject to an opt-in requirement, may significantly hamper the ability of aggrieved employees, deputized by the state, to assist in broad and effective enforcement of the labor laws. [Citation.] Future courts confronted with privacy objections to similar requested disclosures should be mindful of this potential impact when weighing whether to embrace a complete ban like the one imposed here or instead to seek alternative solutions that might accommodate the competing interests at stake.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 554–555.)

Just as in Williams, individuals have a privacy right in their contact information. However, the second and third Hill factors are absent here. There is a significant difference between putative class members (as in Pioneer Electronics) and fellow aggrieved employees (as in Williams), on the one hand, and persons identified in section 836.5, on the other hand. Persons who are putative members of a class in a consumer class action or who are fellow aggrieved employees in a PAGA action are potential beneficiaries of the success of such an action. As the Williams court noted, there is some judicial doubt that those persons have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their contact information in order to benefit from such an action. In a comprehensive groundwater adjudication, the affected persons are not merely potential beneficiaries but are persons who are, by definition, actively exercising their water rights that may be limited or curtailed by the resolution of this action. Due process requires, and the Legislature has specifically provided, that those persons be served as parties to this action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 836, subd. (j).) The contact information is specifically required to be provided to the plaintiff pursuant to section 836.5, subdivision (b). Such persons do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their contact information in the context of this litigation.

Moreover, providing such contact information does not constitute a serious intrusion into these persons’ privacy interests. The provisions for a comprehensive groundwater adjudication, including the provision requiring communication of these persons’ contact information, are to be applied and interpreted “consistently with all of the following:

            “(1)      Protecting water rights consistent with Section 2 of Article X of the California Constitution.

            “(2)      Conducting a comprehensive adjudication in a manner that promotes efficiency, reduces unnecessary delays, and provides due process.

            “(3)      Encouraging the compromise and settlement of comprehensive adjudications.

            “(4)      Conducting a comprehensive adjudication in a manner that is consistent with the achievement of groundwater sustainability within the timeframes of the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act.

            “(5)      Establishing procedures by which courts may conduct comprehensive determinations of all rights and priorities to groundwater in a basin.

            “(6)      Providing for the conduct of a comprehensive adjudication consistent with Winters v. United States (1908) 207 U.S. 564, the McCarran Amendment (codified at 43 U.S.C. Sec. 666), and any other federal laws regarding the determination of federal or tribal water rights, as applicable.

            “(7)      Providing notice and due process sufficient to enable a court in a comprehensive adjudication conducted pursuant to this chapter to determine and establish the priority for unexercised water rights. The court may consider applying the principles established in In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream System (1979) 25 Cal.3d 339. Except as provided in this paragraph, this chapter shall not alter groundwater rights or the law concerning groundwater rights.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 830, subd. (b).)

Where the purposes of the comprehensive groundwater adjudication statute is to protect water rights consistent with the law and also to provide efficient procedures to adjudicate such rights and to encourage compromise and settlement, it is not a serious intrusion into the privacy interests of persons exercising such water rights to communicate the contact information of those persons among those involved in the adjudication of such rights. Such persons should expect their contact information to be made available in that context just as the Legislature has expressly provided. The court therefore finds that, in the context of this litigation, the contact information to be communicated under section 836.5 is not subject to privacy protection so as to prevent or to limit communication of such contact information for use in this litigation. As the Supreme Court noted in Williams, once this has been determined, the court does not engage in the fourth Hill factor of balancing interests.

This determination also resolves the issue of the appropriateness of the discovery relative to this phase of the litigation under which the court has limited discovery. Such discovery is appropriate to ensure that the information required by section 836.5 is fully communicated. Under this circumstance, RFP No. 2 is sufficiently broad to meet the present discovery needs and, if the information communicated ostensibly in satisfaction of the obligations under section 836.5 is complete and up to date, then such information also fully responds to RFP No. 1.

The remaining objections are borderline frivolous. UWCD asserts that the documents and information is already in the possession, custody, or control of the propounding party or its agents applying the traditional rule that information in the possession of an agent is deemed to be in the possession of the principal. (See Phillips Aviation Co. v. Superior Court for Los Angeles County (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 46, 53.) This rule, however, is premised upon the obligation of the agent to communicate received information fully to the principal. (Kelley v. British Commercial Ins. Co. (1963) 221 Cal.App.2d 554, 561.) Here, UWCD has actually negated that premise by communicating the information to the agent under a confidentiality agreement preventing the agent from communicating the information to the principal. (See Wheeler decl., ¶ 28.) Under these circumstances and given the broad principles of interpretation explained above, UWCD has not fully satisfied its obligations under section 836.5 or the Civil Discovery Act.

With respect to the burden objections, there is no showing of the actual burden and expense of producing the information. (See West Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417; Mead Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Court (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 313, 320–332.) With respect to RFP No. 2 in particular, the only burden is to send an already-prepared list (which may be electronic) to another person. Contrary to UWCD’s assertion, this is not per se overly burdensome and it is UWCD’s burden in responding to a motion to compel to justify its objection, not OPV Coalition’s burden to show that the objection is not meritorious. The objections that the burden and expense of producing the requested information outweighs its likely benefit, is not proportional to the needs of the case, and is unduly burdensome, oppressive, and harassing are overruled.

Accordingly, the court will grant the motion to compel and require a further response to these requests. A complete further response will be required for RFP No. 2. Because RFP No. 2 is limited in time to documents delivered on or about February 24, 2023, the response required for RFP No. 1 depends upon whether the information responsive to RFP No. 2 is up to date. To the extent that such responsive documents contain all names and addresses required to be provided to plaintiff under Code of Civil Procedure section 836.5, subdivision (b) (or all such names and addresses with identified exceptions, if any) as of the date of the further response required by this order, then a response so stating is sufficient as a further response for RFP No. 1. To the extent that additional names or addresses are required to be provided to plaintiff under Code of Civil Procedure section 836.5, subdivision (b), in order for such compliance to be current as of the date of the response required by this order, then a further response as to RFP No. 1 is required as to those persons or addresses not included in the production as to RFP No. 1.

The further verified response shall be without objection, shall contain a statement of full or partial compliance consistent with Code of Civil Procedure sections 2031.220, 2031.230, and 2031.240, and shall contain a statement that the document(s) responsive to the request contain all names and addresses required to be provided to plaintiff under Code of Civil Procedure section 836.5, subdivision (b), or all such names and addresses with identified exceptions, if any. In the event that the statement is for partial compliance with the request or if there are exceptions to full compliance identified in the response, the response shall identify with particularity all exceptions and the reasons for partial compliance. The verification shall be executed by someone with knowledge of the completeness of the production under this ruling.

(3)       Case Management Orders

The existence of this discovery and this dispute demonstrates that more formal case management is necessary to keep this matter on track. In particular, prior to the next CMC (which will be set at this hearing), the court will require the parties to meet and confer as to the format and details of a case management order (CMO) to address actions and deadlines. The then-current CMO should serve as an agenda for each succeeding CMC and will be updated accordingly. Understanding that aspects of the CMO will need to be revised or eliminated with the appearance of new parties and as circumstances change, the CMO should also address issues set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 840, subdivision (b), and California Rules of Court, rules 3.728 and 3.750(b), as may be appropriate. The CMO should include (1) a procedure for resolving disputes substantially in the manner of noticed motions so that such disputes will be heard at the same time as a regularly scheduled CMC and (2) a procedure by which new parties are served with the then-existing CMO and given an opportunity to agree or to have objections heard.