Las Posas Valley Water Rights Coalition v. Fox Canyon Groundwater Mgmt. Agency

Case Number

VENCI00509700

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 09/13/2023 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion to Confirm Stay Pending Appeal. Motion(s) to Strike. Motion to Deny the Request to Stay

Tentative Ruling

RULINGS

Having considered Fox Canyon Groundwater Management Agency’s Motion to Confirm Stay Pending Appeal, all supporting and opposing briefing on the matter, including the untimely submissions from the FCOP Parties and Del Norte Mutual Water Company, the evidence presented, and the record in this matter, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

1. As a signatory to the Phase 3 Settlement, Fox Canyon Groundwater Management Agency (“FCGMA”) agreed, inter alia, to serve as Watermaster, (SPTX-0045 § 1.1.2); that it would “perform the tasks assigned to it by the Judgment consistent with the Judgment’s terms and the Watermaster Rules and Regulations,” (id.); that it would “implement the Judgment consistent with the Watermaster Rules and Regulations,” (id. § 1.2.6); that it would “integrate [its] regulatory responsibilities and authorities [as the Basin GSA] with its role as Watermaster under a court-imposed groundwater management Judgment, referred to as the Physical Solution,” (id.§ 1.1); and that “the Judgment shall govern all aspects of the ongoing management of the Basin, whether undertaken by the FCGMA in its role as a special act water management agency, the GSA under SGMA, or as the Watermaster,” (id. § 1.4.1). Taking on these obligations was plainly and undisputedly within the FCGMA’s existing statutory authority to “maintain” and “compromise” a “groundwater rights adjudication.” (Stats. 1982, ch. 1023, § 407.) Given these promises, the FCGMA’s Motion to Confirm Stay Pending Appeal breaches its obligations under the Phase 3 Settlement to “use [its] best efforts to implement [the Phase 3 Settlement] and its purpose, . . . fully cooperate with [the other Phase 3 Settling Parties], and . . . take all steps reasonably necessary in that regard, as long as those steps do not require any material deviations from the terms of [the Phase 3 Settlement],” and to “not make arguments . . . that [are] inconsistent with [the Phase 3 Settlement] or the terms therein.” (Id. § 7.1.) The FCGMA is therefore contractually barred from bringing this motion. (Cf., e.g., Nevallier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 94 [party that “has validly contracted not to speak or petition has in effect ‘waived’ the right” to seek relief contrary to that agreement].)

2. The Phase 3 Settlement independently obligates the FCGMA to implement the physical solution, and the Court independently retains jurisdiction to enforce the Phase 3 Settlement. (See City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 311; Code Civ. Proc., § 664.6 [The Court “may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement” and “may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement[.]”].) Irrespective of the Watermaster’s role as the Court’s special master, the FCGMA has contractually obligated itself to “integrate” its Watermaster role and statutory authorities under the physical solution “[t]o the maximum extent practical,” (SPTX-0045 § 1.1), and to use its “best efforts to implement” the physical solution, (see id. § 7.1). A refusal on the FCGMA’s part to perform tasks such as establishing and consulting with the Policy Advisory Committee and Technical Advisory Committee and timely developing the Basin Optimization Plan therefore breaches the Phase 3 Settlement. These FCGMA obligations are not stayed and are separately enforceable regardless of the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure section 916(a). The arguments to the contrary mistakenly conflate the Court’s jurisdiction to enforce the Judgment as against the FCGMA or FCOP Parties as appellants with the Court’s jurisdiction to enforce the FCGMA’s contractual obligations—a distinction the Court of Appeal drew in the City of Santa Maria and which applies equally here. (See City of Santa Maria, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 311 [“[E]ven if [the court] were to agree” that section 916(a) prevented the trial court from entering orders approving implementation actions, the “stipulating parties nevertheless could have sought judicial enforcement of the agreement” separate from the judgment.].) And the fact that the FCOP Parties and Del Norte are not parties to the settlement is also irrelevant for purposes of this motion because their status as settlement signatories has no effect on the other Settling Parties’ ability to enforce the FCGMA’s settlement obligations.

3. Notwithstanding Code of Civil Procedure section 916(a), “[a] prohibitory injunction remains in full force pending . . . appeal, and the court below may enforce obedience thereto[.]” (Daly v. San Bernardino Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1030, 1040-1041.) “To determine whether an injunction is mandatory or prohibitory, [the courts] examine the terms and effect of the injunction in order to discover its character.” (People ex rel. Brown v. iMergent, Inc. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 333, 342 [quotation omitted].) The injunction imposed by the Judgment is prohibitory. It provides that no party may use groundwater without complying with the Judgment. (J’ment § 3.4) [enjoining all parties from “Using Groundwater and Calleguas ASR Project water Extracted from the Basin except pursuant to this Judgment”].) That injunction “conditions [the parties’] continued activity”—using water from the Basin—on “compliance with” the Judgment’s terms. (iMergent, Inc., supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 342; see United Railroads of S.F. v. Super. Ct. (1916) 172 Cal. 80, 82, 90 (1916) [order “requiring the defendant to desist and refrain from operating [an] excess number of cars” on railroad tracks was prohibitory because it “restrain[ed] waste and trespass” based on disputed property rights].) It thus restrains all parties from pumping groundwater in a manner that would “frustrate efforts to achieve Sustainable Groundwater Management and to protect public, environmental and economic interests in the Basin; injure the Parties’ rights; and interfere with the Physical Solution.” (J’ment § 3.4.) All affirmative acts required by the Judgement are incidental to the prohibitory injunction. For purposes of section 916(a)’s application, such incidental affirmative requirements do not change the conclusion that the Judgment’s injunction is prohibitory in nature. (People v. Mobile Magic Sales, Inc. (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 1, 13 [“The character of prohibitory injunctive relief . . . is not changed to mandatory in nature merely because it incidentally requires performance of an affirmative act.”].) This case is also different than the authority relied upon by the FCOP Parties—Byington v. Superior Court, (1939) 14 Cal.2d 68—because, by the time the Supreme Court considered the nature of the injunction in that matter, “the city had prevailed on the merits in an intervening decision on appeal.” (Daly, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1049 fn.10.)

Here, no court has blessed the FCOP Parties’ asserted right to double-dip from the Basin through mutual water companies, which could greatly harm their neighbors and the Basin and allow the FCOP Parties to secure windfall profits for themselves. (See Phase 2 Stmt. of Decision at pp. 71-83; Phase 3 Stmt. of Decision at pp. 95-97; Stmt. of Decision, US Horticulture Farmland, LLC v. Servin, No. 22CV02720 (Aug. 4, 2023).) In attempting to argue to the contrary, the FCOP Parties mischaracterize the Judgment’s treatment of mutual water companies and other factual aspects of the case. (Cf. Phase 3 Stmt. of Decision at p. 48 [“The FCOP Parties . . . provided misleading citations in their trial brief . . . that . . . undermined the credibility of their arguments.”].) Moreover, there is no “status quo” that can be maintained here; groundwater production from the Basin will continue, and will affect the Basin’s condition and the rights of the parties. (See J’ment § 3.4.) Given these facts as the Court has found them, the recognized ambiguity in distinguishing between mandatory and prohibitory injunctions, and the equitable concerns articulated by the California Supreme Court in Daly, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 1049 fn.10 & 1052-1053, the Court declines the invitation to set aside the plain prohibitory language of the Judgment. Thus, Code of Civil Procedure section 916(a) does not stay enforcement of the Judgment.

4. The comprehensive groundwater adjudication statutes also establish that section 916(a) does not apply. Only provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure that “do not conflict with the provisions of” Part 2, Title 10, Chapter 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure—the statute governing comprehensive groundwater adjudications—apply here. (Code Civ. Proc., § 830, subd. (c).) If Code of Civil Procedure section 916(a) required a stay, it would conflict with Code of Civil Procedure sections 849 and 852—part of the same chapter—and in particular, the Legislature’s determination that this Court shall “impose a physical solution . . . where necessary and consistent with Article 2 of Section X of the California Constitution,” (Code Civ. Proc. § 849, subd. (a)), and “have continuing jurisdiction to modify or amend a final judgment in a comprehensive adjudication,” (Code Civ. Proc. § 852).

5. The correctness of this interpretation is confirmed by the fact that an automatic stay under Code of Civil Procedure section 916(a) would conflict with the Court’s constitutional mandate to implement a physical solution, and retain jurisdiction to enforce and modify it, in furtherance of state water policy as set forth in article X, section 2 of the California Constitution. (City of Lodi v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist. (1936) 7 Cal.2d 316, 347; Rancho Santa Margarita v.Vail (1938) 11 Cal.2d 501, 558-559.) “An overarching consideration for any water rights adjudication is that the judgment should promote California’s policy that available water be put to the maximum beneficial use possible, with waste or unreasonable use prevented, under the circumstances presented.” (Antelope Valley Groundwater Cases (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 17, 49.) And, contrary to certain parties’ assertions, a stay maintaining their characterization of the “status quo” would result in ill effects because, as this Court has already determined, “the status quo has failed to resolve conflict and failed to produce projects that will ensure that beneficial use of water is maximized in this Basin over the long term.” (Phase 3 Stmt. of Decision at p. 70.) And the Court already concluded that the physical solution adopted by its Judgment will effectuate its constitutional mandate to “maximize reasonable and beneficial use of the Basin’s water resources[.]” (J’ment § 3.2; Phase 2 Stmt. of Decision at pp. 48, 51-52; Phase 3 Stmt. of Decision at pp. 37-39, 74-75, 84-86.) A stay would interfere with both the Court’s duty to maximize reasonable, beneficial use and its separate duty to exercise its jurisdiction to enforce that mandate. The arguments to the contrary are in effect a motion to reconsider these points and arguments the Court has already rejected, filed too late and meeting none of the criteria for a reconsideration motion.

6. Courts must interpret and apply the law consistently with the constitutional mandate to further the reasonable and beneficial use of water. (See, e.g., In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 339, 354.) As many courts have therefore recognized, “[t]o the extent there is a conflict between [a statutory provision] and article X, section 2 of the California Constitution establishing a public policy of fostering the reasonable beneficial use of water, the constitutional provision must prevail[.]” (Hillside Mem’l Park & Mortuary v. Golden State Water Co. (2011) 205 Cal.App.4th 534, 550; see also Cent. Basin Mun. Water Dist. v. Water Replenishment Dist. of S. Cal. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 943, 950-951; Cal. Am. Water v. City of Seaside (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 471, 478, 480-481.) The Court’s determination that the Judgment effects a prohibitory injunction and the Court’s interpretation of the comprehensive adjudication statute both avoid this conflict. (See People v. McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172, 1193 [Whenever reasonable, courts must construe statutes “to avoid difficult constitutional issues.”]; Kleffman v. Vonage Holdings Corp. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 334, 346 [“Courts should, if reasonably possible, construe a statute in a manner that avoids any doubt about its constitutional validity.”] [quotation omitted]; Sanchez v. City of Modesto (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 660, 671 [“Where reasonably possible, [courts] are obliged to adopt an interpretation of a statute that renders it constitutional in preference to an interpretation that renders it unconstitutional.”].)

7. In any event, even were Code of Civil Procedure section 916(a) applicable here, the only aspect of the Judgment that this Court might be precluded from enforcing against the FCGMA would be the Watermaster Rules it seeks to appeal because only those aspects are relevant to the effectiveness of the FCGMA’s narrow appeal. (See Kentfield v. Kentfield, 4 Cal.2d 585, 587 (1935) [statutory stay applies party-by-party]; Whittier Redev. Agency v. Oceanic Arts (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1059-60 [stay applies only to aspects of the judgment necessary to the effectiveness of the party’s appeal]; Betz v. Pankow (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 931, 938; 9 Witkin, California Procedure, Appeal, § 240 (6th ed. 2023).) Although the Court strikes the FCOP Parties’ improper submission in support of the motion, see infra, the Court notes that they, like the FCGMA, fail to cite any authority establishing that section 916(a) (even assuming it applied here) would stay all Watermaster actions to implement the Judgment, much less actions undertaken by the FCGMA pursuant to its other authorities that implement the Judgment.

8. The FCGMA would not be irreparably harmed absent a stay. Conversely, based on the lengthy evidentiary record in this case, the Court concludes the Basin, public interest, and other Settling Parties would be irreparably harmed by a stay. Parties like the Las Posas Farming Group established this fact with clear and plain evidence throughout the Phase 1, 2, and 3 trials in this matter. And the FCGMA’s own evidentiary submissions, as well as its conduct, confirm it. So, too, does the conduct of other parties to this action, including the parties that objected to the Judgment and have brought unfounded, retaliatory collateral attacks against it. Likewise, the FCOP Parties and Del Norte have not explained how implementing the Judgment would pose any harm to the Court of Appeal’s jurisdiction over their appeals, nor have they cited to a single case in which a court has imposed the relief they seek here: a total stay of any and all implementation of or compliance with a judgment. A discretionary stay pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 918 is not warranted.

9. The Court also notes that the FCOP Parties and Del Norte did not seek leave of court to file reply briefs in support of the FCGMA’s motion, and they did not cite any authority for their filings. The court may strike “all or any part of any pleading not . . . filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court,” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436(b)), and doing so is proper here.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that (1) Defendants Mahan Ranch LLC, et al.’s Joinder to

Fox Canyon Groundwater Management Agency’s Motion to Confirm Stay Pending Appeal and (2) Reply to Joint Opposition to Fox Canyon Groundwater Management Agency’s Motion to Confirm Stay Pending Appeal and (3) Defendant Del Norte Water Company’s Joinder to Fox Canyon Groundwater Management Agency’s Motion to Confirm Stay Pending Appeal and (4) Joinder to Mahan Ranch LLC, et al.’s and Fox Canyon Groundwater Management Agency’s Reply to Joint Opposition to Motion to Confirm Stay Pending Appeal are STRICKEN pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 436(b).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the FCGMA’s Motion to Confirm Stay Pending

Appeal pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 916(a) is DENIED, and the FCGMA’s request, in the alternative, for a discretionary stay pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 918 is DENIED. Although the Court finds it proper to strike the FCOP Parties and Del Norte Water Company’s joinders therein, the Court further concludes that they are similarly DENIED, both on the merits for the reasons discussed herein and as improper motions for reconsideration given the Court’s previous findings.

There is a proposed Order submitted that the Court intends to sign.

Analysis

On 5/16/23 this case commenced as a Court Trial and continued until it was completed. It was lengthy; sometimes contentious; at times acrimonious.

On 7/5/23 this Court entered its Final Statement of Decision after considering Objections.

On 7/10/23 this Court entered its Final Judgment.

On 8/7/23 Mahan Ranch [via Wendy Lascher, James Q. McDermott, and Neal P. Maguire] filed a Notice of Appeal of this Court’s Judgment entered on July 5 and 10, 2023.

On 8/10/23 Fox Canyon Groundwater Management Agency [via Elizabeth Ewens] filed a Motion for an order confirming the stay in this action; summarized; on August 7, 2023, Defendants Mahan Ranch, et al. (“FCOP Defendants”) filed and perfected an appeal of the Judgment entered in this action on July 10, 2023.  FCOP Defendants’ appeal encompasses the entirety of the Judgment, including, without limitation, several aspects of the Court's determination of groundwater rights; the adoption, implementation, and enforcement of the Judgment and Physical Solution; the imposition of basin assessments; and the fundamental governance and management structure embodied in the Judgment and Physical Solution. FCOP Defendants maintain that the enforcement and implementation of the Physical Solution and Judgment is stayed pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 916(a); FCGMA will be filing an appeal of the Judgment, albeit limited in scope to renewing its objections to the Judgment’s Watermaster Rules, including administrative rules contained therein; in light of FCOP Defendants’ comprehensive appeal, in the absence of a stay, implementation and enforcement of the Judgment places FCGMA, including in its capacity as Watermaster, in a questionable position of authority, requiring it to expend agency funds and staff resources to implement Basin Management Actions, calculate and enforce water rights, and address issues pertaining to the collection of Basin Assessments from Water Right Holders pursuant to a Judgment that may ultimately be reversed on appeal; because these actions all are matters embraced and affected by the forementioned appeals, FCGMA gives notice of FCOP Defendants’ appeal of the Judgment and seeks the Court's confirmation that the Judgment is automatically stayed pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 916 until all appeals are resolved.

On 8/28/23 A “Joint Opposition” was filed by the Los Posas Farming Group, to Fox Canyon Groundwater Agency’s Motion to Confirm Stay Pending Appeal [via Matt Kline; Kevin O’Brien; Robert J. Saperstein; R. Jeffrey Warren; Keith Lemieux; Jamie Jefferson; Robert N. Kwong; Steven R. Hagemann]; summarized; for decades, the Las Posas Valley Groundwater Basin’s stakeholders have struggled to develop a cohesive, consensus approach to managing the Basin.  After five years of litigation and two lengthy trials, the Court at last set the Basin on the right path, entering a Judgment and physical solution in this comprehensive groundwater adjudication—supported by some 85% of the parties; the FCGMA, a party to the Phase 3 Settlement, agreed to be appointed Watermaster, implement the physical solution, and perform all tasks assigned to it by the Judgment; the FCGMA now seeks to abdicate its duties by asking this Court to cease all implementation of the entire Judgment and physical solution—without citing a single groundwater adjudication in which any court has stayed all implementation of a physical solution pending appeal.  Even apart from the FCGMA’s contractual obligations, such a broad stay would be inconsistent with the prohibitory nature of the Judgment, inconsistent with Court’s obligations under article X, section 2 of the California Constitution, and inconsistent with how Code of Civil Procedure section 916 works.  Mothballing the physical solution during a potentially years-long appeals process would be disastrous for the Basin, irreparably harm the interests of all parties and their water rights as already decreed by the Court, and deny the remaining Settling Parties the benefit of their bargain with the FCGMA; the FCGMA seeks to do through this motion what it failed to accomplish during the Phase 3 trial—delay implementation of the physical solution in service of its own power.  The Phase 3 Settlement requires denying this motion on two separate grounds: (1) the motion itself violates the Phase 3 Settlement, and (2) the FCGMA is contractually obligated to comply with the Judgment notwithstanding the existence of any stay.  These are contract-law issues that are independent of questions the Court of Appeal might consider about the merits of this Court’s Judgment.  The Court should deny this motion on those contractual grounds. If the FCGMA believed a stay would obtain in this case the moment any party filed an appeal, it should have documented that in the Phase 3 Settlement.  It did just the opposite.  In exchange for the request that it be appointed Watermaster, the FCGMA affirmed again and again it would implement the physical solution, fulfill the terms of the Judgment, and not argue otherwise.  E.g., SPTX-0045 §§ 1.1.2, 1.2.6, 1.4.1, 7.1.  Those obligations are separately enforceable regardless of the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure section 916(a), and the FCGMA is entitled to no relief under that statute or otherwise. The Court can and should also deny the FCGMA’s motion on the independent ground that section 916(a) does not apply to the Judgment at all because the Judgment imposes a prohibitory injunction, and any affirmative acts it requires are incidental thereto. The Court should decline to interpret section 916(a) as requiring a stay of the Judgment and physical solution to avoid a conflict with article X, section 2 of the California Constitution. Imposing an automatic stay of the Judgment would improperly abdicate the Court’s self-executing constitutional duties. Application of section 916(a), as urged by the FCGMA, defies the Court’s constitutional mandate because it would frustrate both the physical solution and the Court’s obligation to retain jurisdiction under article X, section 2.  Whether FCGMA or the FCOP Parties make this stay argument, the demand for a stay is equally infirm. The FCGMA’s alternative request for a discretionary stay should be denied. For the reasons discussed, the Court should deny the FCGMA’s motion, and adopt the Settling Parties’ proposed order.

Supported by the Declaration of Adam Phillips.

On 8/30/23 Solano Verde Mutual Water Company [via Shawnda M. Grady] filed a Notice of Appeal of this Court’s Judgment of July 10, 2023

On 8/30/23 Mahan Ranch et al [via James Q. McDermott; Neal P. Maguire; Jessica M. Wan; Shane M. Maguire] reported that the “FCOP Defendants” joined in the Fox Canyon Groundwater Management Agency’s position that the appeal filed by FCOP Defendants automatically stays the Final Judgment in this matter (entered by the Court on July 10, 2023) pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 916.

On 8/31/23 the Settling Parties [via Matt Kline; Kevin O’Brien; Robert J. Saperstein; R. Jeffrey Warren; Keith Lemieux; Jamie Jefferson; Robert N. Kwong; Steven R. Hagemann; Robert Kuhs] filed a Motion to Strike Mahan Ranch LLC et al’s Joinder to Fox Canyon Groundwater Agency’s Motion to Confirm Stay Pending Appeal; not summarized here because an amended Motion to Confirm Stay and Motions to Strike were filed 9/11/23

On 9/1/23 DNWC filed a Notice of Appeal.

On 9/5/23 DNWC [via Barbara Brenner] filed a pleading that said in light of Defendant DNWC filing of a notice of appeal of the Final Judgment entered by this Court on or about July 10, 2023, DNWC joins in the position raised in the Fox Canyon Groundwater Management Agency’s Motion to Confirm Stay Pending Appeal; that the appeal filed by the FCOP Defendants automatically stays the Final Judgment in this matter pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 916.

On 9/6/23 the Settling Parties [via Matt Kline; Kevin O’Brien; Robert J. Saperstein; R. Jeffrey Warren; Keith Lemieux; Jamie Jefferson; Robert N. Kwong; Steven R. Hagemann; Robert Kuhs] filed a Motion to Strike DNWC’s Joinder to Fox Canyon’s Motion to Confirm Stay Pending Appeal:  not summarized here because an amended motion(s) was filed 9/11/23.

On 9/6/23 Fox Canyon [via Elizabeth P Ewens] filed a Reply to the Joint Opposition to the Motion to Confirm Stay Pending Appeal; summarized; argues imposition of an automatic stay is not a matter of the Court’s discretion; FCGMA, as Watermaster, requests that the Court confirm the automatic stay of the enforcement of the Judgment in its entirety as required by section 916. Contends the Judgment appoints FCGMA as Watermaster and special master to the Court “for the purpose of executing the powers, duties, and responsibilities assigned therein.”  (Judgment, § 1.113.)  Pursuant to Section 5.1 of the Judgment, “Watermaster shall administer this Judgment consistent with the Judgment’s terms and the Watermaster Rules, subject to the Court’s continuing jurisdiction and oversite.”  The duties under the Judgment require Watermaster to address the effect of an appeal challenging the Judgment.  Ignoring that FCGMA brought the motion as the Court’s special master and Watermaster, Opposing Parties [refers to Settling Parties filing the Joint Opposition] contend that FCGMA somehow seeks to abdicate its duties; Watermaster’s motion does no such thing; Watermaster’s motion simply requests that the Court confirm what the law plainly requires: That the enforcement of the Judgment be stayed, in its entirety, to preserve the status quo pending resolution of the appeal. 

On 9/7/23 DNWC [via Barbara Brenner] asks this court to confirm that the appeal filed by the FCOP Defendants automatically stays the Final Judgment in this matter pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 916. 

On Saturday 9/9/23 the Settling Parties [via Matt Kline; Kevin O’Brien; Robert J. Saperstein; R. Jeffrey Warren; Keith Lemieux; Jamie Jefferson; Robert N. Kwong; Steven R. Hagemann; Robert Kuhs] filed (1) a Joint Response and Request to Strike the FCOP Parties’ Reply and DNWC’s Joinder ISO Fox Canyon Groundwater Management Agency’s Motion to Confirm Pending Appeal, AND (2) an [Amended Proposed] Order Denying Fox Canyon Groundwater Management Agency’s Motion to Confirm Stay Pending Appeal. summarized: The FCOP Parties belatedly proffer a purported “reply” in support of a motion they did not file. That submission is untimely, improper, and should not be considered, nor should the even later joinder, filed by Del Norte Water Company. But it fails on the merits as well. The FCOP Parties do not even address, much less persuasively refute, much of the authority cited by Settling Parties. Instead, much of the FCOP Parties’ brief consists of incorrect revisionist characterizations of the Judgment and the underlying evidence from the Court’s Phase 2 and Phase 3 trials—both of which concluded with the Court thoroughly rejecting the FCOP Parties’ arguments. Contrary to the FCOP Parties’ belated contentions, section 916(a) does not stay implementation of the Judgment for the reasons articulated in the undersigned Settling Parties’ opposition to the FCGMA’s motion (“Opposition”). And even if section 916(a) applied, any resulting stay would be limited to proceedings in the trial court that would affect any individual appellant’s appeal. The entire Judgment and its implementation would not be stayed under any theory.

On Sunday 9/10/23 the Settling Parties provided the Court with a Word version of the [Amended Proposed] Order Denying Fox Canyon Groundwater Management Agency’s Motion to Confirm Stay Pending Appeal filed Saturday.

On Monday 9/11/23 the FCOP Parties [via James Q. McDermott; Neal P. Maguire; Jessica M. Wan; Shane M. Maguire] filed a response; summarized; report that the FCOP Parties’ joinder and reply do not request separate relief from the Fox Canyon GMA’s motion; are proper; LPFG invites the Court to enforce purported rules against other parties that the Court previously declined to apply to the LPFG; the Request to Strike (at 1) asks the Court to ignore the FCOP Parties’ Reply because the “the FCOP Parties cite no authority justifying submission of a ‘reply’ in support of a motion they did not file, nor did they seek leave of court for such a filing.” As has been the pattern in this case, the LPFG asks the Court to enforce purported rules that the Court has not enforced against the LPFG. The LPFG has participated in motions it did not file and, against objections, the Court has allowed them to do so [the LPFG has participated in motions in which it was not a party to the case. The Court declined to strike their brief despite objections, including based on “standing.”] Berylwood Heights and Zone Mutual Water Companies filed a motion to disqualify counsel for the FCOP Parties. The LPFG and others filed a Joint Response to FCOP’s Opposition to Motion to Disqualify in support of that disqualification motion. The FCOP Parties objected to that brief and its voluminous new material, including as an “unauthorized ‘reply’ brief by parties who have no standing to bring the [disqualification] motion.” Despite that objection, similar to the one made by the LPFG here, the Court still “read and considered the testimony, via declaration [7-pages] with about 100-pages of exhibits [A through J], filed by Russell McGlothlin [LPFG”] in support of the Joint Response; the “Court decline[d] the invitation to strike the brief ; the LPFG offer no authority for the position that the FCOP Parties cannot file a reply; the LPFG misleadingly characterizes California Rules of Court, rule 3.1113, which refers to a “party filing a motion” only in connection with a supporting memorandum for the motion (Rule of Court 3.1113, subd. (a)) and not in connection with a reply (id., subd. (d). The FCOP Parties filed a joinder indicating that they join in the Fox Canyon GMA’s position that C.C.P. section 916 automatically stays the Final Judgment in light of the pending appeals. Neither the joinder nor the Reply to Joint Opposition to Fox Canyon Groundwater Management Agency’s Motion to Confirm Stay Pending Appeal (“Reply”) seek separate or additional relief against the LPFG or other parties, and there is no prejudice to them. Cases such as Frazee v. Seely (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 627, and Lerma v. County of Orange (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 709, are inapplicable, as they do involve requests for separate relief (summary judgment in favor of an additional party). The FCOP Parties’ joinder is proper and not barred as untimely. The Court may not reject the FCOP Parties’ Joinder as untimely; California Rule of Court, rule 3.1300, subdivision (d) states, “No paper may be rejected for filing on the ground that it was untimely submitted for filing.” The rule is unequivocal. The Court may not “strike” the FCOP Parties’ joinder on the ground it is untimely, and LPFG invites the Court’s own error by making the request. To the extent there is any concern about the timeliness of any joinder, the proper remedy is to provide additional time for an adequate response, if the LPFG requests it. The Motion to Strike violates the Rules of Court; in yet another example of the inconsistent adherence to rules, even as the LPFG and others complain that the FCOP Parties filed a joinder in violation of the deadlines set forth in C.C.P. section 1005, subdivision (b), their own Motion and Request to Strike fail to meet the same deadlines. The LPFG did not apply, ex parte or otherwise, for an order shortening time, with their earlier Motion to Strike filed only eight court days before the hearing.

On Monday 9/11/23 Defendant DNWC [via Barbara Brenner] filed a Response to Settling Parties’ Motion to Strike DNWC’s Joinder to Fox Canyon Groundwater Management Agencies Motion to Stay and Joint Response and Request to Strike the FCOP Parties Reply and DNWC’s Joinder ISO Fox Canyon Groundwater Management Agency’s Motion to Confirm Stay Opening Appeal; [via Barbara Brenner]; summarized; this underlying adjudication is a special proceeding governed by CCP sections 830 et seq. with the express purpose of resolving all disputes between the parties with respect to the groundwater adjudication at issue; CCP section 853, the underlying judgment binds all of the parties and their successors, heirs, and assigns; any stay of the judgment in any form would therefore necessarily bind all of the parties, regardless of whether they formally “joined” a motion or not; in an abundance of caution, DNWC filed its notice of joinder within one court day of filing its own notice of appeal; DNWC could not have filed its notice of joinder sooner; by the time DNWC filed its notice of appeal, these stay proceedings were already initiated; Settling Parties can point to no authority except for Lerma v. County of Orange (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 709 (“Lerma”) and Frazee v. Seely (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 627 (“Frazee”) for their proposition that DNWC’s joinder was “untimely;” these decisions are distinguishable because they deal with particularized rules on summary judgment and involve situations where the joining party is seeking separate affirmative relief; DNWC seeks no such separate or additional relief; this Court is tasked with making the fundamental determination of whether the judgment is “mandatory” versus “prohibitory” for purposes of determining whether the automatic stay applies; it promotes judicial economy with no prejudice to the Settling Parties to allow DNWC to join in the stay motion of aligned parties, especially since DNWC’s joinder adds no new facts, law or argument; if the Court is inclined to strictly apply the provisions of CCP section 1005, subdivision (b) to DNWC’s joinder notice, an obvious solution is for the Court to continue the September 13 hearing and allow multiple separate motions for stay; this alternative is contrary to the principles of judicial economy as adopted by the legislature and codified in CCP section 830 et seq. DNWC herein adopts and incorporates the law and argument advanced in the FCOP Parties’ Opposition filed with the Court on this date; DNWC’s Notice of Joinder is not untimely; the CRC, rule 3.1300, subdivision (d), do not permit the Court to refuse to accept late-filed papers. Nonetheless, the Settling Parties have not demonstrated that DNWC’s notice of joinder was untimely. DNWC filed its notice of joinder as soon as it reasonably could – within one court day of filing its own notice of appeal of the final judgment. These stay proceedings were already underway when DNWC filed its appeal.

The Settling Parties fail to cite any particular rule that a party seeking to join a motion to confirm an automatic stay on appeal is required to follow the notice and service rules of CCP 1005, subdivision (b), as the Settling Parties argue in their motions to strike. The cases cited by the Settling Parties for this premise – Lerma, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 719, and Frazee, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 636 – are distinguishable. Both cases deal with a co-defendant’s joinder in a motion for summary judgment, which proscribes very specific law and motion requirements, and the joining defendants in those cases sought affirmative relief as well; a prohibitory injunction is not stayed pending appeal, while a mandatory injunction is stayed. The position that the judgment is mandatory versus discretionary for purposes of application of the automatic stay provisions of CCP section 916 must be addressed; the judgment requires DNWC to relinquish water rights that it has operated under for decades. The final judgment here was issued in a “special proceeding” for the adjudication of groundwater rights pursuant to CCP sections 830 et seq. Section 830, subdivision (c) further provides that “[t]he other provisions of this code apply to procedures in a comprehensive adjudication to the extent they do not conflict with the provisions of this chapter.” There is no strict rule on joinder that DNWC is aware of, and imposition of such a rule here would be contrary to a timely, efficient, and comprehensive adjudication of water rights. There is no violation of due process here, because DNWC has not raised any new or different issues but merely joined the arguments of others. Whatever the outcome of the pending motions, DNWC will be bound by it. If the judgment by law applies to everyone, party or otherwise, then a stay of that judgment applies to everyone, whether or not joined or timely joined; DNWC would seek a discretionary stay pursuant to CCP sections 918 and/or 923 were the judgment not automatically stayed, resulting in multiple motions on the same matter; it defeats common sense and the interests of judicial economy to require DNWC to file a wholly separate motion [either to the pending motions to confirm availability of the automatic stay or any subsequent motion for imposition of a discretionary stay], although DNWC is willing to do so should the Court require it. Pursuant to CRC, rule 3.1300, subdivision (d), “[n]o paper may be rejected for filing on the ground that it was untimely submitted for filing.” The court may not “strike” DNWC’s joinder on the ground it is untimely. Regardless, this Court is required to make two fundamental decisions at the outset of multiple underlying appeals: (a) whether the judgment qualifies as a mandatory or prohibitory order for purposes of the automatic stay provision of CCP section 916; and (b) whether a stay should be issued in the event the automatic stay provision does not govern the judgment. If the Court finds the Settling Parties would be prejudiced in any way, the solution is to continue the hearing date on the motion to confirm stay and permit DNWC to file a separate motion to confirm stay, or in the alternative, for a discretionary stay. The only prejudice articulated by the Settling Parties’ motions to strike DNWC’s joinders is to the effect that they have “followed the rules” and DNWC has not. No cognizable “prejudice” is alleged; there is none. DNWC is not adding any new claims, defense, facts, allegations or legal arguments to the motion for stay which it is joining, nor is DNWC seeking affirmative relief. The Settling Parties themselves have filed their motions to strike in violation of the deadlines set forth in CCP section 1005, subdivision (b), eight court days before the hearing, while demanding strict adherence to those rules by other parties. The argument is self-defeating. Based upon the foregoing, DNWC requests that the Court exercise its broad discretion to hear and consider DNWC’s joinder to the pending stay motion, or in the alternative, that the Court continue the stay proceedings of September 13, 2023 to enable the parties to file noticed motion briefing.

The Court’s Conclusion

The Settling Parties Joint Response and Request to Strike the FCOP Parties’ Reply and DNWC’s Joinder ISO Fox Canyon Groundwater Management Agency’s Motion to Confirm Pending Appeal, and [Amended Proposed] Order Denying Fox Canyon Groundwater Management Agency’s Motion to Confirm Stay Pending Appeal are accurate; persuasive; acceptable. They should be GRANTED.