Matter of the Robinson Family Trust

Case Number

25PR00256

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 07/02/2025 - 08:30

Nature of Proceedings

Petition to Determine Claim to Real Property

Tentative Ruling

Probate Notes:

Appearances required. 

Any Respondents desirous to object must file a written objection before the next hearing.  The court has authority to require all objectors to file a written objection pursuant CRC, Rule 7.801, or else deem the failure to do so a waiver. 

The merits of this petition are not governed by Estate of Heggstad as cited by petitioner. In Estate of Heggstad, the real property at issue “was listed as item No. 5 on schedule A” and “remained in decedent's name, as an unmarried man, and there was no grant deed reconveying this property to himself as trustee of the revocable living trust.”  (Estate of Heggstad (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 943, 946.)  On those very specific facts, the Court of Appeal held “the written document declaring a trust in the property described in Schedule A was signed by the decedent at the time he made the declaration and constitutes a proper manifestation of his intent to create a trust.” (Id. at p. 948.) 

The Court of Appeal reached this conclusion after reviewing section 40 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, which is the Statute of Frauds, and reasoning:

Additionally, comment b to section 40 (statute of frauds) establishes that a written declaration of trust, by itself, is sufficient to create a trust in the property. Comment b states: “Methods of creation of trust. The Statute of Frauds is applicable whether a trust of an interest in land is created by the owner's declaring himself trustee, or by a transfer by him to another in trust.” (Second emphasis added.)

(Id. at p. 949.)  Thus, the Court of Appeal reached the holding in Heggstad by tethering the specific facts of that case to the governing law on satisfying the writing requirement of the Statute of Frauds.  Specifically, the Court of Appeal found that the entry of the subject property on schedule A of the Trust satisfied the writing requirement.

In contrast, the allegations and evidence in this case are starkly different than those in Estate of Heggstad. Unlike the schedule A of that case, Petitioner admits the subject property in this case is personal property, not real property as was at issue in Heggstad. Therefore, the Petition is not a “Heggstad” Petition, because it is not governed by the very specific precedent in Estate of Heggstad.

Unlike real property that requires a writing and adequate description in order to transfer it into a trust (Estate of Heggstad (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 943, 948), all that is required to transfer personal property into a trust is a general written statement evincing the settlor’s intent to transfer that property into the trust (Kucker v. Kucker (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 90, 94), or clear and convincing evidence an oral trust was created (Prob. Code,§ 15207).  A general statement is sufficient to consider all personal property a trust asset.  (Kucker v. Kucker (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 90, 95 [“There is no California authority invalidating a transfer of shares of stock to a trust because a general assignment of personal property did not identify the shares. Nor should there be.”].)

As in Kucker v. Kucker, the Robinsons executed the subject trust and declared themselves trustees (Pet., at ex A, dig. P. 8.).  As in Kucker v. Kucker, the Robinsons made a general statement that the subject personal property at issue (i.e. brokerage accounts) was property of the trust, but failed to transfer title to the subject trust. Accordingly, the Court should confirm the subject property a trust asset and grant the petition on the grounds stated in Kucker, not Heggstad.