Matter of Ronald A Knowles Declaration of Trust

Case Number

25PR00021

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Thu, 05/08/2025 - 09:00

Nature of Proceedings

1) Demurrer; 2) Mtn for Statutory Preference; 3) Mtn to Obtain Copy of SBSD Report and Blood Samples Obtained from Decedent; 4) Mtn to Compel Compliance (Dr. Frawley); 5) Mtn to Compel Compliance (Dr. Early); 6) Mtn to Quash; 7) Pet to Det Validity of Tr

Tentative Ruling

The demurrer of respondent David Richard Olivera to the petition of petitioner Kathleen Tingle is overruled.

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Background:

On January 14, 2025, petitioner Kathleen Tingle filed a verified petition against respondent David Richard Olivera (Olivera), alleging seven causes of action: (1) lack of testamentary capacity; (2) undue influence; (3) financial elder abuse; (4) interference with inheritance; (5) breach of trust/fiduciary duties; (6) constructive trust; and (7) declaratory relief. In the petition, petitioner seeks orders determining the validity of a trust amendment, directing a conveyance of property, and authorizing the recovery of enhanced remedies and relief for a breach of trust. (Pet., p. 1, l. 25-p. 2, l. 2.) As alleged in the petition:

Petitioner is the sister of Ronald A. Knowles (decedent), who died on November 2, 2024. (Pet., ¶¶ 2 & 4.) At the time of his death, decedent was 77 years of age and unmarried. (Pet., ¶¶ 2-3.) Decedent was preceded in death by his sons, Christopher Knowles (Christopher) and Ronald A. Knowles, Jr., and is survived by his daughter and petitioner. (Pet., ¶¶ 3-4.) (Note: The court refers to Christopher by his first name to avoid confusion due to common familial surnames. No disrespect is intended.)

Since 2006, decedent had numerous health problems, including cardiopulmonary issues and Stage 4 throat cancer which caused decedent to be, in the time period after his cancer treatment, in constant pain and discomfort, among other things. (Pet., ¶¶ 9-10.) As of January 2012, decedent was unable to provide for his health and personal needs due to his health issues and needed assistance. (Pet., ¶ 11.) Christopher, who is decedent’s youngest son to whom decedent was extremely close, provided the majority of decedent’s in-home care and assistance. (Pet., ¶ 12.) Decedent relied heavily upon, and often expressed that he would not have been able to manage and cope without, Christopher’s assistance. (Ibid.)

On December 14, 2017, decedent established a “Declaration of Trust” (the Trust) which named decedent as trustee, and named Christopher as successor trustee in the event decedent failed or ceased to act as trustee. (Pet., ¶ 8 & Exh. 1.) To the extent Christopher was unable or unwilling to serve, petitioner was appointed to serve as successor trustee of the Trust. (Ibid.)

In February 2018, Christopher committed suicide. (Pet., ¶ 13.) The loss of Christopher left decedent distraught, despondent, desperate for companionship, unable to concentrate or interact with other people, and in a constant state of anxiety, depression, despair, and hopelessness. (Ibid.) Decedent’s health and emotional well-being rapidly deteriorated, leaving decedent with considerable difficulty in managing his medical, personal, and financial affairs, and highly susceptible to and unable to resist fraud and undue influence. (Pet., ¶¶ 13-14.)

In the years following Christopher’s death, petitioner and decedent had a number of discussions in which decedent expressed his love and gratitude for petitioner, and confided to petitioner that when decedent passed, she would inherit his entire estate including the family residence. (Pet., ¶ 19.)

Olivera entered decedent’s life shortly after Christopher’s death and gradually began to take the place of Christopher, who was similar in age and physical appearance to Olivera. (Pet., ¶ 15.) Olivera had financial debts and liabilities, including tax liens in excess of $60,000 which were recorded between 2005 and 2018, and an unlawful detainer judgment in excess of $20,000 which was entered in 2005. (Pet., ¶20.)

Between March and December 2018, Olivera, with whom decedent had little to no relationship prior to February 2018, assumed the role of decedent’s caregiver. (Pet., ¶ 16.) Decedent provided Olivera with remuneration during the time period following Christopher’s death, in recognition of the caregiving services provided by Olivera. (Pet., ¶ 17.)

On December 6, 2018, decedent purportedly executed a “First Amendment” to the Trust, which removed petitioner and inserted Olivera as successor trustee and sole beneficiary of the Trust. (Pet., ¶ 18 & Exh. 2.) Upon decedent’s death, Olivera assumed the role of successor trustee and has served in that capacity since November 2, 2024. (Pet., ¶ 25.) Upon assuming the role of successor trustee, Olivera immediately began to transfer decedent’s financial accounts, assets, and personal property to himself. (Ibid.)

On December 3, 2024, Olivera recorded a grant deed under which he took title to real property of decedent commonly known as 1821 La Coronilla, Santa Barbara, California. (Pet., ¶ 25 & Exh. 3.) On December 15, 2024, Olivera served a “Notification” pursuant to Probate Code section 16061.7. (Pet., ¶ 26 & Exh. 4.)

Petitioner believes that Olivera insinuated himself into decedent’s life, took advantage of decedent’s infirmities and grief over the loss of Christopher to gain a financial advantage, exerted undue influence to gain decedent’s trust and power over decedent’s affairs, deceived and persuaded decedent to amend the Trust to make Olivera the successor trustee, and arranged for decedent to execute the First Amendment by tricking decedent into believing Olivera would only serve as successor trustee and would look after and protect petitioner. (Pet., ¶¶ 21-24.)

On March 20, 2025, Olivera filed a demurrer to the petition on the grounds that the petition is uncertain, and fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer is opposed by petitioner.

Analysis:

An interested party such as Olivera “may file a demurrer to a petition under the Probate Code ‘at or before the hearing.’ [Citations.]” (Goebner v. Superior Court (Apr. 30, 2025, A171241) ___ Cal.Rptr.3d ___ [2025 WL 1244451, *2].) “ ‘The rules by which the sufficiency of a complaint is tested against a general demurrer are well settled. We not only treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but also ‘give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.’ ” (Zhang v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 364, 370, internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) “If the complaint states a cause of action under any theory, regardless of the title under which the factual basis for relief is stated, that aspect of the complaint is good against a demurrer.” (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38.)

The demurrer of Olivera is presented in effectively two parts. The first part, or “Part II”, is directed to what Olivera describes as the “causes of action pursuant to Probate Code §§17200(b), 850, et seq. and 16420”. (Demurrer at p. 7, ll. 24-26.), The second part, which includes Parts III through VI, is directed to what Olivera describes as the “remaining causes of action … that reference statutory sections” other than the Probate Code. (Demurrer at p. 7, ll. 26-28.) For ease of reference, the court will address the points advanced in the demurrer by reference to its separate parts.

(1) Part II

In Part II of the demurrer, Olivera contends that the “opening unnumbered paragraph” of the petition references causes of action pursuant to Probate Code sections 850, 856, 859, and 16420, but does not contain “any basis for such request” other than the allegations of paragraphs 50 through 54, and prayer paragraphs 6 and 7, which appear on pages 12 through 13 and 15. (Demurrer at p. 8 [Part II(a)].)

The Probate Code sections referenced in the opening paragraph of the petition and described above contain procedural requirements, and, where appropriate, authorize the entry of appropriate orders and the imposition of various remedies.

For example, Probate Code section 850 describes persons who “may file a petition requesting that the court make an order under” Part 19 of Division 2 of the Probate Code, and requires that the petition “set forth facts upon which the claim is based.” (Prob. Code, § 850, subds. (a)-(b).) Similarly, Probate Code section 16420 sets forth the purposes for which a beneficiary or cotrustee of a trust may commence a proceeding in circumstances where a trustee commits or threatens to commit a breach of trust. (Prob. Code, § 16420, subd. (a).)

Probate Code section 856, also referenced in the opening paragraph, requires the court to “make an order authorizing and directing the personal representative or other fiduciary, or the person having title to or possession of the property, to execute a conveyance or transfer to the person entitled thereto, or granting other appropriate relief[]” in circumstances where the court is satisfied that the order described in that section should be made. (Prob. Code, § 856.) Probate Code section 859 authorizes, among other remedies, the recovery of “twice the value of property recovered” in circumstances involving a bad faith wrongful taking. (Prob. Code, § 856.)

“[A] demurrer cannot rightfully be sustained … to a particular type of damage or remedy.” (Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1047.) For this reason, to the extent the demurrer is directed to the opening paragraph of the petition in which petitioner seeks orders or the imposition of remedies authorized under the Probate Code sections described above, the court will overrule the demurrer.

Part II of the demurrer is also directed to a request for the appointment of a successor trustee which appears in the title or caption page of the petition. (Demurrer at p. 10 [Part II(f)].) The same analysis and reasoning apply. To the extent the demurrer is directed to this request, the court will overrule the demurrer.

In Part II of the demurrer, Olivera also addresses what the court understands to refer to allegations appearing in the first cause of action which is labeled “lack of testamentary capacity”. (See Demurrer at p. 8.) Olivera contends that the petition does not allege any basis for this “request” apart from allegations regarding decedent’s physical health. (Ibid.)

In the first cause of action, petitioner alleges that, at the time decedent executed the First Amendment, he “was not of sound and dipositive mind” and did not have sufficient mental capacity to understand the nature of his actions, or to understand or recollect the nature of his property or relations with family members. (Pet., ¶ 29.)

Under Probate Code sections 810 through 812, the “capacity to do a variety of acts, including to contract, make a will, or execute a trust, must be evaluated by a person’s ability to appreciate the consequences of the particular act he or she wishes to take.” (Andersen v. Hunt (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 722, 730, original italics.) A reasonable interpretation of the first cause of action shows that petitioner seeks a judicial determination that decedent lacked capacity to execute the First Amendment described above and in the petition, notwithstanding whether decedent’s capacity is determined under the standards set forth in Probate Code sections 810 through 812 or section 6100.5. (Ibid.)

The same analysis and reasoning apply. For all reasons discussed above, the demurrer to the first cause of action, in which petitioner effectively requests a judicial determination of decedent’s capacity to execute the First Amendment, is without merit. Moreover, the court is not, for present purposes, concerned with petitioner’s ability to prove allegations relating to decedent’s lack of capacity at the time he executed the First Amendment. (Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Boyle (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1034.) For these and all reasons discussed above, to the extent the demurrer is directed to the first cause of action alleged in the petition and described above, the court will overrule the demurrer.

Part II of the demurrer is also directed to the second cause of action which is labeled “undue influence”. (Demurrer at pp. 8-9.) Olivera contends that the allegations of this cause of action include conclusions of fact and law which Olivera contends are false and improper because, according to Olivera, the debts and tax liens described in the petition were cleared or released, and because Christopher facilitated a long time friendship between decedent and Olivera, among other things.

Facts alleged in the petition are, for present purposes, “deemed to be true, however improbable they may be.” (Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604.) For these reasons, to the extent Olivera demurs to the second cause of action on the grounds that the allegations are false, the demurrer is without merit.

In addition, any defects must appear on the face of the petition or matters that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The information included in the memorandum supporting the demurrer and described above, which does not appear in the petition and which is offered by Olivera to challenge the truth of allegations regarding tax and other liens and Olivera’s relationship with decedent, may not be considered on demurrer. (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881 [error for court to consider facts asserted in memorandum supporting demurrer].)

Furthermore, “[u]ndue influence is pressure brought to bear directly on the testamentary act, sufficient to overcome the testator’s free will, amounting in effect to coercion destroying the testator’s free agency. [Citations.] [¶] Although a person challenging the testamentary instrument ordinarily bears the burden of proving undue influence [citation], [courts] have held that a presumption of undue influence, shifting the burden of proof, arises upon the challenger’s showing that (1) the person alleged to have exerted undue influence had a confidential relationship with the testator; (2) the person actively participated in procuring the instrument’s preparation or execution; and (3) the person would benefit unduly by the testamentary instrument.” (Rice v. Clark (2002) 28 Cal.4th 89, 96-97.)

Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.70 defines undue influence as “excessive persuasion that causes another person to act or refrain from acting by overcoming that person’s free will and results in inequity.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.70, subd. (a).) Probate Code section 86, which is intended to “supplement the common law meaning of undue influence”, incorporates this definition of undue influence. (Prob. Code, § 86.)

Apart from the contentions further discussed above, Olivera offers no reasoned argument to show why the petition fails to state facts sufficient to give rise to a presumption of undue influence. Therefore, for these and all reasons further discussed above, the court will overrule the demurrer to the second cause of action for undue influence.

Part II of the demurrer also includes a challenge to petitioner’s request for an accounting, which appears in the title or caption page of the petition and which Olivera asserts is made under Probate Code section 17200. Olivera contends that this request is improper because the petition does not allege a basis for an accounting other than in paragraph 53, in which petitioner contends that Olivera has refused multiple requests to provide an accounting under Probate Code section 17200. Olivera further contends that an action for an accounting is not available under the circumstances present here because petitioner is not an actual trust beneficiary, and has failed to allege that 60 days have passed since any written request was made.

Probate Code section 17200 authorizes a trustee or beneficiary of a trust to petition the court “concerning the internal affairs of the trust or to determine the existence of the trust.” (Prob. Code, § 17200, subd. (a).) “Proceedings concerning the internal affairs of a trust include” those described under Probate Code section 17200, subdivision (b)(1) through (23). Under subdivision (b)(7), the petition may seek to compel a trustee to “[a]ccount to the beneficiary … if the trustee has failed to submit a requested account within 60 days after written request of the beneficiary and no account has been made within six months preceding the request.” (Prob. Code, § 17200, subd. (b)(7)(C).)

As noted by Olivera, the petition expressly alleges that Olivera has refused multiple requests to provide an accounting under Probate Code section 17200, subdivision (b)(7). This allegation may be reasonably read to aver that Oliver has failed to submit a requested account within 60 days after a request by petitioner. These allegations do not show on their face that any request of petitioner for an account was verbal or not written. Moreover, to the extent the allegations of the petition are in some respects uncertain as to the requests allegedly made by petitioner, these “ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)

As to Olivera’s contention that petitioner is not a beneficiary of the Trust, “claims that trust provisions or amendments are the product of incompetence, undue influence, or fraud, as is alleged here, should be decided by the probate court, if the invalidity of those provisions or amendments would render the challenger a beneficiary of the trust. [Citations]. So when a plaintiff claims to be a rightful beneficiary of a trust if challenged amendments are deemed invalid, she has standing to petition the probate court under section 17200.” (Barefoot v. Jennings (2020) 8 Cal.5th 822, 828 (Barefoot).)

As further detailed above, the petition alleges that the First Amendment is invalid due to decedent’s lack of capacity and Olivera’s undue influence, and that petitioner is the sole beneficiary of the Trust. (Pet., ¶¶ 18-19, 26, 29, 32, 38, 42, 47, 58 & Prayer, ¶¶ 1-2.) These allegations are sufficient to show that petitioner has an interest in the Trust based on the purported invalidity of the First Amendment. (Barefoot, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 828.) Therefore, to the extent the demurrer is directed to petitioner’s request for an accounting under Probate Code section 17200, the court will, for these and all further reasons discussed above, overrule the demurrer.

(2) Parts III through VI

Part III of the demurrer is directed to the third cause of action for financial elder abuse alleged in the petition. Olivera contends that petitioner lacks standing to commence or maintain an action for financial elder abuse because any cause of action under Welfare and Institutes Code section 15673.2, subdivision (d), passes only to a personal representative of the decedent. Welf. & Inst. Code §15657.3(d). For this reason, Oliver argues, petitioner lacks standing to assert a claim of financial elder abuse.

Welfare and Institutions Code section 15600 et seq. (the Elder Abuse Act) affords claims and remedies to victims of elder adult abuse for the express purpose of enabling “interested persons to engage attorneys to take up the cause of abused elderly persons and dependent adults.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15600, subd. (j); Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Center (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1283.) “In the event of the victim’s death, the cause of action survives, in which case it is or becomes a survivor action pursued by the personal representative of the estate or the decedent’s successor in interest on the decedent’s behalf.” (Id. at p. 1284, original italics.)

Relevant here, section 15657.3 of the Elder Abuse Act provides that, “after the death of the elder or dependent adult, the right to commence or maintain an action shall pass to the personal representative of the decedent.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657.3, subd. (d)(1).) Assuming without deciding that the allegations of the petition show that petitioner is not decedent’s personal representative, the Elder Abuse Act further provides that “[i]f the personal representative refuses to commence or maintain an action …, the persons described in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) of paragraph (1) shall have standing to commence or maintain an action for elder abuse.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657.3, subd. (d)(2).) These persons include “[a]n intestate heir whose interest is affected by the action”, the successor in interest of the decedent as that term is defined in Probate Code section 377.11, or an “interested person” as that term is defined in Probate Code section 48. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657.3, subd. (d)()(1)(A)-(C).)

The petition alleges that petitioner is decedent’s sister and, to the extent the First Amendment is deemed invalid, an intestate heir or sole beneficiary of the Trust. These facts are sufficient, for pleading purposes, to show that petitioner is a person “having a property right in or claim against a trust estate or the estate of a decedent which may be affected by the proceeding.” (Prob. Code, § 48, subd. (a)(2).) For these reasons, the petition alleges facts sufficient to show that petitioner has standing to bring a claim for financial elder abuse under the Elder Abuse Act. (Asaro v. Maniscalco (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 717, 726.)

Olivera also contends that the third cause of action for financial elder abuse is time barred under Welfare and Institutions Code 15657.7, which requires that an action for financial abuse of an elder be commenced “within four years after the plaintiff discovers or, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered, the facts constituting the financial abuse.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657.7.) Because the petition alleges that the purported financial abuse of decedent occurred between December 2017 and December 2018, Olivera argues, the limitations period expired in December 2022.

“A demurrer based on a statute of limitations will not lie where the action may be, but is not necessarily, barred. [Citation.] In order for the bar of the statute of limitations to be raised by demurrer, the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough that the complaint shows that the action may be barred.” (Marshall v. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1403.) “If the dates establishing the running of the statute of limitations do not clearly appear in the complaint, there is no ground for general demurrer. The proper remedy ‘is to ascertain the factual basis of the contention through discovery and, if necessary, file a motion for summary judgment ….’ [Citation.]” (Roman v. County of Los Angeles (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 316, 324-325, italics omitted.)

Wholly absent from the petition are any facts which show, expressly or by inference, when petitioner discovered or should have discovered facts constituting Olivera’s alleged financial abuse of decedent. Further, the allegations of the petition may be reasonably read to allege that petitioner did not discover facts constituting the financial abuse of decedent until, at the earliest, November 2, 2024, when Olivera assumed the role of successor trustee.

Even if the court were to assume without deciding that the petition includes allegations which are sufficient to show that the cause of action for financial elder abuse might be barred (and the court does not find that it does), the petition does not, for reasons further discussed above, clearly or affirmatively show that petitioner discovered or should have discovered the purported financial elder abuse of decedent by December 2022 as Olivera appears to suggest, or that the action was not brought within the time prescribed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.7.

For all reasons discussed above, the petition alleges facts sufficient to show that petitioner has standing to maintain a claim for the financial abuse of an elder (here, decedent), and that the claim was timely commenced. Therefore, the court will overrule the demurrer to the third cause of action for financial elder abuse.

Part IV of the demurrer is directed to the fourth cause of action for interference with inheritance. Olivera contends that claims for interference with inheritance are not recognized as a separate and distinct cause of action.

Code of Civil Procedure section 366.3 recognizes “a claim that arises from a promise or agreement with a decedent to distribution from an estate or trust or under another instrument, whether the promise or agreement was made orally or in writing,” and, subject to exception, requires an action to enforce that claim to be “commenced within one year after the date of death….” (Code Civ. Proc., § 366.3, subd. (a).) The tort of intentional interference with expected inheritance is recognized in California “if it is necessary to afford an injured plaintiff a remedy.” (Beckwith v. Dahl (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1056.) For these reasons, the court will overrule the demurrer to the fourth cause of action for interference with inheritance.

In Parts V and VI of the demurrer, Olivera contends that there is no basis for the constructive trust alleged in the sixth cause of action of the petition, and that the seventh cause of action improperly seeks to remedy or execute past and not prospective rights which, according to Olivera, is an insufficient ground for declaratory relief.

The sixth cause of action on its face seeks the imposition of a constructive trust under Civil Code section 2224. (Pet., ¶¶ 55-56.) A constructive trust is not an independent cause of action but an equitable remedy which is “dependent upon a substantive basis for liability….” (Glue-Fold, Inc. v. Slautterback Corp. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1023, fn. 3.)

The same analysis and reasoning apply. (See also Woodley v. Woodley (1941) 47 Cal.App.2d 188, 190-191 [a pleading is good against a general demurrer “if it pleads facts sufficient to show that the pleader is entitled to some equitable relief”].) As the court will overrule the demurrer to the causes of action alleged in the petition, and as the demurrer to the sixth cause of action is directed to a type of remedy, the court will, for all reasons further discussed above, overrule the demurrer to the sixth cause of action for constructive trust.

As to the seventh cause of action for declaratory relief, where a pleading alleges “an existing actual controversy” which entitles the pleader to declaratory relief, the court “should not sustain a demurrer to the complaint and dismiss the action. ‘It is not essential to entitle a plaintiff to seek declaratory relief, that he should establish his right to a favorable declaration.’ [Citation.] Even ‘where the plaintiff is not entitled to a favorable declaration, the court should render a judgment embodying such determination and should not merely dismiss the action.’ [Citation.]” (C. Dudley De Velbiss Co. v. Kraintz (1951) 101 Cal.App.2d 612, 615-616.)

For all reasons discussed above, the petition alleges facts which are sufficient to demonstrate an actual controversy between petitioner and Olivera with respect to the claims and causes of action further discussed above, including as to the validity of the First Amendment. Further, the demurrer is not an appropriate method to test the merits of petitioner’s declaratory relief cause of action, considering that petitioner is “entitled to a declaration of rights even if it is adverse to [petitioner’s] interest.” (Qualified Patients Assn. v. City of Anaheim (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 734, 756, internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) Therefore, and for all reasons further discussed above, the court will overrule Olivera’s demurrer to the seventh cause of action for declaratory relief.

(3) Special Demurrer

Olivera specially demurs to the petition on the ground that it is uncertain, ambiguous, and unintelligible. A party may object by special demurrer on the grounds that the subject pleading is uncertain. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).) “ ‘[U]ncertain’ includes ambiguous and unintelligible.” (Smith v. Kern County Land Co. (1958) 51 Cal.2d 205, 209.) “A special demurrer on the ground that [a pleading] is (a) ambiguous, (b) unintelligible, or (c) uncertain is insufficient unless the demurrer points out specifically wherein the pleading is ambiguous, uncertain or unintelligible.” (Coons v. Thompson (1946) 75 Cal.App.2d 687, 690.)

Noted above, Olivera includes in the demurrer a general description of the claims and causes of action alleged in the petition, including as to the nature of petitioner’s claim regarding the validity of the Trust and invalidity of the First Amendment, and allegations which Olivera contends are false. Olivera’s recitation of these allegations indicates that the petition is not so unintelligible or ambiguous that Olivera cannot understand the issues or the nature of the claims alleged by petitioner, or so incomprehensible that Olivera cannot reasonably respond. (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245 [“a plaintiff is required only to set forth the essential facts of his case with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficient to acquaint a defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action”]; Morris v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 279, 292.)

Furthermore, to the extent the allegations of the petition are in some respects uncertain as to a particular remedy or order sought by petitioner, these issues can, for reasons further discussed above, be clarified during discovery.

For all reasons discussed above, the facts constituting each cause of action are alleged in the petition with reasonable precision, in a manner that is sufficient to enable Olivera to reasonably respond to these allegations. (Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Ins. Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841, 848, fn. 3.) Therefore, the court will overrule Olivera’s special demurrer on the grounds that the petition is uncertain, ambiguous, or unintelligible.