Holly Leigh Martyn vs John E Price et al

Case Number

25CV04780

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 11/07/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

OSC: Preliminary Injunction

Tentative Ruling

(1) For all reasons discussed herein, the application of plaintiff Holly Leigh Martyn for a preliminary injunction is granted to enjoin defendants John E. Price and Janna Price, co-Trustees of The Price Living Trust Dated September 28, 2007, defendants David E. Chambers and Maureen E. Chambers, defendant Pacific Heights Acquisitions, LLC, defendants Michael Jay Paveloff and Sherri Anne Paveloff, and defendant Ma’an Nasir, from entering plaintiff’s property located at 1130 Barger Canyon Road, Santa Barbara, California, and drilling any water wells (whether termed “replacement” or otherwise), or reopening any wells on plaintiff’s property, near or inside the water well termed by plaintiff as the “Abandoned Well” and by defendants as “Well 3”, only. The application is denied in all other respects.

(2) On or before November 14, 2025, plaintiff shall serve and present for the court’s review and signature, a proposed order that conforms to the court’s ruling herein, with an undertaking in the amount described herein.

(3) The temporary restraining order entered on August 8, 2025, shall remain in effect in effect as to the injunction granted herein, only, during the time allowed for presentation of the proposed order and undertaking described in this ruling, and will continue to remain in effect thereafter until the written order of injunction is signed and entered by the court, provided that the proposed order and required undertaking are timely filed by plaintiff in accordance with this ruling. The temporary restraining order is vacated in all other respects.

Background:

On August 1, 2025, plaintiff Holly Leigh Martyn (Martyn) filed a verified complaint against defendants John E. Price (J Price) and Janna Price (collectively, the Prices), co-Trustees of The Price Living Trust Dated September 28, 2007; David E. Chambers (D Chambers) and Maureen E. Chambers (collectively, the Chambers); Pacific Heights Acquisitions, LLC, (Pacific Heights); Michael Jay Paveloff (M Paveloff) and Sherri Anne Paveloff (collectively, the Paveloffs); and Ma’an Nasir (Nasir) (collectively, defendants), alleging seven causes of action: (1) quite title; (2) declaratory relief; (3) declaratory relief – Water Code section 7005; (4) contribution – Water Code section 7002; (5) trespass – for removal of unpermitted antennae; (6) private nuisance (against the Prices, the Chambers, and the Paveloffs only); and (7) trespass to land (against the Paveloffs only). Briefly, as alleged in the complaint:

Martyn owns real property located at 1130 Barger Canyon Road in Barbara, California (the “Martyn Property”). (Compl., ¶ 1.) The Martyn Property was created by the filing of Parcel Map No 10977 with the County Recorder on January 14, 1969. (Compl., ¶ 18 & Exh. 8.)

The Prices own the real property located at 1550 La Vista Road (the Parcel A Price Property). (Compl., ¶ 6.) The Chambers own Assessor’s Parcel Number 153-370-010 (the Chambers Property). (Compl., ¶ 7.) Pacific Heights owns the real property located at 1556 La Vista Road (the Parcel B Pacific Heights Property). (Compl., ¶ 8.) The Paveloffs own real property located at 1560 La Vista Road (the Parcel C Paveloff Property). (Compl., ¶ 9.) Nasir owns real property located at 1455 La Vista Road (the Parcel D Nasir Property). (Compl., ¶ 10.) These properties, to which the court refers collectively as the “Defendant Properties”, are located uphill from the Martyn Property. (Compl., ¶ 2, 14-15 & 40.)

The Parcel A Price Property, the Parcel B Pacific Heights Property, the Parcel C Paveloff Property, and the Parcel D Nasir Property, which Martyn also refers to as the “La Vista Properties”, were created on May 26, 1982, by the recording of Parcel Map No. 12,137 with the County Clerk Recorder of Santa Barbara County on May 26, 1982. (Compl., ¶ 16 & Exh. 7.)

The Chambers Property is vacant land. (Compl., ¶ 7 & Exh. 3.)

The Martyn Property is served by the Goleta Water District. (Compl., ¶ 17.) Though the Parcel A Price Property and the Parcel D Nasir Property have water accounts with the Goleta Water District, the Prices and Nasir assert that they are not connected to and do not use water from this district. (Ibid.)

There exist three wells on the Martyn Property to which defendants claim ownership and purported easement and access rights. (Compl., ¶¶ 19, 21, 30-31.) These wells collect and supply water from the Martyn Property through a pipeline to the Paveloff Property, where the water is stored in a tank and distributed to the Defendant Properties. (Compl., ¶¶ 2, 21, 28, 31 & 40-41.) The Paveloffs are the only parties physically connected by a pipeline to these three wells, and the only parties taking water from the only well still in operation as described below. (Compl., ¶ 40.)

The first or “Upper Well” was installed by the Prices or the Chambers within the purported easement area. (Compl., ¶¶ 19, 21, 30-31.) Heavy rains in 2022 and 2023 caused land around the Upper Well and an adjacent creekbank to collapse. (Compl., ¶ 32.) This collapse resulted in damage to the Upper Well and its related equipment. (Compl., ¶ 33.)

In addition, unstable land within the purported access easement to the Upper Well rendered the Upper Well inaccessible to heavy vehicles and unable to support construction equipment necessary to perform site work in the purported easement area or otherwise make repairs to the Upper Well. (Compl., ¶ 34.) As a result, the Upper Well is not operational or safely accessible, and should be permanently sealed. (Ibid.)

Defendants also own a well referred to as the “Road Well”, which is the only well still in operation and which defendants claim is for domestic water use. (Compl., ¶ 37 & 40.) The Road Well is not permitted, and defendants do not have a valid easement or other right to access the Martyn Property to get to or operate the Road Well. (Ibid.) Defendants also erected an unpermitted antenna at the Road Well which receives signals from the water tank on the Paveloff Property to either pump or stop pumping water. (Compl., ¶ 46.)

The third well (the Abandoned Well) is located north of the Road Well, has not been in operation for almost two decades, and is permanently inactive. (Compl., ¶ 39.) On May 25, 2025, J Price applied for a permit to drill a “replacement” well for multi-parcel, domestic water use near the Abandoned Well, which was suspended by the County of Santa Barbara “ ‘due to owners dispute of easement.’ ” (Compl., ¶¶ 42-44.) J Price has threatened to enter the Martyn Property to drill a new well at the site of the Abandoned Well, although no active permit has been produced to authorize such work. (Compl., ¶ 44.)

Martyn contends that the wells described above, their related facilities, and the alleged related easements burdening the Martyn Property, have been abandoned or extinguished by defendants’ abandonment or nonuse of the wells; by the destruction of the land in the area of these wells rendering them inoperable; by the recording of quitclaim deeds by the Prices, the Chambers, and Nasir, among others; or when the La Vista Properties and the Martyn Property came to be owned by the same party, among other reasons. (Compl., ¶¶ 2, 23-24, 49, 56.)

On October 21, 2025, defendants each and separately filed their verified answers to the complaint. Concurrently, the Prices, Pacific Heights, and Nasir filed a verified cross-complaint against Martyn alleging seven causes of action: (1) quite title to express easements; (2) quiet title to implied easements; (3) quiet title to prescriptive easements; (4) quiet title to equitable easements; (5) declaratory judgment; (6) private nuisance; and (7) interference with easements. The claims alleged in the cross-complaint arise from the purported ownership of, and water rights easements and rights of way in regard to, the Upper Well, the Road Well, and the Abandoned Well.

On August 6, 2025, Plaintiff filed an ex parte application (the Application) for a temporary restraining order and order to show cause re preliminary injunction, restraining or preventing defendants from: (1) entering the Martyn Property and drilling any replacement or other water wells, or reopening any wells, near or inside the Abandoned Well (Injunction Order No. 1); (2) entering the Martyn Property with any vehicles to attempt to access the area of the Upper Well (Injunction Order No. 2); (3) entering the Martyn Property to perform any unpermitted work in relation to any water wells (Injunction Order No. 3); and (4) powering on electricity at the Abandoned Well or Upper Well without first correcting electrical fire hazards with licensed, bonded contractors performing permitted work (Injunction Order No. 4). (Application at p. 2, ¶¶ 1-4.)

In the Application, Martyn states that she purchased the Martyn Property in 2007, and has a single-family home on that property which Martyn’s family has used for almost 20 years. (Martyn Decl., ¶ 1.) The Martyn declaration includes a map, which appears to be the same map depicted in the complaint, showing the Martyn Property outlined in yellow in relation to the Defendant Properties. (Martyn Decl., ¶ 3.)

Martyn asserts that the Road Well is located near the southwestern boundary of the Martyn Property, close to Barger Canyon Road. (Martyn Decl., ¶ 4.) The Abandoned Well, which was present when Martyn purchased the Martyn Property, is located further north and near the western boundary, also close to Barger Canyon Road. (Martyn Decl., ¶¶ 4-5.) The Upper Well, which was also present before Martyn bought the Martyn Property, is located in the northeast section of the Martyn Property, and not near Barger Canyon Road. (Martyn Decl., ¶¶ 4 & 6-7.)

Martyn states that the Upper Well has not operated for more than two years; that Martyn does not remember the Abandoned Well ever operating, or operating any later than 2009; and that only the Road Well operates today. (Martyn Decl., ¶ 5.) Martyn does not know if there is live electrical service at the site of the Abandoned Well. (Ibid.)

Martyn has never submitted to any local government agency a letter of intent to use the Abandoned Well or Upper Well, and is not aware of any such letter being submitted with respect to any well on the Martyn Property that is inactive or inoperable. (Martyn Decl., ¶ 5.) Martyn includes a photograph purporting to represent the site of the Abandoned Well, and to show the Abandoned Well inside the lefthand, open-air side of a garden shed which existed before Martyn purchased the Martyn Property. (Ibid.)

According to Martyn, when the Upper Well was constructed, it was located or placed at the bottom of a hillside slope just above a creekbank. (Martyn Decl., ¶ 6.) Following heavy rainstorms in early 2023, a crack became visible in the ground adjacent to and partially under the Upper Well’s pad, the land fractured and slumped, and the creekbank just below the Upper Well collapsed. (Ibid.) The Martyn declaration includes photographs purporting to represent the present condition of the Upper Well. (Ibid.) Martyn asserts that power at the Upper Well site has been shut off and no repairs have been performed. (Ibid.)

Martyn further asserts that, prior to the rainstorms described above, the Upper Well would leak and spray water, and its electrical system had been in disrepair. (Martyn Decl., ¶ 6.) Martyn states that defendants have not proposed or presented any plan for electrical system repairs from a licensed and bonded electrician pursuant to lawful permits, or any plans or permits for construction work on the Upper Well. (Ibid.) The Martyn declaration includes photographs from February 2025 representing the condition of the Upper Well’s electrical system, which, according to Martyn, includes melted wiring, a sign that says “do not turn on”, a lack of lock-outs on the breaker box, and at least one junction box covered in tape instead of a metal seal. (Ibid.)

Martyn states that the Upper Well site is not located near Barger Canyon Road and, instead, there is a dirt access road that wraps around Martyn’s house just above what Martyn describes as an eroding and unstable creekbank. (Martyn Decl., ¶ 7.) According to Martyn, portions of this dirt road which lie within the alleged 10-foot-wide access easement have long since washed out and eroded into the creek below. (Ibid.)

Martyn further states that measurements taken on August 1, 2025, show that the portion of the dirt road within defendants’ claimed access easement has narrowed to 4 feet wide in certain places, with the creekbank slope next to and below the eroding road. (Martyn Decl., ¶ 7.) Martyn believes that the dirt road is impassible because a vehicle would have to squeeze through this four-foot-wide section while riding along the edge of the purportedly unstable and eroding creekbank. (Ibid.) For this reason, Martyn contends, a person driving to the Upper Well site would be required to leave the boundary of the alleged access easement, and drive through the Martyn Property without Martyn’s permission. (Ibid.)

In June 2025, J Price attempted to enter the Martyn Property with contractors for unspecified work that would last for three days and include drilling a well at the site of the Abandoned Well on the Martyn Property. (Martyn Decl., ¶ 8.) Martyn learned that a permit application was submitted in May 2025 without Martyn’s knowledge. (Ibid.) A copy of this permit application is provided as exhibit 1 of the index and compendium of exhibits (the Martyn COE) submitted in support of the Application, and indicates that the permit was “suspended” as a result of the present easement dispute. (Ibid.) Though the proposed well was not drilled, it is Martyn’s understanding that defendants threatened to drill this well on the Martyn Property after the parties’ mediation broke down on July 31, 2025. (Ibid.)

The Application is also supported by a declaration of Martyn’s counsel, Matthew R. Gershman (Gershman), who represented Martyn at the parties’ mediation on July 31, 2025. (Gershman Decl., ¶ 4.) Gershman states that the mediation did not result in a settlement, and that “Mr. Forouzandeh” stated the defendants would be imminently going onto the Martyn Property during the week of August 4, 2025, to drill a well at the site of the Abandoned Well and to perform work at the Upper Well. (Ibid.) Gershman is not aware of any permit being issued for these scopes of work. (Ibid.)

In their opposition to the Application, defendants expressly assert that they do not oppose the issuance of a preliminary injunction preventing defendants from entering the Martyn Property to “perform any unpermitted work in relation to any water wells” (i.e., Injunction Order No. 3) or from “powering on electricity at the Abandoned Well or Upper Well without first correcting electrical fire hazards with licensed, bonded contractors performing permitted work” (i.e., Injunction Order No. 4). Defendants contend that they have informed Martyn’s counsel that all work on the Martyn Property would be performed with proper permits and licensed contractors. (Opp. at p. 2, ll. 10-16.)

As to Injunction Order No. 1 and Injunction Order No. 2, defendants assert, among other things, that they and their predecessors in interest have obtained necessary residential water from the wells on the Martyn Property since 1979, pursuant to numerous recorded easements; that defendants have no other source of water for the Defendant Properties; that the same water distribution system has been used for nearly 45 years to pipe water from the Martyn Property to the Paveloff Property, where it is stored and distributed to the other parcels; and that this water distribution system was recorded as part of a Declaration of Covenants and Restrictions against each of the Defendant Properties in 1982. (Opp. at pp. 2-3.)

Defendants appear to concede that the Upper Well, which defendants refer to as “Well #2”, was damaged by a landslide on the Martyn Property two years ago, and rendered the Upper Well non-operational. (Opp. at p. 3.) According to defendants, a dispute arose as to the cause of that landslide, and since that time, Martyn has prevented defendants from accessing the Martyn Property to repair the Upper Well. (Ibid.) Defendants further assert that the Road Well, which defendants refer to as “Well #1”, is the only operational well, and that, due to a shortage of water from that well, defendants have been forced to buy water from a neighboring ranch at significant expense. (Ibid.)

Defendants also concede that they recently obtained a building permit from the County of Santa Barbara to repair the Abandoned Well, which defendants refer to as “Well #3”. (Opp. at p. 3.) When Martyn lodged a protest indicating that the parties were going to mediation, the County placed a hold on that permit pending the conclusion of that mediation. (Ibid.) Defendants state that they intend to have the permit issued upon the conclusion of that mediation, which occurred on July 31, 2025, and that they will not do any work related to Well #3 (i.e., the Abandoned Well), until and unless a valid permit is issued by the County. (Ibid.)

On August 8, 2025, following a hearing held on August 7, the court signed and entered an order (the OSC), granting the Application and requiring defendants to appear and show cause as to why a preliminary injunction should not issue as requested in the Application. Pursuant to the OSC, and pending the hearing on the preliminary injunction, the court issued a temporary restraining order (the TRO) enjoining defendants from: entering the Martyn Property and drilling any water wells (whether termed “replacement” or otherwise), or reopening any wells on the Martyn Property, near or inside the Abandoned Well or Well #3 (which the court will refer to herein as Abandoned Well 3); entering the Martyn Property with any vehicles to attempt to access the area of the Upper Well or Well #2 (which the court will refer to herein as Upper Well 2); entering the Martyn Property to perform any unpermitted work in relation to any of the water wells; or powering on electricity at the sites of Abandoned Well 3 or Upper Well 2, without first correcting electrical fire hazards with licensed, bonded contractors performing permitted work.

On October 16, 2025, Martyn filed a supplemental memorandum in support of the OSC, which is supported by the declarations of Robert Rowe (Rowe) and Long Nguyen (Nguyen), who Martyn describes as consultants in the field of electrical engineering and fire safety. Martyn asserts that Rowe and Nguyen inspected the Martyn Property on September 29, 2025, and that their findings and conclusions reveal a public safety risk to the larger community from the current condition of the electrical systems installed for the wells.

Nguyen’s states that they are a registered electrical engineer and a certified electrical inspector with 30 years of experience in electrical engineering, electrical construction defects and code compliance, systems maintenance, and digital and computer forensics. (Nguyen Decl., ¶ 1.) Nguyen has performed electrical failure investigations, cause determinations, electrical construction defects, damaged assessment and computer forensics on thousands of incidents over the years. (Ibid.) Nguyen has been a partner with Sidhi Consultants, LLC, since 1990. (Ibid.) Nguyen submits a copy of Nguyen’s current curriculum vitae with the Nguyen declaration. (Nguyen Decl., ¶ 1 & Exh. A.)

Rowe is the owner and President of Pyrocop, Inc. (Rowe Decl., ¶ 1.) Among other things, Rowe describes his career with various fire services or departments. (Rowe Decl., ¶¶ 1-4.) Rowe is currently a member of the California Conference of Arson Investigators, International Association of Arson Investigators, and the National Association of Fire Investigators where Rowe maintains his certifications. (Rowe Decl., ¶ 5.) Rowe submits a copy of his curriculum vitae which Rowe states is a summary of Rowe’s qualifications. (Rowe Decl., ¶ 10 & Exh. 1.)

On October 27, defendants filed a combined opposition to the OSC, which is supported by the declarations of Nasir, M Paveloff, D Chambers, J Price, and Jaime Melgoza.

On October 31, Martyn filed a reply to defendants’ combined opposition.

Analysis:

“As its name suggests, a preliminary injunction is an order that is sought by a plaintiff prior to a full adjudication of the merits of its claim. [Citation.] To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff ordinarily is required to present evidence of the irreparable injury or interim harm that it will suffer if an injunction is not issued pending an adjudication of the merits.

“Past California decisions further establish that, as a general matter, the question whether a preliminary injunction should be granted involves two interrelated factors: (1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits, and (2) the relative balance of harms that is likely to result from the granting or denial of interim injunctive relief.... ‘The ultimate goal of any test to be used in deciding whether a preliminary injunction should issue is to minimize the harm which an erroneous interim decision may cause. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528, 554, original italics (White).)

Injunction Order No. 3 and Injunction Order No. 4:

“A preliminary injunction is proper only if there is a substantial basis to suppose that the defendant, if not restrained, will actually engage in the conduct sought to be enjoined. Such an injunction ‘cannot issue in a vacuum based on the proponents’ fears about something that may happen in the future. It must be supported by actual evidence that there is a realistic prospect that the party enjoined intends to engage in the prohibited activity.’ [Citations.]” (Epstein v. Superior Court (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1410 (Epstein).)

Noted above, defendants oppose the Application “to a limited extent[]”, and contend that no relief is required with respect to the permit issues raised in Martyn’s request for Injunction Order No. 3 and Injunction Order No. 4. (See Opp. OSC at p. 2, l. 10.) J Price also states that defendants “will obtain any required permits before performing any maintenance or repairs to the wells at issue in this case.” (J Price Decl., ¶ 11.) For these reasons, defendants contend, they do not oppose Martyn’s request for Injunction Order No. 3 and Injunction Order No. 4. (Opp. OSC at p. 2, ll. 10-14.)

In reply, Martyn submits no information or evidence which demonstrates a basis for any assertion by Martyn that defendants will fail to obtain any necessary permits or will actually enter the Martyn Property and perform unpermitted work, that defendants will power on electricity to Abandoned Well 3 or Upper Well 2 before correcting any electrical or fire hazards asserted by Martyn, or that defendants will not utilize the services of licensed contractors to perform any work. Instead, Martyn contends that, because defendants submit to Injunction Order No. 3 and Injunction Order No. 4, the court should issue these injunctions.

Under the circumstances present here, Martyn has failed to support the request for Injunction Order No. 3 and Injunction Order No. 4 with actual evidence that defendants will engage in the activity Martyn seeks to prohibit. Furthermore, the available evidence and information reflects, without dispute, that defendants have disclaimed any present or future intent to actually engage in the conduct Martyn seeks to prevent by Injunction Order No. 3 and Injunction Order No. 4. For these and all further reasons discussed above, the court will deny the Application as to Injunction Order No. 3 and Injunction Order No. 4.

To the extent any changed circumstances arise in the future which demonstrate that defendants will actually perform work for which a permit is required and has not been obtained, or actually power on the electricity at the Abandoned Well or Upper Well without first correcting electrical or fire hazards with licensed, bonded contractors, the court’s denial of Injunction Order No. 3 and Injunction Order No. 4 is without prejudice to an appropriate application seeking to restrain or enjoin any such conduct that may be filed by Martyn in the future.

Injunction Order No. 1:

Noted above, Injunction Order No. 1 seeks to restrain defendants from entering the Martyn Property to drill or reopen any wells near or inside Abandoned Well 3. The evidence and information appearing in the Martyn declaration and further described above indicates or suggests that Abandoned Well 3 has not operated since at least 2009 or earlier; that there is no electrical service to Abandoned Well 3; and that Abandoned Well 3 is inactive.

In addition, Nguyen states that on September 29, 2025, they attended a joint inspection of Abandoned Well 3. (Nguyen Decl., ¶¶ 3 & 9.) During that inspection, Nguyen found that no electrical wires were connected to the well pump, that no pump controller was found at Abandoned Well 3, and that the underground electrical service of the pump controller was cut at the ground level but was not completely removed or protected from direct contact. (Nguyen Decl., ¶ 9.) The Nguyen declaration includes photographs depicting these conditions. (Nguyen Decl., ¶ 9.)

Rowe also attended the joint inspection described above and also took photographs of the site of Abandoned Well 3. (Rowe Decl., ¶¶ 11 & 13.) Rowe states that Abandoned Well 3 is located inside of a small, covered building enclosed by three walls, and appeared to be out of service and deenergized. (Rowe Decl., ¶ 23.)

Available information and evidence also shows or indicates, without dispute, that: in May 2025, J Price submitted a “Water Well Permit Application” (the Permit Application) requesting a permit for the construction of a “[r]eplacement well” on the Martyn Property; the Permit Application was ostensibly signed by Adam Simmons of Adam Simmons Consulting Geologist on May 8, 2025; the Permit Application was approved by the Santa Barbara County Public Health Department, Environmental Health Services, on May 27, 2025; and the permit was temporarily suspended on May 8, 2025, “due to owners dispute of easement....” (Martyn Decl., ¶ 8; Martyn COE, Exh. 1; see also Opp. OSC at p. 10, ll. 9-11.)

The points advanced in defendants’ combined opposition suggest that defendants concede that Abandoned Well 3 is not in use or operational. (See Opp. OSC at p. 10, ll. 20-22 [addressing Martyn’s “focus on the physical/condition/physical use” of Abandoned Well 3], p. 11, ll. 5-6 [discussing attempts to repair Abandoned Well 3], p. 15, ll. 15-17 & 25-26 [arguing that the non-use of Abandoned Well 3 “is insufficient to show” any intent to abandon rights to that well].) Defendants also offer no evidence or information to dispute Martyn’s contention that Abandoned Well 3 has not operated since at least 2009 or earlier, that Abandoned Well 3 has remained inoperable and unused since at least that time, or that the Permit Application was submitted on or after May 8, 2025.

Instead, defendants state that they have been precluded from accessing or repairing Abandoned Well 3 notwithstanding that defendants obtained permit approval before this action was filed, that defendants will be forced to “continue to rely upon the uncertain continuation of outside water being delivered to the Price Property at significant expense throughout the pendency of this litigation, which may last for years[]”, and that “[t]here is no guarantee that the neighboring ranch currently supplying the Prices will continue to provide this water, either at the current rate or at any rate in the future. In the event this alternative supply ceases to provide water to [d]efendants, there will not be sufficient water from only the Road Well for [d]efendants to service all of their properties, and [d]efendants will further suffer as water use will be further restricted.” (Opp. OSC at p. 10, ll. 9-14 & p. 18, ll. 23-27.)

To support the points described above, M Paveloff states that the Paveloffs have been harmed by the limited amount of water being produced by the Road Well; that the Paveloffs have been forced to ration water for domestic use and to allow thousands of dollars of landscaping to wither and die; and that if Injunction Order No. 1 is implemented and the Paveloffs are precluded from drawing water from wells on the Martyn Property during the pendency of this litigation, the Paveloffs will lack water for domestic use and landscaping and will be functionally evicted from their home. (M Paveloff Decl., ¶¶ 10-11.)

Nasir states that if Injunction Order No. 1 is implemented and Nasir is precluded from drawing water from wells on the Martyn Property, Nasir will lack water for cooking, cleaning, personal hygiene, and maintaining landscaping on the Parcel D Nasir Property. (Nasir Decl., ¶ 9.)

J Price states that he will lack water for domestic and other uses if Injunction Order No. 1 is implemented, and additionally states that the lack of adequate water has forced defendants to ration their water use by reducing water used for showers, bathing, cooking, cleaning, and landscaping, and that the Price Property has lost approximately $20,000 in plants due to this rationing. (J Price Decl., ¶¶ 13-14.)

D Chambers asserts the same harm described in the declarations further discussed above, and also states that if the Chambers are forced to identify alternate sources of water, the Chambers will incur costs of “unknown magnitude” because there is no readily available source of water for the Chambers Property. (D Chambers Decl., ¶¶ 7-8.)

For all reasons discussed above, the undisputed record shows that Abandoned Well 3 has remained inoperable and unused by defendants since at least 2009, if not longer, and that Abandoned Well 3 has not supplied water to the Defendant Properties since at least that time. Absent a dispute by defendants, the record also indicates or suggests that first time defendants undertook efforts to repair or replace Abandoned Well 3 was in May 2025, when J Price submitted the Permit Application. Though defendants assert that they will suffer harm if the court were to issue Injunction Order No. 1 due to the lack of a domestic water supply to the Defendant Properties, wholly absent from defendants’ opposition is any evidence or information showing that Abandoned Well 3 has supplied any water to the Defendant Properties after 2009.

Defendants also do not dispute that they first undertook efforts to repair or replace Abandoned Well 3 in May 2025. Though defendants contend that they will be harmed by a lack of water supply to their respective properties should the court issue Injunction No. 1, defendants fail to explain this ostensible delay in seeking to repair or replace Abandoned Well 3.

Considering that the Abandoned Well 3 has not operated or supplied water to the Defendant Properties for at least 16 years, and that defendants did not undertake any effort to repair or replace that well until May 2025, the undisputed record reflects that if the court were to issue Injunction Order No. 1, the present status quo as to Abandoned Well 3 would be maintained until this case is decided, and that any effect on defendants would be minimal if the court’s interim decision were erroneous under the circumstances present here. (O’Connell v. Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1472 (O’Connell) [“the general purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending a final adjudication of the claims on the merits[]”]; White, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 554-555.)

The available evidence and information also shows that there exists at least one alternative source from which defendants have been purchasing water for use at the Defendant Properties. (See, e.g., Opp. OSC at p. 3, ll. 9-10 [asserting that defendants have been purchasing water from a neighboring ranch].) Though defendants appear to contend that they would incur significant expense if they were required to purchase water from an alternative source pending a trial, defendants offer no information to show the magnitude of this expense, or any burden defendants would suffer. Defendants also offer no information to support any conclusory and speculative suggestion that the neighboring ranch may cease supplying water to defendants, or that there exist no other alternative sources from which defendants could purchase water.

In addition, to the extent defendants “are ultimately found to have been wrongly enjoined[,]” defendants fail to explain why any expense they may incur to purchase water from alternate sources could not be compensated by the payment of damages by Martyn, or by the posting of an undertaking as requested in the opposition and required under Code of Civil Procedure section 529, as further discussed below. (Stevenson v. City of Sacramento (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 545, 551.)

A plaintiff is “not required to wait until they have suffered actual harm before they apply for an injunction, but may seek injunctive relief against the threatened infringement of their rights.” (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1292.) The Permit Application ostensibly requests a permit to construct a well to replace Abandoned Well 3. (Martyn COE, Exh. 1 at p. 1.) Martyn also presents evidence that defendants’ counsel stated, after the mediation, that defendants would return to the Martyn Property to “drill a well at the site of [Abandoned Well 3]....” (Gershman Decl., ¶ 4.) For these reasons, and absent a dispute by defendants, Martyn has made a sufficient showing of a threatened infringement of Martyn’s rights with respect to defendants’ intent to drill a well on the Martyn Property to replace Abandoned Well 3.

Defendants do not dispute that the construction of replacement well would occur exclusively on the Martyn Property. Absent any dispute, it can be inferred from the evidence and information presented by the parties that a denial of Injunction Order No. 1 “would leave defendant[s] free to rip up [Martyn’s] property and construct a [replacement well]” to replace Abandoned Well 3. (Keith v. Superior Court (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 521, 524 (Keith).)

“In general, if the plaintiff may be fully compensated by the payment of damages in the event he prevails, then preliminary injunctive relief should be denied.” (Tahoe Keys Property Owners’ Assn. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1459, 1471.) Payment of damages is “not typically an adequate remedy when the [matter at issue] involves unique real property.” (Fonteno v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1380.) “Moreover, the right to an injunction in a case involving a trespass irreparable in character and of a continuing nature ‘does not depend upon the extent of the damage measured by a money standard.’ [Citation.]” (Aspen Grove Condominium Assn. v. CNL Income Northstar LLC (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.)

To the extent the court were to deny Injunction Order No. 1, and defendants were to proceed with constructing a well on the Martyn Property to replace Abandoned Well 3, it can be inferred from the undisputed record that, if the court’s decision was later shown to be erroneous, Martyn would incur significant expense to restore the Martyn Property at the site of the replacement well. (Keith, supra, 26 Cal.App.3d at p. 524 [denial of the preliminary injunction would require the court, at the end of trial, “to choose between a mandatory injunction, requiring defendant to restore the premises at great expense, or limit plaintiffs’ recovery to monetary damages”].)

Considering that the Martyn Property is unique real property, defendants fail to explain why monetary damages would be adequate to compensate Martyn, or ascertainable under the circumstances present here. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 526, subd. (a)(4)-(5) [describing circumstances under which injunction may be granted]; Thayer Plymouth Center, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp. (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 300, 306-307 [general discussion of circumstances where equitable relief may be denied when there exists an adequate remedy at law].)

For all reasons discussed above, Martyn has made a sufficient showing that, were the court to deny Martyn’s request for Injunction Order No. 1, that Martyn is likely to sustain irreparable interim harm which cannot be adequately compensated by the payment of monetary damages by defendants, as compared to the minimal harm that defendants are likely to suffer if the court were to grant the requested injunction. (Abrams v. St. John’s Hospital & Health Center (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 628, 636 [discussion of factors to be considered when weighing interim harm].) Martyn has also made a sufficient showing that, if the court were to grant the Application as to Injunction Order No. 1, the present status quo would be preserved. (Ibid.) For these reasons, and as Martyn is likely to suffer greater injury from the denial of Injunction Order No. 1 than defendants are likely to suffer if that injunction is granted, the balance of the harms and relative hardships the parties would suffer favors the granting of Martyn’s request for Injunction Order No. 1.

The court “may not grant a preliminary injunction, regardless of the balance of interim harm, unless there is some possibility that the plaintiff would ultimately prevail on the merits of the claim.” (Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 678.) “The trial court’s determination must be guided by a ‘mix’ of the potential-merit and interim-harm factors; the greater the plaintiff’s showing on one, the less must be shown on the other to support an injunction.” (Ibid.) For these and all further reasons discussed above, notwithstanding that the balance of harms weighs in favor of granting Martyn’s request for Injunction Order No. 1, Martyn must also show a likelihood of prevailing on the merits. (Cohen v. Board of Supervisors (1985) 40 Cal.3d 277, 286-288 [the court must determine both factors when granting or denying a preliminary injunction].)

Noted above, Martyn alleges in the complaint that any purported easement rights relating to Abandoned Well 3 were merged or extinguished when the La Vista Properties (i.e., the Parcel A Price Property, the Parcel B Pacific Heights Property, the Parcel C Paveloff Property, and the Parcel D Nasir Property) and the Martyn Property came to be owned by the same parties. Martyn also alleges that defendants’ easement rights were extinguished or abandoned for a variety of additional reasons including: the destruction of adjacent land rendering Abandoned Well 3 inoperable; defendants’ nonuse of Abandoned Well 3; conduct Martyn contends is incompatible with the exercise of defendants’ easement rights; because the prior water easements, which are reflected in a series of recorded documents, were abandoned in 2007 as reflected in an “Amended Water Rights Agreement” (the 2007 Agreement) between the previous owner of the Martyn Property and Barger Canyon Associates, LLC; and by the recording of quitclaim deeds by J Price, M Chambers, Nasir, and Pacific Height’s predecessor-in-interest. (Compl., ¶¶ 2, 16, 19, 22-23, 24, 39, 49, 56 & Exh. 9.)

In the Application, Martyn refers to a “web of recorded documents that range from the 1970s to 2007” (the Prior Water Easements) which Martyn contends show that defendants “do not have the far reaching rights they claim”. (Appl. at p. 13, ll. 1-11.) Martyn states that a 1979 document “purported to grant easements for two wells on the Martyn Property (seemingly in gross) to the owners of what was at the time a single combined parcel for all four of the properties today owned by the Prices, Pacific Heights, the Paveloffs, and ... Nasir.” (Appl. at p. 13, ll. 12-14.) Noted above, the complaint also alleges that these Prior Water Easements gave the Prices and the Chambers purported rights to access wells and obtain water from the Martyn Property. (Compl., ¶ 21.)

“ ‘ “An easement is an interest in the land of another, which entitles the owner of the easement to a limited use or enjoyment of the other’s land. [Citations.] [¶] An easement creates a nonpossessory right to enter and use land in another’s possession and obligates the possessor not to interfere with the uses authorized by the easement.” ’ [Citation.] [E]asements may be created by an express grant, an implied grant, or by prescription.” (Batta v. Hunt (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 295, 304-305.) Absent further reasoned factual or legal argument by Martyn apart from the points further discussed above, it is the court’s understanding that Martyn concedes, for present purposes, that easements at issue and granting a right to use the Martyn Property to access or obtain water from Abandoned Well 3, were created by an express grant.

Martyn further contends that by 1984, Zapata Investments Corporation (Zapata) had acquired the Martyn Property, the Parcel A Price Property, Parcel B Pacific Heights Property, Parcel C Paveloff Property, and Parcel D Nasir Property, such that any purported water rights or other easements over the Martyn Property “merged out of existence”. (Appl. at p. 13, ll. 15-19.)

The documents on which Martyn relies to show that the easements at issue were extinguished by merger include: (1) four grant deeds (collectively, the Four 1983 Deeds) ostensibly purporting to grant to Zapata the Parcel A Price Property, the Parcel B Pacific Heights Property, the Parcel C Paveloff Property, and the Parcel D Nasir Property, as well as various rights of way, easements, water wells, and appurtenances; and (2) a grant deed (the 1983 Deed) ostensibly purporting to grant to Zapata the Parcel A Price Property and various easements. (Martyn COE, Exhs. 4-8.)

Martyn submits a request for judicial notice of the Four 1983 Deeds and the 1983 Deed, which the record reflects were recorded in the official records of Santa Barbara County on, respectively, June 1, 1983, and November 8, 1983. (Ibid.; See Martyn RJN, ¶¶ 3-7; Martyn COE, Exhs. 4-8.)

Defendants do not dispute that Zapata acquired the properties described above in 1984 pursuant to the Four 1983 Deeds and the 1983 Deed. Defendants contend that an “Agreement For Sale And Purchase Of Water Rights And Easements” (the 1988 Agreement) between Michael Edward Robles (Robles), who defendants assert is Martyn’s predecessor in interest, and Zapata discusses the existence of the easements burdening the Martyn Property and appurtenant to each of the lots, and expanded defendants’ predecessor in interest’s right to water from the Martyn Property, including all subsurface water withdrawn from Abandoned Well 3. (Opp. at p. 14.) Because the 1988 Agreement was executed after the merger relied on by Martyn and discussed above, defendants argue, the evidence reflects that Zapata did not intend to destroy the appurtenant easements upon its acquisition of the Martyn Property. (Ibid.)

A copy of the 1988 Agreement is attached to a request for judicial notice submitted by defendants in support of their opposition to the Application. (Def. RJN, Exh. F.) That agreement includes highlighted language stating or effectively stating: Robles owns the property described in Exhibit A to the 1988 Agreement and referred to as the “well parcel”; there are two wells on the well parcel which provide potable water to the other parcels in its vicinity (the served parcel); Zapata owns one of the served parcels, one of two wells on the well parcel, and a 50 percent interest in the other well which Zapata desires to purchase, together with all of Robles’ water rights appurtenant to the well parcel and “such easements for well and pipeline replacement, maintenance and repair as are reasonably necessary to enable him to utilize such well and water rights.” (Def. RJN, Exh. F at p. 1, ¶¶ (A)-(C).) The “served parcels” owned by Zapata appear to include the Parcel A Price Property, the Parcel B Pacific Heights Property, the Parcel C Paveloff Property, and the Parcel D Nasir Property. (Def. RJN, Exh. F at Exh. B.)

The 1988 Agreement was recorded in the official records of the County of Santa Barbara on October 18, 1988. (Def. RJN, ¶ 6 & Exh. F.)

The court will grant the parties’ respective requests for judicial notice of the Four 1983 Deeds, the 1983 Deed, and the 1988 Agreement. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c) & (h).) Judicial notice of these records does not extend to the truth of their contents, or to their proper interpretation. (Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375.)

“A servitude is extinguished[] [¶] [b]y the vesting of the right to the servitude and the right to the servient tenement in the same person....” (Civ. Code, § 811, subd. (1).) “ ‘[T]he union of a lesser and greater estate does not always result in a merger. The doctrine of merger is applied only where it prevents an injustice and serves the interests of the person holding the two estates, in the absence of evidence of a contrary intent. It is not applied where it results in an injustice, injury, or prejudice to a third person. [¶] ... [¶] Whether or not there has been a merger depends on the actual or presumed intention of the parties and is a question of fact. A stipulation between the parties that there will not be a merger usually is respected and enforced. There will be no merger if it would be inequitable. If inequitable, it is presumed that there is no merger, but this presumption can be overcome by evidence that the parties intended a merger upon the union of the estates.’ [Citation.]” (Hamilton Court, LLC v. East Olympic, L.P. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 501, 505.)

There exists a question of fact as to whether the rights to any easements relating to Abandoned Well 3 were extinguished by the vesting of these rights and the right to the Martyn Property in Zapata, and whether a contrary intent by Zapata is reflected in the 1988 Agreement, including whether the 1988 Agreement is sufficient to show the existence of an agreement by Zapata hat there will not be a merger. For these reasons, the evidence and arguments advanced by the parties in regard to the merger issue raised in the Application and the complaint, can reasonably support either the granting or the denial of Injustice No. 1 and, when viewed as a whole, is sufficient to show “ ‘some possibility’ [Martyn] will prevail on the merits of [the] action.” (Costa Mesa City Employees’ Assn. v. City of Costa Mesa (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 298, 309-310.)

Martyn also contends that Abandoned Well 3 has not been used by defendants for two decades, such that any easement for use to supply water to the Defendant Properties has been extinguished.

As further discussed above, the record reflects that defendants have not used Abandoned Well 3 since at least 2009. It can be inferred from the available evidence and information that defendants have also not used any easements for access to, or relating to, Abandoned Well 3 since that time. Abandonment of an easement “involves intent.... ‘[A]n abandonment may be predicated upon facts showing that the means of enjoyment of an easement have been in a state of disrepair for a long period of time.’ ” (Flanagan v. San Marcos Silk Co. (1951) 106 Cal.App.2d 458, 463-464.)

Martyn has presented undisputed evidence which, for present purposes, is sufficient to show, expressly and by inference, that Abandoned Well 3 has not operated since at least 2009. Defendants have presented evidence that they intend to replace Abandoned Well 3 with a new well. The same analysis and reasoning apply. For the same reasons further discussed above, the evidence and information submitted by the parties can reasonably support either the granting or the denial of Injunction Order No. 1.

Balancing the respective equities of the parties, and harms to Martyn, which, under the totality of the circumstances present here, favor the granting of Injunction Order No. 1 for all reasons discussed above, the court finds that, pending a trial on the merits, defendants should be restrained from entering the Martyn Property and drilling or reopening any water wells, including replacement wells, near or inside the site of Abandoned Well 3. For these reasons, the court will grant the Application as to Injunction Order No. 1.

Injunction Order No. 2:

By its express terms, Injunction Order No. 2 seeks only to restrain defendants from entering the Martyn Property with any vehicles to access Upper Well 2. Injunction Order No. 2 does not seek to prevent defendants from otherwise performing any repairs to this well.

The parties here do not appear to dispute that Upper Well 2 has not been operational or repaired since the rainstorms described above caused the land adjacent to or under Upper Well 2 to collapse. As further detailed above, Martyn contends that the portion of the dirt road used to access Upper Well 2 that lies within defendants’ alleged easement has washed out and narrowed, and, according to Martyn, is impassable. (Martyn Decl., ¶ 7.)

Though the Rowe declaration addresses purported fire hazards observed by Rowe at the site of Upper Well 2, wholly absent from the Rowe declaration is any information or evidence in regard to whether the dirt road which is the subject of Injunction Order No. 2 is impassable as Martyn contends. Martyn also fails to explain why the Rowe declaration shows that the use of this dirt road presents a fire hazard or safety risk.

In addition, though Nguyen states that the land under Upper Well 2 has collapsed, Martyn fails to sufficiently explain why any information appearing in the Nguyen declaration shows that the dirt road is impassable or otherwise unsafe. (See, e.g., Nguyen Decl., ¶¶ 11 & 13.)

J Price confirms that Upper Well 2 has been out of operation for 2 years, and states that it can be repaired by “equipment capable of navigating the existing access roads located on the easements.” (J Price Decl., ¶¶ 9-11.) In the memorandum opposing the Application, defendants state that a dispute arose between the parties in regard to the cause of the landslide which damaged the area adjacent to Upper Well 2; that Upper Well 2 was providing water to defendants prior to this landslide; that at the time of the landslide, Upper Well 2 was being “serviced and overhauled”; that the landslide made the area inaccessible to vehicles; that less than 50 cubic yards of dirt must be moved from the landslide area to permit vehicular access; that Martyn objected to defendants bringing vehicles to the area to move this dirt; that Martyn prevented defendants from repairing Upper Well 2 by refusing to allow access the Martyn Property; and that defendants have tried to negotiate a good faith resolution of the parties’ dispute as to Upper Well 2. (Opp. Appl. at p. 5, ll. 2-9.)

In the opposition to the OSC, defendants also assert that they have not undertaken efforts to restore Upper Well 2 during the past two years because Martyn has blocked them from doing so. (Opp. OSC at p. 10.)

In the moving and reply papers, Martyn presents no evidence, information, or reasoned argument to refute the contentions described above.

Defendants also assert the same evidence, information, and arguments described above to show the harm defendants would suffer in regard to defendants’ inability to obtain sufficient water based on, among other things, the limited amount of water produced by the Road Well.

Though Martyn states her belief that the dirt road is unstable and impassable, and references measurements taken in August 2025 to show that the road has narrowed, Martyn provides no basis on which Martyn obtained any personal knowledge of these matters. Martyn also fails to identify the person who measured the road, when Martyn reviewed these measurements, or the manner in which the road was measured, among other things. For these reasons, the matters stated in the Martyn declaration in regard to the condition of the dirt road appear speculative and conclusory. The court disregards statements made in declarations which are “argumentative, speculative and impermissible opinions, and also lack foundation and personal knowledge.” (Tuchscher Development Enterprises, Inc. v. San Diego Unified Port Dist. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1238.)

Even if the court were to assume without deciding that the dirt road used to access Upper Well 2 was presently impassable, Martyn fails to explain why Martyn will suffer irreparable harm if the court were to deny Injunction Order No. 2. For example, Martyn does not describe what harm would be incurred if defendants attempted to access the dirt road to move what defendants describe, without dispute, as a “nominal” amount of dirt to make the road passable. Martyn also fails to show the nature of any harm that Martyn would suffer should defendants attempt to use the dirt road to access the area of Upper Well 2, or why any such harm could not be compensated by the payment of damages. For these reasons, Martyn has failed to show why Martyn will suffer irreparable harm should the court deny the Application as to Injunction Order No. 2.

It can also be inferred from the undisputed record that defendants do not actually intend to trespass upon the Martyn Property, and instead intend to move what defendants describe as a nominal amount of dirt in the area of Upper Well 2 which made that area inaccessible. As Martyn presents no evidence, apart from the speculative assertions described above, sufficient to show any realistic prospect that defendants will be required, or intend, to trespass upon the Martyn Property to access the area of Upper Well 2, Martyn has failed to show why Injunction Order No. 2 should be issued. (Epstein, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 1410.)

In addition, vague and overbroad injunctions are generally improper. (Evans v. Evans (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1169 [general discussion].) “[J]udicial abstention may be appropriate in cases where ‘granting injunctive relief would be unnecessarily burdensome for the trial court to monitor and enforce given the availability of more effective means of redress.’ [Citation.]” (Arce v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 496.)

Though Martyn seeks to enjoin defendants from entering the Martyn Property to access the area of Upper Well 2 based on Martyn’s speculative conclusion that the dirt road is impassable, Martyn also states that this road “wraps around” Martyn’s house. (Martyn Decl., ¶ 7.) It is unclear from the present record whether this dirt road is also used to access other wells, such as the Road Well which Martyn concedes is still in operation and supplies water to defendants’ respective properties. (See, e.g., Appl. at p. 9; Martyn Decl., ¶ 5; Nguyen Decl., ¶¶ 5-6; see also M Paveloff Decl., ¶ 10.) For these reasons, it appears to the court that the request stated in Injunction Order No. 2 is unnecessarily broad (In re Coleman (1974) 12 Cal.3d 568, 572 [discussion of circumstances under which order at issue provided “adequate notice of proscribed area and conduct”].) .

Noted above, Martyn also does not effectively dispute defendants’ assertions that Upper Well 2 was supplying water to defendants prior to the landslide, that the landslide damaged the area of Upper Well 2 which was at the time being serviced, that a dispute arose regarding the cause of the landslide which ostensibly rendered the dirt road impassable and damaged the area of Upper Well 2, that defendants intended and undertook efforts to repair this damage, that Martyn has prevented defendants from accessing the Martyn Property to repair this damage, or that the parties have been attempting to resolve their dispute. Gershman also states that, after the parties’ mediation broke down, defendants’ counsel stated that defendants would “imminently” be going onto the Martyn Property to perform work at the site of Upper Well 2. (Gershman Decl., ¶ 4.)

Considering the available information and evidence described above, the present record indicates that the last uncontested status preceding the present controversy, which ostensibly involves a dispute arising after the landslide and Martyn’s subsequent denial of access to the area of Upper Well 2, was that Upper Well 2 was operable, supplying water to defendants, and accessible to defendants. For these and all further reasons discussed above, the granting of Injunction Order No. 2 would maintain the status quo. (United Railroads of San Francisco v. Superior Court (1916) 172 Cal. 80, 87 [general discussion of status quo].)

In addition, though the balance of the harms in regard to defendants’ ability to supply of water to the Defendant Properties does not weigh in favor of granting Injunction Order No. 1 for reasons more fully discussed above, that injunction differs in its scope and effect. Absent evidence of what, if any, irreparable harm Martyn will incur should the court deny Injunction Order No. 2, and under the totality of the circumstances present here considering that it is undisputed that Upper Well 2 was supplying water to defendants prior to the landslide, the balance of harms weighs in favor of denying the Application as to Injunction Order No. 2 for all reasons discussed above.

Martyn advances the same arguments discussed above to show why there is a likelihood of success on the merits of Martyn’s claims as to Upper Well 2. The same reasoning and analysis apply here. Furthermore, Martyn’s arguments regarding whether Upper Well 2 should be deemed an abandoned well under the Santa Barbara County Code does not change the court’s analysis. For example, it can be inferred from the available evidence and information presented by the parties that defendants have demonstrated an intention to continue using Upper Well 2. (Santa Barbara County Code, ch. 34A-2, § 34A-2, subd. (b)(1) [requiring that “property owner has not demonstrated an intention to use the well”].)

“[T]he burden [is] on [Martyn], as the part[y] seeking injunctive relief, to show all elements necessary to support issuance of a preliminary injunction.” (O’Connell, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1481.) For all reasons discussed above, Martyn has failed to show that she is likely to suffer greater injury from a denial of Injunction Order No. 2 than defendants are likely to suffer if that injunction is granted. Instead, the record reflects that a greater injury will result to defendants from granting Injunction Order No. 2 than to Martyn from refusing that injunction. For these reasons, and as the evidence, information, and arguments presented by the parties can reasonably support either the granting or the denial of Injunction Order No. 2, the court will deny the Application as to Injunction Order No. 2.

The Road Well:

Defendants assert in their opposition that the supplemental memorandum filed by Martyn and described above seeks an additional order enjoining defendants from using the Road Well (which the court will refer to as Road Well 1), and improperly expands the relief sought in the Application.

Nothing in the supplemental memorandum indicates to the court that Martyn seeks to expand the relief sought in the Application to include an order restraining defendants from using or accessing Road Well 1.

For example, the supplemental memorandum describes only the injunction orders requested in the Application and described above, references the OSC which also describes these requests, and states that the court “should also now issue the preliminary injunction.” (Supp. Memorandum at p. 2 & p. 5, ll. 17-18.) Gershman also states that defendants’ agent visited the site of Road Well 1 after the TRO was issued, and that the TRO does not preclude those visits. (Gershman Reply Decl., ¶ 2 & Exh. 13.)

In addition, though Martyn contends in her reply that the court would be “justified were it to issue another OSC as to” Road Well 1 (Reply at p. 13, ll. 19-20), Martyn does not include any proposed restraining language, describe the injunction sought, or any activities to be enjoined. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1150(c).) To the extent Martyn intends to seek an injunction as to Road Well 1, nothing herein shall preclude Martyn from filing an appropriate application for such an injunction in the future.

Undertaking:

“On granting an injunction, the court or judge must require an undertaking on the part of the applicant to the effect that the applicant will pay to the party enjoined any damages, not exceeding an amount to be specified, the party may sustain by reason of the injunction, if the court finally decides that the applicant was not entitled to the injunction.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 529, subd. (a).)

Absent information specifying the amount of the bond or undertaking requested in defendants’ opposition to the motion, and based on the court’s experience in similar matters, the court will require an undertaking on the part of Martyn in the amount of $30,000, subject to any request by a party for an increase or decrease in this amount upon the filing and service of an appropriate noticed motion. The undertaking ordered herein shall comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1130.

Proposed order:

Further, the court will order Martyn to, on or before November 14, 2025, present for the court’s review and signature, a proposed order that conforms to the court’s ruling herein, with an undertaking in the amount ordered herein.

The TRO:

The TRO shall remain in effect as to Injunction Order No. 1, during the time allowed for presentation of the proposed order of injunction and undertaking as described above, and will continue to remain in effect thereafter until the written order is signed and entered by the court, provided that the proposed order and required undertaking are timely filed by Martyn in accordance with this ruling.

The TRO is otherwise vacated as to Injunction Order No. 2, Injunction Order No. 3, and Injunction Order No. 4.

The parties’ requests for judicial notice:

In support of the Application, Martyn submits a request for judicial notice of various grant deeds, including the Four 1983 Deeds and the 1983 Deed, and an Assignment of Water Rights recorded in the official records of the County of Santa Barbara on April 2, 2003. (Martyn RJN, ¶¶ 1-10.)

In support of their opposition to the Application, the Paveloffs submit a request for judicial notice of various grant deeds, parcel maps, declarations, amendments to easement, grant deeds, assignment agreements, and other records, including the 1988 Agreement. (Def. RJN, ¶¶ 1-15.)

For all reasons discussed above, the court will grant Martyn’s request for judicial notice of the Four 1983 Deeds and the 1983 Deed, and defendants’ request for judicial notice of the 1988 Agreement.

As to the remaining records or documents for which the parties request judicial notice, these records and materials are not necessary or relevant to the issues discussed and determined herein. (See Evid. Code, § 350; Mangini v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063, overruled on other grounds in In re Tobacco Cases II (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1257, 1276.) For these reasons, the court will deny the parties requests for judicial notice of the additional records and materials described in the parties’ respective requests.

Defendants’ objections to evidence:

Defendants submit objections to material and matters appearing in the Martyn, Rowe, and Nguyen declarations, and Martyn’s supplemental memorandum. The court considers only that evidence which is relevant and admissible.