Mario Gomez et al vs Morgan V Phillips et al

Case Number

25CV04426

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Mon, 10/20/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion: Strike

Tentative Ruling

Mario Gomez, et al., v. Morgan V. Phillips, et al. 

Case No. 25CV04426

           

Hearing Date: October 20, 2025                                                         

HEARING:              Motion of Defendants to Strike Portions of Complaint

ATTORNEYS:        For Plaintiffs Mario Gomez, Alondra Gomez, and Jesus Ortega: Monica M. Robles, Robles-Muzinich, APC  

                                    For Defendants Morgan V. Phillips and Steven Phillips: Aaron N. Soleimani, Messner Reeves LLP

                                 

TENTATIVE RULING:

The motion of defendants Morgan V. Phillips and Steven Phillips to strike portions of plaintiffs’ complaint is denied. Defendants shall file and serve their answer to the complaint on or before November 4, 2025.

Background:

As alleged in plaintiffs’ complaint:

On December 21, 2024, at 8:04 p.m., plaintiffs Mario Gomez, Alondra Gomez, and Jesus Ortega were passengers in a vehicle that was lawfully stopped at a red light at the intersection of Cliff Drive and Meigs Road in Santa Barbara. (Complaint, ¶ EX-2.) Defendant Morgan V. Phillips (Phillips) was operating a vehicle owned by Steven Phillips (S. Phillips) while under the influence of alcohol, in violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (a). (Ibid.) As a direct result of Phillips’s intoxication, she collided with the vehicle occupied by plaintiffs, causing them to suffer serious bodily injuries. (Ibid.)

Phillips operated the vehicle while knowingly and willfully intoxicated. (Complaint, ¶ EX-2.) She was aware of the high probability that driving in such a condition would cause serious bodily injury or death to others. (Ibid.) Nevertheless, she consciously disregarded the safety of others and drove while under the influence of alcohol. (Ibid.) Phillips willfully consumed alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing that she would thereafter be operating a motor vehicle capable of high speeds and substantial destructive force. (Ibid.) Her actions demonstrated a conscious disregard for the rights and safety of others. (Ibid.) Phillips’s decision to become intoxicated and operate a vehicle was intentional, willful, and done with a knowing disregard for human life and safety. (Ibid.)

Rather than stopping to exchange information as required by law following the collision, Phillips fled the scene of the accident, in violation of Vehicle Code section 20001, subdivision (a). (Complaint, ¶ EX-2.) She was subsequently stopped by a witness who had observed the collision. (Ibid.) The acts and omissions of Phillips as alleged herein were done with malice, oppression, and in conscious disregard of the rights and safety of plaintiffs and the public at large. (Ibid.) Plaintiffs therefore seek an award of punitive and exemplary damages in an amount appropriate to punish and deter Phillips and others from engaging in similar conduct. (Ibid.)

On July 15, 2025, plaintiffs filed their complaint in this action.

On August 27, 2025, defendants filed this motion to strike the exemplary damages attachment to the complaint, which includes the allegations summarized above.

The motion is opposed by plaintiffs. (Note: Plaintiffs’ opposition was filed one day late on account of illness of plaintiffs’ counsel. Defendants filed a substantive reply and have not asserted any prejudice by the limited untimeliness. The court will consider the opposition.)

Analysis:

As a prefatory matter, the court notes that the meet and confer declaration attached to the motion is insufficient.

“Before filing a motion to strike pursuant to this chapter, the moving party shall meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purpose of determining if an agreement can be reached that resolves the objections to be raised in the motion to strike.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5, subd. (a).)

“The moving party shall file and serve with the motion to strike a declaration stating either of the following:

“(A)     The means by which the moving party met and conferred with the party who filed the pleading subject to the motion to strike, and that the parties did not reach an agreement resolving the objections raised by the motion to strike.

“(B)     That the party who filed the pleading subject to the motion to strike failed to respond to the meet and confer request of the moving party or otherwise failed to meet and confer in good faith.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5, subd. (a)(3).)

The declaration filed with the motion states only that a letter was sent inviting a further discussion. The declaration does not state either that the meet and confer took place in the manner required by section 435.5 or that plaintiffs’ counsel failed to respond to the request. Thus, the declaration fails to comply with the requirements of section 435.5. Ordinarily, the court would order the motion off calendar so that the moving party may comply with section 435.5. However, in light of the filing of the opposition and the issues raised, the court will nonetheless rule on the merits at this time.

“The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) “Irrelevant matter” includes a “demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subds. (b)(3), (c).) “The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).)

“In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff. [Citations.] In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth. [Citations.] In ruling on a motion to strike, courts do not read allegations in isolation.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)

“In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “ ‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) “ ‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(2).)

“Inasmuch as Civil Code section 3294 requires as a prerequisite to the recovery of punitive damages that the defendant ‘has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice,’ the cases have uniformly recognized that proof of negligence, even gross negligence, or recklessness is insufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages.” (Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, 87-88 (Dawes).)

In Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890 (Taylor), the California Supreme Court “concluded that the act of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated may constitute an act of ‘malice’ under [Civil Code] section 3294 if performed under circumstances which disclose a conscious disregard of the probable dangerous consequences.” (Id. at p. 892.)

The Taylor court explained those circumstances: “[O]ne who voluntarily commences, and thereafter continues, to consume alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing from the outset that he must thereafter operate a motor vehicle demonstrates … ‘such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that his conduct may be called wilful or wanton.’ [Citation.] Although the circumstances in a particular case may disclose similar wilful or wanton behavior in other forms, ordinarily, routine negligent or even reckless disobedience of traffic laws would not justify an award of punitive damages.” (Taylor, supra, 24 Cal.3d at pp. 899-900.)

Defendants point out that Taylor was decided before the 1987 amendments to Civil Code section 3294, which added the additional requirement of despicable conduct to the definition of malice.

“Malice is defined by section 3294, subdivision (c)(1) as ‘conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.’ ‘Despicable conduct’ is conduct that is “ ‘so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by most ordinary decent people.” ’ [Citation.] Such conduct has been described as having the character of outrage frequently associated with crime. [Citation.] ‘Conscious disregard’ means ‘ “that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and that he willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.” ’ [Citation.] Put another way, the defendant must ‘have actual knowledge of the risk of harm it is creating and, in the face of that knowledge, fail to take steps it knows will reduce or eliminate the risk of harm.’ [Citation.]” (Butte Fire Cases (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1159, italics omitted.)

Defendants are correct that intoxication, by itself, is insufficient to support a claim for punitive damages. (Dawes, supra, 111 Cal.App.3d at p. 90.) The allegations here, however, go beyond the fact of intoxication and assert that Phillips willfully consumed alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication knowing that she would thereafter be operating a motor vehicle. Knowledge and intent are ultimate facts that may be pleaded in conclusory language, even where specific pleading is required. (City of Pomona v. Superior Court (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 793, 803 [allegations of knowledge and intent in fraud cause of action].)

Moreover, as the Supreme Court observed: “It is crystal clear to us that courts in the formulation of rules on damage assessment and in weighing the deterrent function must recognize the severe threat to the public safety which is posed by the intoxicated driver. The lesson is self-evident and widely understood. Drunken drivers are extremely dangerous people.” (Taylor, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 899.) Plaintiffs have expressly alleged that Phillips committed a crime in driving after excessive consumption of alcohol. These allegations are sufficient to show “despicable conduct” under section 3294.

Defendants further argue that allegations of leaving the scene of the accident are also insufficient to support a claim for punitive damages. Because the court determines that the other allegations are sufficient, for pleading purposes, to support plaintiffs’ punitive damages claim, it is unnecessary for the court to determine the extent, if any, that the allegations of leaving the scene of the accident further support the claim for punitive damages.

Plaintiffs have adequately alleged a claim for punitive damages. The motion to strike will be denied.