Tentative Ruling: John Doe v. The Ritz-Carlton Hotel Company, et al.
Case Number
25CV04296
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Wed, 10/14/2026 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings
Defendant The Ritz-Carlton Hotel Company, LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication
Tentative Ruling
For Plaintiff John Doe: Mary E. Alexander, Haley R. Broughton, Zeke Fortenberry, Tahira Khan Merritt
For Defendant The Ritz-Carlton Hotel Company, LLC: Stephen C. Grebing, Saleema A. Hawatmeh, Marilin V. Colli
For Defendant Arnold Martinez-Lenz: Miguel A. Avila
RULING
For the reasons set forth herein, defendant The Ritz-Carlton Hotel Company, LLC’s motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication is granted. The first, second, third, fourth, and sixth causes of action are dismissed as to The Ritz-Carlton Hotel Company, LLC. To the extent that The Ritz-Carlton Hotel Company, LLC claims it is entitled to costs, it may proceed by the procedure set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 3.1700.
Background
This action commenced on July 10, 2025, by the filing of the complaint by plaintiff John Doe (“plaintiff”) against defendants The Ritz-Carlton Bacara Santa Barbara (“Bacara”), Ruby SB Hotel LLC (“Ruby”), Ritz-Carlton Hotel Company LLC (“Ritz-Carlton”), Marriott International Inc. (“Marriott”), and Arnold Martinez-Lenz (“Lenz”) for: (1) Negligence - All Defendants, (2) Negligent Hiring, Retention, and Supervision - Ritz-Carlton Hotel Defendants, (3) Premises Liability - Ritz-Carlton Hotel Defendants, (4) Sexual Battery - All Defendants, (5) Ralph Act Violation - All Defendants, and (6) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”) - All Defendants.
As alleged in the complaint:
On August 3, 2024, plaintiff was an invitee on defendants’ premises, The Spa at Bacara, as he and his wife were guests at the Bacara and had reserved massages at the Spa located on the Bacara premises (the “Spa”). (Compl., ¶ 19.) At all times mentioned in the complaint, the Ritz-Carlton Hotel Defendants employed defendant Lenz, who was a massage therapist. (Compl., ¶ 17.)
On August 3, 2024, Lenz engaged in sexual abuse, molestation, and exploitation upon plaintiff at the Spa. (Compl., ¶ 20.) The conduct occurred while Lenz was an agent of the Ritz-Carlton Hotel Defendants and while in the course and scope of Lenz’s employment with the Hotel Defendants. (Compl., ¶ 21.)
On August 11, 2025, plaintiff dismissed Marriott, Bacara, and Ruby without prejudice.
On September 8, 2025, Lenz answered the complaint with a general denial and 10 affirmative defenses.
On August 25, 2025, Ritz-Carlton demurred to the fourth cause of action for sexual battery, the fifth cause of action for violation of the Ralph Act, and the sixth cause of action for IIED. On the same date, Ritz-Carlton filed its motion to strike portions of plaintiff’s complaint.
On September 24, 2025, the court sustained the demurrer to the firth cause of action for violation of the Ralph Act, without leave to amend, and overruled the demurrer to the fourth and sixth causes of action. The motion to strike punitive damages allegations against Ritz-Carlton, was granted.
On October 14, 2025, Ritz-Carlton answered the complaint, as modified by the September 24, 2025 rulings, with a general denial and 18 affirmative defenses.
On July 21, 2026, Ritz-Carlton filed the present motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication. Ritz-Carlton.
On September 24, 2026, plaintiff filed his opposition to the motion.
On October 2, 2026, Ritz-Carlton filed its reply to plaintiff’s opposition.
Analysis
Evidentiary Objections
Ritz-Carlton objects to several portions of the declaration of plaintiff’s purported expert, Felicia Brown.
“In granting or denying a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, the court need rule only on those objections to evidence that it deems material to its disposition of the motion. Objections to evidence that are not ruled on for purposes of the motion shall be preserved for appellate review.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (q).)
“ ‘The same rules of evidence that apply at trial also apply to the declarations submitted in support of and in opposition to motions for summary judgment. Declarations must show the declarant’s personal knowledge and competency to testify, state facts and not just conclusions, and not include inadmissible hearsay or opinion.’ ” [Citation.] “ ‘The declarations in support of a motion for summary judgment should be strictly construed, while the opposing declarations should be liberally construed. [Citation.] This does not mean that courts may relax the rules of evidence in determining the admissibility of an opposing declaration. Only admissible evidence is liberally construed in deciding whether there is a triable issue.’ ” [Citation.]” (Fernandez v. Alexander (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 770, 779.)
“An expert may testify to an opinion “ ‘[r]elated to a subject that is sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact.’ ” (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a).) “ ‘Testimony in the form of an opinion that is otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces the ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.’ ” (Evid. Code, § 805.) However, an expert is not permitted to give an opinion on questions of law or legal conclusions.” (City of Rocklin v. Legacy Family Adventures-Rocklin, LLC (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 713, 728.)
The court recognizes that much of the information that Ms. Brown relies on is contradicted by uncontroverted admissible evidence. However, the court need not rule on the objections to her declaration because the declaration only addresses issues that are not raised by the pleadings. Her opinions are irrelevant to the motion before the court.
Standard on Summary Judgment
A defendant’s motion for summary judgment asks the court to determine that the entire action has no merit, and to terminate the action without the necessity of a trial. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a).) The procedure enables the court to look behind the pleadings to determine whether the party against whom the motion is directed has evidence to back up the claims. The court must determine from the evidence presented that there is no triable issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)
“[F]rom commencement to conclusion, the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) There is no obligation on the opposing party to establish anything by affidavit unless and until the moving party has by affidavit stated facts establishing every element necessary to sustain an adjudication in his favor. (Consumer Cause, Inc. v. Smilecare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.) “[W]e liberally construe plaintiff’s evidentiary submissions and strictly scrutinize defendant’s own evidence, in order to resolve any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in plaintiff’s favor.” (Johnson v. American Standard, Inc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 56, 64.)
“A defendant … has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. Once the defendant … has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff or cross-complainant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)
In resolving the motion, the court may not weigh the evidence. (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.) Rather, the role of the trial court in resolving a summary judgment motion is to determine whether issues of fact exist, not to decide the merits of the issues. (Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1107.) A triable issue of material fact exists only if the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) Any doubts as to the propriety of granting the motion should be resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion. (Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn., supra at p. 1107.)
Standard on Summary Adjudication
“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).)
“A motion for summary adjudication may be made by itself or as an alternative to a motion for summary judgment and shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(2).)
“A defendant … has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. Once the defendant … has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff or cross-complainant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)
Role of Pleadings
“The pleadings play a key role in a summary judgment motion.” (Hutton v. Fidelity National Title Co. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 486, 493 (Hutton).) “The materiality of a disputed fact is measured by the pleadings [citations], which ‘set the boundaries of the issues to be resolved at summary judgment.’ [Citations.]” (Conroy v. Regents of University of California (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1244, 1250.) “Accordingly, the burden of a defendant moving for summary judgment only requires that he or she negate plaintiff’s theories of liability as alleged in the complaint; that is, a moving party need not refute liability on some theoretical possibility not included in the pleadings. [Citations.]” (Hutton, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 493.)
Separate Statement
“Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (b)(1), requires each motion for summary judgment to be accompanied by a separate statement “ ‘setting forth plainly and concisely all material facts that the moving party contends are undisputed. Each of the material facts stated shall be followed by a reference to the supporting evidence.’ ” California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(d)(2)4 states: “ ‘The separate statement should include only material facts and not any facts that are not pertinent to the disposition of the motion.’ ” Under the Rules of Court, “ ‘ “Material facts’ “ are facts that relate to the cause of action, claim for damages, issue of duty, or affirmative defense that is the subject of the motion and that could make a difference in the disposition of the motion.’ ” (Rule 3.1350(a)(2).)” (Beltran v. Hard Rock Hotel Licensing, Inc. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 865, 874-875.)
“The point of the separate statement is not to craft a narrative, but to be a concise list of the material facts and the evidence that supports them. “ ‘The separate statement serves two important functions in a summary judgment proceeding: It notifies the parties which material facts are at issue, and it provides a convenient and expeditious vehicle permitting the trial court to hone in on the truly disputed facts.’ ” [Citation.]” (Beltran v. Hard Rock Hotel Licensing, Inc., supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at page 875.)
“The duty to comply with the law regarding separate statements applies to both sides of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication. The opposing party’s responses to the separate statement must be in good faith, responsive, and material. Responses should directly address the fact stated, and if that fact is not in dispute, the opposing party must so admit. It is completely unhelpful to evade the stated fact in an attempt to create a dispute where none exists.” (Beltran v. Hard Rock Hotel Licensing, Inc., supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at page 875.)
“Separate statements serve a laudable purpose. As explained in Weil & Brown, California Practice Guide (The Rutter Group 1996) Civil Procedure Before Trial, paragraph 10:94.1, pp. 10–31, 10–32, these documents are ‘intended to permit the judge to determine quickly whether the motion is supported by sufficient undisputed facts. If the opposing statement disputes an essential fact alleged in support of the motion, the judge merely has to review the evidence cited in support of that fact. This saves the judge from having to review all the evidentiary materials filed in support of and in opposition to the motion.’ ” (Kulesa v. Castleberry (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 103, 113.)
Undisputed material facts (“UMFs”) that are either undisputed, or not reasonably disputed, will be discussed below where appropriate.
First Cause of Action for Negligence
The negligence cause of action does not allege vicarious liability, under the respondeat superior doctrine. Rather, it alleges direct negligence on the part of Ritz-Carlton
“ ‘The elements of a cause of action for negligence are well established. They are ‘ “(a) a legal duty to use due care; (b) a breach of such legal duty; [and] (c) the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.” ’ ” [Citation.]” (Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917-918.)
Ritz-Carlton argues that the negligence cause of action fails, as to Ritz-Carlton, because it had no actual or constructive knowledge, prior to August 3, 2024, of any propensity of Lenz to commit sexual misconduct and that plaintiff cannot establish breach of a duty or causation. In making this argument, Ritz-Carlton claims: “Each theory of negligence Plaintiff advances rests on the same predicate: that Ritz-Carlton knew or should have known Martinez-Lenz posed a risk of sexual
misconduct. The undisputed evidence forecloses that predicate.” (Motion, p. 13, l. 28 - p. 14, l. 2.)
In opposition, plaintiff argues that by adopting safety standards, Ritz-Carlton assumed a duty to implement those standards with reasonable care. The court has concerns regarding the citation of Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill (2005) 36 Cal.4th 224 (Delgado) provided by plaintiff in support of the argument. The case, and specific page references, do not state what plaintiff claims they do, and are possibly the result of generative artificial intelligence (“AI”) hallucinations. Plaintiff’s counsel is reminded of his obligations under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7, subdivision (b), Business & Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (d), and Rules of Professional Conduct section 3.3, subdivision (a).
By way of the complaint, as to Ritz-Carlton, plaintiff alleges:
“RITZ-CARLTON HOTEL DEFENDANTS knew or should have known that LENZ was likely to commit sexual abuse, molestation, perversion and other acts of sexual misconduct against patrons of massage services prior to the acts he committed towards Plaintiff JOHN DOE.” (Compl., ¶ 23.)
“RITZ-CARLTON HOTEL DEFENDANTS owed to the public in general, and to Plaintiff in particular, a duty to reasonably identify, remove, and/or report to law enforcement authorities and/or to government agencies individuals who it knew, or should have known, were sexual predators in its service and employ. RITZ-CARLTON HOTEL DEFENDANTS owed to the public in general, and to Plaintiff in particular, a duty to reasonably supervise and/or monitor individuals who it knew, or should have known, were sexual predators in its service and employ. RITZ-CARLTON HOTEL DEFENDANTS owed to Plaintiff a duty to control the acts of their agents, servants, and/or employees.” (Compl., ¶ 35.)
“The acts and omissions of Defendants complained of herein constitute negligent and reckless hiring, training, supervision, and retention of LENZ. It was foreseeable that if RITZ-CARLTON HOTEL DEFENDANTS did not adequately exercise or provide the duty of care owed to clients in their care, including, but not limited to Plaintiff, that the clients, including Plaintiff, would be vulnerable to sexual misconduct by massage therapists. RITZ-CARLTON HOTEL DEFENDANTS also negligently and improperly failed to exercise the minimal and reasonable care by failing to warn Plaintiff about LENZ’S propensity to improperly touch men, and by permitting and encouraging LENZ to have physical access to Plaintiff’s body on the premises of RITZ-CARLTON HOTEL DEFENDANTS. Based on the acts alleged above, Defendants knew, or should have known, that their failure to exercise due care toward Plaintiff would, and did, cause Plaintiff emotional distress, injury, damage, loss and harm.” (Compl., ¶ 36.)
Based on the allegations of the complaint, Ritz-Carlton is correct that the basis of plaintiff’s negligence claim against Ritz-Carlton rests on the proposition that Ritz-Carlton knew or should have known that Lenz posed a risk of sexual misconduct. Nowhere in the complaint does plaintiff allege that Ritz-Carlton failed to implement safety standards that it had adopted. As noted above, Ritz-Carlton need only negate plaintiff’s theories of liability as alleged in the complaint to prevail on summary judgment.
The UMFs that are either undisputed, or not reasonably disputed, regarding Ritz-Carlton having known, or through reasonable diligence should have known, that Lenz had a propensity to engage in sexual misconduct, include:
Lenz received his diploma in massage therapy from Kaplan College in 2011. (UMF No. 1.)
Before 2016, Lenz worked as a massage therapist at luxury resorts including the Viceroy Palm Springs, Las Palmas in Rancho Mirage, the St. Regis, and Pelican Hill. (UMF No. 2.)
Lenz held an active certification from the California Massage Council (“CAMTC”), which requires 500 hours of training and a criminal background check. (UMF No. 4.)
Ritz-Carlton requires that all of its massage service providers hold and maintain an active CAMTC certification. (UMF No. 5.)
Lenz first worked at the Bacara from October 2018 to May 2019, when he voluntarily resigned to take other employment. (UMF No. 6.) (Not reasonably disputed. The response from plaintiff only addresses the reason that Lenz voluntarily resigned to work elsewhere, but the evidence does not negate the fact as stated.)
Lenz worked at the Chumash Casino & Resort from approximately May 1019 to September 2020, and returned to work at the Bacara in June 2021. (UMF No. 7.)
In connection with Lenz’s 2021 rehire, on June 4, 2021, Lenz completed and signed Marriott’s background investigation disclosure and authorization package, authorizing HireRight, a third-party consumer reporting agency, to obtain a consumer report including criminal history, and completing the Company’s criminal-conviction self-disclosure and pre-employment drug testing authorizations. (UMF No. 8.) (Not reasonably “partially disputed.” The partial disputing of the UMF does not address the specific facts as stated, and plaintiff points to no evidence supporting the partial disputing of the UMF.)
“Ritz-Carlton verified through CAMTC’s public certificate search that Martinez-Lenz held CAMTC Certificate No. 20260 as a Certified Massage Therapist in ‘Active’ status.” (UMF No. 9.) (Not reasonably disputed. The court acknowledges that the screenshot of the document evidencing the search shows a date of September 8, 2021. That does not negate the veracity of the fact as stated. Further, that date is nearly three years prior to the alleged date of the sexual assault, and shows that Ritz-Carlton did look to see if Lenz had an active CAMTC.)
“Upon his 2021 rehire, Martinez-Lenz signed a Position Summary for the massage therapist position acknowledging that his duties included ‘Handle inappropriate guest behavior by following MI international standard operating procedures for inappropriate conduct for guests and therapists’ and that he was required to ‘follow all company policies and procedures.’ ” (UMF No. 10.) (Not reasonably “partially” disputed.)
“On June 11, 2021, Martinez-Lenz signed the California Harassment, Discrimination, Retaliation & Unprofessional Conduct Prevention Policy; acknowledged in writing his review of the resort’s local policies, including the Harassment, Discrimination, Retaliation and Unprofessional Conduct Policy; and signed the Employee Handbook acknowledgment, committing ‘to reading, learning and abiding by all of the policies and procedures as outlined in the Handbook.’ ” (UMF No. 11.) (Not reasonably “partially” disputed.)
“In his entire career as a massage therapist, Martinez-Lenz never received a complaint from any client for inappropriate sexual touching, and never received a client complaint of any kind.” (UMF No. 13.) (Not reasonably disputed. The only evidence regarding this fact is the deposition testimony of Lenz. Plaintiff has produced no evidence that Lenz has received complaints from any clients. Plaintiff’s argument, rather than being responsive to the fact as stated, focuses solely on Lenz’s supervision, or lack thereof, by Ritz-Carlton.)
“Before August 3, 2024, the Spa Director had never received a True Guest report, guest email, or complaint of any kind concerning Martinez-Lenz, or any report of inappropriate touching during a massage.” (UMF No. 14.) (Not reasonably disputed for the same reasons explained as to UMF No. 13.)
“Ritz-Carlton had not, at any time, received an accusation against Martinez-Lenz for any misconduct prior to Plaintiff’s accusation.” (UMF No. 15.) (Not reasonably “partially” disputed. Plaintiff’s response does not address the UMF as stated.)
“Asked to state all facts supporting his denial of the Request for Admission that he has no personal knowledge of prior complaints made to Ritz-Carlton about Martinez-Lenz, Plaintiff responded only that he ‘believes prior complaints about Defendant Martinez-Lenz are more likely than not to exist because perpetrators of sexual abuse are known to victimize more than one person,’ and stated that after diligent search and reasonable inquiry ‘the requested documents never existed.’ ” (UMF No. 43.) (Although the UMF is poorly worded, it is not reasonably disputed. The response to Form Interrogatory No. 17.1, subdivision (b), relating to Request for Admission No. 21, states: “Plaintiff believes prior complaints about Defendant Martinez-Lenz are more likely than not to exist because perpetrators of sexual abuse are known to victimize more than one person. It is more likely than not, as is common with all perpetrators of sexual abuse, that Lenz assaulted other massage clients. At the time of response, Plaintiff is actively requesting information, documents, and things from Defendant the Ritz-Carlton Hotel Company LLC and Defendant Arnold Martinez-Lenz. Defendants have withheld and failed to produce any such documents.” The responses were verified by plaintiff on February 17, 2026. (Evid. In Support, Ex. 9.) Plaintiff’s response is pure speculation, and he did not file a motion to compel production of any documents that he alleges defendants have withheld. What is clear from the response is that plaintiff has no personal knowledge of prior complaints made to Ritz-Carlton about Lenz.)
“Plaintiff admits that, at the time of his responses, he has no personal knowledge of any prior criminal record of Martinez-Lenz.” (UMF No. 44.)
Plaintiff does not provide any additional material facts in opposition to the UMFs.
“If the opposing party contends that additional material facts are pertinent to the disposition of the motion, those facts must be set forth in the separate statement.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(f)(3).)
The undisputed facts foreclose any reasonable trier of fact from determining that Ritz-Carlton knew, or should have known, that Lenz had any propensity to commit sexual assault. Because Ritz-Carlton had no knowledge, or even reason to suspect, that Lenz had any propensity to engage in sexual assault, it owed no duty to plaintiff to protect him from Lenz committing a sexual assault. Plaintiff has not provided any persuasive argument that he would be capable of obtaining any evidence of Ritz-Carlton’s prior knowledge of Lenz’s propensity to commit sexual assault. Summary adjudication will be granted based on Ritz-Carlton’s lack of knowledge, after taking reasonable measures regarding Lenz’s background, of Lenz’s propensity for committing sexual assault.
Further, even if plaintiff had pled that Ritz-Carlton was negligent in implementing its safety standards, which he did not, the cause of action would fail. The undisputed facts clearly demonstrate that any alleged deviation from the safety standards would not have prevented Lenz from his actions. See UMF Nos. 10 and 11 above, as well as:
“Ritz-Carlton maintained written policies prohibiting sexual harassment-defined to include ‘[u]nwanted physical contact including touching . . . or assault’-applicable to conduct involving employees and guests, and requiring that any allegation of inappropriate conduct be actively investigated, with discipline up to and including termination. “ (UMF No. 17.) (Not reasonably “partially” disputed.)
“Ritz-Carlton policy prohibited a massage therapist from touching a client’s genitals under any circumstances-even if the client requests it-and Martinez-Lenz knew this at all relevant times.” (UMF No. 19.) (Not reasonably disputed.)
“Marriott’s Progressive Discipline Process and the Employee Handbook authorize immediate suspension pending termination-without prior warnings or discipline-for extremely serious or egregious conduct, expressly including ‘[h]arassing, discriminatory, or retaliatory conduct toward another associate, guest or vendor.’ ” (UMF No. 20.) (Not reasonably “partially” disputed.)
“Martinez-Lenz admits that the touching violated Ritz-Carlton policy and that he knew at the time that his job would be in jeopardy for touching a client’s penis, whether or not consensual.” (UMF No. 24.)
“Immediately after the incident, Martinez-Lenz asked Plaintiff not to report him because he could lose his job.” (UMF No. 25.)
“On August 6, 2024, Plaintiff reported the incident to front office manager Kenan Done and, approximately thirty minutes later, met with Mr. Done and hotel security.” (UMF No. 30.)
“Mr. Done offered to call law enforcement to the hotel for Plaintiff to make a report on the premises, or alternatively advised Plaintiff he could go to the nearby police station; Plaintiff thereafter made a report to the Santa Barbara County Sheriff’s Department.” (UMF No. 31.)
“Upon learning of Plaintiff’s complaint on August 6, 2024, Spa Director Alexis Haley immediately notified safety and security and Director of Human Resources Paul Bullock, who took over the investigation.” (UMF No. 32.)
“On August 7, 2024, when Martinez-Lenz arrived for his next scheduled shift, the Spa Director escorted him directly to Human Resources, where he was suspended without pay pending investigation and walked off the property.” (UMF No. 33.) (Not reasonably disputed.)
“Martinez-Lenz never performed another massage at the Bacara, or anywhere else, after his suspension.” (UMF No. 34.)
“Following an investigation that included Martinez-Lenz’s written statement to Human Resources, Ritz-Carlton terminated Martinez-Lenz’s employment by letter dated August 21,2024, which informed him that ‘the investigation has been concluded,’ that the investigation ‘determined your behaviors were egregious and represent a serious breach of responsibility in violation of company policies,’ and that his employment was ‘terminated effective the date of this letter’; the termination was contemporaneously documented on a Disciplinary Action Form.” (UMF No. 35.)
Lenz was undisputably aware that Ritz-Carlton policy, and the Penal Code, prohibited him from committing sexual assault. The policies had no role in the incident, and Lenz actions were clearly outside the scope of his employment.
Second Cause of Action for Negligent Hiring, Supervision, Retaining, and Supervision.
Ritz-Carlton essentially makes the same arguments, of lack of knowledge or reason to know of Lenz’s propensity for sexual assault, for the second cause of action as for the first.
In opposition, plaintiff acknowledges: “An employer is liable for negligent training and supervision where it knew or should have known that its employee created a particular risk of harm and failed to take reasonable steps to prevent it.” (Opp., p. 18, ll. 20-22, italics added.)
“California case law recognizes the theory that an employer can be liable to a third person for negligently hiring, supervising, or retaining an unfit employee. (Evan F. v. Hughson United Methodist Church (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 828, 836.) Liability is based upon the facts that the employer knew or should have known that hiring the employee created a particular risk or hazard and that particular harm materializes.” (Doe v. Capital Cities (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1038, 1054.)
“To establish negligent supervision, a plaintiff must show that a person in a supervisorial position over the actor had prior knowledge of the actor’s propensity to do the bad act.” (Z.V. v. County of Riverside (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 889, 902.)
For the reasons discussed above, relative to the first cause of action, there is no evidence that Ritz-Carlton knew or should have known that hiring Lenz would create any particular risk or hazard of sexual assault. Thus, plaintiff does not establish the threshold requirement of the cause of action. As such, the motion will be granted as to the second cause of action against Ritz-Carlton.
Third Cause of Action for Premises Liability
Ritz-Carlton argues that the third cause of action fails because plaintiff cannot establish that Ritz-Carlton breached any duty of care in the ownership, operation, or management of the premises, or that any act or omission of Ritz-Carlton was a substantial factor in causing the assault.
Plaintiff provides no argument in opposition to the motion with respect to the third cause of action.
“The elements of a negligence claim and a premises liability claim are the same: a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury.” (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158.)
By way of the complaint, plaintiff alleges:
“RITZ-CARLTON HOTEL DEFENDANTS owned, occupied, managed, operated,
controlled, leased or serviced the subject premises.” (Compl., ¶ 55.)
“RITZ-CARLTON HOTEL DEFENDANTS owed a duty to Plaintiff to own,
occupy, manage, operate, control, lease, or service the premises in a safe and prudent manner.” (Compl., ¶ 56.)
“The acts and/or omissions of Defendants were a breach of the duties Defendants
owed to Plaintiff.” (Compl., ¶ 57.)
Plaintiff fails to allege, or explain in opposition to the present motion, how Ritz-Carlton breached any duty with respect to the property.
“Ordinarily, there is no duty to protect others from third party criminal activity. [Citation.] Courts, however, “ ‘have recognized exceptions to the general no-duty-to-protect rule,’ ” one of which is the “ ‘ “special relationship’ ” doctrine.’ ” [Citation.] “ ‘Courts have found such a special relationship in cases involving the relationship between business proprietors such as shopping centers, restaurants, and bars, and their tenants, patrons, or invitees.’ ” [Citation.] Based on the special relationship, “ ‘commercial proprietors . . . are required to ‘ “maintain land in their possession and control in a reasonably safe condition” ’ and . . . this general duty includes taking ‘ “reasonable steps to secure common areas against foreseeable criminal acts of third parties that are likely to occur in the absence of such precautionary measures.” ’ [Citation.]” (Ericson v. Federal Express Corp. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1291, 1300 (Ericson).)
“The existence and scope of a duty are questions of law for the court’s determination, and foreseeability is a critical factor in the analysis. When foreseeability is analyzed to determine the existence or scope of a duty, foreseeability is also a question of law.” (Ericson, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 1300.)
Based on the UMFs set forth above, including the lack of any knowledge of Lenz’s propensities after making appropriate pre-hire inquiries and checks, it was unforeseeable that Lenz would commit a sexual assault. No reasonable trier of fact could conclude otherwise.
The motion will be granted as to the third cause of action against Ritz-Carlton
Fourth Cause of Action for Sexual Battery
Ritz-Carlton argues that the fourth cause of action fails because Ritz-Carlton committed no touching of plaintiff, Lenz’s intentional sexual misconduct was outside the course and scope of his employment, and the immediate suspension and subsequent firing of Lenz negate ratification.
As with the third cause of action, plaintiff provides no argument in opposition.
By way of the complaint, plaintiff alleges:
“As described above, Defendant LENZ, the massage therapist, without Plaintiff’s consent, engaged in sexual misconduct against Plaintiff, all with the intent of LENZ’S sexual arousal in violation of Civil Code § 1708.5 and Penal Code § 243.4(e)(1).” (Compl., ¶ 62.)
“The massage therapist was employed as a massage therapist by Defendants at Defendants’ businesses. Defendants failed to adequately investigate and reprimand him. By allowing the massage therapist to continue working as a massage therapist after the aforementioned incident and failing to adequately investigate and reprimand him, Defendants approved, aided and abetted, adopted, and ratified the massage therapist’s sexual misconduct.” (Compl., ¶ 64.)
The cause of action, as against Ritz-Carlton, is premised on respondeat superior vicarious liability.
“Respondeat superior liability should apply only to the types of injuries that are “ ‘ “as a practical matter are sure to occur in the conduct of the employer’s enterprise.” ’ ” [Citation.] The employment, in other words, must be such as predictably to create the risk employees will commit intentional torts of the type for which liability is sought.” (Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital (1995) 12 Cal.4th 291, 299 (Lisa M.).)
“In what has proved an influential formulation, the court in Rodgers v. Kemper Constr. Co., supra, 50 Cal.App.3d at page 618, 124 Cal.Rptr. 143, held the tortious occurrence must be “ ‘a generally foreseeable consequence of the activity.’ ” In this usage, the court further explained, foreseeability “ ‘merely means that in the context of the particular enterprise an employee’s conduct is not so unusual or startling that it would seem unfair to include the loss resulting from it among other costs of the employer’s business.’ ” [Citations.] The Rodgers foreseeability test is useful “ ‘because it reflects the central justification for respondeat superior [liability]: that losses fairly attributable to an enterprise-those which foreseeably result from the conduct of the enterprise-should be allocated to the enterprise as a cost of doing business.’ ” [Citation.]” (Lisa M., supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 299.)
“ ‘Ordinarily, the determination whether an employee has acted within the scope of employment presents a question of fact; it becomes a question of law, however, when ‘ “the facts are undisputed and no conflicting inferences are possible.” ’ ” [Citation.]” (Lisa M., supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 299.)
Here, as in Lisa M., which also alleged sexual battery, Lenz “took advantage of plaintiff’s trust and his own superior knowledge to commit on [him] a deliberate sexual battery. His reasons for doing so did not derive from any events or conditions of his employment, nor were his actions provoked by anything that occurred during the prescribed [massage]. [Defendant], by employing the [assailant] and providing the [massage] room, may have set the stage for his misconduct, but the script was entirely of his own, independent invention. For this reason it would be unfair and inconsistent with the basic rationale of respondeat superior to impose liability on [defendant] irrespective of its own negligence.” (Lisa M., supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 306.)
The motion will be granted as to the fourth cause of action against Ritz-Carlton.
Sixth Cause of Action for IIED
Ritz-Carlton argues that the sixth cause of action fails because Ritz-Carlton’s conduct was not outrageous because it vetted Lenz before hiring him, prohibited the conduct in writing, secured written acknowledgements, responded to plaintiff’s report within hours, offered to summon law enforcement to the property, suspended Lenz the following day, terminated Lenz’s employment after investigation, and barred him from being re-hired.
As with the third and fourth causes of action, plaintiff provides no opposition to the motion with respect to the sixth cause of action.
“A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists when there is ‘(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.’ [Citations.] A defendant’s conduct is ‘outrageous’ when it is so ‘extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.’ [Citation.] And the defendant’s conduct must be ‘intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.’ [Citation.]” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-1051, internal quotation marks omitted.)
The UMFs, as set forth above, conclusively demonstrate that Ritz-Carlton did not engage in any extreme and outrageous conduct with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress. Even the complaint itself fails to allege any independent basis for the cause of action against Ritz-Carlton. To the extent that plaintiff is alleging the cause of action against Ritz-Carlton on a vicarious liability theory, it fails for the same reasons set forth above with respect to the fourth cause of action. The motion will be granted as to the sixth cause of action.