John Doe v The Ritz-Carlton Bacara Santa Barbara; Ruby SB Hotel LLC; Ritz-Carlton Hotel Company LLC; Marriott International, Inc.; Arnold Martinez-Lenz

Case Number

25CV04296

Case Type

Civil Law & Motion

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 09/24/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Application to appear pro hac vice; a demurrer; and a motion to strike.

Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff John Doe [“Doe”]: Mary Alexander, Catherine Cawley, Haley Broughton,

For Defendants Ritz-Carlton Hotel Company LLC: [“Ritz-Carleton”] Stephen Grebing, Saleem A. Hawatmeh, Shealie E. Brew

For Defendant Arnold Martinez-Lenz [“Lenz”]: Miguel Avila

Issues

Application to appear pro hac vice; a demurrer; and a motion to strike.

RULINGS [1]

For the reasons set out below:

(1) The application of Tahira Khan Merritt to appear pro hac vice is GRANTED; there is a [Proposed] Order submitted that the Court intends to sign.

(2) The Demurrer is GRANTED as to the 5^th Cause of Action [for Violation of the Ralph Act]. No leave to amend will be permitted. Doe cannot demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the defect on that count can be cured by amendment.

(3) The Demurrer is DENIED as to the 4th [sexual battery claim] and 6th [intentional infliction of emotional distress] Causes of Action.

(4) The Motion to Strike [Punitive damages] is GRANTED. No leave to amend will be permitted now. Doe cannot demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment now. However, Doe may seek leave to add a punitive damage claim if discovery uncovers the necessary facts to sustain such a claim here. This permission given by the Court should not be construed as an invitation to do so unless there are sufficient facts unearthed.

(5) An Answer shall be filed by 10/14/25.

The Complaint

Filed 7/10/25 6 counts:

1. Negligence

2. Negligent Hiring/Retention/Supervision

3. Premises Liability

4. Sexual Battery (Civ. Code § 1708.5)

5. Ralph Act Violation (Civ. Code § 51.7)

6. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Dismissals

Filed 8/11/25 – Dismissed the following:

Defendant The Ritz-Carlton Bacara, Santa Barbara.

Defendant Ruby SB Hotel LLC.

Defendant Marriott International, Inc.

[Two Defendants left in: Lenz and Ritz-Carlton.]

Lenz’s Answer

Filed 9/8/25; General Denial; 10 affirmative defenses.

The Pro Hac Vice Application

Filed 7/17/25; Tahira Khan Merritt: testifies via declaration; residence address is 5930 Bentcreek Trail, Dallas Texas 75252: office address is The Fortenberry Firm, 17177 Preston Road, Dallas Texas 75248; not a resident of California, nor regularly engaged in the practice of law in California; been retained by Mary E. Alexander of the firm Mary Alexander & Associates, P.C., to appear in this action; currently an attorney and counselor at law in good standing with the Bar of the State of Texas, as evidenced by the Certificate of the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Texas, dated June 17, 2025 [attached to the Application as Exhibit A]; was admitted to the Bar of the State of Texas on May 5, 1989; member in good standing with the State Bar of Texas as evidenced in the Certificate of Good Standing [attached to the Application as Exhibit B]; not been suspended or disbarred from the practice of law in any court; not applied for or been admitted pro hac vice in any other action in a California Court in the last two years; Mary E. Alexander of the firm Mary Alexander & Associates, P.C., is counsel of record in this action; address and telephone number are 44 Montgomery Street, Suite 1303, San Francisco, California 94104, (415) 433-4440; applicant for admission pro hac vice; read the application; know its contents; matters stated in the application are true.

Supported by a Memorandum of Points and Authorities.

Supported by the Declaration of Mary Alexander; testifies via declaration; the Verified Application of Tahira Khan Merritt to Appear as Counsel Pro Hac Vice, along with supporting papers and the $500 filing fee, were submitted for filing to the Superior Court of California, County of Santa Barbara, on July 17, 2025; Verified Application and all supporting papers, along with an electronic payment for the $500 fee, were uploaded to the State Bar of California website on July 17, 2025.

The Court’s Conclusions

The request should be granted.

Ritz-Carleton’s Demurrer

Summarized: Ritz-Carleton (1) demurrers to the 4^th cause of action for sexual battery on the grounds it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Defendant. (California Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10(e)); (2) demurrers to the 5^th cause of action for Violation of the Ralph Act on the grounds that the Fifth Cause of Action does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Defendant. (California Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10(e)); (3) demurrers to the Sixth Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress on the grounds that the Sixth Cause of Action does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Defendant. (California Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10(e)).

Supported by the Declaration of Saleem Hawathmeh; August 7, 2025, met and conferred with Doe’s counsel, via telephone conference regarding pleading deficiencies to Doe’s complaint; followed up by email on August 13, 2025; did not receive a response with sufficient time before the due date of Responding Party’s responsive pleading, necessitating the Demurrer.

Supported by a Memorandum of Points and Authorities; filed 8/25/25; 9 pages; summarized: Doe’s Complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to state viable causes of action for the intentional torts of Sexual Battery, violation of the Ralph Act, and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress against Ritz-Carleton; Doe makes sweeping and conclusory assertions regarding alleged misconduct by Lenz, the Complaint does not contain any well-pled allegations establishing that Ritz-Carleton itself engaged in, intended, or ratified the sexual misconduct allegedly committed by Lenz. Doe improperly seeks to impose liability on Ritz-Carleton by attributing to it the alleged independent acts of Lenz, without pleading supporting facts to satisfy the required elements of the asserted causes of action.

Doe’s Fourth Cause of Action for Sexual Battery is legally deficient because the Complaint does not allege any independent conduct by Ritz-Carleton demonstrating intent to cause harmful or offensive contact, as required under Civil Code section 1708.5. Doe’s Fifth Cause of Action for Violation of the Ralph Act similarly fails because it contains only a bare assertion that Lenz acted based on Plaintiff’s sex, without alleging facts showing that Ritz-Carleton engaged in violence, threats of violence, or discriminatory intent based on Doe’s protected status. Doe’s Sixth Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress is unsupported, as Doe does not allege any outrageous conduct by Ritz-Carleton, nor facts establishing that it knew or should have known of Lenz’s alleged misconduct or acted with reckless disregard of the probability of causing Doe emotional distress.

Doe attempts to rely on generalized allegations that Ritz-Carleton failed to investigate or discipline Lenz after the alleged incident. Even if accepted as true - which Ritz-Carleton denies - such assertions are insufficient as a matter of law to state claims for sexual battery, violation of the Ralph Act, or intentional infliction of emotional distress. Because the Complaint lacks the necessary factual allegations to establish liability against Ritz-Carleton each of these causes of action is fatally defective and must be dismissed on demurrer.

On July 10, 2025, Doe filed a Complaint against Ritz-Carleton for the conduct of a massage therapist at the Ritz-Carleton hotel. Within their Complaint, Doe contends Lenz engaged in illegal acts of sexual abuse, molestation, and exploitation upon Doe within a Spa located at the Ritz-Carlton Bacara. Doe alleges Lenz was employed as a male massage therapist under the direction, control, and supervision of Ritz-Carleton.

Within the scope of his employment, Doe states Lenz intended to cause harmful or offensive contact with Doe’s intimate parts for his own sexual arousal, and that Lenz caused Doe to be in imminent apprehension of sexually offensive contact. Doe maintains Ritz-Carleton ratified Lenz’s actions since they knew or otherwise should have known this alleged inappropriate conduct was occurring since they employed Lenz.

At the core of their Complaint Doe argues that as the employers of Lenz, Ritz-Carleton, knew or should have known, Lenz was likely to commit sexual misconduct against patrons of massage services prior to the alleged actions committed against Doe. Following the alleged incident Doe asserts Ritz-Carleton aided, abetted, and ratified Lenz’s sexual misconduct due to their failure in adequately investigate and reprimand Lenz for the alleged actions against Doe.

Doe maintains Ritz-Carleton aided, abetted, and ratified the behavior of Lenz by allowing him to continue to work as a massage therapist with physical access to male clients. Doe argues the primary motivating reason for Defendants’ alleged conduct was Doe’s status as a male.

Doe’s Complaint is devoid of any factual allegations demonstrating intent to cause harmful, outrageous, or extreme offensive contact on behalf of Ritz-Carleton, nor does it allege conduct reflecting a reckless disregard for the probability of causing emotional distress sufficient to support claims of sexual battery, violation of the Ralph Act, or intentional infliction of emotional distress. Accordingly, Doe’s Fourth Cause of Action for Sexual Battery, Fifth Cause of Action for Violation of the Ralph Act, and Sixth Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress fail to survive the present demurrer.

Sets out the Demurrer standards; it is well settled that a plaintiff must set forth specific facts in the complaint so that a defendant may plead intelligently and responsibly to the pleading without having to guess or speculate as to items of material or essential facts. The party against whom a complaint has been filed may object by demurrer to the pleading on the grounds that the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and on the grounds that the allegations are so uncertain that defendant cannot reasonably respond since it cannot be reasonably determined what issues must be admitted or denied or what claims, if any are directed against defendant. A defendant can file a demurrer as an initial pleading. A demurrer is used to test the legal sufficiency of a complaint. This is accomplished by challenging defects which appear on the face of the pleading under attack, or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. The court may take judicial notice of the records in the pending action, or any other court of record in the United States. For purposes of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. The court does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. Further, the allegations of the complaint are not accepted as true if they contradict or are inconsistent with facts judicially noticed by the court. Thus, a pleading valid on its face may nevertheless be subject to demurrer when matters judicially noticed render the complaint meritless. Most importantly, under the doctrine of conclusiveness of pleadings, a pleader is bound by well pleaded material allegations or by failure to deny well pleaded material allegations.

Doe does not allege facts supporting their sexual battery cause of action. Under Civil Code section 1708.5 a person commits a sexual battery if they do any of the following: (1) Act with the intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact with an intimate part of another, and a sexually offensive contact with that person directly or indirectly results; (2) Act with the intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact with another by use of the person's intimate part, and a sexually offensive contact with that person directly or indirectly results; (3) Act to cause an imminent apprehension of the conduct described in paragraph (1) or (2), and a sexually offensive contact with that person directly or indirectly results; (4) Cause contact between a sexual organ, from which a condom has been removed, and the intimate part of another who did not verbally consent to the condom being removed; (5) Cause contact between an intimate part of the person and a sexual organ of another from which the person removed a condom without verbal consent.

Doe states Ritz-Carleton is liable for Sexual Battery because Ritz-Carleton failed to adequately investigate and reprimand Defendant Lenz following the Incident. Plaintiff asserts that by allowing Lenz “to continue working as a massage therapist after the aforementioned incident and failing to adequately investigate and reprimand him, Ritz-Carleton approved, aided and abetted, adopted, and ratified the massage therapist’s sexual misconduct.”

Lacking from Doe’s Complaint are any facts establishing that Ritz-Carleton, through their own independent conduct, committed any direct act with the requisite intent to cause harmful or offensive contact with Doe, or to place Doe in imminent apprehension of sexual misconduct as required under Civil Code § 1708.

The mere fact of Lenz’s employment with Ritz-Carleton does not establish that Ritz-Carleton themselves intended or engaged in sexual misconduct toward Doe. Doe’s Complaint references only the alleged intent of Ritz-Carleton, namely the intent to create his own sexual arousal in violation of Civil Code § 1708.5 and Penal Code § 243.4(e)(1). Presently, no facts within Doe’s Complaint allege Ritz-Carleton engaged in any act for their own sexual arousal or with the intent to cause harmful or offensive contact with Doe’s intimate areas. Doe contends Ritz-Carleton’s failure to investigate or reprimand Lenz is sufficient to establish ratification of Lenz’s conduct and overall satisfactory in demonstrating the requisite intent element required under Civil Code § 1708.5.

Even if taken as true, which Ritz-Carleton denies, such allegations fall short of establishing the statutory intent or conduct necessary to support a sexual battery claim. Doe makes conclusory allegations that Ritz-Carleton aided and abetted Lenz’s actions without providing facts expressing what kind of encouragement or actions constitute aiding and abetting with the intent of causing sexual contact with Doe. The core elements of sexual battery require intent and direct action by the defendant to cause harmful or offensive contact. Doe’s allegations concerning Ritz-Carleton’s conduct after the alleged incident are immaterial to this analysis.

Because Doe fails to allege facts showing that Ritz-Carleton independently intended or committed harmful or offensive contact, the Fourth Cause of Action for Sexual Battery cannot withstand the present demurrer.

Doe does not allege facts supporting their cause of action for a violation of the Ralph Act. The Ralph Act provides that all persons within California have the right to be free from any violence, or intimidation by threat of violence, committed against their persons or property because of race. To establish a claim under the Ralph Act, a plaintiff must show (1) the defendant threatened or committed violent acts against the plaintiff; (2) the defendant was motivated by his perception of plaintiff's race; (3) the plaintiff was harmed; and (4) the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's harm.

Doe’s assertion that Lenz’s conduct was motivated due to Doe’s status as a male is equally unsubstantiated. Aside from identifying Doe’s biological sex, the Complaint provides no factual support showing that either Lenz—and more importantly, Ritz-Carleton —acted with discriminatory intent or was motivated by Doe’s status as a male. The mere recitation of a protected category is insufficient to state a viable Ralph Act claim.

Plaintiff’s cause of action for violation of the Ralph Act suffers from the same deficiencies as their sexual battery claim. Even if Lenz’s alleged actions were motivated by Doe’s sex, Doe has not alleged any facts establishing that Ritz-Carleton intended or committed acts of violence, or threats of violence, based on Doe’s sex. Nor has Doe identified facts showing that Ritz-Carleton’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing harm under the Ralph Act. At most, Doe attempts to impute Lenz’s alleged intent to Ritz-Carleton without alleging facts to support such a theory of liability.

Because Doe has failed to allege facts showing that Ritz-Carleton engaged in or intended violence or threats of violence against Doe due to his sex, the Ralph Act claim is insufficiently pled and cannot withstand demurrer.

Doe does not allege facts supporting the intentional infliction of emotional distress count.

The elements of a prima facie case for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: “(1) outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) the defendant's intention of causing or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct.”

Doe relies on the assertion that Ritz-Carleton ratified Lenz’s actions and failed to act to prevent his actions even though they knew or should have known his inappropriate conduct was occurring. In supporting this assertion, Doe states the acts committed by Lenz occurred as Doe was entrusted by Ritz-Carleton to Lenz’s care. Ritz-Carleton allowed Lenz to have skin-to-skin contact with male clients, including Doe, and to be alone with them while the clients were undress and in a vulnerable position. In sum, Doe concludes Ritz-Carleton knew or should have known that Lenz was likely to commit sexual abuse, molestation, perversion and other acts of sexual misconduct against patrons of massage services prior to the acts he committed towards Doe.

Doe does not plead any facts showing that Ritz-Carleton had actual or constructive knowledge of Lenz’s alleged misconduct prior to the incident, nor does Doe allege that Lenz had a history of complaints, misconduct, or criminal behavior that would have put Ritz-Carleton on notice. Without such factual support, Doe’s assertion that Ritz-Carleton knew or should have known amounts to a conclusory allegation not a well pled fact.

Equally unavailing is Doe’s implication that allowing a massage therapist to perform massages involving skin-to-skin contact in a private setting constitutes “outrageous” conduct sufficient to support a claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. Skin-to-skin contact in a private environment is an inherent and ordinary aspect of professional massage services. Doe provides no additional facts to show that Ritz-Carleton’s provision of such services was unusual, reckless, or outrageous, let alone that it reflected an intent—or reckless disregard—of causing Doe emotional distress.

Doe’s allegations fail to establish any outrageous conduct by Ritz-Carleton, any intent to cause emotional distress, or facts showing reckless disregard of a probability of harm. As such, the Complaint does not state a viable cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Ritz-Carleton, and this claim cannot withstand demurrer.

A Court does not err in sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend where it is probable from the nature of the defects that plaintiff cannot state a cause of action. Here, Doe fails to plead any factual basis supporting their claims for Sexual Battery, Violation of the Ralph Act, and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. Further, Doe cannot amend their claims to state any viable causes of actions and the demurrer to each cause of action is properly sustained without leave to amend.

Doe’s Opposition to the Demurrer

Filed 9/11/25; 17 pages; summarized: Doe brings this opposition to Ritz-Carleton’s Demurrer to the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth causes of action in Doe’s Complaint. Doe requests that the motion be denied in its entirety as the allegations in the complaint are sufficiently pled.

The facts supporting to constitute Doe’s causes of action are sufficient, including the following: Doe was sexually assaulted by Lenz, who was the male employee scheduled to massage him while he and his wife were guests at Ritz-Carleton on or about August 3, 2024. Lenz sexually abused, molested, and exploited Doe during the massage while in the course and scope of his employment with Ritz-Carleton. Ritz-Carleton knew Lenz had a propensity to improperly touch men. Despite having knowledge of its employee Lenz’s propensity, Ritz-Carleton provided the opportunity for Lenz to sexually assault male clients, including Doe, and to be alone with them while in a vulnerable position. Doe’s sex was a motivating factor for Lenz’s conduct. Defendant failed to investigate and reprimand Lenz and allowed him to continue performing massages as a massage therapist under their employment after the aforementioned incident of which they had explicit knowledge.

Ritz-Carleton files the demurrer to the Sexual Battery C.C.P. §1708.5, violation of the Ralph Act C.C.P. § 51.7 and C.C.P. § 52, and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress causes of action in Ritz-Carleton’s Complaint on the theory that sufficient facts have not been pled to constitute an action against Ritz-Carleton. Ritz-Carleton is incorrect because the complaint adequately apprises Ritz-Carleton of the nature of each cause of action and the factual basis for each claim. Proof of the facts as pleaded would entitle Doe to relief under each cause of action. Doe asks that the demurrer be denied in its entirety.

Set forth the rules on demurrer; read and acknowledged.

Doe’s complaint states ultimate facts which entitle Doe to relief. California is a notice pleading jurisdiction. Under C.C.P. § 425.10(a)(1), a complaint is sufficient if it contains a statement of facts constituting the cause of action in ordinary and concise language. The California Supreme Court has consistently held that the complaint ordinarily is sufficient if it alleges ultimate rather than evidentiary facts. A plaintiff need not particularize matters presumptively within the knowledge of the demurring defendant.

Ritz-Carleton alleges that the wrongful and illegal conduct of Lenz was undertaken while in the course and scope of his employment with Lenz engaged in illegal acts of sexual abuse, molestation and exploitation upon Doe at the Spa located at The Ritz-Carlton Bacara. Said wrongful and illegal conduct was undertaken while Lenz was an agent of Ritz-Carleton, and while in the course and scope of Lenz’s employment with Ritz-Carleton and was ratified by Ritz-Carleton.

Ritz-Carleton, as the employers, directors, and supervisors of Lenz, are peculiarly situated to have knowledge beyond that of, or at least equal to, Doe at the pleading stage as Lenz’s employee personnel file, which is likely to include his performance reports, any complaints about him to management from guests including Doe, and communications and information relevant to Ritz-Carleton’s decision to hire and subsequently retain Lenz with knowledge of the sexual abuse suffered by Doe, is solely within the possession and control of Ritz-Carleton and can only be obtained by Doe through discovery. Thus, the ultimate facts alleged in Doe’s Complaint are sufficient to constitute proper notice of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth causes of action.

Defendant’s “Demurrer Standard” mistakenly conflates and misstates the C.C.P. § 430.10(e) general demurrer standard, which tests the sufficiency of facts in the pleading, with the C.C.P. § 430.10(f) special demurrer standard, which tests the uncertainty of the pleading. Ritz-Carleton’s Complaint clearly alleges every fact essential to each cause of action. Ritz-Carleton’s position is not the proper standard of review for ruling on a general demurrer and should be disregarded in deciding on this motion, and any uncertainty Ritz-Carleton believes the Complaint suffers is outside of the scope of this motion.

An employer can be held vicariously liable for an employee's willful and malicious acts if the tortious conduct occurs within the scope of employment. A sexual tort will be within the scope of employment if its motivating emotions were attributable to work-related events or conditions. The Supreme Court of California has expressly declined to follow the path of other jurisdictions that declare such torts per se beyond the scope of employment.

Here, Lenz’s sexual abuse of Doe arose out of and during the performance of the massage Ritz-Carleton hired Lenz specifically to perform on invitees of its enterprise The Ritz- Carlton Bacara Spa. It is obvious that employing a person to perform massages involves physical touch, which by itself, is an insufficient basis on which to impose vicarious liability for a sexual assault. However, Ritz-Carleton knew that Lenz had a propensity to improperly touch men and still scheduled him to massage male clients such as Doe, allowing him to be alone and in skin-to-skin contact with male clients while they were undressed and in a vulnerable position. Ritz-Carleton’s employment of Lenz as a massage therapist, Ritz-Carleton’s knowledge of Lenz’s propensity, and Ritz-Carleton’s scheduling of Lenz to touch male clients created a workplace for Lenz that would be expected to, or did, give rise to intense emotions on the other side.

Lenz’s sexual abuse of Doe was motivated, in part by lust, but also by the opportunity given to Lenz by Ritz-Carleton to act on such motivations, as well as the subsequent ratification of his conduct, which goes far beyond merely making the abuse possible.

Unlike the hospital employee’s conduct in Lisa M, the sexual battery committed by Lenz in this case was a foreseeable outgrowth of Lenz’s employment for which Ritz-Carleton is vicariously liable.

Where the result from the foreseeability test or from an analysis of whether the conduct was an outgrowth of the employment is not clear, the Supreme Court of California has suggested that policy factors should ultimately guide the court's decision.

There are three reasons for applying the doctrine of respondeat superior: (1) to prevent recurrence of the tortious conduct; (2) to give greater assurance of compensation for the victim; and (3) to ensure that the victim's losses will be equitably borne by those who benefit from the enterprise that gave rise to the injury.

Doe expected his massage at The Ritz-Carlton Bacara Spa to be a relaxing, professional, and safe experience. He believed, as any person would, that a massage therapist employed, trained, and supervised by The Ritz-Carlton would never harm him during the massage.

Instead, Doe was sexually assaulted by Ritz-Carleton’s employee on Ritz-Carleton’s premises. No one should ever be sexually exploited and molested while receiving a massage. No one should ever be touched on their genitals during a massage. Any entity that permits, enables, and ratifies such conduct by their employees should be held accountable to prevent such abuse from happening in their establishments.

Plaintiff requests that Ritz-Carleton’s demurrer to the Fourth cause of action fail. Doe’s allegations contain sufficient facts to establish Ritz-Carleton’s Vicarious Liability for a violation of the Ralph Act Under Civil Code § 51.7 and § 52.

Under the Ralph Act [C.C.P. § 51.7], a plaintiff must establish the defendant threatened or committed violent acts against the plaintiff or their property, and a motivating reason for doing so was a prohibited discriminatory motive, or that the defendant aided, incited, or conspired in the denial of a protected right.” Gabrielle A. v. County of Orange (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1268,1291(see California Civil Jury Instructions 3603 (sic) [3063] Acts of violence – Ralph Act – Essential Elements C.C.P. § 51.7). [2]

Here, Lenz, while in the course and scope of his employment as a massage therapist with Ritz-Carleton, committed an act of violence (specifically sexual abuse, molestation, and exploitation) against Doe that was substantially motivated by Doe’s sex as a male.

The sexual abuse has caused Doe to “suffer great pain of mind and body, shock, emotional distress, physical manifestations of emotional distress, embarrassment, loss of self-esteem, disgrace, humiliation, and loss of enjoyment of life; was prevented and will continue to be prevented from performing daily activities and obtaining the full enjoyment of life; has sustained loss of earnings and earning capacity; and/or has incurred and will continue to incur expenses for medical and psychological treatment, therapy and counseling, loss of earnings and earning capacity.” Ritz-Carleton’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing Doe’s harm because it knew Lenz had a propensity to improperly touch men and still scheduled him to massage male clients such as Plaintiff John Doe.

Ritz-Carleton’s claim that the Complaint provides no factual support showing that either Lenz or Ritz-Carleton acted with discriminatory intent or was motivated by Doe’s status as male fundamentally misunderstands how ultimate facts in a complaint are treated in ruling on general demurrer. Plaintiff’s allegation, read within the context of the entire Complaint, that “Defendants subjected Plaintiff [John Doe] to violence based on his sex, causing physical and psychological injuries to him. A motivating reason for [Defendants] conduct was Plaintiff’s sex” is enough to entitle Plaintiff to relief when assumed true as the Court does in making its ruling.

Ritz-Carleton’s claim is nothing more than an argument that what Doe alleges is not true, which is improper. Thus, the general demurrer to the Fifth Cause of Action should fail.

Doe’s Allegations Contain Sufficient Facts to Establish Ritz-Carleton’s Vicarious Liability for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED).

The elements of a cause of action for IIED are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intent of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) plaintiff’s suffering of severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. A defendant's conduct is outrageous when it is so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.

Here, Lenz, while in the course and scope of his employment with Ritz-Carleton intended to cause harmful or offensive contact with intimate parts of Doe, and sexually offensive contact with Doe directly or indirectly resulted therefrom. This ultimate fact taken as true, which is proper when the Court is ruling on general demurrer, clearly establishes that Lenz’s sexual abuse, exploitation and molestation of Doe is outrageous. Ritz-Carleton allowed, adopted, approved, aided, abetted, and ratified the behavior of Lenz by allowing him to continue to work as a massage therapist with physical access to male clients. This ultimate fact within the context of the Complaint, taken as true, establishes Ritz-Carleton’s vicarious liability for Lenz’s conduct. Doe will continue to suffer mental, physical, and pain and suffering in the future because of Ritz-Carleton’s conduct.

It is for the jury to decide, not a question of law, if sexual assault during a massage is outrageous. Assuming the correctness of the allegations, reasonable minds could certainly differ whether it is beyond the bounds of conduct to be tolerated in civilized society whether such alleged behavior is sufficiently extreme as to constitute outrageous behavior is properly determined by the fact finder after trial or possibly after discovery upon a motion for summary judgment.

Doe makes several allegations throughout the Complaint that Ritz-Carleton knew or should have known about. These allegations are not legal conclusions as Ritz-Carleton claims, but ultimate facts that are deemed true by the Court when ruling on general demurrer. Whether one has notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent man upon inquiry as to a particular fact, and whether, by prosecuting such inquiry, he might have learned such fact, are themselves questions of fact to be determined by the jury or the trial court.

Doe alleges that Lenz sexually assaulted Doe while working in his capacity as an agent of Ritz-Carleton. An allegation of agency has been consistently considered an ultimate fact by California courts. Ritz-Carleton does not cite any authority supporting their position that the sexual abuse was not outrageous. Thus, the general demurrer to the Sixth Cause of Action should fail.

If the Court finds that Doe has failed to adequately allege these facts to demonstrate a claim for relief against Ritz-Carleton, Doe requests leave to amend the complaint pursuant to C.C.P. § 472a(c).

Ritz-Carlton’s Reply to Doe’s Opposition to Demurrer

Filed 9/17/25; 10 pages; summarized: Doe’s Opposition highlights rather than resolves the deficiencies in the Complaint. Instead of providing the necessary ultimate facts to support his claims, Doe repeats conclusory allegations that merely restate the wrongful conduct of Lenz and attempt to impute that conduct to Ritz-Carlton through broad assertions of ratification. Even if all facts alleged against Lenz are accepted as true, Doe’s Complaint does not plead facts with reasonable particularity how Ritz-Carlton itself engaged in wrongful conduct, acted with discriminatory intent, or otherwise satisfied the elements required for Sexual Battery, Violation of the Ralph Act, or Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

The sexual battery claim cannot stand against Ritz-Carlton because Doe alleges no ultimate facts showing that the corporation itself committed, directed, or intended any offensive touching. Doe fails to assert facts that Lenz was within the scope of his employment as a massage therapist that would satisfactorily attribute vicarious liability against Ritz-Carlton.

Lenz’s alleged sexual assault of Doe was the independent product of Lenz’s private desires and decision to engage in conduct unrelated to his duties as a massage therapist. As such, his actions were not foreseeable from the nature of the work he was employed to perform.

Doe’s Ralph Act claim fails because the Complaint does not plead facts demonstrating that Ritz-Carlton acted with discriminatory intent based on Doe’s protected status. Doe’s Opposition does nothing more than repeat that Lenz’s alleged acts were discriminatory, without explaining how Ritz-Carlton itself adopted, ratified or motivated any sexual assault by such animus against males. A claim under the Ralph Act requires more than alleging an opportunity for misconduct; it requires factual allegations that Ritz-Carlton committed, threatened, or was motivated to permit violence against Doe because of his protected status as a male. Doe’s Opposition merely recycles conclusory assertions that do not satisfy this requirement and instead cites to CACI elements without any factual backing.

The intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is likewise defective because Doe pleads no facts showing that Ritz-Carlton, in their own personal capacity, engaged in “outrageous” conduct or acted with intent or reckless disregard of causing emotional distress.

Doe’s Opposition concedes the alleged outrageous acts were those of Lenz, not Ritz-Carlton. Even accepting the allegations concerning Lenz’s conduct as true, Doe does not plead ultimate facts with reasonable particularity showing how Ritz-Carlton itself engaged in outrageous conduct or acted with the intent - or reckless disregard - necessary to sustain an IIED claim.

Plaintiff mischaracterizes conclusory allegations as ultimate facts. To overcome a demurrer, a complaint is sufficient if it alleges ultimate rather than evidentiary facts, but Doe must set forth the essential facts of his with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficient to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source, and extent of Doe's claim.

Legal conclusions are insufficient. Although the distinction between ultimate facts and conclusions of law has no fixed definition, a useful test asks whether the pleading apprises the adversary of the factual basis of the claim. Plaintiff may allege on information and belief any matters that are not within his personal knowledge, if he has information leading him to believe that the allegations are true.

Here, Doe’s Opposition improperly conflates ultimate facts with conclusory allegations. In doing so, Doe attempts to recast their pleading deficiencies as factual assertions sufficient to withstand demurrer, when the allegations remain conclusory and unsupported.

Doe alleges Lenz committed an independently motivated sexual tort while performing massage services. Ritz-Carlton does not dispute Lenz’s employment status, but rather disputes that the alleged sexual misconduct fell within the scope of his employment, or that it was ratified, encouraged, or directed by Ritz-Carlton.

Doe argues that they lack access to critical information, such as Lenz’s personnel file, guest complaints, or internal communications, which they contend are solely within the possession and control of Defendants and can only be obtained by Doe through discovery. Yet Doe simultaneously asserts that they may allege matters on information and belief so long as they possess information leading them to believe those allegations are true.

The two positions are inconsistent. Doe cannot both claim to have sufficient information to allege facts on information and belief and at the same time insist that the facts necessary to support their claims are entirely within Ritz-Carlton’s possession and unavailable without discovery. Accepting Doe’s approach would allow conclusory allegations to substitute for factual pleading, undermining the very purpose of the demurrer standard.

Doe’s fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action rest on the conclusory assertion that said wrongful and illegal conduct was undertaken while Lenz was an agent of Ritz-Carlton and while in the course and scope of Lenz’s employment with Ritz-Carlton and was ratified by Ritz-Carlton. This type of boilerplate allegation; unsupported by specific facts demonstrating how Ritz-Carlton ratified or endorsed Lenz’s alleged misconduct; does not satisfy the requirement that ultimate facts, rather than conclusions, be pled. Doe’s effort to reframe their conclusory allegations as ultimate facts is unavailing.

Doe’s attempt to undermine Ritz-Carlton’s position by stating Ritz-Carlton’s position is not the proper standard of review for ruling on a general demurrer and should be disregarded in deciding on this motion, and any uncertainty Ritz-Carlton believes the Complaint suffers is outside of the scope of this motion misinterprets the basis of Ritz-Carlton’s demurrer. Ritz-Carlton maintains, and emphasizes, that even if all the facts alleged within Doe’s complaint were admitted as true, they still fail to plead ultimate facts against Ritz-Carlton and instead amount to conclusory allegations.

Doe’s Opposition is premised on an assumption that the Complaint need only state the CACI elements to survive a Demurrer. Contrary to the actual pleading standard requiring claims be pled with specific allegations, the Complaint does not allege any particularized facts justifying liability against Ritz-Carlton, even if all facts within the Complaint are taken as true.

Ritz-Carlton is not vicariously liable for sexual battery since Lenz’s conduct was not a foreseeable outgrowth of his employment. An employer is vicariously liable for the torts of its employees committed within the scope of the employment. An employer will not be held liable for an assault or other intentional tort that did not have a causal nexus to the employee's work. The fact that the employment brought tortfeasor and victim together in time and place is not enough. The employment must predictably create the risk employees will commit intentional torts of the type for which liability is sought. Respondeat superior liability requires the risk of the tort to have been engendered by, typical of or broadly incidental to, or, viewed from a somewhat different perspective, a generally foreseeable consequence of, a business’ enterprise.

Vicarious liability has been deemed inappropriate where the misconduct does not arise from the conduct of the employer's enterprise but instead arises out of a personal dispute or is the result of a personal compulsion. Neither physical violence nor sexual exploitation is legitimate, excusable or routinely expected in the workplace. That a job involves physical contact is, by itself, an insufficient basis on which to impose vicarious liability for a sexual assault. Here, Plaintiff seeks to impose vicarious liability on Ritz-Carlton by alleging that Lenz was employed as a massage therapist, that his duties involved physical contact with male clients, and that Ritz-Carlton scheduled him to provide such services despite an alleged propensity of Lenz to touch men improperly.

These allegations do not establish foreseeability. The scope of massage therapy is designed to provide therapeutic services directed toward health and wellness, not sexual touching. Although the role involves physical contact, that feature does not transform sexual assault into a foreseeable incident of Ritz-Carlton’s enterprise. Lenz’s alleged conduct reflects a personal deviation arising from his private impulses, not a risk inherent in the enterprise of providing massage services.

Doe’s reliance on contentions of prior knowledge and ratification falls short in attaching vicarious liability to Ritz-Carlton. The Complaint does not allege specific facts explaining how Ritz-Carlton supposedly knew of any propensity for misconduct, what prior conduct alerted it to such risks, or how ordinary scheduling decisions could reasonably be construed as an endorsement of sexual assault. These are conclusory assertions, not ultimate facts. Without factual allegations tethering the employer’s conduct to the tort, the Complaint fails to allege that Ritz-Carlton either foresaw or condoned the misconduct.

Doe improperly conflates opportunity with foreseeability. It is not enough to allege that Ritz-Carlton placed Lenz in private rooms with clients as part of his employment. If opportunity alone established liability, every enterprise involving physical contact - hospitals, spas, physical therapy clinics - would face strict liability for an employee’s private misconduct. Lisa M. rejected this approach, recognizing that sexual misconduct is not engendered by the conditions of employment simply because privacy or physical contact is involved.

Nor has Doe alleged ultimate facts showing that Ritz-Carlton itself harbored the intent required to support a claim for sexual battery. Doe’s theory rests entirely on vicarious liability but providing a room in which massages occur does not establish Ritz-Carlton independently intended or directed harmful contact. In short, the Complaint reduces to an assertion that a massage therapist committed a sexual assault while on the job. Without factual allegations showing that such misconduct was foreseeable from the nature of the enterprise or attributable to the employer’s conduct, the claim cannot stand.

Doe’s appeal to public policy is equally unpersuasive. Expanding vicarious liability to encompass intentional sexual misconduct committed by massage therapists would not meaningfully prevent future misconduct but would instead distort the very nature of wellness services by requiring intrusive monitoring of every private session. Nor does Doe demonstrate how imposing liability in these circumstances would further compensation or loss-spreading goals. The alleged misconduct here was so unusual, startling, and unrelated to the enterprise that it would be fundamentally unfair to assign the costs to the employer.

Just as the Court concluded in Lisa M., Ritz-Carlton may have provided the employment setting, but the alleged misconduct was the product of Lenz’s independent decision to act outside his duties. The employer set the stage for therapeutic services, not the sexual misconduct. Accordingly, the doctrine of vicarious liability does not apply and Doe’s claim for sexual battery against Ritz-Carlton cannot withstand the present demurrer.

Doe’s Assertion that Ritz-Carlton violated the Ralph Act fails since Doe does not plead independent discriminatory intent by Ritz-Carlton. To properly state a Ralph Act claim, Doe must allege facts showing that Ritz-Carlton committed or threatened violence against Doe, and that such conduct was motivated by discriminatory intent based on Doe’s protected status. Doe’s Opposition fails to remedy the fundamental pleading deficiencies in his Ralph Act cause of action and merely recycles conclusory assertions premised on an assumption that the Complaint need only state the CACI elements to survive a Demurrer.

In rebutting Ritz-Carlton’s Demurrer, Doe reiterates that Lenz, while in the scope of his employment as a massage therapist with Ritz-Carlton committed an act of violence (specifically sexual abuse, molestation, and exploitation) against Doe that was substantially motivated by Doe’s sex as a male. Doe relies on two contentions: (1) Ritz-Carlton’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing Doe’s harm because it knew Lenz had a propensity to improperly touch men and still scheduled him to massage male clients such as Doe and (2) Ritz-Carlton subjected Doe to violence based on his sex, causing physical and psychological injuries to him.

A motivating reason for Ritz-Carlton conduct was Doe’s sex. Doe maintains Ritz-Carlton’s claim is nothing more than an argument that what Doe alleges is not true, which is improper. Neither contention is supported by ultimate facts sufficient to withstand demurrer.

Here, even assuming the truth of the allegations regarding Lenz’s misconduct, the facts do not establish that Ritz-Carlton itself engaged in violence or threats of violence, or that Ritz-Carlton acted with discriminatory animus against Doe based on his sex. Doe’s conclusory assertion that Ritz-Carlton knew Lenz had a propensity to improperly touch men and still scheduled him to massage male clients is insufficient. This allegation describes, at most, the provision of workplace opportunity, not conduct undertaken by Ritz-Carlton with the intent to discriminate or harm based on Doe’s sex.

A viable Ralph Act claim requires factual allegations demonstrating how Ritz-Carlton, in and of itself, harbored discriminatory intent or engaged in acts motivated by Doe’s protected status. Doe pleads no such facts here. The Complaint and Opposition do not allege what Ritz-Carlton allegedly knew about Lenz, when it acquired this knowledge, or how that knowledge reflects animus against men as a class. At most, the pleading asserts that Ritz-Carlton provided Lenz with access to clients and that Lenz was working within the scope of his employment. Even if taken as true, Doe’s assertion that Ritz-Carlton’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing Doe’s harm fails to support a claim for violation of the Ralph Act since the Complaint lacks facts that Ritz-Carlton, in their own personal capacity, threatened or committed violent acts against Doe. Opportunity is not equivalent to motive, and scheduling employees to perform the very work they were hired to do cannot be transformed into evidence of discriminatory intent without more.

Without particularized allegations of intent or conduct attributable to Ritz-Carlton, the Ralph Act claim cannot withstand the present demurrer.

Doe’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim fails since the complaint does not plead the requisite intent. The elements of a prima facie case for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) the defendant's intention of causing or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct.

Doe attempts to cure the deficiencies identified in Ritz-Carlton’s Demurrer by re-framing Lenz’s alleged conduct and claiming that Ritz-Carlton ratified it. Specifically, Doe relies on the assertion that Lenz, while in the course and scope of his employment with Ritz-Carlton intended to cause harmful or offensive contact with intimate parts of Doe and sexually offensive contact with Doe directly or indirectly resulted therefrom. Doe further contends this establishes that Lenz’s sexual abuse, exploitation and molestation of Doe is outrageous. But these allegations focus exclusively on the alleged conduct of Lenz - not Ritz-Carlton.

Doe’s Opposition merely reiterates Lenz’s alleged behavior and then asserts, without factual support, that Ritz-Carlton allowed, adopted, approved, aided, abetted, and ratified the behavior of Lenz by allowing him to continue to work as a massage therapist with physical access to male clients. Even accepting the allegations concerning Lenz’s conduct as true, Doe does not allege ultimate facts with reasonable particularity showing how Ritz-Carlton itself engaged in outrageous conduct or acted with the intent - or reckless disregard - necessary to sustain an IIED claim. The bare conclusion that Ritz-Carlton “ratified” Lenz’s conduct by retaining him as an employee is insufficient. It is a legal conclusion, not a factual allegation, and it does not establish that Ritz-Carlton knew of or affirmatively endorsed the wrongful acts attributed to Lenz. Without such specific allegations, Doe cannot establish the requisite intent or outrageous conduct by Ritz-Carlton.

Because Doe offers only conclusory allegations of ratification without supporting facts, the Complaint fails to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Ritz-Carlton, and the demurrer for this cause of action should be sustained.

A Court does not err in sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend where it is probable from the nature of the defects that plaintiff cannot state a cause of action.

Here, Doe fails to plead any factual basis supporting their claims for Sexual Battery, Violation of the Ralph Act, and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. Further, Doe cannot amend their claims to state any viable causes of actions and the demurrer to each cause of action is properly sustained without leave to amend.

The Court’s Conclusions

Doe’s assertion that Lenz’s conduct was motivated due to Doe’s status as a male is equally unsubstantiated. Aside from identifying Doe’s biological sex, the Complaint provides no factual support showing that either Lenz - and more importantly, Ritz-Carleton - acted with discriminatory intent or was motivated by Doe’s status as a male. The mere recitation of a protected category is insufficient to state a viable Ralph Act claim.

Even if Lenz’s alleged actions were motivated by Doe’s sex, Doe has not alleged any facts establishing that Ritz-Carleton intended or committed acts of violence, or threats of violence, based on Doe’s sex. Nor has Doe identified facts showing that Ritz-Carleton’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing harm under the Ralph Act. At most, Doe attempts to impute Lenz’s alleged intent to Ritz-Carleton without alleging facts to support such a theory of liability.

Doe cannot amend their Ralph Act claim to state a viable cause of actions.

As to Ritz-Carleton’s argument concerning the other two counts the Court finds those arguments are without merit.

The Motion to Strike

1. The following allegation found at page 6 ¶ 22 of the Complaint: “Defendants, and each of their acts described herein, violated California Penal Code §182 in that Defendants, and each of them, conspired with one or more other persons to commit acts injurious to public health, to public morals, and/or to prevent or obstruct justice or the due administration of the laws.”

2. The following allegation found at page 13 ¶ 74 of the Complaint: “As a result of the conduct, Plaintiff is entitled to a$25,000.00 penalty and/or punitive damages for Defendants' conduct in violation of Civil Code § 51.7, as well as attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Civil Code § 52.”

3. The following allegation found at page 13 ¶ 75 of the Complaint. “The conduct was accomplished intentionally and/or recklessly with conscious disregard for said Plaintiff's health, safety, privacy, freedom, and human dignity. Defendants' conduct was so outrageous in character and so in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and should be regarded as despicable, atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. The acts of Defendants alleged above were willful, wanton, malicious, oppressive, fraudulent, despicable, and outrageous and justify the awarding of exemplary and punitive damages.”

4. The following allegation found in the Prayer of the Complaint at Page 14-15 lines 28-1: “2. For punitive damages/exemplary damages according to proof and pursuant to Civil Code §§ 1708.5(3)(b) and 1782(2).”

5. The following allegation found in the Prayer of the Complaint at Page 15 lines 2-3: “For attorney fees and/or penalties pursuant to Civil Code § 1708.5(3)(b) and 3 1782(2) and Civil Code § 51.7 and 52, and Code of Civil Procedure §1021.5.”

This Motion is made on the ground that the above matters constitute irrelevant, false, or improper matters pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 436.

Ritz-Carlton’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities

Filed 8/25/25; 8 pages; summarized: As part of their claims, Doe seeks the imposition of punitive damages against Ritz-Carlton. Doe fails to specifically allege any factual basis that would give rise to the imposition of punitive damages against Ritz-Carlton. As a result, the Complaint offers neither specific pleading nor specific justification for Ritz-Carlton to be punished in this matter, and the Complaint is entirely devoid of facts sufficient to establish that Ritz-Carlton acted with malice, oppression, or fraud as required by California Civil Code § 3294(s) to satisfy the strict standard for punitive damages under California law. Indeed, the Complaint offers only conclusory allegations which cannot form the basis for a unitive damages claim. For this reason, the Court should strike all allegations and prayers for punitive damages against Ritz-Carlton as irrelevant, improper, and not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 436(b).

California case law establishes that a motion to strike is the proper method to dispose of an immaterial matter within a pleading, including improper claims for punitive damages. Mere general assertions by way of conclusory allegations fail to comply with the rules of pleading. Consequently, statements in a pleading characterizing a defendant’s conduct in a conclusory manner, as here, are properly stricken from the complaint. California Civil Code § 3294(a) allows the recovery of punitive damages in a tort action only “where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” Thus, to survive a motion to strike punitive damages, a plaintiff must plead specific facts showing entitlement to such release. Conclusory allegations are not sufficient to satisfy the stringent pleading requirements for punitive damages. The complaint must contain specific factual allegations that support entitlement to punitive or exemplary damages.

In addition, “the plaintiff must establish that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of its conduct and that it willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.” Taylor v. Super. Ct., 24 Cal. 3d 890, 895-96 (1979). The purpose of the heightened pleading standard for recovery of punitive damages is so that the defendant can intelligently meet the charges against it.

Doe’s Complaint contains mere conclusory allegations that fail to meet the stringent burden of pleading specific facts establishing that Moving Defendants acted with malice, oppression, or fraud. There are no specific facts in the complaint to show that Ritz-Carlton acted intentionally, with malice, oppression or fraud, or with a conscious disregard for public safety or Doe’s rights. Indeed, there are no facts establishing that Ritz-Carlton engaged in any conduct that would even suggest an award of punitive damages are justified in this case.

For these reasons, the Court should grant Ritz-Carlton’s Motion and issue an Order striking all references in the Complaint that allege or refer to punitive damages or conclusory allegations of conduct purportedly supporting such damages.

Doe fails to plead facts sufficient to establish malice or oppression. Malice is “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(c)(1). Despicable conduct is conduct that is so “base, vile or contemptible” that it would be despised and looked down upon by ordinary persons. Oppression is “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(c)(2).

California courts have held that the standard of adequate pleading of malicious conduct applies to the pleading of oppressive conduct. Thus, to state a claim for punitive damages based on malice or oppression, Doe’s complaint must plead specific facts to establish that Ritz-Carlton’s conduct either (1) intended to cause injury to Doe, or (2) was so “base, vile or contemptible” that it would be despised and looked down upon by ordinary persons.

Here, Doe merely states in conclusory fashion that “The aforementioned conduct [by Ritz-Carlton] was accomplished intentionally and/or recklessly with conscious disregard for Doe’s health, safety, privacy, freedom, and human dignity. Ritz-Carlton’s aforementioned conduct was so outrageous in character and so in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and should be regarded as despicable, atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. The acts of Ritz-Carlton alleged above were willful, wanton, malicious, oppressive, fraudulent, despicable, and outrageous and justify the awarding of exemplary and punitive damages.” (Complaint at ¶ 75.)

Doe further asserts Ritz-Carlton “ratified Lenz’s actions and failed to act to prevent his actions despite the fact that they knew or should have known his inappropriate conduct was occurring.” (Complaint at ¶ 50.)

Doe does not plead any facts showing that Ritz-Carlton had actual or constructive knowledge of Lenz’s alleged misconduct prior to the incident, nor does Doe allege that Lenz had a history of complaints, misconduct, or criminal behavior that would have put Ritz-Carlton on notice. Without such factual support, Doe’s assertion that Ritz-Carlton “knew or should have known” amounts to a conclusory allegation not a well pled fact.

As a result, Doe has not alleged, as they must, that Ritz-Carlton’s conduct was sufficiently “base, vile or contemptible” that it would be looked down upon by ordinary persons nor does they allege Ritz-Carlton intended to harm Doe. Bare conclusions are not sufficient to plead entitlement to punitive damages; Doe must plead specific facts showing entitlement to relief, which he has not done. As a result, Doe’s allegations against Ritz-Carlton are without sufficient factual basis to support punitive damages claim.

Doe may argue that because the case is merely at the pleadings stage, the facts as pled are sufficient to establish malice or oppression. However, California courts require parties to plead specific and sufficient facts to support a claim for punitive damages:

When nondeliberate injury is charged, allegations that the defendant’s conduct was wrongful, willful, wanton, reckless or unlawful do not support a claim for exemplary damages; such allegations do not charge malice. When the defendant must produce evidence in defense of an exemplary damage claim, fairness demands that he receive adequate notice of the kind of conduct charged against him. G.D. Searle and Co. v. Super. Ct., 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 29 (1975). Buzzwords and conclusory allegations are not sufficient to overcome a motion to strike punitive damages. See Kisesky, 144 Cal. 5 App. 3d at 234. Thus, because the Complaint fails to plead specific facts to support allegations that Ritz-Carlton acted with conscious disregard or engaged in despicable conduct in connection with the alleged sexual misconduct of Lenz, Doe fails to properly plead malice or oppression against Ritz-Carlton, and the allegations, claims, references, and prayers regarding punitive damages should be stricken.

Moreover, an award of punitive damages against a corporation also requires proof of oppression, fraud, or malice committed or authorized by a corporate officer, director, or managing agent who exercise substantial discretionary authority over decisions that ultimately determine corporate policy. Cruz v. Homebase (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 160, 167. Corporations are legal entities which do not have minds capable of recklessness, wickedness, or intent to injure or deceive. (Cruz, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 167.)

To establish intentional conduct against a corporation, therefore, a plaintiff is required to identify a specific individual of the corporation, establish the individual’s authority to act on behalf of the corporation, and prove the intentional tortious conduct by said individual. Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto, Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 157. No such allegations appear in the FAC.

California courts historically have adopted a restrictive position towards awards of punitive damages, and such awards are generally disfavored. The California Legislature’s 1987 amendment to California Civil Code § 3249 requires clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice to recover exemplary damages. The adoption of such a stringent standard for punitive damages by both California statutory and decisional law demonstrates that exemplary damages are disfavored and are recoverable only in the clearest of cases. Even prior to the stringent language of section 3294, courts consistently held that the law does not favor punitive damages and they should be granted with the greatest caution. Accordingly, California courts have long held that to withstand a motion to strike punitive damages, a plaintiff must plead specific facts which support his claim for punitive damages. As Doe’s punitive damages allegations here are based entirely on conclusory allegations of malice or oppression, with no specific facts to support such allegations, the Court should strike all language in the Complaint alleging or suggesting Plaintiff is entitled to punitive

Ritz-Carlton requests this Court grant their Motion to Strike in its entirety, and strike all claims, allegations, and references to punitive damages in the Complaint, including in the Prayer for Relief, without leave to amend.

Doe’s Opposition

Filed 9/11/25; 13 pages; summarized: Doe brings this opposition to Ritz-Carlton’s Motion to Strike Portions of Doe’s Complaint alleging a claim for punitive or exemplary damages. Doe requests that the motion be denied in its entirety as the allegations in the complaint are sufficiently pled.

The facts supporting punitive damages are sufficient, including the following:

Plaintiff John Doe (“Plaintiff”) was sexually assaulted by Defendant Arnold Martinez-Lenz (“Lenz”), the male employee who was scheduled to massage him while he and his wife were guests at The Ritz-Carlton Hotel Company’s (“Defendant”) resort and spa, The Ritz-Carlton Bacara in Santa Barbara, on or about August 3, 2024. Page 5 ¶ 20 of Complaint.

Lenz sexually abused, molested, and exploited Plaintiff during the massage while in the course and scope of his employment with Defendant. Page 5 ¶ 21 of Complaint.

Defendant knew Lenz had a propensity to improperly touch men. Page 7-8 ¶ 36 of Complaint.

Despite having knowledge of its employee Lenz’s propensity, Defendant provided the opportunity for Lenz to sexually assault male clients, including Plaintiff John Doe, and to be alone with them while in a vulnerable position. Page 5 ¶ 24 of Complaint.

Plaintiff’s sex was a motivating factor for Lenz’s violent conduct. Page 13 ¶ 70 of Complaint.

Further, Defendant failed to investigate and reprimand Lenz and allowed him to continue performing massages as a massage therapist under their employment after the aforementioned incident of which they explicitly had knowledge. Page 12 ¶ 64 of Complaint.

Ritz-Carlton files the instant motion to strike on the theory that Doe’s Complaint does not offer any facts which would give rise to punitive damages against Ritz-Carlton. Specifically, Ritz-Carlton seeks to strike:

1. The allegation found at page 6 ¶ 22 of the Complaint: “Defendants, and each of their acts described herein, violated California Penal Code §182 in that Defendants, and each of them, conspired with one or more other persons to commit acts injurious to public health, to public morals, and/or to prevent or obstruct justice or the due administration of the laws.”

2. Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages based on Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant violated the Ralph Act at page 13 ¶ 74 of the Complaint: “As a result of the aforementioned conduct, Plaintiff is entitled to a $25,000.00 penalty and/or punitive damages for Defendants' conduct in violation of Civil Code § 51.7, as well as attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Civil Code § 52.”

3. The factual allegation found at page 13 ¶ 75 of the Complaint: “The aforementioned conduct was accomplished intentionally and/or recklessly with conscious disregard for said Plaintiff's health, safety, privacy, freedom, and human dignity. Defendants' aforementioned conduct was so outrageous in character and so in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and should be regarded as despicable, atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. The acts of Defendants alleged above were willful, wanton, malicious, oppressive, fraudulent, despicable, and outrageous and justify the awarding of exemplary and punitive damages.”

4. Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages at Page 14-15 ¶ 2-3.

Ritz-Carlton’s motion to strike is inconsistent with C.C.P. § 436 because it asks the Court to strike allegations which are directly related to their liability for punitive damages. The purpose of C.C.P. § 436 “is to authorize the excision of superfluous or abusive allegations… matter that is essential to a cause of action should not be struck and it is error to do so.” Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 509, 528 (quoting Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Center (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1281.)

Ritz-Carlton’s motion to strike punitive damages is unsupported based on the well-pled factual allegations in Doe’s Complaint. Doe requests that it be denied in its entirety.

At the pleading stage, it is enough to allege facts that raise an inference of malice, oppression or fraud to support a claim for punitive damages under C.C.P. § 3294. Perkins v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 1, 6 (Taken in context, the words wrongfully and intentionally describe a knowing and deliberate state of mind from which a conscious, disregard of petitioner's rights might be inferred a state of mind which would sustain an award of punitive damages.) A plaintiff is required only to set forth the essential facts of his case with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficient to acquaint a defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action. (Doheny Park Terrace Homeowners Assn. Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exchange (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1099.)

California courts have long recognized that what is important is that the complaint as a whole contain sufficient facts to apprise the defendant of the basis upon which the plaintiff is seeking relief. (Pridonoff v. Balokovich, 36 Cal.2d 788, 792.)

Moreover, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth. (Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. v. Superior Court (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 696, 704.) In Kisekey v. Carpenters’ Trust for So. California, the appellate court held that the plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages was sufficient, not merely conclusory, because he alleged the defendant’s conduct was “intentional, outrageous, and malicious” and “coupled” the claim “with factual allegations” that demonstrated the alleged intentional, outrageous, and malicious conduct. (1983)144 Cal.App.3d 222, 234.

Similarly, Doe’s Complaint alleges that acts of Defendants “were willful, wanton, malicious, oppressive, fraudulent, despicable, and outrageous…” Page 13 ¶ 75 and Page 14 ¶ 83 of Complaint. This is pled and sufficient with the following facts:

“[Defendant] operated and controlled the Spa at The Ritz-Carlton Bacara.” Page 4 ¶16 of Complaint.

“Defendant Lenz who was employed by, and under the direction, control and supervision of [Defendant].” Page 5 ¶ 17 of Complaint.

“On or about August 3, 2024, Lenz engaged in illegal acts of sexual abuse, molestation and exploitation upon Plaintiff.” Page 5 ¶ 20 of Complaint.

“[W]hile Defendant Lenz was an agent of [Defendant], while in the course and scope of Lenz’s employment with [Defendants] and was ratified by [Defendant].” Page 5 ¶ 21 of Complaint.

“Defendant allowed Lenz… to be alone with them while the clients were undressed and in a vulnerable position.” Pages 5-6 ¶ 24 of Complaint.

“[Lenz] intended to cause harmful or offensive contact with intimate parts of Plaintiff, and sexually offensive contact with Plaintiff directly and indirectly resulted therefrom.” Page 7 ¶ 33 of Complaint.

“[Defendant] also negligently and improperly failed to… warn Plaintiff about Lenz’s propensity to improperly touch men.” Page 7 ¶ 36 of Complaint.

“[Defendant] negligently hired and negligently supervised Lenz knowing that Lenz would be hired to engage in the provision of massage therapy to Plaintiff and would be in a position of power, trust, and authority over Plaintiff.” Page 8 ¶ 40 of Complaint.

“[Defendant] knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known that Lenz was incompetent and unfit to perform the duties for which he was employed and that an undue risk to persons such as Plaintiff would exist because of his employment.” Page 9 ¶ 48 of Complaint.

“[B]y allowing [Lenz] to continue working as a massage therapist after the aforementioned incident and failing to adequately investigate and reprimand him, Defendant approved, aided and abetted, adopted, and ratified [Lenz’s] sexual misconduct.” Page 12 ¶ 64 of Complaint.

“[Lenz] subjected Plaintiff to violence based on his sex.” Page 13 ¶ 70.

The California Supreme Court has held that “[l]ess particularity [in pleading] is required when it appears that defendant has superior knowledge of the facts, so long as the pleading gives notice of the issues sufficient to enable preparation of a defense.” Okun v. Superior Court (1981) 29 Cal.3d 442, 458.

Ritz-Carlton, as the employer and supervisor of The Ritz-Carlton Bacara Spa employees, including massage therapists such as Lenz, have superior knowledge of “a history of complaints, misconduct, or criminal behavior that would have put Ritz-Carlton on notice.” Page 6 Line 28 15-16

Ritz-Carlton is the sole party to possess and control Lenz’s employee personnel file, which presumably includes Lenz’s initial job application, Lenz’s professional references, internal communications between directors, managers, and supervisors regarding Lenz’s employment, any complaints against Lenz by clients including Doe, Lenz’s job performance reports, and all other communication and information relevant to Ritz-Carlton’s decision to hire and subsequently retain Lenz with knowledge of the sexual abuse suffered by Doe.

Doe can only, and is seeking to, obtain that information through discovery. Doe believes, based on the sexual abuse inflicted on Doe and Ritz-Carlton’s subsequent ratification of the sexual abuse as described in the Complaint, that the allegations made are true. Thus, the ultimate facts pleaded by Doe are sufficient because Ritz-Carlton has superior, or at least equal, knowledge of the facts.

With the above factual allegations, Doe has sufficiently pled facts to put Ritz-Carlton on notice of the ultimate facts on the basis for which punitive damages are sought when taken as true.

With respect to claims for punitive and exemplary damages, C.C.P. § 3294(c) provides, in pertinent part:

(1) "Malice" means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.

(2) "Oppression" means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.

(3) "Fraud" means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.

It is well established that a conscious disregard for the safety of others may constitute the malice required to sustain a claim for punitive damages. Blegen v. Superior Court (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 959, 962. [In order to justify an award of punitive damages on this basis, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of [its] conduct, and [it] willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.]

As Ritz-Carlton notes, the appellate court in Blegan held that to accomplish this, “the plaintiff must plead the ultimate facts which give rise to liability.” Id. at 962-63.

Although Blegan and Taylor were decided before the 1987 amendment to C.C.P. § 3294 that added a “despicable conduct” requirement to the punitive damages statute, cases decided since the 1987 amendment have defined the term “despicable” to include conduct that is either criminal, that has “the character of outrage frequently associated with crime,” or that is in “blatant violation of law or policy.” The sexual assault which Doe suffered is clearly despicable conduct under this standard.

Doe’s Complaint alleges Ritz-Carlton knew about Lenz’s propensity to improperly touch men and still permitted him to have physical access to Doe’s body on their premises. Page 7-8 ¶ 36 of Complaint.

Lenz sexually assaulted Doe while in the course and scope of his employment as a massage therapist for Defendant. This allegation, taken as true clearly establishes Ritz-Carlton’s conscious disregard for the rights and safety of The Ritz-Carlton Bacara Spa guests, including Doe. This conduct is “outrageous” because it is so “extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 1001.

Doe’s Complaint clearly alleges that Ritz-Carlton is vicariously liable for the despicable and outrageous conduct of Lenz because Lenz committed the sexual assault while in the course and scope of his employment with Ritz-Carlton. Page 5 ¶ 20-21.

In Greives v. Superior Ct., the appellate court granted a motion to strike, with leave to amend, on petitioners’ prayer for punitive damages from the hospital for the battery committed by hospital employees because the amended complaint only “refer[ed] to [hospital’s] negligence. [Petitioners] make not a single assertion of intentional conduct… Thus, even if we interpret [moving parties’] alleged ‘knowledge’ as describing a state of mind from which a conscious disregard of petitioner's rights might be inferred—'a state of mind which would sustain an award of punitive damages ...’ we cannot ignore the recurring theme underlying petitioners' claim, i.e., that [moving parties’] conduct was, at most, negligent.” (1984) 157 Cal. App. 3d at 167(quoting Perkins,117 Cal.App.3d at 6).

Here, Doe’s Complaint alleges Ritz-Carlton is vicariously liable for its employee’s intentional conduct, including that “Defendant Lenz, who was employed by, under the direction, control, and supervision of [Defendant]… engaged in illegal acts of sexual abuse, molestation and exploitation upon Plaintiff John Doe… said wrongful and illegal conduct was undertaken while Defendant Lenz was an agent of [Defendant], and while in the course and scope of Lenz’s employment with [Defendants] and was ratified by [Defendants]. Page 5 ¶ 17-21 of Complaint.

“Defendants, allowed Lenz to have skin-to-skin contact with male clients, including Plaintiff, and to be alone with them while the clients were undressed and in a vulnerable position.” Page 5 ¶ 24 of Complaint.

Defendants, allowed Lenz “to continue working as a massage therapist after the aforementioned incident and fail[ed] to adequately investigate and reprimand him.” Page 12 ¶ 64 of Complaint.

Doe’s Complaint alleges that Ritz-Carlton’s conduct was intentional and provides several factual allegations in support of that claim. For these reasons, Ritz-Carlton’s motion to strike must be denied.

Ritz-Carlton claim that “an award of punitive damages against a corporation also requires proof of oppression, fraud, or malice committed or authorized by a corporate officer, director, or managing agent” citing to Cruz v. Homebase (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 160, 167 (quoting White v. Ultramar (1999) 21 Cal.4th. 563, 573).

In White v. Ultramar, Inc., the ex-employee plaintiff sued his former employer for wrongful termination after his supervisor fired him for testifying in an unemployment hearing. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 578. The corporate defendant claimed it was not liable for the supervisor’s conduct because she was not a managing agent under C.C.P § 3294(b). The California Supreme court explained that a “managing agent must be someone who exercises substantial discretionary authority over decisions that ultimately determine corporate policy.” White, 21 Cal.4th at 573.

The distinction between policy making corporate employees and “mere supervisory” corporate employees is not immediately clear because those duties often overlap. Id. At 575. The supervisor in White was ultimately held to be a managing agent under this standard because of the testimony of her superiors at trial. Id. At 577.

At the discovery stage, the plaintiff in White had no way of knowing how much “substantial discretionary authority over vital aspects of Ultramar’s business” his supervisor wielded. Id.

The California Supreme Court in White cites several cases affirming punitive damages against a corporate employer.

As applied to Ritz-Carlton’s contentions regarding Doe’s Complaint, White highlights the fact that the officers, directors, or managing agents responsible for the ratification of the wrongful act of the entity's employee may not be readily ascertainable at the pleading stage. It is anticipated that names of the particular individuals will be determined once discovery and further investigation are conducted. However, at the current stage in pre-trial litigation, the identities of the responsible corporate officers, directors, or managing agents have not yet been ascertained and therefore cannot be alleged. This in no way defeats a claim for punitive damages against the Ritz-Carlton at the pleading stage because Ritz-Carlton has been sufficiently put on notice of the ultimate facts which form the basis of Doe’s Complaint.

California law has long endorsed the use of punitive damages to deter continuation or imitation of a corporation's course of wrongful conduct. The California Supreme Court has consistently held that the purpose and function of punitive damages to punish wrongdoing and thereby protect the public from future misconduct, either by the same defendant or by other potential wrongdoers. The courts cannot usurp the Legislature's determination that [punitive] damages should be recoverable in cases in which the statutory prerequisites are fulfilled. At trial, punitive damages are to be assessed in an amount which, depending upon the defendant's financial worth and other factors, will deter him and others from committing similar misdeeds.

Ritz-Carlton ignores that the factual allegations taken as true would rise to meet the stringent requirements for punitive damages pleadings, and as discussed above, incorrectly characterizes Doe’s allegations as based entirely on conclusory allegations of malice or oppression, with no specific facts to support such allegation.

Further, a violation of the Ralph Act C.C.P § 51.7 expressly permits a recovery of punitive damages under the statute. Thus, the motion to strike should fail because the cited authorities emphasize the importance of holding corporations accountable when necessary to protect the public.

Ritz-Carlton erroneously states that factual allegations do not “appear in the FAC”, but the present motion to strike is on Doe’s original complaint which has not been amended. However, an amendment should be allowed where the defect, though one of substance, may possibly be cured by supplying omitted allegations.

Plaintiff believes it can learn the true names of responsible corporate officers, directors, or managing agents during discovery. The rule is that courts will be liberal in allowing an amendment to a pleading when it does not seriously impair the rights of the opposite party.

If the Court is inclined to grant the motion to strike, Doe requests leave to amend.

Ritz-Carlton’s Reply

Filed 9/17/25; 7 pages; summarized: Punitive damages are not a matter of course, but rather an extraordinary remedy meant to punish and deter only the most egregious misconduct. To survive a motion to strike, a plaintiff must plead specific facts showing conduct so extreme that it rises to the level of malice, oppression, or fraud, as defined by Code of Civil Procedure section 3294. Yet here, Doe’s Complaint does not allege facts that meet that demanding standard.

Doe’s allegations fall into three categories: (1) negligent conduct alleged against Moving Defendant, such as permitting Lenz to continue working or failing to investigate; (2) intentional misconduct attributed solely to Lenz; and (3) conclusory assertions of malice, oppression, or ratification without supporting facts. None of these categories satisfy the heightened pleading requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 3294.

Simply labeling conduct “despicable” or “outrageous” does not establish malice, oppression, or fraud, nor does it demonstrate that any officer, director, or managing agent of Ritz-Carleton acted with the requisite intent.

Doe’s reliance on discovery to fill in these gaps is improper. A plaintiff cannot both claim to have alleged facts on “information and belief” and simultaneously admit that the factual basis for punitive damages is unknown absent further discovery. Accepting this approach would eliminate the requirement that a complaint plead ultimate facts with reasonable particularity, not speculation.

California law disfavors punitive damages. Doe’s allegations here — grounded in negligence, vicarious liability, and conclusory assertions — do not approach that threshold. The Complaint contains no specific facts showing Ritz-Carleton acted with malice, oppression, or fraud.

Instead of providing the necessary ultimate facts to support his claims, Doe repeats conclusory allegations that merely restate the wrongful conduct of Lenz and attempt to impute that conduct to Ritz-Carleton through broad assertions of ratification. Even if all facts alleged against Lenz are accepted as true, Doe’s Complaint does not plead with reasonable particularity how Ritz-Carleton itself engaged in wrongful conduct, acted with discriminatory intent, or otherwise satisfied the elements required for Sexual Battery, Violation of the Ralph Act, or Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. For this reason, the Court should strike all allegations and prayers for punitive damages against Ritz-Carleton as irrelevant, improper, and not “drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 436(b).

Doe has not sufficiently pled facts supporting a claim for punitive damages. Doe cites Kisekey v. Carpenters’ Trust for So. California to excuse the lack of particularity in their pleadings in addition to supporting that the acts of Ritz-Carleton were willful, wanton, malicious, oppressive fraudulent, despicable, and outrageous. That reliance is misplaced. Kisekey alleged that employees and/or agents of the defendant union, acting within the scope of their employment, insulted and threatened Plaintiff Kiseskey and his family with harm if he did not sign another agreement with the union. (Kiseskey v. Carpenters' Trust for So. California (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 222.) Kisekey found that the individuals making the threatening phone calls were the agents and/or employees of their co-defendants and that the threatening phone calls were made within the course and scope of their agency with co-defendants. Ultimately, the Kisekey Court held that the complaint adequately alleged facts (1) sufficient to constitute an intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action, including allegations of outrageous conduct; and (2) sufficient to support punitive damages against the union for the acts of its agents.

The reasoning in Kiseskey is plainly distinguishable. There, the agents of the defendant union directly engaged in outrageous conduct by threatening the plaintiff’s life and the safety of his family. Here, Doe attempts to equate the alleged conduct of Lenz with the type of egregious conduct in Kiseskey by alleging that the incident occurred on Ritz-Carleton’s property, that Lenz was acting within the scope of his employment, and that Ritz-Carleton allowed him to continue working. But Doe pleads no facts showing that Ritz-Carleton itself engaged in “outrageous” conduct, or that it acted with the intent or reckless disregard necessary to support punitive damages. Indeed, Doe’s Opposition to the Demurrer concedes that the alleged “outrageous” acts were those of Lenz, not Ritz-Carleton.

Ritz-Carleton may have provided the employment setting, but the alleged misconduct was the product of Lenz’s independent decision to act outside his duties. The employer set the stage for therapeutic services, not the sexual misconduct. Accordingly, the doctrine of vicarious liability does not apply either. Even accepting Doe’s allegations against Lenz as true, the Complaint does not allege ultimate facts with reasonable particularity showing how Ritz-Carleton itself engaged in conduct that would support punitive damages.

Doe argues that they lack access to critical information, such as personnel records, guest complaints, or internal communications, which are allegedly within Ritz-Carleton’s exclusive possession and obtainable only through discovery. Relying on this, Doe contends that less particularity in pleading is required when it appears that Ritz-Carleton has superior knowledge of the facts, so long as the pleading gives notice of the issues sufficient to enable preparation of a defense. But Doe cannot simultaneously claim to have pled facts sufficient to support punitive damages “on information and belief,” while also admitting that the factual basis for such claims is unknown and unavailable absent discovery.

Allowing conclusory allegations to substitute for factual pleading would eviscerate the requirement that a plaintiff must set forth essential facts with reasonable precision and particularity to acquaint a defendant with the basis of the claims.

Ultimately, the allegations doe relies upon fall into three categories: (1) purportedly negligent conduct by Ritz-Carleton; (2) independent tortious conduct by Lenz; and (3) conclusory allegations devoid of particularized facts. None of these are sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages.

The Complaint does not allege facts showing malice, oppression, or fraud by Ritz-Carleton required under Code of Civil Procedure section 3294. Accordingly, Doe has not pled facts justifying punitive damages against Ritz-Carleton, even if all allegations in the Complaint are taken as true.

Doe’s Complaint does not contain sufficient allegations of malice, oppression, or fraud. Doe relies heavily on the proposition that “a conscious disregard for the safety of others may constitute the malice required to sustain a claim for punitive damages,” citing Blegen v. Superior Court (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 959, 962, and Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 895–96.

But what Doe ignores is the requirement recognized in Blegen that “the plaintiff must plead the ultimate facts which give rise to liability.” (Id. at 962–63.) Simply asserting that a defendant “knew” of misconduct, or that a defendant “ratified” an employee’s acts, is not the same as alleging the concrete facts that demonstrate such knowledge or ratification. Doe’s pleading is made up of conclusions rather than facts, and that is not enough to sustain a punitive damages claim.

Doe alleges that Lenz committed sexual assault while in the course and scope of his employment and Ritz-Carleton “ratified” his conduct by permitting him to continue working. These allegations, taken at face value, at most suggest negligent hiring, supervision, or retention. They do not contain factual matter establishing Ritz-Carleton acted with the intent to injure Doe, with a willful and conscious disregard for his safety, or with any of the other heightened states of mind required by section 3294. The complaint does not identify any specific facts showing Ritz-Carleton was aware of a probable risk of harm and deliberately ignored that risk.

There is no allegation of a misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact made by Ritz-Carleton with the intent to deprive Doe of any property, legal rights, or to cause him injury. Likewise, the complaint does not allege facts amounting to “oppression.” There is no suggestion Ritz-Carleton subjected Doe to cruel or unjust hardship in conscious disregard of his rights. Instead, the punitive damages claim rests entirely on the alleged intentional acts of Lenz. While those allegations may be directed at Lenz himself, they cannot automatically be imputed to Ritz-Carleton without specific facts showing Ritz-Carleton itself engaged in, authorized, or ratified such conduct with the required state of mind. Doe’s bare assertion that Ritz-Carleton “ratified” Lenz’s conduct is a legal conclusion, not a factual allegation, and therefore insufficient to withstand scrutiny. Because Doe has failed to plead facts establishing malice, oppression, or fraud as defined by Code of Civil Procedure section 3294(c), the punitive damages allegations against Ritz-Carleton are legally deficient and should be stricken.

Supplementing names of corporate officers of Ritz-Carleton still not sufficient to state a claim for punitive damages. Doe attempts to avoid dismissal of his punitive damages claim by invoking White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, and similar cases, suggesting that it is premature at the pleading stage to require identification of which corporate officers, directors, or managing agents may have ratified Lenz’s alleged misconduct. However, even if such individuals were later identified, Doe’s Complaint still fails because it does not contain factual allegations showing malice, oppression, or fraud as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 3294(c).

An award of punitive damages against a corporation also requires proof of oppression, fraud, or malice committed or authorized by a corporate officer, director, or managing agent who exercise substantial discretionary authority over decisions that ultimately determine corporate policy. The case law cited by Doe focuses on who qualifies as a managing agent and whether the requisite level of corporate authority has been shown. But nothing in White eliminates the requirement that the pleadings must still set forth facts showing that the corporation, through those officers or managing agents, acted with the state of mind required by Code of Civil Procedure section 3294(c).

Even if Doe were able to identify which corporate supervisors or managers allegedly knew of or ratified Lenz’s conduct, the Complaint still does not contain allegations showing that those individuals acted with malice, oppression, or fraud. Without allegations of malice, oppression, or fraud, merely pointing to “supervisors” or suggesting that they may be identified later does not salvage Doe’s claim.

Accordingly, Doe’s attempt to rely on White to postpone the deficiencies in his pleading should be rejected. The absence of factual allegations establishing corporate malice, oppression, or fraud is fatal to the punitive damages claim, and those portions must be stricken.

California public policy disfavors punitive damage awards. California courts historically have adopted a restrictive position towards awards of punitive damages, and such awards are generally disfavored. The California Legislature’s 1987 amendment to California Civil Code § 3249 requires clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice to recover exemplary damages. The adoption of such a stringent standard for punitive damages by both California statutory and decisional law demonstrates that exemplary damages are disfavored and are recoverable only in the clearest of cases.

Even prior to the stringent language of section 3294, courts consistently held that the law does not favor punitive damages, and they should be granted with the greatest caution.

California courts have long held that to withstand a motion to strike punitive damages, a plaintiff must plead specific facts which support his claim for punitive damages. Mere conclusory allegations will not suffice. As Plaintiffs’ punitive damages allegations here are based entirely on conclusory allegations of malice or oppression, with no specific facts to support such allegations, the Court should strike all language in the Complaint alleging or suggesting Doe is entitled to punitive

Based on the foregoing, Ritz-Carleton requests the Court grant the Motion to Strike in its entirety without leave to amend.

The Court’s Conclusions

As part of their claims, Doe seeks the imposition of punitive damages against Ritz-Carlton. Doe fails to specifically allege any factual basis that would give rise to the imposition of punitive damages against Ritz-Carlton. As a result, the Complaint offers neither specific pleading nor specific justification for Ritz-Carlton to be punished in this matter, and the Complaint is entirely devoid of facts sufficient to establish that Ritz-Carlton acted with malice, oppression, or fraud as required by California Civil Code § 3294(s) to satisfy the strict standard for punitive damages under California law. The Complaint offers only conclusory allegations which cannot form the basis for punitive damages claim. For this reason, the Court should strike all allegations and prayers for punitive damages against Ritz-Carlton as irrelevant, improper, and not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state.

The Court can find no reason that Doe can amend to survive the challenge made.

The Court apologizes for the length of this ruling and any clerical and grammatical errors; could not get it all done in one sitting.

[2] 3063. Acts of Violence - Ralph Act - Essential Factual Elements(Civ. Code, § 51.7)[Name of plaintiff] claims that [name of defendant] committed an act of violence against [him/her/nonbinary pronoun] because of [his/her/nonbinary pronoun] [race/color/religion/ancestry/national origin/political affiliation/sex/sexualorientation/age/disability/citizenship/primary language/immigration status/position in a labor dispute/[insert other actionable characteristic]].To establish this claim, [name of plaintiff] must prove all of the following:1. That [name of defendant] committed a violent act against [name of plaintiff] [or [his/her/nonbinary pronoun] property];2. That a substantial motivating reason for [name of defendant]’s conduct was [[his/her/nonbinary pronoun] perception of] [name of plaintiff]’s [race/color/religion/ancestry/national origin/political affiliation/sex/sexual orientation/age/disability/citizenship/primarylanguage/immigration status/position in a labor dispute/[insert other actionable characteristic]]; 3. That [name of plaintiff] was harmed; and4. That [name of defendant]’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing [name of plaintiff]’s harm. [Use this instruction for a cause of action under the Ralph Act involving actual acts of violence alleged to have been committed by the defendant against the plaintiff.]

Judicial Branch of California

Notice:

John Doe v The Ritz-Carlton Bacara Santa Barbara; Ruby SB Hotel LLC; Ritz-Carlton Hotel Company LLC; Marriott International, Inc.; Arnold Martinez-Lenz

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