Gary Craigwell vs Jacob Samuel Bartlett

Case Number

25CV03320

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Mon, 10/13/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

CMC; Motion: Strike

Tentative Ruling

Gary Craigwell v. Jacob Samuel Bartlett 

Case No. 25CV03320

           

Hearing Date: October 13, 2025                                             

HEARING:              Defendant Jacob Samuel Bartlett’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint

ATTORNEYS:        For Plaintiff Gary Craigwell: Maryanne B. Cooper, Miles B. Cooper, Andrea G. Posey

                                    For Defendant Jacob Samuel Bartlett: Delmas A. Woods               

                       

TENTATIVE RULING:

The motion to strike portions of plaintiff’s first amended complaint is denied.

Defendant Jacob Samuel Bartlett shall file and serve his answer to plaintiff’s first amended complaint no later than October 27, 2025.

Background:

This action commenced on May 29, 2025, by the filing of the original complaint by plaintiff Gary Craigwell against Jacob Samuel Bartlett for negligence and negligence per se. On June 11, 2025, plaintiff filed the operative first amended complaint (FAC) against defendant setting forth the same two causes of action.

As alleged in the FAC:

On February 11, 2024, at approximately 6 p.m., plaintiff had just dropped a passenger off at the Santa Barbara airport and was driving back toward Santa Barbara traveling eastbound on Hollister Avenue. (FAC, ¶ 7.) At the same time, defendant was driving his vehicle westbound on Hollister Avenue at a high rate of speed, weaving in and out of the traffic lanes, revving his vehicle’s engine, and appeared to be racing his vehicle with another vehicle. (Id. at ¶¶ 8, 9.)

Defendant was traveling at approximately 70 mph, in a 45 mph zone, when he lost control of his vehicle, struck a palm tree in the center median, and crossed over into oncoming traffic where he collided head-on with the driver’s side of plaintiff’s vehicle. (FAC, ¶ 10.) The impact caused the airbags in plaintiff’s vehicle to deploy, plaintiff’s body was “thrust about,” and plaintiff’s vehicle was pushed sideways across the roadway. (Id. at ¶ 11.) As a result, plaintiff suffered serious injuries to his head, neck, shoulder, and arm. (Id. at ¶ 12.)

The 22 year old defendant has a history of speeding and reckless driving, with little regard for the safety of others on the roadway, and 10 months after the subject collision that injured plaintiff, defendant was cited for driving 103 mph in a 65 mph zone. (FAC, ¶ 14.) Despite prior violations and the incident that caused plaintiff’s injuries, defendant continues to operate his vehicle in a dangerous manner and in reckless disregard for public safety. (Id. at ¶ 15.)

“At the time of the crash, Defendant BARTLETT was driving at an excessive rate of speed (70mph in a 45mph zone), engaging in illegal street racing on a public roadway, weaving in and out of traffic lanes, failing to maintain control of his vehicle, and driving in a manner that endangered the safety of persons and property. Defendant BARTLETT acted with conscious disregard in his willful, wanton, grossly negligent, careless, and reckless conduct, that result[ed] in serious injuries to Plaintiff CRAIGWELL.” (FAC, ¶ 25.)

“The conduct of Defendant BARTLETT was despicable and subjected Plaintiff to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of Plaintiff’s rights. Pursuant to California Civil Code section 3294, Plaintiff is entitled to recover punitive damages from Defendant BARTLETT  in an amount according to proof.” (FAC, ¶ 26.)

Defendant now moves to strike the following portions of the FAC that pertain to punitive damages:

1. Page 5, lines 3-5: “Defendant BARTLETT acted with conscious disregard in his willful, wanton, grossly negligent, careless, and reckless conduct, that result in serious injuries to Plaintiff CRAIGWELL.”
2. Page 5, paragraph 26
3. Prayer for relief for punitive damages for the first and second causes of action

Plaintiff opposes the motion.

Analysis:

“The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).) “Irrelevant matter” includes a “demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subds. (b)(3), (c).) “The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).)

“[J]udges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)

The right to punitive damages is strictly statutory. “In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “ ‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Id. at subd. (c)(1).) “ ‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Id. at subd. (c)(2).) “ ‘Fraud’ means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Id. at subd. (c)(3).)

“Used in its ordinary sense, the adjective ‘despicable’ is a powerful term that refers to circumstances that are ‘base,’ ‘vile,’ or ‘contemptible.’ (4 Oxford English Dict. (2d ed. 1989) p. 529.) As amended to include this word, the statute plainly indicates that absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, ‘malice’ requires more than a ‘willful and conscious’ disregard of the plaintiffs’ interests. The additional component of ‘despicable conduct’ must be found.” (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.)

Defendant’s first argument is: “In order to state a claim for punitive damages, a plaintiff must allege facts that establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant has engaged in oppression, fraud or malice that constitutes despicable conduct.” (Motion, p. 4, ll. 7-9.) In support, defendant cites Stewart v. Truck Ins. Exchange (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 468 (Stewart). In doing so, defendant reaches the incorrect conclusion. In Stewart, the plaintiff sued a hospital’s insurer for bad faith. The court granted a nonsuit on plaintiff’s punitive damages claim. Thereafter, a jury awarded financial injury and emotional distress damages. Defendant moved for a new trial on the issues of liability and damages, which the trial court partially granted because the court found the financial injury damages excessive. The court also granted plaintiff’s motion for a new trial on the issue of punitive damages. The court of appeal reversed the portion of the trial court’s order granting a new trial as to punitive damages, because, among other things, it found that plaintiff had failed to present any substantial evidence of malice. In the present case, defendant is conflating what is required at the pleading stage with what evidence must be presented at trial. At the pleading stage, the court is concerned with the allegations that are contained in the complaint rather than what plaintiff is eventually required to prove.

Defendant next makes assertion that “a plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted with oppression, fraud, or malice, for example, that the defendant had the intent to inflict injury or destroy reputation.” (Motion, p. 4, ll. 12-13.) In support, defendant cites G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22 (Searle). Defendant’s assertion of what Searle holds is somewhat misleading. What Searle explains, with respect to pleading, is: “A preliminary inquiry is whether a pleading of malice as a basis for exemplary damages should be judged by the relatively strict standards governing an inquiry into jury instructions or evidentiary support for a jury award. Notwithstanding relaxed pleading criteria, certain tortious injuries demand firm allegations. Vague, conclusory allegations of fraud or falsity may not be rescued by the rule of liberal construction. [Citation.] When the plaintiff alleges an intentional wrong, a prayer for exemplary damage may be supported by pleading that the wrong was committed willfully or with a design to injure. [Citation.] When nondeliberate injury is charged, allegations that the defendant’s conduct was wrongful, willful, wanton, reckless or unlawful do not support a claim for exemplary damages; such allegations do not charge malice. [Citations.] When a defendant must produce evidence in defense of an exemplary damage claim; fairness demands that he receive adequate notice of the kind of conduct charged against him.” (Id. at pp. 28-29.) It is obvious from the complaint that plaintiff is accusing defendant of acting with malice.

Related to the above argument, is defendant’s next argument that plaintiff fails to plead specific facts that show defendants actions rise to the level of malice.

“In California, malice is the basis for assessing punitive damages for nonintentional conduct; that is, acts performed without intent to harm. [Citations.] Nonintentional conduct comes within the definition of malicious acts punishable by the assessment of punitive damages when a party intentionally performs an act from which he knows, or should know, it is highly probable that harm will result. [Citations.]” (Ford Motor Co. v. Home Ins. Co. (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 374, 381.) There is no requirement that to recover punitive damages in an unintentional motor vehicle accident that the defendant be intoxicated at the time of the accident. Rather, the action can be any action that defendant knows or should know has a high probability of resulting in harm. Street racing and weaving in and out of traffic certainly fits into that type of action.

Defendant misses the point when he argues: “[T] the plaintiff tries to use the alleged facts that the defendant was young, driving a nice car, revving his engine and switching lanes and combined with a single incident that occurred, AFTER THE ACCIDENT, when the defendant allegedly received a ticket under an entirely different set of circumstances (i.e., speeding on a freeway) to somehow argue that the conduct should support punitive damages for conduct he did 10 months earlier.” (Motion, p. 8, ll. 19-23.) While defendant’s youth is not relevant to the allegations, the other allegations show that defendant had a vehicle that was likely capable of reaching high speeds, that defendant was driving aggressively and recklessly, and that even after this incident defendant continues to engage in dangerous driving behavior.

Plaintiff adequately alleges that defendant was driving recklessly by speeding and weaving in and out of traffic, that defendant has a history of speeding and reckless driving, and that defendant acted with conscious disregard for the safety of others. If plaintiff is able to prove his case, by clear and convincing evidence, a reasonable trier of fact could find defendant’s actions despicable and determine that he acted with malice.

Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts, at the pleading stage, to support a claim for punitive damages. As such, defendant’s motion to strike will be denied.