The Mission LLC v. City of Santa Barbara

Case Number

25CV03180

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 10/01/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Demurrer of Respondent City of Santa Barbara

Tentative Ruling

For Petitioner and Plaintiff, The Mission LLC: Richard Jacobs

 

For Respondent and Defendant, City of Santa Barbara: Eric S. Phillips, Caitlin R. Eliason, Burke, Williams & Sorensen, LLC; Sarah Jane Knecht, Tava Marie Ostrenger, Office of the Santa Barbara City Attorney

                                   

RULING

For the reasons set forth herein, the demurrer of Respondent and Defendant City of Santa Barbara is sustained, with leave to amend, as to the second and fourth causes of action of the petition and complaint of The Mission LLC and is otherwise overruled. Petitioner and Plaintiff, The Mission LLC, shall file and serve its first amended petition and complaint on or before October 16, 2025.

Background

Petitioner and Plaintiff, The Mission LLC (Mission) is both a Petitioner and Plaintiff in this action; correspondingly, the City of Santa Barbara (City) is both a Respondent and a Defendant. For simplicity of writing, the Court may sometimes refer to Mission or City, respectively, as Petitioner or Respondent, and the petition and complaint simply as a petition.

As alleged in the petition:

At some point prior to June 13, 2023, Mission submitted a “SB330 Builder’s Remedy Preliminary Application” to the City of Santa Barbara. (Petition, ¶ 37.) Following discussions between the parties, on June 15, 2023, the City deemed the preliminary application complete and gave Mission 90 days to submit the full application. (Petition, ¶¶ 38-45.) Mission subsequently submitted its full application. (Petition, ¶ 46.)

On May 13, 2025, Mission sent a letter to the City to activate the procedures set forth in Government Code section 65589.5, subdivision (h)(6)(D), under which the City must take certain actions within certain timeframes. (Petition, ¶¶ 64, 65.)

The first such action was required to be taken “within five working days of receiving the applicant’s written notice.” (Petition, ¶ 66.) The required actions are “the local agency shall post the notice on the local agency’s internet website, provide a copy of the notice to any person who has made a written request for notices pursuant to subdivision (f) of Section 21167 of the Public Resources Code, and file the notice with the county clerk of each county in which the project will be located. The county clerk shall post the notice and make it available for public inspection in the manner set forth in subdivision (c) of Section 21152 of the Public Resources Code.” (Ibid.)

Rather than comply, the City insists that it need not comply. (Petition, ¶ 68.)

Given the City’s refusal to comply with the first requirement, and given that the first requirement is what triggers action on the remaining requirements, Mission anticipates that the City will continue their refusal to comply and not comply with any of the other requirements. (Petition, ¶ 70.)

Prior to filing this action, Mission checked with the City to determine if there was an administrative appeal that was required. (Petition, ¶ 71.) The City’s appeal procedure for an administrative appeal decision must be one that was taken at a meeting of a body of the City. (Petition, ¶¶ 72-73.) There was no meeting by a body of the City in this case, so no administrative appeal is available. (Petition, ¶ 74.)

On May 22, 2025, Mission filed its petition asserting five causes of action: (1) writ of mandate (failure to process application as complete without payment of certain fees); (2) writ of mandate (imposing improper requirements on application); (3) declaratory and injunctive relief (failure to process applications); (4) declaratory and injunctive relief (imposing improper requirement on application); and (5) writ of mandate (compliance with Gov. Code, § 65589.5, subd. (h)(6)(D)).

On July 25, 2025, the City filed its demurrer to the petition. The City argues that Mission fails to state each cause of action by failing to exhaust administrative remedies and that each cause of action is either not ripe for adjudication or is moot.

The demurrer is opposed by Mission.

Analysis

“ ‘The rules by which the sufficiency of a complaint is tested against a general demurrer are well settled. We not only treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but also ‘give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.’ ” (Zhang v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 364, 370, internal quotation marks and citations omitted.)

In support of the demurrer, the City requests that the Court take judicial notice of: (City Request for Judicial Notice [RJN], exhibit A) a May 12, 2025, letter from the City to Petitioner; (exhibit B) Santa Barbara Municipal Code section 30.205.250; and (exhibit C) a July 3, 2025, letter from the City to Petitioner. The Court will grant the request for judicial notice as to the Municipal Code. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (b).) The Court will grant judicial notice as to exhibits A and C, but only to the extent of the fact of statements made in those letters and not as to the truth of factual matters stated therein. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c); Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 113.)

The City demurs on the grounds that the Petitioner has failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, and that the specific issues raised are either not ripe or moot. A difficulty in addressing this demurrer on these grounds is the lack of specificity in the complaint.

“A complaint or cross-complaint shall contain both of the following: [¶] (1) A statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language. [¶] (2) A demand for judgment for the relief to which the pleader claims to be entitled. If the recovery of money or damages is demanded, the amount demanded shall be stated.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.10, subd. (a).) “[T]he general rule [is] that a complaint must contain only allegations of ultimate facts as opposed to allegations of evidentiary facts or of legal conclusions or arguments.” (Burke v. Superior Court (1969) 71 Cal.2d 276, 279, fn. 4.)

The petition here provides a lengthy background summary of the California housing crisis, housing elements and the planning process, the Housing Accountability Act (HAA) and the “Builder’s Remedy” (Gov. Code, § 65589.5), the Housing Crisis Act of 2019 (Gov. Code, § 66300), and the City’s issues in passing a conforming housing element. (Petition, ¶¶ 15-36.) The petition does not, however, provide any specific information concerning Petitioner’s project. Instead, the petition provides generic allegations, such as “Plaintiff submitted its SB330 Builder’s Remedy Preliminary Application to the City of Santa Barbara.” (Petition, ¶ 37.) The absence of basic information regarding the project makes ruling on the issues raised in the demurrer unnecessarily generic. The Court nonetheless addresses the legal issues presented, assuming without deciding the sufficiency of the allegations where not challenged.

Mission’s first cause of action seeks a writ of mandate ordering the City to comply with the Builder’s Remedy law. (Petition, ¶ 84.) In particular, Mission alleges that City is not complying with its mandatory duties because the City refuses to accept Mission’s Builder’s Remedy application as complete based upon a claim that Mission must first pay $30,000 in fees for a Zone Change and General Plan Amendment in violation of the Builder’s Remedy laws. (Petition, ¶ 82.)

City’s response letter of July 3, 2025 states: “The purpose of this letter is to notify you that the Planning Application for the subject project has been deemed ‘complete,’ and that further processing of the Planning Application can occur. Further processing includes environmental review of the proposed project, analysis for compliance with applicable plans, policies, ordinances, codes, etc., and action on the proposed project application by the appropriate decision-making body(ies). [¶] The subsequent LLA application submittal has a balance due for the application fees. The application is otherwise complete and will be deemed as such once said fees are paid. This application will be incorporated into, and processed concurrently with, the original housing development application.” (RJN, exhibit C, p. 2.)

The July 3 letter confirms that “completeness” is dependent upon the payment of a fee. Mission alleges that the fee may not be charged because it is contrary to statute. There are no allegations that the fee has been paid. To the limited extent that Mission here essentially alleges that the City has a ministerial duty to process the “complete” application without payment of the allegedly-illegal fee, Mission states a cause of action for issuance of a writ of mandate to compel compliance with that ministerial duty.

Mission alleges that there is no administrative appellate process as to the issue of whether payment of the fee is actually required or permitted by law. (Petition, ¶ 74.) There are no allegations of any staff hearing officer decision regarding the fee payment issue. Instead, acceptance of the application as complete without payment of a fee, as allegedly a ministerial decision, would appear to be a final ministerial decision that is not subject to appeal. (Santa Barbara Mun. Code, § 30.205.150, subd. (A)(5).) As such, Mission has sufficiently alleged a ministerial duty that is not subject to administrative appeal. These allegations are sufficient to allege a cause of action for issuance of writ of mandate for which there is no further exhaustion requirement; this cause of action is now ripe for adjudication and is not moot. These allegations are sufficient for pleading purposes to state a cause of action for issuance of a writ, whether or not other matters potentially included within this cause of action are not ripe or administratively exhausted, or are moot. (See Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1047 [“[A] demurrer cannot rightfully be sustained to part of a cause of action or to a particular type of damage or remedy.”].)

The demurrer to the first cause of action will be overruled.

The same analysis applies to the third cause of action seeking declaratory relief on the same grounds. The demurrer to the third cause of action will be overruled.

Mission’s second cause of action is to compel compliance with mandatory duties that relate to the approval of the project. (Petition, ¶¶ 94-96.) These allegations are different than the simple requirement for payment of a fee. To the extent that these allegations suggest that the City is not proceeding with a “complete” application, except as to the fee issue addressed in the first and third causes of action, the City has made a determination that the application is “complete.” (RJN, exhibit C, p. 2.) To that extent, this cause of action is moot.

To the extent that the issue is the satisfaction of requirements that Mission asserts are illegal, the petition does not allege that the City has refused to approve the project on the basis of noncompliance with the satisfaction of such requirements. Indeed, based upon the dearth of specific allegations, it is unclear from the petition what the City specifically refuses to do that a writ of mandate may require. In the same way, the petition does not clearly describe any particular duties relating to this project that may be subject to a writ of mandate that would not be subject to the City’s appellate procedure by virtue of expressly or impliedly denying the application for the project. (See Santa Barbara Mun. Code, § 30.205.105, subd. (A)(1), (2).) To this extent, Mission has not alleged a claim against the City that is ripe for adjudication.

The demurrer to the second cause of action will be sustained on these grounds.

The same analysis applies to the fourth cause of action seeking declaratory relief on the same grounds. The demurrer to the fourth cause of action will be sustained.

Mission’s fifth cause of action is for violation of Government Code section 65589.5, subdivision (h)(6)(D). Subdivision (h)(6)(D) states in part:

“ ‘Disapprove the housing development project’ includes any instance in which a local agency does any of the following: [¶] … [¶]

            “(D)     Fails to cease a course of conduct undertaken for an improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increases in the cost of the proposed housing development project, that effectively disapproves the proposed housing development without taking final administrative action if all of the following conditions are met: [¶] … [¶]

                        “(i)       The project applicant provides written notice detailing the challenged conduct and why it constitutes disapproval to the local agency established under Section 65100.

                        “(ii)      Within five working days of receiving the applicant’s written notice described in clause (i), the local agency shall post the notice on the local agency’s internet website, provide a copy of the notice to any person who has made a written request for notices pursuant to subdivision (f) of Section 21167 of the Public Resources Code, and file the notice with the county clerk of each county in which the project will be located. The county clerk shall post the notice and make it available for public inspection in the manner set forth in subdivision (c) of Section 21152 of the Public Resources Code.

                        “(iii)    The local agency shall consider all objections, comments, evidence, and concerns about the project or the applicant’s written notice and shall not make a determination until at least 60 days after the applicant has given written notice to the local agency pursuant to clause (i).” (Gov. Code, § 65589.5, subd. (h)(6)(D)(i)-(iii).) This text is followed by other enumerated conditions. (Id., subd. (h)(6)(D)(iv)-(vi).)

Mission alleges that “Defendant has a mandatory duty under Government Code Section 65589.5(h)(6)(D) to take specific actions after receiving a letter from an applicant invoking the code section.” (Petition, ¶ 117.) “Defendant has categorically refused to take any of the mandatory actions.” (Petition, ¶ 118.)

The letter which Mission appears to reference is the letter sent in May 2025. (Petition, ¶ 64.) The letter is not attached and no argument is made in this demurrer that the letter does not satisfy the requirements of subdivision (h)(6)(D)(i). Mission alleges that the City has not complied with the posting of the notice on the website. For purposes of pleading, Mission has sufficiently alleged the failure of the City to comply with this ministerial duty of posting the notice on the website. As discussed above, such a ministerial duty appears under the Municipal Code to be final and not subject to an administrative appeal process. These allegations are sufficient to state a cause of action for writ of mandate to compel compliance with this specific ministerial duty, whether or not other matters potentially included within this cause of action are not ripe or administratively exhausted, or are moot.

The demurrer to the fifth cause of action will be overruled.

This is the first petition for which the Court has ruled on a demurrer. The Court will grant leave to amend.