Claudia Zoghlami v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

Case Number

25CV03158

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 09/24/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

(1) Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint (2) Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint

Tentative Ruling

For Plaintiff Claudia Zoghlami: Michael H. Rosenstein, Sepehr Daghighian, Michael William Oppenheim, California Consumer Attorneys, P.C.

For Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc.: Christina Burk, Corinne Orquiola, SJL Law LLP

RULING

This case is also on the Court’s 8:30 am CMC Calendar and the Court intends to call both matters on that calendar.

(1) For all reasons discussed herein, the demurrer of Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc., to Plaintiff’s complaint is overruled.

(2) For all reasons discussed herein, the motion of Defendant to strike portions of Plaintiff’s complaint is denied.

(3) On or before October 24, 2025, Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc., shall file and serve an answer to Plaintiff’s complaint.

(4) Trial Date 9/23/26 at 11:30 – jury comes over on 9/24/26.

MSC 9/4/26 at 8:30am in #5

Next CMC 1/28/26 at 8:30 am

Do not stipulate to continue the trial date. Will continue only on an ex parte motion. Do not settle the underlying case and bifurcate attorney fees.

Background

On May 21, 2025, Plaintiff Claudia Zoghlami filed a complaint against Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (AHM), alleging three causes of action: (1) violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act – breach of express warranty; (2) violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act – breach of implied warranty; and (3) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (b). As alleged in the complaint:

On January 21, 2023, Plaintiff purchased a 2023 Honda CR-V (the vehicle) from an authorized dealership of AHM, the sale of which was accompanied by express warranties under which AHM undertook to preserve or maintain the utility or performance of the vehicle or to provide compensation if there was a failure in such utility or performance. (Compl., ¶¶ 8 & 32.) The vehicle was delivered to Plaintiff with defects and nonconformities in its electrical, electronics, and infotainment systems which were present at the time of sale and manifested during the applicable express warranty period, and which impair the use, value, and safety of the vehicle. (Compl., ¶¶ 9, 22 & 35-37.)

Plaintiff delivered the vehicle to an authorized AHM repair facility on multiple occasions for repair of the defects and nonconformities but AHM’s authorized facility was unable to conform the vehicle to the warranty and failed to issue a refund, replace the vehicle, or make restitution. (Compl., ¶¶ 23-26 & 48-49.) 

On July 21, 2025, AHM filed a demurrer which is made on the grounds that the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute causes of action under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (the Act), codified as Civil Code section 1790 et seq., and is uncertain, and a motion to strike portions of the complaint.

Plaintiff opposes the demurrer and motion to strike.

Analysis

(1) Demurrer

“In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint against a general demurrer, we are guided by long-settled rules. ‘We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.’ [Citation.] Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “If the complaint states a cause of action under any theory, regardless of the title under which the factual basis for relief is stated, that aspect of the complaint is good against a demurrer.” (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38 (Quelimane).)

As to the first cause of action for breach of express warranty under the Act, AHM asserts that Plaintiff fails to allege in the complaint whether the vehicle was purchased from a retail seller, whether the vehicle was new or used at the time of purchase, when the alleged nonconformities manifested and how they affected the use, value, or safety of the vehicle, when or where the vehicle was taken for repairs, or how many times the vehicle was presented for repair. For these reasons, AHM argues, the complaint fails to plead with particularity facts demonstrating Plaintiff’s right to recover under the Act.

AHM does not dispute that the elements of a claim for breach of express warranty under the Act are: “(1) the vehicle had a defect or nonconformity covered by a written warranty that substantially impaired the vehicle’s use, value, or safety to a reasonable person in Plaintiff’s shoes (the nonconformity element); (2) the vehicle was presented to an authorized representative of the manufacturer for repair (the presentation element); (3) the manufacturer or its authorized repair facility did not repair the defect after a reasonable number of repair attempts (the failure to repair element); and (4) the manufacturer did not promptly replace or repurchase the vehicle from the Plaintiff (the failure to replace or repurchase element).” (Carver v. Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 864, 879.)

AHM fails to explain why Plaintiff is required to allege, as part of the elements described above, whether the vehicle was purchased from a retail seller or when the alleged nonconformities or defects manifested. Plaintiff also alleges in the complaint that the defects in the vehicle’s electric, electrical, and infotainment systems manifested during the warranty period. For present purposes, the Court accepts these allegations as true without considering whether Plaintiff can prove them to a trier of fact. (Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Boyle (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1034.)

In addition, “[w]hether the impairment is substantial is determined by an objective test, based on what a reasonable person would understand to be a defect. [Citations.] This test is applied, however, within the specific circumstances of the buyer.” (Lundy v. Ford Motor Co. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 472, 478.) A reasonable trier of fact could conclude, from the allegations described above, that the alleged defects affected the use and value of the vehicle.

Plaintiff also alleges that the vehicle was “new”, and was purchased from an authorized AHM dealership with a written warranty issued by AHM. (Compl., ¶¶ 17 & 25.) These allegations are sufficient, for pleading purposes, to show that the vehicle falls within the Act’s definition of a “new motor vehicle”. (Civ. Code, § 1793.22, subd. (e)(2); Rodriguez v. FCA US LLC (2024) 17 Cal.5th 189, 206.) As to the identity of the authorized dealership, the complaint shows or suggests that AHM “necessarily possesses knowledge of the facts.” (Quelimane, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 47.) Further, to the extent the allegations of the complaint are in some respects uncertain as to the identity of AHM’s dealership, these “ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)

Plaintiff further alleges that the vehicle was presented to AHM’s authorized repair facility, and that the facility was unable to conform the vehicle after a number of repair attempts. Presumably AHM also knows, or can discover, the identity of its authorized repair facility and the number of repair attempts undertaken by that facility. Furthermore, to the extent Plaintiff fails to allege the specific number of times the vehicle was presented for repair, the question of whether this number is reasonable “cannot be mechanistically determined under the relatively rigid legal rules applicable to the sustaining or overruling of a demurrer.” (Schnall v. Hertz Corp. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1144, 1167.) Instead, this determination is a “question of fact, requiring consideration and weighing of evidence from both sides before it can be resolved.” (McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1472 (McKell).)

For all reasons discussed above, AHM has failed to meet its burden to show why the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for breach of express warranty under the Act.

As to the second and third causes of action alleged in the complaint, AHM advances the same or effectively similar arguments as those further discussed above. (Demurrer at pp. 4-5.) The same reasoning and analysis apply.

AHM further contends that the complaint is uncertain because it fails to allege what “other serious nonconformities to warranty” the vehicle developed. To the extent there exist additional defects or nonconformities, the parties may clarify these facts during discovery. In addition, the absence of allegations regarding additional defects does not make the complaint so unintelligible or ambiguous that AHM cannot understand the issues or the nature of the claims alleged by Plaintiff. (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245 [“a Plaintiff is required only to set forth the essential facts of his case with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficient to acquaint a Defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action”].) For these and all reasons further discussed above, the Court will overrule the general and special demurrers of AHM to Plaintiff’s complaint.

(2) Motion to Strike

“Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof[.]” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).) Upon a motion to strike made under Code of Civil Procedure section 435, the Court may “strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading” or “strike all or part of any pleading not filed in conformity with applicable law, Court rules, or an order of the Court.” (Code Civ. Proc., §436(a) & (b).) The grounds for a motion to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or from matters of which the Court may take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).)

AHM contends that allegations that Plaintiff revokes acceptance of the vehicle or sales contract are unsupported, false, and improper because Plaintiff has not alleged that she notified the seller of the vehicle of Plaintiff’s purported revocation. AHM further contends that allegations regarding serious defects and nonconformities constitute improper legal conclusions.

“In order to plead a cause of action, the complaint must contain a ‘statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language.’ [Citation.] While it is true that pleading conclusions of law does not fulfill this requirement, it has long been recognized that ‘(t)he distinction between conclusions of law and ultimate facts is not at all clear and involves at most a matter of degree. (Citations.) For example, the Courts have permitted allegations which obviously included conclusions of law and have termed them “ultimate facts” or “conclusions of facts.” ’ [Citation.] What is important is that the complaint as a whole contain sufficient facts to apprise the Defendant of the basis upon which the Plaintiff is seeking relief. [Citations.] The stricken language must be read not in isolation, but in the context of the facts alleged in the rest of [the] complaint.” (Perkins v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 1, 6 (Perkins).)

Furthermore, “[t]he rules of pleading require, with limited exceptions not applicable here, only general allegations of ultimate fact. [Citations.] The Plaintiff need not plead evidentiary facts supporting the allegation of ultimate fact. [Citation.] A pleading is adequate so long as it apprises the Defendant of the factual basis for the Plaintiff’s claim.” (McKell, supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1469-1470.)

AHM fails to address whether the allegations of the complaint constitute ultimate facts, and appears to assert that Plaintiff is required to plead additional evidentiary facts apart from the defects described in the complaint and above. Notwithstanding this issue, to the extent the complaint includes conclusory allegations regarding defects that manifested in the vehicle, the specific defects and nonconformities alleged in the complaint and described above are sufficient to support those allegations and to inform AHM of the factual basis for the claims alleged in the complaint. (See Perkins, supra, 117 Cal.App.3d at pp. 6-7.)

In addition, even if the Court were to assume without deciding that the Commercial Code required Plaintiff to notify the seller of the vehicle of Plaintiff’s revocation of Plaintiff’s acceptance of the vehicle or sales contract, there is nothing on the face of the complaint which would show or suggest that Plaintiff did not so notify the seller, who Plaintiff alleges is the authorized dealership of AHM. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a) [“grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading...”].)

For all reasons discussed above, the Court will deny the motion to strike.