Ramiro Quezada vs Land And Sea LLC et al
Ramiro Quezada vs Land And Sea LLC et al
Case Number
25CV02447
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Mon, 08/18/2025 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings
Demurrer
Tentative Ruling
Ramiro Quezada v. land and Sea, LLC, et al.
Case No. 25CV02447
Hearing Date: August 18, 2025
HEARINGS: Defendants’ Land and Sea, LLC and Andre N. Manoux’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint
ATTORNEYS: For Plaintiff Ramiro Quezada: Elnaz Shahla, Shahla Legal APC
For Defendants Land and Sea, LLC and Andre N. Manoux: Michael J. Cummins, Sean D. Ross, Gibson Robb & Lindh LLP
TENTATIVE RULINGS: The Demurrer of defendant to plaintiff’s complaint is sustained in part and overruled in part as follows:
- The demurrer to the first and second causes of action are overruled.
- The demurrer to the third cause of action is sustained with leave to amend.
- The demurrer to the fourth cause of action is sustained without leave to amend.
- Plaintiff shall file and serve his first amended complaint no later than September 3, 2025.
Background:
This action commenced on April 21, 2025, by the filing of the complaint by plaintiff Ramiro Quezada (“plaintiff”) against defendants Land and Sea, LLC (“Land and Sea”) and Andre N. Manoux (“Manoux”) (collectively “defendants”) for: (1) False Imprisonment; (2) Negligence; (3) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (4) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress; and (5) Violation of California Vehicle Code and Santa Barbara Municipal Code.
As alleged in the complaint:
On September 29, 2024, at approximately 3:30 p.m., plaintiff suffered a severe ankle injury while playing catch on the beach near 99 W. Cabrillo Blvd., Santa Barbara. (Compl., ¶ 11.) Plaintiff began walking to his vehicle to seek medical attention, but defendants’ tour bus had parked so close to plaintiff’s vehicle that leaving was nearly impossible. (Ibid.)
Plaintiff, in visible pain, approached an employee of defendants, identified as “Riley,” who was wearing the company insignia. (Compl., ¶ 12.) Plaintiff informed Riley about his injury and the obstruction caused by the bus but Riley refused to assist and instructed plaintiff to wait for the bus captain, “Mike.” (Ibid.) When Mike arrived, Mike displayed a lack of concern for plaintiff’s injury and made derogatory comments including questioning whether it was plaintiff’s first time in America, in a mocking tone, referencing plaintiff’s Mexican heritage. (Ibid.) Mike refused to move the bus and deliberately delayed the situation. (Id. at ¶ 13.) Although plaintiff repeatedly asked Mike to move the bus, Mike only acted when plaintiff threatened to call the police. (Ibid.)
Additional allegations will be discussed below where appropriate.
Defendants now demur to the first four causes of action.
Plaintiff opposes the demurrer.
Analysis:
“The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or more of the following grounds:
“(a) The court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading.
“(b) The person who filed the pleading does not have the legal capacity to sue.
“(c) There is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action.
“(d) There is a defect or misjoinder of parties.
“(e) The pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
“(f) The pleading is uncertain. As used in this subdivision, “uncertain” includes ambiguous and unintelligible.
“(g) In an action founded upon a contract, it cannot be ascertained from the pleading whether the contract is written, is oral, or is implied by conduct.
“(h) No certificate was filed as required by Section 411.35.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10.)
“When any ground for objection to a complaint, cross-complaint, or answer appears on the face thereof, or from any matter of which the court is required to or may take judicial notice, the objection on that ground may be taken by a demurrer to the pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).)
“[A] court must treat a demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, it does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law.” (Travelers Indem. Co. of Connecticut v. Navigators Specialty Ins. Co. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 341, 358, citing Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)
“If the complaint states a cause of action under any theory, regardless of the title under which the factual basis for relief is stated, that aspect of the complaint is good against a demurrer. “ ‘[W]e are not limited to plaintiffs’ theory of recovery in testing the sufficiency of their complaint against a demurrer, but instead must determine if the factual allegations of the complaint are adequate to state a cause of action under any legal theory. The courts of this state have . . . long since departed from holding a plaintiff strictly to the ‘form of action’ he has pleaded and instead have adopted the more flexible approach of examining the facts alleged to determine if a demurrer should be sustained.’ ” [Citations.]” (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38-39.)
“To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.)
A demurrer searches for defects in the allegations of the pleading. “A demurrer is simply not the appropriate procedure for determining the truth of disputed facts.” (Ramsden v. Western Union (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 873, 879.)
Plaintiff attempts to improperly introduce extrinsic evidence as part of his opposition. The extrinsic evidence will not be considered in ruling on the demurrer.
False Imprisonment
Defendants demur to the first cause of action for false imprisonment arguing:
“Here, the complaint does not contain any allegations showing a legal restraint of Quezada, who always remained free to go wherever he pleased. The complaint also fails to contain any allegations to support a finding of intent to confine. Finally, even if Quezada could prove confinement with the requisite intent, which cannot be done, the cause of action still fails as the complaint does not contain any allegations to support a finding that Land & Sea’s bus was parked without lawful privilege.”
“The crime of false imprisonment is defined by Penal Code section 236 as the “ ‘unlawful violation of the personal liberty of another.’ ” The tort is identically defined. (Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1123.) As we recently formulated it, the tort consists of the “ ‘ “nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a person, without lawful privilege, for an appreciable length of time, however short.” ’ ” (Ibid.) That length of time can be as brief as 15 minutes. [Citation.] Restraint may be effectuated by means of physical force [Citation.], threat of force or of arrest [Citation.], confinement by physical barriers [Citation.], or by means of any other form of unreasonable duress. [Citation.]” (Fermino v. Fedco, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 701, 715 (Fermino).)
“All that is necessary to make out a charge of false imprisonment is that the individual be restrained of his liberty without any sufficient complaint or authority therefor, and it may be accomplished by words or acts which such individual fears to disregard. Temporary detention is sufficient, and the use of actual physical force is not necessary. The essential thing in false imprisonment is the restraint of the person [citation].” (Ware v. Dunn (1947) 80 Cal.App.2d 936, 943.)
“The only mental state required to be shown to prove false imprisonment is the intent to confine, or to create a similar intrusion. [Citations.] Thus, the intent element of false imprisonment does not entail an intent or motive to cause harm; indeed false imprisonments often appear to arise from initially legitimate motives. [Citation.]” (Fermino, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 716.)
In addition to the allegations set forth above, plaintiff alleges:
A tour bus owned and operated by defendants “was deliberately parked so closely in front of his vehicle that it was physically impossible for him to exit the parking space.” (Compl., ¶ 10.) [Note: The paragraphs of the complaint are misnumbered following paragraph 14, where it is then followed by a second paragraph 9. Then, following the cause of action for false imprisonment, the paragraphs begin to be numbered with paragraph 3. The citations here will refer to the paragraphs under each cause of action discussed.)
Mike “displayed a complete disregard for Plaintiff’s situation and intentionally refused to move the bus despite Plaintiff’s repeated and urgent requests.” (Compl., ¶ 11.) The refusal “was not based on any lawful justification or necessity but instead motivated by animus, ridicule, and malice.” (Ibid.)
“The physical act of blocking Plaintiff’s vehicle, combined with the refusal to remove the obstruction, resulted in intentional confinement within the meaning of false imprisonment under California law, regardless of the absence of physical force or threats. No physical restraint is required to establish false imprisonment where confinement is achieved through obstruction and unreasonable duress, as occurred here.” (Compl., ¶ 12.)
“The mental state required for false imprisonment - the intent to confine or create a similar intrusion - was satisfied by Defendants’ deliberate decision to block Plaintiff’s exit and ignore his pleas for help.” (Compl., ¶ 13.) “Plaintiff remained trapped and unable to leave the parking area for approximately 30 minutes. Mike ultimately moved the bus only after Plaintiff threatened to involve law enforcement.” (Id. at ¶ 14.)
“As a direct and proximate result of the false imprisonment by Defendants and their agents, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer physical injury, emotional distress, humiliation, and loss of time.” (Compl., ¶ 16.)
Blocking an individual’s vehicle, and thereby preventing them from leaving, can constitute false imprisonment. (See, Schanafelt v. Seaboard Finance Co. (1951 108 Cal.App.2d 420, 422-423.)
Here, plaintiff has pled all necessary elements of false imprisonment to overcome demurrer. On demurrer, the court cannot consider defendants’ arguments regarding plaintiff being illegally parked, or any other matters that are not contained in the complaint. As such, the demurrer to the first cause of action will be overruled.
Negligence
Defendants’ argument in support of the demurrer to the second cause of action for negligence is that they did not owe any duty to plaintiff.
“To succeed in a negligence action, the plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty, (2) the defendant breached the duty, and (3) the breach proximately or legally caused (4) the plaintiff’s damages or injuries.” (Thomas v. Stenberg (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 654, 662.)
“Every person is bound, without contract, to abstain from injuring the person or property of another, or infringing upon any of his or her rights.” (Civ. Code, § 1708.)
“[I]t is established that a cause of action may be stated in which negligence is alleged in general terms . . ..” (Guilliams v. Hollywood Hospital (1941) 18 Cal.2d 97, 101.)
In addition to the allegations set forth above, plaintiff alleges:
“At all times relevant, Defendants LAND AND SEA LLC and Andre N. Manoux owed a duty of care to Plaintiff to avoid causing harm to him or restricting his freedom of movement, especially given Plaintiff’s visibly injured state.” (Compl., ¶ 4.)
“Defendants, through their employees, breached that duty of care by failing to move the bus and obstructing Plaintiff’s ability to seek immediate medical attention for his ankle injury.” (Compl., ¶ 5.)
“Defendants’ employee Mike exacerbated the situation by refusing to move the bus and mocking Plaintiff with racially charged comments, displaying reckless disregard for Plaintiff’s health and well-being.” (Compl., ¶ 6.)
“Defendants failed to properly train and supervise their employees in responding to situations involving injured or distressed individuals, further contributing to Plaintiff’s prolonged suffering.” (Compl., ¶ 7.)
“As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ negligence, Plaintiff sustained physical pain from his injury, emotional distress, and additional medical complications, all of which could have been avoided if Defendants had acted reasonably.” (Compl., ¶ 8.)
For pleading purposes, the court finds that defendants owed a general duty to plaintiff in this circumstance, and that plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to overcome demurrer. As such, the demurrer to the second cause of action will be overruled.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
“A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists when there is ‘(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.’ [Citations.] A defendant’s conduct is ‘outrageous’ when it is so ‘extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.’ [Citation.] And the defendant’s conduct must be ‘intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.’ [Citation.]” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-1051, internal quotation marks omitted (Hughes).)
“In order to avoid a demurrer, the plaintiff must allege with “ ‘great[ ] specificity’ ” the acts which he or she believes are so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. [Citation.]” (Vasquez v. Franklin Management Real Estate Fund, Inc. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 819, 832.)
In addition to the allegations set forth above, plaintiff alleges:
“On September 29, 2024, Defendants, through their employee ‘Mike,’ engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct by refusing to move the tour bus that obstructed Plaintiff’s vehicle despite Plaintiff’s visible distress and urgent need to seek medical attention for an ankle injury.” (Compl., ¶ 12.)
“Defendants’ employee, Mike, not only refused to assist Plaintiff but also subjected him to racial mockery and humiliation, asking derogatory questions about his ethnicity and treating him with disdain, further exacerbating Plaintiff’s emotional distress.” (Compl., ¶ 13.)
The act of refusing to move a vehicle cannot, as a matter of law, be considered extreme and outrageous conduct that exceeds all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.
As noted above, in the background section, the allegation regarding “racial mockery” consisted of “Mike” asking plaintiff if it was his first time in America. Assuming, for purposes of ruling on the demurrer, that the comment was meant in a racially derogatory way, however distasteful this comment may be, the allegation is insufficient to plead the element of outrageous and extreme conduct. (See Hughes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1051 [“[l]iability for intentional infliction of emotional distress ‘does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.’ [Citation.]”]; Yurick v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1116, 1128 [“there can be no recovery for mere profanity, obscenity, or abuse, without circumstances of aggravation, or for insults, indignities or threats which are considered to amount to nothing more than mere annoyances”].)
Plaintiff’s allegations are far from sufficient to support a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The demurrer to the third cause of action will be sustained. Although the court is skeptical, given the facts as presented, that plaintiff will be able to sufficiently allege a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, because this is the original complaint, leave to amend will be granted.
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
“Negligent infliction of emotional distress “ ‘ “is not an independent tort, but the tort of negligence,” ’ ” to which “ ‘ “traditional elements of duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages apply.” ’ ” [Citations.]” (Downey v. City of Riverside (2024) 16 Cal.5th 539, 547.)
Because negligent infliction of emotional distress is not an independent tort, the demurrer to the fourth cause of action will be sustained without leave to amend. However, plaintiff may recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress, if he is able to prove the required elements, under his negligence cause of action.
Violation of California Vehicle Code and Santa Barbara Municipal Code
By way of the moving papers, defendants did not demur to the fifth cause of action for violation of the California Vehicle Code and Santa Barbara Municipal Code. Even though defendants request that the court sustain a demurrer to the cause of action by way of the reply papers, it would be improper to do so. Because the cause of action was not demurred to, the court cannot make a ruling with respect to the cause of action. However, as plaintiff appears to acknowledge that the cause of action is improper, and he is being given leave to amend as to other causes of action, he should not reallege the fifth cause of action if he recognizes that it would be improper to do so. Alleging a frivolous cause of action is sanctionable conduct. See Code of Civil Procedure sections 128.5 and 128.7.