Markus Cruz v. Smart & Final Stores LLC, et al

Case Number

25CV02363

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 07/23/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion To Compel Arbitration and To Stay the Action

Tentative Ruling

For Plaintiff Markus Cruz: Kristi D. Rothschild, Julian Alwill, Rothschild & Alwill, APC

For Defendant Smart & Final Stores, LLC: Laura Reathaford, Lathrop GPM LLP

For Defendant Felipe Mireles: No appearance

HEARING

Motion To Compel Arbitration and To Stay the Action.

 

RULING

For all reasons discussed herein, the motion of Defendant Smart & Final Stores, LLC, to compel arbitration and stay the action is granted.

Background

As alleged in the complaint filed on April 17, 2025, by Plaintiff Markus Cruz against Defendants Smart & Final Stores LLC, (Smart & Final) and Felipe Mireles (Mireles):

Smart & Final is a grocery store chain with approximately two hundred fifty stores throughout California, Arizona, and Nevada. (Compl., ¶ 10.) Plaintiff began working as an associate at Smart & Final’s Store #914 (the Store) in 2015 and became an assistant manager in 2020, a position which Plaintiff held during his tenure at the Store. (Id. at ¶ 11.) Plaintiff began working permanently and full time at the Store in 2022. (Id. at ¶ 12.) Despite Plaintiff’s title, Smart & Final compensated Plaintiff as an hourly employee and did not qualify him as an exempt worker. (Ibid.)

Shortly after Plaintiff began working at the Store, management pressed Plaintiff and other employees to forgo meal periods when the Store was busy or staff was shorthanded. (Compl., ¶ 13.) Plaintiff worked through his meal periods without compensation. (Id. at ¶ 14.) Smart & Final altered Plaintiff’s and other employee’s timecards to show a meal period was taken when it was not, and instead allowed Plaintiff and other employees to leave thirty minutes before the end of their scheduled work shift. (Id. at ¶ 15.) Plaintiff was also regularly denied rest periods. (Id. at ¶ 16.)

In October and December 2022, Plaintiff reported to human resources that thousands of dollars were being stolen from the Store by employees and management, and in June 2023, Plaintiff reported that management was not tracking employee hours, was fabricating employee timecards, and was allowing time theft. (Compl., ¶ 17.)

On January 7, 2025, Mireles, who was a co-worker of Plaintiff and a supervisor at the Store, punched Plaintiff in the chest with a store scanner gun in response to Plaintiff instructing Mireles that there was a mandatory safety training session that Mireles had to attend. (Compl., ¶¶ 4 & 18.) Plaintiff reported the attack to his manager and human resources, and made a police report. (Id. at ¶ 18.) Less than a month later, Plaintiff was told by management that he was suspended and being investigated for taking time off. (Id. at ¶ 19.)

While on suspension and as part of his investigation, Plaintiff reiterated to human resources the illegal occurrences Plaintiff had reported. (Compl., ¶ 20.) Within one day of this complaint to human resources, Smart & Final terminated Plaintiff’s employment. (Id. at ¶ 21.)

In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges nine causes of action: (1) battery (against Smart & Final and Mireles); (2) unlawful denial of minimum wage (against Smart & Final only); (3) unlawful denial of overtime compensation (against Smart & Final only); (4) unlawful denial of meal and rest periods (against Smart & Final only); (5) waiting time penalties (against Smart & Final only); (6) failure to issue accurate and itemized wage statements (against Smart & Final only); (7) retaliation (against Smart & Final only); (8) wrongful termination (against Smart & Final only); and (9) unfair business practices (against Smart & Final only).

On May 21, 2025, Smart & Final filed a motion for an order compelling arbitration of and staying the action on the ground that a valid written arbitration agreement exists between the parties.

The motion is supported by a declaration of Maria Garcia (Garcia), who states that she is currently employed by Chedraui USA Inc., (Chedraui), the parent company of Smart & Final, as the Vice President of Human Resources, and that Garcia has worked in this capacity at all times relevant to the present action. (Garcia Decl., ¶ 1.) Garcia asserts that, based on her position and knowledge of Chedraui and Smart & Final’s operations, Garcia understands that Smart & Final operates supermarkets throughout the United States. (Id. at ¶ 4.)

Garcia further states that, in the ordinary course of business, Chedraui maintains personnel records for Smart & Final’s current and former employees, and that Garcia has personal knowledge of the content of Plaintiff’s personnel records. (Garcia Decl., ¶ 2.) According to Garcia, Plaintiff’s personnel records include a copy of a document titled “Mutual Arbitration Agreement” (the Arbitration Agreement) between Plaintiff and Smart & Final which Plaintiff electronically signed on November 14, 2015. (Id. at ¶ 3.) A copy of the Arbitration Agreement described in the Garcia declaration is attached to that declaration as exhibit A. (Ibid. & Exh. A.)

The motion is opposed by Plaintiff. In support of that opposition, Plaintiff submits a declaration stating that, since his termination from Smart & Final on February 8, 2025, he has been unable to find new employment, and that Plaintiff’s sole and limited source of income consists of state unemployment insurance benefits. (Cruz Decl., ¶¶ 3-5.) Plaintiff further states that he is eligible to receive these benefits for six months, and that the benefits pay, on an annual basis, an amount which is below the federal poverty level for a single household. (Id. at ¶ 5.) Cruz further states that, though he lives with other family members who earn income, the collective income of Plaintiff’s household is also below the federal poverty level for similar households. (Id. at ¶ 6.)

Plaintiff also submits a declaration of his counsel, Julian B. Alwill (Alwill), in support of the opposition to the motion. Alwill states that on May 23, 2025, Alwill spoke with Defendants’ counsel regarding a request by Plaintiff that Defendants pay Court reporter and deposition expenses pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1282.5, based on Plaintiff’s status as an indigent consumer. (Alwill Decl., ¶ 3.) Alwill advised Defendants’ counsel that that Plaintiff would not oppose the present motion if Defendants would agree that section 1282.5 applied to the arbitration. (Ibid.) Alwill also offered to provide an order entered in a case filed with the Superior Court of Kern County in which a similar issue was adjudicated in Alwill’s client’s favor. (Ibid.)

Alwill further states that Defendants’ counsel indicated that Defendants would consider Plaintiff’s position but were unlikely to agree to pay for unlimited depositions by Plaintiff. (Alwill Decl., ¶ 4 & Exh. A.) In response, Alwill offered to discuss deposition limitations with the arbitrator and noted that Defendants could seek a protective order if they felt Plaintiff was acting in bad faith when noticing depositions. (Ibid.)

Alwill asserts that, over the next month, he contacted defense counsel on several occasions seeking additional information as to Defendants’ position and decision in regard to the matters described above. (Alwill Decl., ¶ 5 & Exh. B.) On July 7, 2025, Defendants stated that they would not agree to pay costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 1282.5. (Ibid.)

Analysis

“ ‘Arbitration is ... a matter of contract.’ [Citation.] ‘The policy favoring arbitration cannot displace the necessity for a voluntary agreement to arbitrate. Although the law favors contracts for arbitration of disputes between parties, there is no policy compelling persons to accept arbitration of controversies which they have not agreed to arbitrate. Absent a clear agreement to submit disputes to arbitration, Courts will not infer that the right to a jury trial has been waived.’ [Citations]” (Remedial Construction Services, LP v. AECOM, Inc. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 658, 663, original italics.)

“Under both federal and state law, the threshold question presented by a petition to compel arbitration is whether there is an agreement to arbitrate.” (Cheng-Canindin v. Renaissance Hotel Associates (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 676, 683.) “[C]ourts must first apply state law principles in determining whether the parties entered into an agreement to arbitrate.” (Garcia v. Stoneledge Furniture LLC (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 41, 51.) “Because the existence of the agreement is a statutory prerequisite to granting the petition, the petitioner bears the burden of proving its existence by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 409-410, 413 (Rosenthal).)

“The arbitration proponent must first recite verbatim, or provide a copy of, the alleged agreement. [Citations.] A movant can bear this initial burden ‘by attaching a copy of the arbitration agreement purportedly bearing the opposing party’s signature.’ [Citation.] At this step, a movant need not ‘follow the normal procedures of document authentication’ and need only ‘allege the existence of an agreement and support the allegation as provided in [California Rules of Court,] rule [3.1330].’ [Citation.]” (Iyere v. Wise Auto Group (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 747, 755, original italics.)

The Arbitration Agreement attached to the Garcia declaration was ostensibly signed by Plaintiff on November 14, 2015, and consists of two pages in which the Arbitration Agreement’s substantive or material provisions are set forth in seven separate paragraphs. (Garcia Decl., Exh. A.)

The Arbitration Agreement includes the following provisions which are set forth in the first three paragraphs appearing on the first page of that document:

“The purpose of this Mutual Arbitration Agreement (‘Agreement’) is to allow for the speedy, cost-effective resolution of any disputes arising out of your employment between you and Smart & Final (and/or any of its directors, executives, employees, associates, members, shareholders, and partners) via private arbitration. Unlike a Court proceeding, a private arbitration is often quicker and less expensive. The same claims that could have been brought in a Court of law and determined by a judge or jury will, under this Agreement, be resolved by a neutral arbitrator chosen by the parties. In other words, while the place and manner in which claims may be decided has changed, your right to have your claims decided by an independent third party remains unchanged.

“Therefore, in order to fairly and quickly resolve any disputes which may arise in the context of your employment relationship, and as a condition of your employment and continued employment with Smart & Final (the ‘Company’), you (‘Associate’) and the Company agree as follows:

“The Company and Associate (collectively, the ‘Parties’) agree that a final and binding arbitration held before a single, neutral arbitrator shall be the exclusive remedy for all covered claims between them. A ‘covered claim’ is any claim (except a claim that by law is non-arbitrable) arising out of, related to, or in any way connected with Associate’s employment with the Company, including but not limited to, one for breach of contract, for any provision of the California Labor Code or a Wage Order, for unpaid expenses, or wages, for unpaid compensation or penalties for missed meal or rest breaks, for wrongful termination, for unfair competition, and for discrimination, harassment, or unlawful retaliation. As to any covered claim, each Party waives the right to jury trial and to bench trial, and also waives the right to bring, maintain, participate in, or receive money from, any class, collective, private attorney general or representative proceeding, whether in arbitration or otherwise.” (Garcia Decl., Exh. A at p. 4.)

Based on the matters and claims alleged in the complaint and the express, unambiguous terms of the Arbitration Agreement set forth above, Smart & Final has sufficiently alleged the existence of an agreement to arbitrate the present dispute by providing a copy of the Arbitration Agreement which appears to be signed by Plaintiff, and by reciting its relevant provisions including those that provide for arbitration of the claims alleged by Plaintiff in the complaint.

For all reasons discussed above, Smart & Final has met its initial prima facie burden to produce evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the present controversy. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330; see also Bannister v. Marinidence Opco, LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 541, 543-544 [“[t]he party seeking arbitration can meet its initial burden by attaching to the petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the respondent’s signature”]; Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 219 [moving party may allege the existence of the agreement by reciting its terms in the motion].)

Smart & Final further contends that the Arbitration Agreement expressly provides that the Federal Arbitration Act (the FAA), codified as 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., governs its enforcement. The parties to an agreement to arbitrate “may ... voluntarily elect to have the FAA govern enforcement of the Agreement....” (Victrola 89, LLC v. Jaman Properties 8 LLC (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 337, 355.) Further, “if a contract involves interstate commerce, the FAA’s substantive provision [citation] applies to the arbitration. But the FAA’s procedural provisions [citation] do not apply unless the contract contains a choice-of-law clause expressly incorporating them.” (Valencia v. Smyth (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 153, 173-174, original italics (Valencia).)

The Arbitration Agreement includes a provision  stating that it “is governed by and enforceable under the [FAA].” (Garcia Decl., Exh. A at p. 5.) For all reasons noted above, the present record is sufficient to show that the parties expressly agreed that the procedural provisions of the FAA would govern the Arbitration Agreement. (Valencia, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at pp. 173-174.)

The FAA also “provides for the enforcement of arbitration provisions in any contract evidencing a transaction involving interstate commerce.” (Mount Diablo Medical Center v. Health Net of California, Inc. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 711, 717.) The terms “involving commerce” are “the functional equivalent of “affecting[]” commerce. (Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson (1995) 513 U.S. 265, 273-274 [115 S.Ct. 834, 130 L.Ed.2d 753] (Allied-Bruce).) “[T]he United States Supreme Court has identified ‘three categories of activity that Congress may regulate under the commerce power: (1) the channels of interstate commerce, (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce and persons or things in interstate commerce, and (3) those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.’ [Citation.]” (Carbajal v. CWPSC, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 227, 238.) “The party asserting FAA preemption bears the burden to present evidence establishing a contract with the arbitration provision affects one of these three categories of activity, and failure to do so renders the FAA inapplicable.” (Ibid.)

Further, “the pertinent question is whether the contract evidences a transaction involving interstate commerce, not whether the dispute arises from the particular part of the transaction involving interstate commerce.” (Shepard v. Edward Mackay Enterprises, Inc. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1092, 1101; see also Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc. (2003) 539 U.S. 52, 56-57 [123 S.Ct. 2037, 156 L.Ed.2d 46] [in individual cases, the economic activity at issue and in the aggregate must reflect a “general practice” which “bears on interstate commerce in a substantial way”].) The FAA applies if the employee, while performing his or her employment duties, “was “working ‘in’ commerce, was producing goods for commerce, or was engaging in activity that affected commerce....” (Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America (1956) 350 U.S. 198, 200-201 [76 S.Ct. 273, 100 L.Ed. 199].)

The evidence and information presented by Smart & Final and further detailed above is sufficient to show that Smart & Final operates supermarkets in states outside of California and conducts its business with out of state customers. (Garcia Decl., ¶ 4.) Noted above, Plaintiff also alleges in the complaint that Smart & Final has stores throughout Arizona and Nevada, and in the declaration submitted in opposition to the present motion, Plaintiff expressly asserts that Smart & Final is a national chain. (Compl., ¶ 10; Cruz Decl., ¶ 3.) For these and all reasons further discussed above, the present record is also sufficient to show that the business of Smart & Final involves or affects interstate commerce.

Based on the undisputed multistate business activities of Smart & Final, the present record is also sufficient to show that the aggregate economic activity of Smart & Final demonstrates a general practice that bears on interstate commerce. Based on Plaintiff’s responsibilities while employed by Smart & Final, as alleged in the complaint and described in Plaintiff’s declaration further discussed above, the record is also sufficient to show that Plaintiff engaged in activity which affected or involved interstate commerce during Plaintiff’s employment with Smart & Final.

For all reasons discussed above, Smart & Final has made a sufficient showing that the employment activity at issue in this action substantially affected interstate commerce such that the Arbitration Agreement is subject to the FAA. (Valencia, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 174.)

As Smart & Final has met its initial prima facie burden to show the existence of an agreement to arbitrate the present dispute, which is governed by the FAA, Plaintiff now “bears the burden of producing evidence to challenge the authenticity of the agreement.” (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165.) To meet this burden, Plaintiff “must ‘identify a factual dispute as to the [Arbitration Agreement’s] existence’ and must present admissible evidence to support the existence of that factual dispute. [Citation.]” (Ramirez v. Golden Queen Mining Co., LLC (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 821, 832.)

Plaintiff expressly states that he “does not contest that he was required to sign an arbitration agreement as part of his employment and ... the validity of such agreement as it relates to Defendants’ ability to compel this lawsuit to be transferred to an arbitration forum.” (Opp. at p. 1, l. 26 – p. 2, l. 1.) Instead, Plaintiff contends that the “dispute before the Court that necessitates this hearing is the application of [Code of Civil Procedure section] 1282.5 in the arbitration forum.” (Id. at p. 2, ll. 2-3.)

Plaintiff advances no reasoned factual or legal argument to show why the Arbitration Agreement does not require arbitration of the claims alleged in the complaint, why the disputes giving rise to the causes of action alleged in the complaint are not encompassed within the terms of the Arbitration Agreement, why Plaintiff’s signature appearing on the last page of the Arbitration Agreement is not authentic, or why there exist grounds on which the Court should refuse to enforce the Arbitration Agreement under section 2 of the FAA or Code of Civil Procedures section 1281. For these reasons, Plaintiff has failed to show that the Arbitration Agreement is not valid or enforceable. (See Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 93, 99 (Armendariz) [“our inquiry into the enforceability of the arbitration agreement at issue in this case entails the same inquiry under the [California Arbitration Act] as the FAA: Are there reasons, based on general contract law principles, for refusing to enforce the present arbitration agreement?”].)
 

In addition, the grounds for Plaintiff’s argument that the FAA does not apply under the circumstances present here are wholly unclear. For example, Plaintiff contends that section 1 of the FAA, which states “nothing herein contained shall apply to ... any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce”, is inapplicable to employees who are engaged in interstate commerce. (Opp. at p. 6, ll. 4.) A similar argument was addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams (2001) 532 U.S. 105 [121 S.Ct. 1302, 149 L.Ed.2d 234] (Circuit City):

“We must, of course, construe the ‘engaged in commerce’ language in the FAA with reference to the statutory context in which it is found and in a manner consistent with the FAA’s purpose. These considerations, however, further compel that the § 1 exclusion provision be afforded a narrow construction. As discussed above, the location of the phrase ‘any other class of workers engaged in ... commerce’ in a residual provision, after specific categories of workers have been enumerated, undermines any attempt to give the provision a sweeping, open-ended construction. And the fact that the provision is contained in a statute that ‘seeks broadly to overcome judicial hostility to arbitration agreements,’ [citation], which the Court concluded in Allied-Bruce counseled in favor of an expansive reading of § 2, gives no reason to abandon the precise reading of a provision that exempts contracts from the FAA’s coverage.

“In sum, the text of the FAA forecloses ... a construction which would exclude all employment contracts from the FAA. While the historical arguments respecting Congress’ understanding of its power in 1925 are not insubstantial, this fact alone does not give us basis to adopt, ‘by judicial decision rather than amendatory legislation,’ [citation], an expansive construction of the FAA’s exclusion provision that goes beyond the meaning of the words Congress used. While it is of course possible to speculate that Congress might have chosen a different jurisdictional formulation had it known that the Court would soon embrace a less restrictive reading of the Commerce Clause, the text of § 1 precludes interpreting the exclusion provision to defeat the language of § 2 as to all employment contracts. Section 1 exempts from the FAA only contracts of employment of transportation workers.” (Circuit City, supra, 532 U.S. at pp. 118-119.)

Plaintiff offers no information or evidence to show why he qualifies as a “transportation worker” under section 1 of the FAA. For these and all reasons further discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to show why any contract of employment between Plaintiff and Smart & Final is exempt under section 1 of the FAA.

Based on the points advanced by Plaintiff in his opposition to the present motion, it is the Court’s understanding that Plaintiff’s opposition is limited to a request that the Court enter an order requiring Smart & Final to pay for all Court reporter costs incurred in the arbitration proceeding under the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 1282.5, on the grounds that Plaintiff qualifies as an “indigent consumer” for purposes of that statute.

Code of Civil Procedure section 1282.5 provides that a party to an arbitration is entitled “to have a certified shorthand reporter transcribe any deposition, proceeding, or hearing.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1282.5, subd. (a)(1).) The statute further states that “[i]f an arbitration agreement does not provide for a certified shorthand reporter, the party requesting the transcript shall incur the expense of the certified shorthand reporter. However, in a consumer arbitration, a certified shorthand reporter shall be provided upon request of an indigent consumer, as defined in Section 1284.3, at the expense of the nonconsumer party.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1282.5, subd. (b).)

Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2 requires the Court, upon the filing of a “petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party to the agreement refuses to arbitrate that controversy”, to “order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists,” unless the Court determines that the matters described in subdivisions (a) through (d) have been established. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2.) “Like a constitutional provision or statute, the arbitration agreement confers subject matter jurisdiction on the trial Court to order the parties to arbitration.” (United Firefighters of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1576, 1582.)

“A proceeding to compel arbitration is in essence a suit in equity to compel specific performance of a contract.” (Freeman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1975) 14 Cal.3d 473, 479 [noting that “Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2 was drafted by the California Law Revision Commission to prescribe and limit the power of the superior Court in passing upon a petition to compel arbitration...”].) “The only question implicated by the petition to compel arbitration is whether the arbitration agreements should be specifically enforced.” (Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 412.) “[W]hile the trial Court must not decide the merits of an alleged controversy when ruling upon a petition to compel arbitration, it must nevertheless determine the threshold question of whether the petition adequately alleges facts demonstrating the existence of an arbitrable controversy.” (Graphic Arts Internat. Union v. Oakland Nat. Engraving Co. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 775, 780.)

Further, “[o]nce a Court grants the petition to compel arbitration and stays the action at law, the action at law sits in the twilight zone of abatement with the trial Court retaining merely a vestigial jurisdiction over matters submitted to arbitration. This vestigial jurisdiction over the action at law consists solely of making the determination, upon conclusion of the arbitration proceedings, of whether there was an award on the merits ... or not .... The Court also retains a separate, limited jurisdiction over the contractual arbitration which was the subject of the section 1281.2 petition[.]” (Brock v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1790, 1796; see also McRae v. Superior Court for Los Angeles County (1963) 221 Cal.App.2d 166, 170 [“ ‘judicial proceedings’ surrounding the arbitration itself are restricted by the statute to: (1) the enforcement of the agreement to arbitrate ...; and (2) the enforcement of the award made following arbitration...”].)

For all reasons discussed above, Plaintiff’s arguments relate to the conduct of the arbitration proceeding itself, and do not address the “threshold” and narrow question which the Court must presently determine regarding whether there exists a valid and enforceable agreement to arbitrate the present dispute. The existence of a dispute over the payment of Court reporter expenses that the parties anticipate will be incurred during the arbitration proceeding also does not constitute a defense to enforcement of the Arbitration Agreement. (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 98-99 [defenses to enforcement of an arbitration agreement are based on “general contract law principles”].)

In addition, any dispute between the parties regarding the payment of certified shorthand reporter expenses incurred during the arbitration proceeding is a matter for the arbitrator and not the Court to resolve. (See Knutsson v. KTLA, LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1133-1134 [the arbitrator must decide procedural issues]; Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. (2002) 537 U.S. 79, 86 [123 S.Ct. 588, 154 L.Ed.2d 491] [“parties to an arbitration contract would normally expect a forum-based decisionmaker to decide forum-specific” procedural matters].)  

For all reasons discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to identify a factual dispute as to the existence or validity of the Arbitration Agreement or to produce evidence challenging its authenticity or the authenticity of Plaintiff’s signature on that document. Plaintiff has also failed to show why the Arbitration Agreement does not apply to the claims alleged in the complaint or is not enforceable. Therefore, and considering the totality of the evidence and information offered by the parties, Smart & Final has met its burden to prove the existence of a valid and enforceable agreement to arbitrate the present dispute. Therefore, the Court will grant the motion and order this proceeding stayed pending completion of arbitration.

The Court has reviewed the proposed order submitted by Smart & Final and intends to sign it.

Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice:

Plaintiff requests that the Court take judicial notice of a Court order (the Order) entered on June 16, 2022, in an unrelated case filed in the Superior Court of Kern County as case no. BCV-22-100624 entitled Simington vs. Environmental Waste Minimization, Inc., et al. (the Simington Matter). (Pl. RJN, ¶ 1 & Exh. 1.) Plaintiff requests judicial notice of the Order to show that his counsel litigated in the Simington Matter the issue of whether Code of Civil Procedure section 1282.5 applies employment lawsuits, and to show that the Court in that matter ordered the Defendants to pay Court reporter costs. (Opp. at p. 2, ll. 11-24.)  

Even if the Court were to assume without deciding that the Order entered in the unrelated Simington Matter addresses the same issue presented by Plaintiff in this proceeding, “a written trial Court ruling has no precedential value. [Citation.]” (Santa Ana Hospital Medical Center v. Belshe (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 819, 831.) As the isolated ruling cited by Plaintiff has no precedential value, it is not citable authority. As the Court does not consider the Order, it is not relevant to the Court’s reasoning set forth herein, or its analysis of the issues presented in the motion. For these reasons, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice of the Order. (Evid. Code, § 350; Mangini v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063, overruled on other grounds in In re Tobacco Cases II (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1257, 1276.)