Clifton Sato vs Elliott William Lenard Lanam
Clifton Sato vs Elliott William Lenard Lanam
Case Number
25CV01843
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Mon, 10/27/2025 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings
Motion re Preferential Trial Setting
Tentative Ruling
Clifton Sato v. Elliot William Lenard Lanam
Case No. 25CV01843
Hearing Date: October 27, 2025
HEARING: Plaintiff Clifton Sato’s Motion for Preferential Trial Setting
ATTORNEYS: For Plaintiff Clifton Sato: Anthony C. Kastenek, Philip Alexander, Harris Personal Injury Lawyers Inc.
For Defendant Elliot William Lenard Lanam: Christopher L. Patton, Jeffrey P. Wilson, Patton Trial Group
TENTATIVE RULING:
The motion to preferentially set the trial date is denied.
Background:
This action commenced on March 26, 2025, by the filing of the complaint by plaintiff Clifton Sato against Elliott William Lenard Lanam for negligence. By way of the complaint, Sato alleges that on September 16, 2024, Lanam struck Sato with a motor vehicle, causing Sato to suffer serious injuries.
On April 29, 2025, Lanam answered the complaint with a general denial and 12 affirmative defenses.
On July 29, 2025, Sato filed the present motion for preferential trial setting pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 36, arguing that Sato is 79 years old and suffers from several progressive medical conditions.
Lanam opposes the motion.
Analysis:
“ (a) A party to a civil action who is over 70 years of age may petition the court for a preference, which the court shall grant if the court makes both of the following findings:
“(1) The party has a substantial interest in the action as a whole.
“(2) The health of the party is such that a preference is necessary to prevent prejudicing the party’s interest in the litigation.
“(b) A civil action to recover damages for wrongful death or personal injury shall be entitled to preference upon the motion of any party to the action who is under 14 years of age unless the court finds that the party does not have a substantial interest in the case as a whole. A civil action subject to subdivision (a) shall be given preference over a case subject to this subdivision.
“(c) Unless the court otherwise orders:
“(1) A party may file and serve a motion for preference supported by a declaration of the moving party that all essential parties have been served with process or have appeared.
“(2) At any time during the pendency of the action, a party who reaches 70 years of age may file and serve a motion for preference.
“(d) In its discretion, the court may also grant a motion for preference that is accompanied by clear and convincing medical documentation that concludes that one of the parties suffers from an illness or condition raising substantial medical doubt of survival of that party beyond six months, and that satisfies the court that the interests of justice will be served by granting the preference.
“(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court may in its discretion grant a motion for preference that is supported by a showing that satisfies the court that the interests of justice will be served by granting this preference.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 36, subds. (a)-(e).)
“An affidavit submitted in support of a motion for preference under subdivision (a) of Section 36 may be signed by the attorney for the party seeking preference based upon information and belief as to the medical diagnosis and prognosis of any party. The affidavit is not admissible for any purpose other than a motion for preference under subdivision (a) of Section 36.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 36.5.)
Plaintiff’s counsel declares:
“Plaintiff is currently 79 years old.” (Kastenek Decl., ¶ 5.) “It is my understanding that Plaintiff has been diagnosed with diabetes, hypertension, stage 3A kidney disease, and hypercholesterolemia.” (Id. at ¶ 6.) The declaration does not address plaintiffs’ prognosis.
Attached to the declaration are medical records, from March 2025, confirming that plaintiff suffers from some medical conditions. The medical records do not reflect that any of plaintiff’s conditions necessitate preference to prevent prejudicing his interest in the litigation. One of the chart notes, in fact, states that plaintiff “has done remarkably well . . ..”
“In a motion proceeding, the moving party usually has the burden of proving every fact essential to the relief requested.” (Corns v. Miller (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 195, 200.)
As stated above, Sato has provided no information regarding his prognosis. Plaintiffs’ motion is not supported by a showing that satisfies the court that preference is necessary to prevent prejudicing plaintiff’s interest in the litigation, or that the interests of justice will be served by granting preference. The motion will be denied.